Military Policy during the Northern Song Dynasty in Eastern Eurasia

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Introduction

The Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127) succeeded in reunifying China proper, which had suffered upheavals due to a period of disunity from the Late Tang to the time of the Five Dynasties. However, while the Northern Song Dynasty accomplished reunification, it also faced the serious issue of how to deal with a developing international situation in Eastern Eurasia.

The Northern Song Dynasty had active diplomatic relations with the regions of Liao (Qitay 契丹) to the north, Xixia (Tangut 党項) to the northwest, and Dayue (Vietnam) to the south. The Dynasty found itself pitted against three empires, with its international arena known as one within “the three tense regions 三方之急,” and the matter was treated as crucial using both diplomatic and military means [Kim 2000:14]. Ever since the Northern Song Dynasty’s foundation, it faced a considerable threat from Liao, which possessed formidable military might, perhaps because it also had to cope with Xixia, which had risen to power in the northwest, and Dayue, which had achieved independence at the end of the Five Dynasties period. Kim Sung-kyu called the Dynasty’s diplomacy a “peace negotiations system” since diplomatic relations between it and the three kingdoms revolved around peace negotiations [Kim 2000:14-15]. Aside from the neighboring kingdoms of Liao, Xixia, and Dayue, the Northern Song Dynasty also had diplomatic relations with Goryeo 高麗, Japan, West Uighur 西ウイグル, Qing-tang Tibet 青唐吐蕃, Champa 占城, Zhen-la 真臘 and other countries. The Dynasty also hoped that these six countries would hold Liao, Xixia, and Dayue in check. Needless to say, the international situation surrounding the Northern Song Dynasty had a considerable impact on its domestic and diplomatic policies.

In historical science today, it is increasingly fashionable to investigate “world history” and to look beyond the histories of single countries and bilateral relationships. Accordingly, there is an increasing tendency among historians to view the Song Dynasty, which covers the period from the 10th century to the 13th century, as a groundbreaking epoch in world history, as an example of its international influence.

Seo Tatsuhiko, for example, suggests a “new chronological division” of the Eurasian-scale world history based on criteria such as transition in the volume of exchanges between groups of people in world regions, information flow, and environmental changes. Seo has characterized the period from the 4th/5th century to the 15th/16th century as the “formation period of Eurasian history” [Seo 1999; 2001; 2007]. In this period, he considers the 9th to 13th century in particular to have brought major changes to international relations in East Asia, arguing that the various regions accelerated their individual regional integration and that the basic framework of Qing China’s spatial structure (which has remained until the present time) was formed [Seo 1999: 56-57].

Takao Moriyasu holds a similar view. Focusing on military and economic power as well as the capacity to gather and transmit information that formed its backdrop, Moriyasu suggests a chronological division of world history from a central Eurasian historical perspective. He considers the period from the 9th to the 10th century to be a period in which central Eurasian-type states formed and gained prominence, and a period of great change in “Eurasian world history” [Moriyasu 2007: 84-86, 307-308].

The international order that had until then existed in Eastern Eurasia would be considerably shaken up by the decline and diminution of the Tang Dynasty’s global empire following the An Lushan Rebellion (安史の乱) in the late 8th century, and also by the successive disintegration of the Uighur and Tibetan kingdoms in the mid 9th century. The result was multipolarization, where multiple states existed alongside each other. This
became an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in Eastern Eurasia from the 10th to 13th centuries. Takashi Furumatsu has labelled this international situation the “Chan-yuan system,” arguing that it came about as a result of the 1004 Chan-yuan Treaty between Liao and the Northern Song Dynasty in conjunction with the realities of Liao-Northern Song relations, which were governed by the treaty, and would subsequently have a huge impact on both Northern Song-Xixia relations and Jin-Southern Song relations [Furumatsu 2007; 2010; 2011]. Eisuke Mori calls this international situation “Pax Khitaica” since Liao made deliberative efforts to coordinate relations between states and because international equilibrium was maintained as a result of its efforts [Mori 2008]. These historical researchers explore a state of international order that goes beyond simple bilateral relations.2

It has additionally been proposed that the multipolarized international situation can be better understood if the synergy and linkage between the states is considered beyond the traditional “East Asia” framework that focuses only on the three states of China, Korea, and Japan. Rather, it has been suggested that a frame consider a broader “Eastern Eurasia” framework that includes northern Asia, continental Asia, South East Asia, and maritime Asia. For example, Shinji Yamauchi has created an Eastern Eurasia framework that encompasses East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea), Northeastern Asia, Northern Asia, Central Asia, and South East Asia [Yamauchi 2011: 45]. It is argued that such a perspective is not only useful for researching the period from the 10th to the 13th centuries, but is also useful for the periods before and after the Tang Dynasty and the Ming and Qing Dynasties.3

Considering these trends, it seems necessary to look at the Song Dynasty as a distinctive epoch in world history based on a broader perspective transcending the framework of Chinese history. Historians of Song China have pointed out the necessity of examining the Song Dynasty from an Eastern Eurasian perspective by taking into consideration its relations with neighboring powers.4 As for the Tang-Song Transition Thesis, which to this day commands a strong influence in studies on Song China, some historians say it is necessary to consider the way in which it can be understood in conformity with the history of exchanges with each region.5

To examine how the Northern Song Dynasty is positioned in the context of the contemporary international situation of Eastern Eurasia, this thesis will focus on the jiang-bing system. A hierarchy of officers and men in the Northern Song Dynasty, it saw the organization and mobilization of multiple regiments. This system is important because, as has already been mentioned, the region was perpetually set militarily against Liao, Xixia, and Dauye. Since in the context of the Northern Song Dynasty foreign relations were considered of the utmost importance militarily, there was a need to garrison large numbers of armed forces on the front line to

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1 Some have argued that Jin-Southern Song relations were not purely an emulation of Liao-Northern Song relations. Shinobu Iguro refers to the international order that revolved around Jin-Southern Song relations as “the second Chan-yuan system” [Iguro 2010].
2 Furumatsu (2011) has given a detailed summary of the international order of the 10th to the 13th century as well as trends in the relevant research.
3 Similar frameworks have been presented by Hirose (2010), Iwami (2009), Ueda (2005; 2006) and other historians.
4 Iiyama et al. suggested the following in 2009: “We need a framework that challenges the deeply rooted framework of ‘China and its periphery’ itself by dissecting 10th to 13th century Eastern Eurasia beyond Song, and by reviewing the historical aspects of states and societies in the areas controlled by the Song Dynasty with an eye on the interactions between other political powers and the areas they ruled” [2-3].
5 Atsushi Aoki argues that “the Tang-Song Transition Thesis is often understood as the formation process of a singular culture and a singular state. It has never been understood from a perspective that focuses on the history of exchanges” and that “we must reconsider how the Song Dynasty, which supposedly accomplished the transition from Tang, should be placed in the context of Eastern Eurasia” [Aoki 2010: 338].
prepare against possible attack. Military expenditure is said to have accounted for as much as 80% of the Song Dynasty’s state budget [Wang 1995: 395, 772], and a “war-time fiscal policy” was in place throughout the period [Sogabe 1941: 3]. If such conditions are taken into consideration, the international situation must have had a tremendous impact on the Northern Song Dynasty’s policies. Its military policy in particular would have been inseparable from changes in the international situation.

Studies on the Northern Song Dynasty’s military policy and military administration have so far tended to focus on the imperial army (jinjun 禁军) and to emphasize its centralized authoritarian rule. This thesis attempts to understand the Dynasty’s military policy, and construction and transition of its regional military administration particularly in the Shan-xi region. Pitted against the Xixia, changes in the military situation in that region will be considered here as aspects of foreign policy and foreign relations. The Shan-xi region poses the most interesting example, because it saw frequent cycles of war and peace after the 1004 Chan-Yuan Treaty, particularly after the accession of Li Yuan-hao 李元昊 (Emperor Jingzong 景宗) and the foundation of Xixia, which resulted in as many as six treaties being signed between the Northern Song Dynasty and Xixia. Moreover, the Song Dynasty was increasingly under pressure to deal with the Xixia threat in the area both militarily and diplomatically [Kim 2000: 14-17].

During the reign of the Emperor Shenzong 神宗 (1068-1084), a diverse range of reforms was enacted, but at the same time the Dynasty’s foreign situation was growing increasingly tense. The period can therefore be considered an epochal reign in the history of the Northern Song Dynasty. It was during this period that the jiang-bing 將兵 system was implemented, which saw the organization and garrisoning of multiple regiments (jiang 將) commanded by jiang-guan 將官, which were compelled to undertake military training. The jiang-bing system is said to have started with the formation of 37 jiang regiments in the He-bei 河北 region in the ninth month of the seventh year of Xi-ning 熙寧 (1074). The system expanded throughout the country including to the Shan-xi 陝西 region and the Southeast circuits. The establishment and proliferation of the jiang-bing system is said to be closely linked to the bao-jia 保甲 system [Yoza 2009a], and that the maintenance of a centralized administration was the key aim [Yoza 2009b: 50]. Others hold that the bao-jia system was a part of the “New Laws 新法” promulgated by Wang An-shi 王安石.

The jiang-bing system, however, seems to be traced back as far as the “jiang,” which were formed in the Shan-xi region during the Song-Xia War in the reign of the Emperor Renzong 仁宗 [Luo 1957: 243; Wang 1983: 95-96]. The jiang regiments were proven to have existed in various places throughout the Shan-xi region before the seventh year of Xi-ning [Wang 1983: 96]. However, much still remains unknown. For example, the intention behind the organizing of the jiang regiments and the context in which it took place remains unclear. It is also unclear as to how the organizing of the jiang regiments related to the establishment of the jiang-bing system. While the jiang-bing system itself was apparently established all over the country, the period of establishment varied from region to region. For this reason, there is a need to examine the background to and the process of the implementation of the jiang-bing system.

6 For example, Hiromitsu Koiwai states that “an examination of the military system of the Song Dynasty will be indispensable for achieving an understanding of centralized administrative frameworks now and in the future” [Koiwai 1998: 9].
8 For more information about the time period in which the jiang-bing system was established in each region, please refer to Wang 1983: 97-98 and Li 1992. Regarding the Shan-xi region, please refer to Kim 2000: 230-234 and Yoza 2010: 31-33. However, note that these works contain some errors as is pointed out in this thesis.
1. Prototype of the Jiang-bing System

This chapter examines the organizing of jiang regiments carried out in the Shan-xi region during the Song-Xia War in the reign of Renzong. During this period the jiang regiments were organized by Fan Zhong-yan, one of the officials in charge of coming up with measures to tackle the threat of Xixia. According to existing research, the jiang became the prototype for the jiang-bing system [Luo 1957: 243], but the details of the jiang regiments and the purpose behind their creation have never been examined in depth.

1.1. Fan Zhong-yan’s Jiang Regiments

The Song-Xia War broke out suddenly in the first year of Bao-yuan (1038). The Northern Song forces suffered major defeat in the early stage of the war and allowed Xixia forces to penetrate as far as Yanzhou where they surrounded the castle of Yanzhou. After the war ended, an attempt was made to reorganize the Dynasty’s military administration. In the first year of Gang-ding (1040), Han Qi and Fan Zhong-yan were dispatched to the Shan-xi region to oversee this task. Fan Zhong-yan in particular was praised for having played the key role in the prevention of a Xixia invasion, and one of his measures was to organize jiang regiments.

In the eighth month of the first year of Gang-ding, Fan Zhong-yan departed for Yanzhou to take up his post as the Military Commissioner of Shan-xi region and the Prefect of Yanzhou (Shan-xi jinglue anfu shi and Zhi Yanzhou 陝西經略安撫副使兼知延州). This gave him jurisdiction over the Fuyan 延遠 circuit, which was centered on Yanzhou. Fan Zhong-yan organized jiang regiments as follows: He divided the armed forces of Yanzhou into six jiang regiments, each consisting of 3,000 soldiers, and he put each jiang regiment under the Military Director in chief (Dou-jian 都監) [Wang 1983: 96; Chikusa 1995: 156; Watanabe 1997: 74-75]. The armed forces were thus organized to ensure that the soldiers would be fully trained as well as to tighten the bond between soldiers and their commanding officers [Wang 1983: 95-96], however the significance of the organizing of jiang regiments went beyond this.

In order to reorganize the military administration, the first thing Fan Zhong-yan did after arriving in the Shan-xi region was to identify existing problems with the military administration. Organizing jiang regiments was a solution identified to resolve a number of problems recorded. The problems that Fan Zhong-yan identified can be summarized as 1) Inadequate training resulting from the absence of responsible officers; 2) Confusion over the chain of command resulting from a lack of clear differentiation in the authority and responsibilities of commanding officers such as Administrator (Bu-shu 部署) and Military Administrator (Qian-xia 鈐轄) and; 3) Ineffective tactics (for example, launching sorties without considering enemy numbers). The first part of Quesao bian describes how the jiang regiments were organized and administered in order to address and resolve these problems.

Regarding training, the soldiers were organized into units, each of which was under the watch of officers and instructors to ensure thorough structures. One jiang regiment consisting of 3,000 men was divided among twelve commanders, and the standard training unit would be formed around the respective commander. Each commander would then select 25 men who excelled in martial arts and make them training instructors. Each of the twelve commanders oversaw around 250 men, and the instructors they selected could also train about ten men, suggesting that there was adequate oversight.

Tactics were also overhauled. In the event that the a Xixia forces invaded in small numbers, the

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9 For more on the fighting between the Northern Song and Xixia forces and the Xixia forces’ siege of Yanzhou, please refer to Li 1998: 169-171.

10 For more on the background of this reorganization, please refer to Chikusa 1995: 150-155 and Watanabe 1999: 78-79.

11 Quesao bian 却掃編: 1; Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 續資治通鑑長編: 128.

dou-jian were prepared to lead a single jiang to meet them in battle, but in if large numbers of enemy troops were present, multiple jiang were trained to attack. This tactic ensured that the size of the enemy force would be properly considered before any sortie was launched. Chain of command was also modified. It was decided that in the case of attacks involving multiple jiang, a bu-shu or qian-xia of a higher rank than dou-jian would be dispatched as commander so as to avoid unnecessary discord between dou-jian of a similar rank as well as to clarify hierarchies.

Through organizing and mobilizing jiang regiments Fan Zhong-yans intended not only to enforce change through training, but also to address and resolve the problems relating to attack methods and chain of command that had so hampered the army. In addition, while a jiang was a unit for the purpose of training, it was at the same time a unit formed to repel enemy attacks. Fan Zhong-yans strategy against Xixia was focused on defense, and organizing jiang regiments formed a core part of this defense strategy.

Fan Zhong-yans colleague Zhang Kang 張亢 heavily influenced his strategic vision. As Fuyan circuits qian-xia, Zhang Kang was under the Fan Zhong-yans at the time of the reforms and can be shown to have influenced the changes. Zhang Kang presented a report on the problems of the military administration and proposed various measures to address and resolve them. There is much in this report that matches Fan Zhong-yans strategic vision. Moreover, Fan Zhong-yans stated himself that Recently, I carried out training by dividing the mounted forces of Yanzhou and organizing them into six jiang regiments. Such an undertaking is based on a method pioneered in Prefect of Fuzhou (Zhi Fuzhou 知潁州). At the time, Zhang Kang also held the post in Zhi Fuzhou, suggesting that he may have been the one who initiated the organization of the jiang regiments.

Fan Zhong-yans jiang regiment-style was adopted in every circuit of the Shan-xi region. We can be certain of this because it is written in the Quesao bian that the same method was subsequently adopted in every circuit. It is also written in the Xu zizhi tongjian changbian that shortly thereafter, every circuit emulated the method. It is also possible to find in the policy of Han Qi and details related to the organizing of jiang regiments [Zeng 2006: 57].

In terms of the backdrop to the proliferation of jiang regiments throughout the Shan-xi region, it is likely that the problems of military administration were commonly known and that jiang regiments were expected to be a central pillar of a new military administration that would address and resolve them. In other words, in the context of the pressing need to prepare a military administration and defense strategy to counter the attacks by Xixia forces, Fan Zhong-yans organization of jiang regiments can be seen as the core of the overall military strategy, including the enforcement of training.

1.2. The Jiang after the Song-Xia War

The Song-Xia War came to an end with the signing of a peace treaty in the twelfth month of the fourth year of Qing-li 慶曆 (1044). What happened to the jiang of the Shan-xi region in the years that followed? Wen Yan-bo 文彦博 presented his report on the military administration in the Shan-xi region during the reign of Huang-you 皇祐 (1049-1054). The report stated that from the early days of Qing-li until today,

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12 As part of his military strategy against Xixia, Fan Zhong-yans first prepared a defense structure, and argued that driving off attacks from Xixia forces should be prioritized. He was constantly critical of offensive raids made by the Northern Song. For example, when a plan to launch a raid into Xixia was announced in the first month of the second year of Gang-ding (1041), Fan Zhong-yans stubbornly opposed it and refused to mobilize the troops in the Fuyan circuit, which were under his jurisdiction [Chikusa 1995: 161-162].

13 For example, Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 128.

14 Fan wenzhenggong wenji 范文正公文集: 11, “Shang shumi shangshu shu 上枢密尚書書.”
multiple jiang regiments have been organized in every circuit, and each jiang regiment contains two to three thousand soldiers.”¹⁵ This shows that there were jiang regiments in the Shan-xi region at the time of the report, during the reign of Huang-you. The report also stated that Zhi Yanzhou commanded the qian-xia and dou-jian to lead one mounted jiang regiment each to repel a Xixia invasion that took place during the twelve month of the first year of Zhi-ping 治平 (1064) in the reign of the Emperor Yingzong 英宗.¹⁶ This information confirms the existence of jiang regiments during the reign of the Emperor Yingzong. It can thus be said that the jiang regiments organized by Fan Zhong-yans proliferated across the entire Shan-xi region and were still in operation after the end of Song-Xi War even into the reign of the Emperor Yingzong.

2. The Jiang and the Shan-xi Region during the Reign of the Emperor Shenzong

The report that Wen Yan-bo presented in the sixth year of the reign of the Emperor Shenzong (1073) states that “in the Shan-xi region, from the years of Kang-ding onward, there were orders to carry out military training and the jiang-guan were put in charge of such training.”¹⁷ This entry reveals that jiang regiments were still in use by the sixth year of Xi-ning. A chapter of Zhiyuan cuoyao 職源撮要 of each circuit gives the following information: “The Emperor Shenzong’s attention was focused on military affairs. Accordingly, the military methods that were originally used to defend our own country against the twin threats of Xi-xia and Liao spread throughout the southeast region.” This entry suggests that the situation on the borders during the reign of the Emperor Shenzong was a factor in the establishment of the jiang-bing system. During this reign, there were frequent clashes with Xi-xia over the Shan-xi region, so we may assume that such a situation had a major impact on the establishment of the jiang-bing system.

2. 1. Attacks by Xixia Forces and the “Seven Jiang Regiments”

In the first month of the fourth year of Zhiping (1067) immediately after the accession of the Emperor Shenzong, the forces of Northern Song seized Suizhou 綏州 from Xixia. The Northern Song Dynasty was initially planning to return Suizhou to Xixia, but the negotiations ultimately broke down, prompting Xixia to invade with a large army.

In the fourth month of the third year of Xi-ning (1070), the forces of Xixia invaded Northern Song territory. The Northern Song Dynasty responded to the attack by appointing Han Jiang 韓絳 as Shan-xi circuit pacification commissioner (xuanfu shi 宣撫使) and Lu Defang 呂大防 as Administrative assistant of pacification commissioner (xuanfu panguan 宣撫判官).¹⁹ Once both men arrived in the Shan-xi region, they gathered together a rag-tag group of brigands and runaways, and organized them into special regiments with the aim of launching surprise attacks. They also recruited soldiers from Fan and Han to make a total of seven regiments. They then placed a general in charge of each of these regiments. The names of these seven generals were Chong Gu 种古, Chong Zhen 种診, Ren Huaizheng 任懐政, Jing Sili 景思立, Chong E 种諤, Zhou Yongqing 周永清, and Xiang Bao 向寶. All of these regiments were composed of soldiers from across the Shan-xi region and it is likely that each one would have taken on the forces of Xixia in battle.

The intention behind the creation of these regiments was as a “containment tactic.” As Lu Defang

¹⁵ Lugong wenji 遝公文集: 17, “Qi ling bianshuai lianjiegou yueshu zuhujiang 乞令邊帥練兵約束諸將.”
¹⁶ Taiping zhiji tonglei 太平治迹統類: 11, “Zhi-ping Xixia raobian 治平西夏擾邊.”
¹⁷ Lugong wenji: 22, “Qi ling zhulu shuaichen yu fuzongguan tongyi bianshi 乞令諸路帥臣與副総管同議辺事.”
¹⁸ Suizhou refers to a region located in the southern foothills of the Hengshan mountain 橫山 range; it was from ancient times a strategic point in the route that ran north and south through the mountains. As such, it was of utmost strategic importance to both the Northern Song Dynasty and Xixia.
¹⁹ Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 蜀志緯綱纂: 215.
stated, “I have dispatched seven mounted jiang regiments to undertake containment tactics.” This entry indicates that the seven regiments were “jiang” regiments. Under the “containment tactics,” if the Xixia forces were not fully gathered, the “seven jiang regiments” would all be sent on surprise attack missions, and if Xixia tried to launch a major and focused attack, then other military units would be mobilized to counter the attack. It appears that such tactics were actually implemented and that they reaped considerable military gains.

Thus, Han Jiang formed the “seven jiang regiments” to conduct “containment tactics” against Xixia incursions.

Following the initiation of peace negotiations between the two sides in the ninth month of the fourth year of Xi-ning (1071) the relationship between the Northern Song Dynasty and Xixia became more stable, and the military tension in the Shan-xi region gradually eased.

In the midst of this situation, an imperial edict that outlined the “the strategy of defending against nomads (fangqiu ce 防秋策)” strategy was issued in the seventh month of the fourth year of Xi-ning to the four circuits of Shan-xi region (Jingyuan 涘原 circuit, Huanqing 環慶 circuit, Qinfeng 契鳳 circuit, and the Fuyan circuit). The “fangqiu ce” strategy plotted the routes by which Xixia might invade and contained detailed instructions on how each circuit needed to respond. According to Masanori Hatachi’s detailed study, the defense plan outlined in the strategy and incorporated a diverse range of military tactics including frontal attacks, hit-and-run attacks, siege resistance, encirclement resistance, intercepting enemy retreat, and reinforcement. Hatachi mentions that of these, siege resistance and intercepting enemy retreat (both involving reinforcement) brought considerable results [Hatachi 2009: 40-43]. These military tactics had the same purpose as “containment tactics.”

What is particularly notable about the “fangqiu ce” is the presence of the “Fourth Jiang Regiment of the Zhenrong Jun 鎮戎軍第四將.” The Zhenrong Jun was one of the key strategic locations in the Jingyuan circuit. The mounted forces of the “fourth jiang regiment” garrisoned there would likely have played a fundamental role in the defense of the area. A mounted jiang regiment was also garrisoned in Weizhou 渭州. For other circuits too, the policy outlined expected invasion routes, the key locations where defenses should be concentrated, and instructed where sizable deployments of troops should be made. We can easily infer from the term “Fourth Jiang of the Zhenrong Jun” that multiple jiang were present and that they played a crucial role in the defense of each circuit. Thus, the defense policy against Xixia that was based on the “fangqiu ce” strategy involved the implementation of “containment tactics” by mounted jiang regiments that were deployed to key strategic locations in each circuit. These jiang regiments were the successors of the “seven jiang regiments.”

Later on, in the fifth month of the fifth year of Xi-ning (1072), an edict was issued ordering that the training method devised by Cai Ting 蔡挺, the Jingyuan circuit’s administrative commander, be proliferated across all other circuits. This training method instructed that there be “around seven jiang regiments in the Jingxuan circuit” as well as “a jiang regiment in Jingzhou, and another in Yizhou for logistical support.” We can therefore confirm that a total of nine jiang were operating. There is the view that these nine jiang regiments were organized by Cai Ting at the same time that he devised his training method [Luo 1957: 244; 20, Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 215.]

21 Sanchao mingchen yanying lu 三朝名臣言行録: 10, “chengxiang kangguo han xiansugong 丞相康国韓獻崇公.”
22 For a detailed description of the progress of the peace negotiations, please refer to Kim 2000: 97-126.
23 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 225.
24 For example, the areas in Huanging circuit designated as strategic locations were Yelue-zhen 業樂鎮, Rongyuan-zhai 柔遠寨, Dashun-cheng 大順城, Liyuan-bao 莉原堡, and Mubo-zhen 木波鎮. In Qinfeng circuit they were Gangu-cheng 甘谷城, Tongwei-zhai 通渭寨, and Guwei-zhai 古渭寨, and in Fuyan circuit they were Yongping-zhai 永平寨, Qingjian-cheng 青潤城, Bao’an-jun 保安軍, and Dejing-zhai 德靖寨. For more information, please refer to Yoza 2010: 24-28.
25 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 233.
Wang 1983: 96; Li 1992: 9]. However, as has already been stated, mounted jiang regiments had been deployed in various places in the Shan-xi region prior to this, so a more plausible view is that the training method was devised for the jiang regiments that had been already organized.

So what was the backdrop to the proliferation of this training method for each circuit? Peace negotiations with Xixia were underway, so it would have been a time of stability. Attention at this point should be drawn to the Xihe Campaign 熙河経略, which was said to have achieved the greatest military gains of the Song Dynasty. Intent on claiming possession of the He-huang 河湟 region, which was ruled at the time by the Tibetan regime of Qing-tang Tibet, the Song Dynasty initiated a full-scale military offensive in the fifth month of the fifth year of Xi-ning. The forces of the Jingyuan circuit saw much action in the course of the campaign. Thus, the training method that was devised by Cai Ting and then proliferated widely would have been for the purpose of preparing for the full-scale military offensive.

2. 2. The Xihe Campaign and the Jiang

The Xihe Campaign had its origin in the “a strategy to subjugate the Xixia (Pingrong ce 平戎策), which was presented by Wang Shao shortly after the accession of the Emperor Shenzong. As part of his presentation, Wang Shao 王韶 argued that the Song Dynasty should seize control of the Huang He region, which at the time was under the control of the Tibetan regime of Qing-tang Tibet. Qing-tang Tibet had been a key part of the Northern Song’s strategy against Xixia, and it stood against the power of Xixia alongside Northern Song. After the death of the mighty Gusiluo 嘎斯囉, however, it had become divided and weakened by power struggles among various clans. This meant that the Northern Song Dynasty could no longer rely on Qing-tang Tibet for support. In fact, there was now even a danger that Xixia would take advantage of Qing-tang Tibet’s weakened state and expand its sphere of control. The Huang He region was strategically important, being located along the Hengshan mountain range, and if it fell into Xixia’s hands it would put the Northern Song Dynasty in danger. Conversely, if the Northern Song Dynasty were able to control it, tremendous pressure would be put on Xixia. Wang Shao said that the Northern Song Dynasty ought to take the initiative and take control of the He-huang region before Xixia might. The Emperor Shenzong took Wang Shao’s counsel, since he was eager to topple Xixia. The Emperor then charged Wang Shao with responsibility for overseeing the Xihe campaign by making him the Confidential copier of the office of the Military Commissioner of Qinfeng circuit (Qinfeng-lu jinluesi jiyiwenzi 秦鳳路經略司機宜文字) in the eleventh month of the first year of Xi-ning (1068).

According to Enoki Kazuo’s detailed study, the main events of the Xihe Campaign were as follows: He-huang region was divided roughly among three powers. The area encompassing Hezhou 河州, Taozhou 涇州, and Minzhou 岐州 was controlled by Muzheng 木征, the grandson of Gusiluo, the area encompassing Xiningzhou 西寧州 (Qing-tang), Hezhou, Huazhou 湮州 and Kuozhou 廬州 was controlled by Dongzhao 董鉞, the son of Gusiluo, and the routes between Guwei-zhai 古渭寨, Wushengjun 武勝軍, and Minzhou were controlled by tribal headsman Yulonhke 俞龍珂 [Enoki 1992: 298; Kim Sung-kyu 2000: 218-220]. Before shifting to military operations, Wang Shao set about recruiting the tribesmen scattered across the borderlands. Once Yulonke agreed, on the fifth month of the fifth year of Xi-ning, to take up arms for Song the whole of Wushengjun was under the Northern Song Dynasty’s sphere of control, and so the Xihe Campaign moved to a stage of full-scale military operation.

As military operations got underway, the first thing the Northern Song Dynasty did was establish Guweizhai as a base of operations by upgrading it to a Tongyuanjun. Then, on the seventh month of the fifth year of Xi-ning, the Northern Song forces attacked Wushengjun, which was under Muzheng’s control, and

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26 For more on the Pingrong Ce, please refer to Zhu 1983: 81-83 and Enoki 1992: 300-303.
captured it by the end of the month. In the following month, Wushengjun was renamed Zhentaojun 鎮洮軍. The area around Zhentaojun was cleared in order to make it a base of operations, and then it was renamed again as Xizhou 熙州. Thus, the Hixe circuit was established. However, at this stage, ruling Hixe circuit meant only having nominal rule over the region that encompassed Xizhou and its surrounding areas, so the next step was to plan an advance into Hezhou and Minzhou and to gain control there.

In the seventh year of Xi-ning, the Northern Song forces came up against fierce resistance from Qing-tang Tibet. Muzheng formed an alliance with Guizhang 鬼章, the commanding officer of Dongzhang, and captured the castle of Tabaicheng 踏白城 in an attempt to take back Hezhou. When the Northern Song sent a regiment in response, it was overpowered by the allied forces of Muzheng 木征 and Guizhang 鬼章. This formidable alliance proceeded to surround Hezhou and advance towards Minzhou. The Northern Song forces found a way to break through their impasse, and eventually succeeded in forcing the surrender of Muzheng in the fourth month of that year. This surrender marked a turning point in the Xihe campaign, and it was at this point that Wang Shao was recalled to the capital. With these events as a backdrop, what can we learn about the jiang regiments? What role did they play as the military operations developed into a large scale?

First, when the Northern Song Dynasty made Tongyuanjun a base of operations, it adopted a system of reinforcements involving the dispatching of troops from Jingyuan circuit. This was overseen by the “sixth jiang regiment of Jingyuan” commanded by Jing Sili and Di Xi 狄喜. The “sixth jiang regiment of Jingyuan” that Jing Sili and Di Xi commanded would go on to play an important role in the offensive operations. For example, during the attack on the stronghold of Muzheng in Wushengjun, the sixth jiang regiment led by Jing Sili achieved impressive military gains. Moreover, after the Xihe circuit was established, Jing Sili was appointed Prefect of Hezhou (Zhi Hezhou 知河州) and tasked with capturing the as yet unconquered Hezhou. At the time, Muzheng was encamped in Hezhou having fled from Wusheng. Thus, the “sixth jiang regiment” led by Di Xi and Jing Sili played a crucial role in the offensive operations in their targeting of an important enemy commander.

During the Hixe Campaign, there were other jiang regiments in the Shan-xi region that also played active roles. For example, when the mounted forces under the jurisdiction of the Jingyuan circuit were transferred to the Xihe circuit following its establishment in the tenth month of the fifth year of Xi-ning, it was stated that in the event of an emergency, jiang-guan from Jingyuan were to come to the rescue with mounted forces at their command. The jiang-guan had jurisdiction over mounted jiang regiments, so it stands to reason that these jiang-guan too would have been commanding mounted jiang regiments.

The jiang were involved from the time of the Qing-tang Tibet counter-offensive onward. This can be concluded because, for example, eight “Jiang-guan shichen 將官使臣” were promoted for recapturing Tabaicheng. Liu Weiji 劉惟吉, the “Minzhou Jiang-guan 巛州將官” who succeeded in repelling Qing-tang Tibet’s attack on Minzhou, was also honored during the period. When Wang Shao sent out a request for a workforce to carry out repairs to Zannake-cheng 賛納克城, it is said that jiang-guan in each circuit were expected to supply the workforce, and that the jiang-guan were not only given jurisdiction over the imperial army, but were also given jurisdiction over the Aboriginal Troops (tubing 土兵), Frontier Tribal Army (fanbing...
It is possible to detect here an expansion in the scale of the jiang regiments and a change in the nature of the officer rank that commanded the jiang, namely the jiang-guan. Wen Yanbo argues that ever since Fan Zhong-yan organized the jiang regiments in the sixth year of Xi-ning, despite the fact that the vice-Administrator (fu-douzongguan 副都総管) never commanded any jiang regiment and despite the fact that there was a clear line drawn between the fu-douzongguan and the cengxia and doujian, by around the time in the sixth year of Xi-ning the fu-douzongguan was not treated as particularly important and ended up being appointed as a jiang-guan.

While we do not know the exact time period in which the fu-douzongguan started being appointed as the jiang-guan, it is apparent that the development took place against the backdrop of an expansion in the scale of jiang regiments, which was essentially an expansion in the jurisdiction of the jiang-guan. The “fangqiu ce” strategy stated that in the event of a Xixia invasion, the gongjianshou and fanbing forces would join up with the imperial army to repel the invasion. Thus, although the gongjianshou and fanbing forces originally operated with a different chain of command than that of the imperial army, when they were engaged in military operations together with the imperial army they too would have fallen under the jiang-guan’s jurisdiction.

Though Wen Yanbo claims that the fu-douzongguan was not treated as particularly important, it is probably more accurate to say that in order to exercise effective jurisdiction over the expanded jiang regiments, there was a need to appoint as commander the fu-douzongguan, who was superior in rank to the doujian and cengxia.

### 3. The Establishment of the Jiang-Bing System and its Expansion across the Country

#### 3.1. The Jiang-Bing System of the Shan-xi Region

There is evidence that in the Shan-xi region, jiang regiments were organized one after the other from the third month the eighth year of Xi-ning. Four regiments were organized in the Xihe circuit in the third month of the eighth year of Xi-ning, and in the same year, four jiang regiments were organized in Qinfeng circuit in the fourth month (leap month). Another four jiang regiments were organized in Huanging circuit in the fifth month, and five jiang regiments were organized in Jingxuan circuit in the seventh month. Jiang regiments were also organized in Fuyan circuit during the eighth year of Xi-ning at the latest.

Jiang regiments were organized in such quick succession in each circuit of the Shan-xi region from the eighth year of Xi-ning onward in order to be prepared for the changing situation in the wake of the Xihe Campaign. The Northern Song Dynasty forces themselves suffered great losses in the Xihe campaign and the Northern Song had to deploy its forces in the newly acquired territories. In addition, the possibility of counter-attacks from remnant Qing-Tibet forces remained a threat, as did the possibility of a Xixia invasion. We may therefore assume that the jiang regiments were organized in each circuit so as to install a military administration that could stabilize the situation in the Shan-xi region following the Xihe Campaign. The question remains, what does this military administration reveal about the Northern Song Dynasty’s stance on foreign relations?

First, the organizing of jiang regiments containing both imperial army troops and other forces such as

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34 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 250.
35 Lugong wenji 22, “qi ling zhulu shuaichen yu fuzongguan tongyi bianshi.”
36 For more on the four jiang regiments of Xihe circuit, see Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 261, for more on the four jiang regiments of Qinfeng circuit, see Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 263, for more on the four jiang regiments of Huanging circuit, see Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 264, and for more on the five jiang regiments of Jingyuan circuit, see Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 266.
37 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 272.
“gongjianshou” and “fanbing” has can be linked to the fact that the “fu-douzongguan” was appointed as commander in the circuits of Qinfeng, Huanging, and Jingxuan. The groundwork for this development had already been laid, and we can consider it a measure designed to ensure effective management of the expanded “jiang” regiments, which by that time incorporated the “gongjianshou” and “fanbing” forces under the same chain of command as the imperial army.

Next, we can understand that the generals, regiments, and other military forces deployed up until the seventh year of Xi-ning were maintained. For example, many of the names on the list of “jiang-guan” were the names of generals who had distinguished themselves in military operations in the Shan-xi region during the early years of the reign of the Emperor Shenzong. Examples of the officers in each circuit who were awarded the rank of first “jiang” commander were Wang Jun-wan, Yan Da, Lin Kuang, Miao Shou, Han Cun-bao, Yao Si, and Yao Ling. These men all took part in the recapture of Tabaicheng. Liu Wei-ji also performed meritorious service as “Minzhou jiang-guan.” In addition, the names of Chong Gu and Chong Chen appear on the list of the commanders of the “seven jiang” regiments” that were organized by Han Jiang. Chong Gu and Chong Chen both served for a long period on the frontline. It is also noteworthy that the “jiang” garrison camps in each circuit of the Shan-xi region [Li 1992] overlapped with the key strategic locations designated in the “fangqiu ce” strategy.

This suggests that the Northern Song Dynasty was intent on maintaining its fighting potential and at the same time organized better operational efficiency in preparing for further military operations. The establishment of the “jiang-bing” system in the Shan-xi region represented an across-the-board reorganization of the “jiang” regiments, which were made to play a cardinal role in the military operations that took place in the context of the foreign/military situation in the Shan-xi region, particularly on the frontline against Xixia. The “jiang-bing” system in Shan-xi region, the frontline against Xixia, should be understood as a system that developed in a unique way according to the changing situation in the region.

### 3.2. The Jiang-Bing System of the Hebei Region

As discussed in the previous chapter, the “jiang-bing” system in Shan-xi developed in tandem with the changing situation in the region since the reign of the Emperor Renzong. If this is the case, how can we understand the thirty-seven “jiang” regiments that were organized in the Hebei region in the ninth month of the seventh year of Xi-ning? These thirty-seven “jiang” regiments were organized against the backdrop of border negotiations with Liao, as is stated in the following entry: “the border in Yun Zhong was discussed with Liao, but the negotiations dragged on and on.”

These negotiations were over “Yunzhong 雲中,” and concerned the border between Yuzhou 蔚州, Yingzhou 應州, and Shouzhou 涿州 on Liao’s side, and Daizhou 代州 and Ninghuajun 寧化軍 on Northern Song side. The negotiations began following a request issued by an envoy sent from Liao in the third month of the seventh year of Xi-ning. Regarding the causes of these negotiations, historians have cited factors such as the pressure that Liao exerted against Northern Song’s frenetic military operations during the years of Xi-ning, and the fact that the Northern Song Dynasty unlawfully advanced into the forbidden zone set up between the two empires. It is also argued that the internal situation of the Liao Dynasty played a role, with problems with tribesman and political troubles most often cited. As already mentioned, the Northern Song Dynasty engaged in continuous military operations during the years of Xi-ning, and they were probably concerned that their military operations had provoked Liao. What we can infer from historical sources is that the Northern Song Dynasty intended to forestall a possible Liao southward expansion by indicating that they had no enmity towards them. At the same time, however, and considering that they would otherwise be defenseless in the

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38 For more on the negotiations over the borderlands, please refer to Li 1994, Mouri 2004, Tao 2008: 107-129, 131-139.
event that Liao did advance south, the Northern Song Dynasty prepared for such an event by organizing and training jiang regiments in regions distanced from the frontline.

As training exercises in the Hebei region were not being carried out as prescribed, bingguan was dispatched from the Shan-xi region to enforce proper training. This action indicates that the deployment of the system in the Shan-xi region preceded its establishment in the Hebei region since the former provided the latter with the know-how to fully enforce training. Training in particular focused on the method that had been used in the Shan-xi region since the Song-Xixia War during the reign of the Emperor Renzong. The Hebei region adopted the military administration of the Shan-xi region. As relations with Liao grew increasingly strained owing to the continuing deadlock in the negotiations over the borderlands, the jiang-based military administration developed in its own unique methods in the Shan-xi region, and put it to use in the Hebei region. This resulted in the establishment of the thirty-seven jiang regiments of the Hebei region.

3.3. The Jiang-Bing System of the Southeast Circuits

Jiang regiments were organized in the southeast circuits in the fourth year of Yuanfeng 元豐 (1081). They were organized against the backdrop of military clashes between Northern Song and Vietnam (Dayue). Dayue invaded Northern Song in the eleventh month of the eighth year of Xi-ning. In response, Northern Song mobilized the thirty-fifth and thirty-ninth jiang regiments of Hebei in the twelfth month of the eighth year of Xi-ning, also garrisoning the thirty-fifth in Guizhou 桂州 and the thirty-ninth in Tanzhou 潭州 to await instructions from the Guangxi 広西 commander. Northern Song then dispatched Zhao Xie 趙頴, Li Xian 李懐, and Yan Da and organized the Mobile Brigade of Annam (Annan-dao xingying 安南道行營). This expeditionary force was later joined by jiang-guan from the regions of Shan-xi, Hebei, and the Hedong 河東 circuits, where jiang regiments had already been organized. These jiang-guan were garrisoned with regiments at their command, and undertook training exercises.

The mounted forces of the Annan-dao xingying were divided into nine jiang regiments consisting of three forward groups, three central groups, and three rear groups. The areas where these troops were garrisoned in once they had moved out included Guizhou, Tanzhou (Cangsha 長沙), Jingzhou 荊州, Dingzhou 鼎州, and Lizhou 潭州. There was also a pacification commission (zhaotaosi 招討司) that kept watch to ensure there were no spies lurking among the recruits from Guangdong 広東, Jiangxi 江西, and Fujian 福建, procured shipments of supplies from Fujian, and stored supplies in Guizhou and Quanzhou 全州. These facts confirm that the war with Dayue was centered on the Annan-dao xingying, and that the military advance depended on cooperation of the southeast circuits.

During the war, the Northern Song forces that had come to resist Dayue’s invasion drove forward to the very outskirts of Hanoi. However, they were blocked by the naval forces of the enemy and were prevented from crossing the Red River 紅河. In the third month of the tenth year of Xi-ning, with no hope of victory in sight, the Northern Song forces were forced to retreat. Accordingly, the war came to an end and peace negotiations as well as frontier settlement began.

39 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 271.
40 We know that jiang regiments were also organized in the southeast circuits in the eighth year of Xi-ning because the words “Hedong diqi fujiang WangMin 河東第七副將王愍” appear in Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 272.
41 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 272.
42 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 272.
44 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 273.
45 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 273.
46 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian: 273.
Given the available information, it seems that the organizing of jiang regiments in the southeast circuits in the second month of the fourth year of Yuanfeng was conducted following the stabilization of the relationship with Dayue. However, since the Northern Song Dynasty had already been attacked once by Dayue it felt the need to leave defensive preparations in place. So, during the fighting in the years of Xi-ning and Yuanfeng, it built up a military administration involving cooperation of all the southeastern circuits. As the manifestation of this approach, there were jiang regiments organized not only in the frontline locations of Guizhou and Yongzhou, but also in Tanzhou, Quanzhou, Yongzhou, and Shaozhou, which were useful locations for organizing logistical support. Additionally, the Jinghubei circuit and Fujian circuit were set up, although it is unclear as to where the garrisons were. However, despite the vast size of the southeast circuits, only thirteen jiang regiments were organized there. This situation was in stark contrast to that of the Shan-xi region, which stood against Xixia, and the Hebei region and conducted defensive preparations against Liao. Why were there so few regiments in the southeast circuits? Given the fact that Dayue was occupied in frequent struggles with the southern kingdom of Champa, and the fact that while it did initiate military clashes with the Northern Song Dynasty, Dayue also gave tribute and was bestowed with imperial privileges in return. Moreover, it was probably the case that the Northern Song Dynasty was not altogether concerned about the threat of another Dayue invasion.

Thus, the jiang-bing system of the Shan-xi region represented an across-the-board reorganization of the military administration, which it developed independently in response to the situation of the Shan-xi region following the Song-Xia War. The thirty-seven jiang regiments of the Hebei region were modeled on the methods pioneered in the Shan-xi region, and the jiang-bing system of the southern circuits was also based on the Annan-dao xingying, which consisted of jiang-guan dispatched from the Shan-xi region. By examining the ways in which the jiang regiments were organized in each region, a glimpse of the differing stance of each region towards the respective threats that they faced can be gained. The Shan-xi region was set against Xixia, so the organization of the jiang regiments there reflected the region’s proactive approach in which it had its forces ready for offensive operations against Xixia. The Hebei region was set against Liao, so the organization of the jiang regiments there reflected the region’s passive approach in which it made efforts to avoid provoking Liao while at the same time making preparations in the event that Liao did advance to the south. The southeast circuits were set against Dayue, so the organization of the jiang regiments there reflected the region’s strategy to maintain the status quo by keeping half an eye on the possibility of another military confrontation and leaving a minimal defensive force.

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the jiang-bing system in terms of its formation process and the context in which it was established with a particular focus on how its establishment was related to the situation on the borders. The first chapter explored the jiang regiments organized by Fan Zhong-yang, which are considered the prototype of the jiang-bing system. These jiang regiments formed the core of the defensive strategy in the Song-Xia War during the reign of Renzong and continued to proliferate across the region even after the war.

47 For more on the garrisons of the jiang regiments in the southeast circuits, please refer to Li 1992: 13-14.
48 For a summary of the fighting between Dayue and Champa from the 10th to the 15th century, please refer to Momoki 1992: 161-162.
49 For more on the documents bestowing privileges to Dayue from the Northern Song Dynasty, including the titles, please refer to Katakura 1972.
50 It is argued that the trade embargo with Huangxi was eased in the eighth year of Zhenghe 政和 (1118) because there was no more trouble from Dayue following the military clashes in the reign of Shenzong [Momoki 1990: 231-232].
ended. The second chapter looked into the role played by the jiang regiments of the Shan-xi region in the war against Xixia and the Xihe Campaign, and identified that these regiments did not only form the nucleus of the defensive strategy there, but also played a key role in offensive operations. The chapter then traced the process by which jiang regiments of the Shan-xi region proliferated.

The third chapter shed light on how the jiang-bing system of the Shan-xi region represented an across-the-board reorganization of the jiang-based military administration, and how it developed as a response to the changing situation of the Shan-xi region following the end Xong-Xia War. The chapter then revealed that the jiang-bing systems of the Hebei region and the southeast circuits were established in the context of a tense international situation in the seventh year of Xi-ning and were heavily influenced by the military administration of the Shan-xi region. The chapter finally points out that the jiang-bing systems of the Shan-xi region, the Hebei region, and the southeast circuits reflected the different stances adopted by the Northern Song Dynasty towards the threats from Xixia, Liao, and Dayue.

This leads to the conclusion that the jiang-bing system of the Northern Song Dynasty was by no means a uniform, homogenous system. Rather, it was formed in the context of military policy against threats to the Shan-xi region, the Hebei region, and the southeast circuits. The Shan-xi region, in particular experienced frequent military clashes with Xixia, and became a region of military advancement in Northern Song. As such, it influenced other regions such as Hebei and the southeast circuits, which is evidenced by the jiang-bing systems established there.

As can be seen in the jiang-bing system explored in this thesis, Northern Song’s military strategy in the Shan-xi region affected and was affected, both directly and indirectly, by its relations with Liao, Xixia, and Dayue. In addition, trade with Japan was linked with the war against Xixia.\(^{51}\) The jiang-bing system of the Shan-xi region existed until the fall of the Northern Song Dynasty in the early 12th century, and once the Southern Song Dynasty was established, it was succeeded by Liu Yu’s 刘豫 Qi 齐 and Jin 金.\(^{52}\) Subsequently, there was repeated friction between the Southern Song Dynasty, Jin (and Qi) and Xixia over the Shan-xi region, because each had different designs on the region. Thus, in the context of 10th-13th century Eastern Eurasia, the Shan-xi region became a point of interconnection in which the situations of Northern Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Maritime Asia became entangled.

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\(^{51}\) For example, Shinji Yamauchi asserts that the use of sulfur for military purposes was of major significance. He has pointed out that a high-volume purchase of sulfur from Japan, which had been planned in the seventh year of Yuanfeng (1084), was carried through, and that the purpose behind this was to procure the resources for firearms that would be employed in the war against Xixia, which was raging at the time [Yamauchi 2003: 252-255; Yamauchi 2009: 27-42].

\(^{52}\) The existence of jiang regiments around the fall of the Northern Song Dynasty and the existence of the jiang in Qi have been confirmed in “The Military and Administrative Manuscripts on Northwest Frontier of the Song Dynasty (Song xibei bianjingjunzheng wenshu 宋西北边境军政文书).” The manuscripts were discovered during an expedition led by the Russian explorer Kozlov at the beginning of the 20th century. It was lying within the ruins of Xara-xoto (Heishuicheng 黑水城) in the Ejina 額濟納 oasis region. Regarding the contents of the manuscripts, research results have already been presented by Kondo 2005 and Sun 2009. As for the jiang of Jin, please refer to Wang 2004: 93-95.
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