Agency, Monopoly, and Commerce: 
The Administrators of the Junta do Tabaco in Asia and the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Global Economies, 1674 to 1774*

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This paper is about the agency of Crown appointed merchants in the administration and the commercial activities of the Portuguese Crown’s monopoly of Brazilian tobacco, its trade and exchange for Afro-Asian commodities in local, regional, and global economies over the long eighteenth century. It relies upon archival research in materials on the Crown’s tobacco monopoly. Beginning at the inception of the monopoly in 1674, it traces and analyzes these merchants and their actions and operations as agents until 1774, when the Crown eliminated their positions.

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1 The Instituto do Arquivo Nacional, Torre do Tombo (IAN/TT) in Lisbon, Portugal holds the Junta da Administração do Tabaco’s voluminous records, which include seven collections (Consultas, Decretos, Avisos, Cartas do Brasil e Índia, Papéis Findos, Vária, and Cartas e Inforne) that contain pertinent information from 1674-1853 on the general and specific structure and functioning of the Portuguese Crown’s tobacco monopoly in Portugal, Brazil, and the Estado da Índia, including China. Portions of all seven collections have been examined. The Cartas do Brasil e Índia (Letters from Brazil and India) collection, which are in 31 mapas or boxes of loose documents, were examined in their entirety are a fundamental source for the research discussed in this essay. Five additional collections at the Instituto do Arquivo Nacional, Torre do Tombo (IAN/TT) in Lisbon, Portugal were consulted: the Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia, Cartas, Mf. 2206, 2209, 2255, and 2361; and Registo de alvaráes e cartas régias: Mf. 1887; and Casa das Rainhas collection, Livros 142; Maços: 658, 659, 662, 676, 725, 732, 733, and 734; Arquivos Particulares, Casa Fronteira e Alorna collection, number 245; Salpeter report: “Salitre vindos da Índia por conta do Cabedal de S. Mag.de no descundo de vinte annos que tiverao príncipio o anno de 1690 cê o de 1710”, Lisbon, 18/viii/1711; Conselho da Fazenda collection: Consulta: Livros 349-351; and Junta do Comércio, Consultas, Decretos, Avisos, Maços 310-311, Caixos 619-621: “Listas das Entradas e Saídas do Navios do Porto de Lisboa.” They contain invaluable and important documentation concerning the tobacco monopoly and its administration and the Queen’s involvement and are equally central to the discussion of this topic.

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It is organized into five sections, which are: 1) Empire and Global Commodities: An Introduction; 2) Tobacco and Empire; 3) Monopoly and Commerce; 4) Merchants as Agents and Administrators; 4) Two cases: Cowries and Cottons; and 5) Conclusions.

**Empire and Global Commodities: An Introduction**

This topic is placed in the historiographical context of the political economy of early modern global maritime European empires in general and of the Portuguese in particular. In our workshop discussion of the broader implications of empire, it was observed that empire on land was a nearly omnipresent global form of governance in South America, Asia and Africa prior, during (in Asia and Africa) and after the emergence of global maritime European empires and the variations in their comparative degrees of success in transitioning into becoming land based empires as well in Asia and Africa over the long eighteenth century. Consequently, the general discourse on empire does not necessarily entail the triumphal rise of one or more European maritime empires and colonial experiences, especially for instance the British, Dutch and French in Asia, to the exclusion of other maritime and terrestrial imperial experiences and encounters.

One of tropes that historians have employed to avoid what has been referred to as the triumphal Eurocentric rise of maritime empires has been to examine the role of merchants and the nature of their activities to a different set of propositions and in relation to empire, state formation, institutional, communal, and economic growth and development in the early modern period. Needless to say, this examination of merchant activity and behavior has also engaged in historical discussions of the debate over the nature, timing, and emergence of globalization and the local, regional, intra-regional and international exchanges of commodities over the same space and period of time.

The present paper deals only implicitly with that debate and those issues, which on account of

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2. A comprehensive list of citations of the literature on empire in pre-colonial and during the period of European expansion in America (the Aztecs and Inkas, for instance), Africa (the kingdoms of the savanna, the Oyo, and the Bamana, for instance), Eurasia (the Russians, Mongols, and Chinese), and Asia (the Ottomans, Timurids, Safavids, Mughals, Marathas, and, for example, the smaller Hindu city/state/empires such as Vijayanagara) is too large to be cited extensively, for an introduction, see Susan E. Alcock, *et al.*, eds., *Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.


space constraints will be briefly summarized. Employing a narrow quantitative focus on economics and econometrics, O'Rourke and Williamson “defined globalization the way all economists are trained, as integration of markets across space”, concentrated on one dimension, commodity market integration and found that world wide prices of the same (staple) commodities converged in the early nineteenth century.\(^5\) With that narrow focus and measureable metric parameter as evidence, they concluded and defined the historical process of globalization. Alternatively, Flynn and Giráldez, incorporating a much broader, inter-disciplinary, qualitative as well as quantitative approach, have argued that with the establishment of global maritime European empires in diverse land masses around the globe (in the Americas, Africa, and Asia) in the sixteenth century, “globalization began” and is defined as “when all heavily populated land masses began interacting – both directly and indirectly via other land masses – in a sustained manner with deep consequences for all interacting regions.”\(^6\)

*a priori*, commerce (local, regional) and long distance (intra-regional and international) caravan and maritime trade based upon the exchange of goods or commodities existed in most, if not, all parts of the world to varying degrees of sophistication and intensity prior, during and after the emergence of global maritime European empires. Both sides of the debate agree that there was a “boom” in international trade (at least between Europe and the rest of the world) in the early modern period from c.1500 to c. 1800 but disagree on the explanations as to how it occurred and its relative historical importance.

The debate focuses on the intensification of contacts and trade and a range of issues concerning commodities has already been raised and observed such as, for example, the diffusion(s) and exchanges of food, herbal, and medicinal plants from the Americas to Europe/Asia/Africa and vice-versa. The necessity or desirability to rigorously clarify, identify, categorize, and define the existence and properties of individual “global” commodities have, thus far, generally, escaped scrutiny and definition by historians. Prior, during and after the emergence of global maritime European empires, the vast majority of commodities produced, mined, harvested or collected locally worldwide were employed and commercialized by producers and merchants to meet local, regional, and, exceptionally, intra-regional, and, even more exceptionally, international demand.

What, then, is an early modern “global” commodity? It logically parallels, paraphrases, and slightly modifies the Flynn and Giráldez definition of globalization. A “global” commodity is a commodity that was employed in commerce and trade that was primarily, but not exclusively available in one geographic location, and was employed, transported, and exchanged in a sustained manner between two and/or, preferably, more distinct geographic land masses around the globe with *significant* consequences for all interacting regions. There are two dimensions, which *sine qua non* must have occurred, for this definition to be true. The first is spatial or geographical and, preferably, quantifiable; a commodity cannot be “global” if it was *not* exchanged between two and/

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or, preferably, more distinct geographic land masses around the globe. The second is qualitative, hence, the word *significant* in italics, which requires some greater precision and explicit minimum condition. But, for the moment, must be left as it is, meaning: important, of consequence, and/or momentous.

Some of the categories from which individual commodities may be found to be included in this definition are precious and base metals, textiles and key raw materials involved in textile production, foods (staples and non-staples), drinks, stimulants, condiments (spices), medicines, construction and/or ceremonial materials. A few examples of commodities in the early modern period that would be considered “global” under the above definition include the well-known example of New World (Mexican and Peruvian) silver, which was mined at relatively low cost, flooded into Europe, closed mining operations there, produced a severe price revolution, and financed much of Europe’s maritime trade with Asia, with significant quantities of New World and Japanese silver being incorporated into the economy of Ming-Qing China, as Flynn and Giraldez, as well as many other scholars, have discussed. Chinese silk textiles would be included, as they were exported from Asia, via multiple routes; the extent of their trans-Pacific trade was to seriously place in jeopardy silk raising in colonial Mexico. In the same manner, Indian cotton textiles were also involved in trade not only for consumption in Europe and America but in Africa in exchange for enslaved labor. Monopolized cinnamon sourced from Sri Lanka moved and found markets in Asia, Europe, and America, which were partially and symbiotically linked to the consumption of a Mesoamerica commodity – chocolate, via shipments from Asia directly to Europe, transshipments from Europe to America, and trans-Pacific trade. Certain commodities, like tobacco, for example, was so facile in its diffusion that in less than a century after the European encounter with tobacco in the New World that it was being cultivated, consumed and incorporated into regional trade in Asia from Safavid Persia, Mughal India, and Qing China. But, despite the near ubiquitous diffusion of this commodity, colonial production in Brazil could, as we shall see, be profitably monopolized by the Portuguese Crown and Brazilian tobacco and products (snuff) sold globally in America, Europe, Africa, and Asia.

Ultimately, the decision to include or exclude individual commodities in general and those that may be identified as “global” in commerce and maritime trade was made by merchants, ship owners and operators and investors at different locations around the globe based upon commercial intelligence and experience, commercial constraints caused by political conditions, physical availability and cost pricing and suitability for long distance trade, and a projected cost benefit analysis of each commodity calculated on the basis of profit maximization. The present research and the arguments developed in this paper broadens the discussion of the merchant in the discrete and specific field of Portuguese and Brazilian colonial economic historiography to include the Crown as merchant in and throughout the Portuguese imperial project in general and in particular in Asia.7 This is a

7 For general discussions and overviews in English, see Stuart B. Schwartz, “The Economy of the Portuguese
preliminary examination of the Crown's monopoly in Brazilian tobacco that envisages it as an appropriate artifice or platform that centers on the re-dimensioning of an imperial project for a history of the Portuguese Empire in Asia and the World in the eighteenth century. It demonstrates how the economies of the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds were interconnected in the early modern period. It provides fundamental evidence that supports a revision of the decline of the Portuguese Empire in Asia thesis and modifies some excesses in the characterization of the Portuguese Empire in Asia as a redistributive enterprise.

The envisaged broader treatment of this topic will ask and answer questions like: for whom and how and why did Portugal and the Portuguese derive benefit from empire in the eighteenth century? How did the Crown re-organize its commercial interests and what was the long term impact of that re-organization upon the development of private Portuguese merchant activities? What was the importance of this commerce toward and within the rest of the Portuguese Empire and, in a broader context, in the Atlantic and Global economies? To what degree did this re-dimensioning of empire aid the Crown and local Portuguese society in recuperating, maintaining and defending its imperial presence from external indigenous threats in India and Africa in the long eighteenth century? And, to what degree did and how significant was this inter-action and conflict with indigenous empires (the Marathas and the Omani, in particular) in their histories and the historiographies of early modern India, Africa, and the Indian Ocean?


Tobacco and Empire

Tobacco originated in the New World. Throughout the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, tobacco was diffused around the world and introduced by the Portuguese and Spanish in Asia. The dissemination and acculturization of tobacco production and its use was widespread and profound in its penetration and acceptance. Previous social customs and practices aided tobacco acceptance and the massification of its consumption. Early Portuguese efforts to commercialize Brazilian tobacco production in Asia were frustrated because of the rapid and pervasive acceptance and growth of indigenous tobacco production within that region. Attempts were made to harness the revenue generating capacity of tobacco by monopolizing its sale late in period of the union of Portugal.


with the Crown of Spain with contested results. This changed dramatically, after the successful restoration of the Portuguese Crown in 1668, despite widespread evasion described as contraband.

Confronting an acute fiscal and economic crisis both at home and overseas during and after the restoration, the Portuguese Crown had to seriously re-organize and re-structure its sources of revenue in order to cancel accumulated obligations and attend to current operating expenditures. One of the solutions was to establish a monopoly over the commercialization of Brazilian tobacco. Towards this end, the Junta da Administração do Tabaco (or the Tobacco Administrative Council, which is normally shortened to the Tobacco Council) was established in Portugal and its Empire in mid-1674. Whether it was intended to be a temporary or permanent solution to the Crown’s revenue requirements is not clear. In an attempt to garner support from growers for the policy in Brazil, the Crown exempted the commercialization of lower grade tobacco by private individuals in Brazil and for the burgeoning slave trade between the colony and Africa (the Mina Coast).13

The Junta was responsible for the commercialization and control of the tobacco monopoly in metropolitan Portugal and its Empire. It was granted and exercised broad search and seizure powers. Infractors faced legal proceedings and, if found guilty, met diverse and draconian punishment. Customs duties on and the fabrication of tobacco were subordinated to it. The establishment of the Junta has been seen as “among the most important manifestations of increasing state involvement in the [Portuguese] economy,” but the “real aim of the crown’s economic policy was the raising of capital from whatever source available.”14 Since private contractors handled the actual distribution of the commodity, the implementation of the monopoly was “a means of obtaining a share of the income produced from its sale.”15 Within a short time span, the tobacco monopoly became the single most effective source of revenue for the Crown. By 1681, it produced around one-sixth to one-seventh of the revenue collected annually by the Crown in Portugal. It was not eliminated until 1834.

Brazilian tobacco and products were found globally. The Crown’s monopoly operated on four continents in South America, Europe, Africa and Asia. The Junta was a small but powerful administrative unit, presided over by a President and four desembargadores (high court judges), which met in Lisbon. The Junta’s members were all appointed and held their office at the pleasure of the Crown. They incorporated existing Crown financial officials in Brazil and India and vetted and appointed a new group of administrators in Asia, who were in permanent residence by 1677 and responsible to the Council and the Crown for the functioning of the monopoly.

The Junta coordinated the reception, handling (including customs clearance and warehousing), processing at the Fabrica do Tabaco in Lisbon, and to local contractors for consumption in Portugal and the shipments to the Portuguese Empire in Asia, the Estado da India. They observed but the sale of Brazilian tobacco and products to foreign merchants for re-export was exempted. The Junta

14 Hanson, Economy and Society, p. 160.
15 Hanson, Economy and Society, p. 235.
subdivided the internal metropolitan market in Portugal (including the Atlantic islands and North Africa) into specific geographically demarcated regions. Private Portuguese merchants, as previously mentioned, contracted the supply of tobacco and the junta oversaw its delivery and commercialization by these contractors. It also oversaw the handling at Lisbon and re-exports of the highest grade of Brazilian leaf tobacco and snuff destined for the Estado da India in Crown and privately owned individual and Company\(^{16}\) operated shipping.

The quantities of tobacco and product that were exported to the Estado da India were significantly smaller than the amounts sent from Brazil to Portugal. The junta coordinated the reception, handling, and sale of Asian commodities in Portugal that were regularly shipped to Lisbon from India, which had been purchased using the proceeds and profits of the tobacco monopoly in Asia by the administrators in the Estado da India. The primary commodities that the junta received from Asia and oversaw the sale at Lisbon to local and foreign merchants were from India. Initially, they were pepper from the Malabar Coast, diamonds from Golconda, and saltpeter from Bengal with the subsequent inclusion of textiles, primarily Gujarati colored cotton textiles. In the case of saltpeter from Bengal, they oversaw the delivery of this commodity to the Crown’s Fabrica de Polvora (gunpowder factories) before releasing any excess deliveries for sale to foreign or local buyers at Lisbon. After the discovery of diamonds in Brazil, the Junta ceased the trade on the Crown’s account in Indian diamonds. Later, they were to include commodities (tea, fine silk or damask textiles and porcelain) from China in their purchases and shipments.

The superintendents of the junta and other Crown officials in Brazil and the superintendent and administrators in India executed different functions and responsibilities, depending upon their specific location. They both possessed a wide-range of economic and political power, including the authority to integrate Crown assets, especially shipping, and utilize Crown administrators as commercial agents in the execution of the monopoly’s business.

**Monopoly and Commerce**

The total quantity of tobacco that was shipped from Brazil to Portugal from 1699 to 1704, for example, was 6,225,669 pounds.\(^{17}\) It included the tobacco to be re-exported from Portugal to the Estado da India. From 1675 to 1715, the junta re-exported an approximate total of 788,532 pounds or

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\(^{16}\) For archival references and secondary literature on the activities of the Portuguese companies that traded with Asia, especially with China and sailed directly from Lisbon to China and China to Lisbon (Companhia do Comercio de Lisboa; Companhia da Cidade de Macau; Companhia da Fabrica Real da Seda; Felix von Oldenburg Companhia; and the Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão), see George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, c.1639-1754*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 179-180; and Tiago C. P. dos Reis Miranda’s recent article concerning the Companhia de Comércio da Ásia.

\(^{17}\) For the number of rolls of Brazilian tobacco shipped to Portugal, 1680-1704 and their weight in arroba from 1699 to 1704, which have been converted to pounds, see Hanson, *Economy and Society*, p. 240.
8,571 barrels of different grades (Fino, Cidade, and Simoneta) of Brazilian tobacco and snuff to the superintendent and administrators in Goa, an annual average of 20,240 pounds or 220 barrels of tobacco.18 By volume, therefore, the Crown tobacco monopoly in the Estado da India was a relatively insignificant fraction of Portugal's overall and the Crown's trade in Brazilian tobacco. The Brazilian tobacco that was shipped from Portugal to the Estado da India was packed in wooden "hogshead" barrels in the attempt to insure quality and safe handling in the voyage on Crown shipping, the Carreira da India,19 and in the warehouse that the administrators operated at Goa. The barrels were of a standard size and each held, approximately, 92 arrates or pounds20 of tobacco.

At present, it is not possible to quantify the total or annual income generated from 1675 to 1699 by the sale of tobacco at Goa. However, because of the relatively stable quantity of the tobacco delivered, it must have been an amount similar to a slightly later period. The revenue from the sale of Brazilian tobacco to the Goa tobacco renda (the farming out by the Crown of a revenue source via usually a three year contract to the highest bidder) aided dramatically in the fiscal stabilization of the Estado da India.21 It provided the Crown, as the administrators reported, with adequate revenue to advance funding for military and naval operations, public works and repay loans made to the Crown by ecclesiastical institutions. The administrators documented that 1,199,501 xerafines roughly equivalent for this presentation's purpose to the same number of pesos in Spain and its Empire; of taels in China; and of rijksdaalders in Holland and its Empire22 had been used and paid for the above-mentioned purposes from the tobacco monopoly from 1678 to 1708.23

18 IAN/TT, Cartas do Brasil e India, Maço 58, "Balancão dos Barris do tabaco fino e de simonete que se Remeteo por Conta e Risco da Fazenda de Sua Magestade que Deos Guarda começando no anno de 1675 até 1715," This report indicates that tobacco was not delivered in two years, 1692 and 1708.
19 The Carreira da India is the term used for Portuguese shipping using the Cape of Good Hope route to Asia from the late fifteenth century onwards. For the role of Bahia in Brazil in supporting these efforts, see José Roberto do Amaral Lapa, A Bahia e a Carreira da India (São Paulo, Brazil: Cia. Ed. Nacional, 1968); and V. Magelhães Godinho, "The Portuguese and the 'Carreira da India', 1497-1810," in Jaap R. Brujin and Femme S. Gaasstra, eds., Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries, Amsterdam: NEHA, 1991, pp. 1-47.
20 The arrate is an old Portuguese measure of weight, which was equal to 16 ounces. Its relationship to other Portuguese measures of weight used in India and the tobacco trade was: 112 of an arrate or 1/128 of a quintal, see Humberto Leitão and J. Vicente Lopes, Dicionário da Linguagem de Marinha Antiga e Actual second ed. (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos da Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1974), p. 59. There, obviously, was shrinkage and each barrel was weighed upon receipt at Goa in order to control fraud. Since some reports only report barrels, this approximation was reconstructed and calculated.
22 The xerafin was a silver coin worth 300 Portuguese reis. It had a strong exchange rate to the Spanish peso, Dutch rijksdaalders, and Chinese taels. One xerafin was equal to 1.07 pesos, 1.29 rijksdaalders and or 1.33 taels.
23 For the 1708 report that documents the partial use of the monopoly's revenue for: 1) military and naval aid for
The overwhelming quantity of the small amounts of tobacco that was shipped to the *Estado da India* was destined for commercialization by the *Goa renda*. The sale of this tobacco emerged as a significant source of revenue for the Crown that was disproportionately more important than the volume of tobacco that was involved. Excluding the even smaller sales of tobacco in East Africa, the *Província do Norte*, the Indonesian Archipelago and China, the sale of the Goa tobacco renda produced a total income of 6,288,840 xerasfines for the *Estado da India* from 1700 to 1760. It generated on the average an annual income of 104,814 xerasfines, over the same period, which was slightly over one-eighth of all of the *Estado da India*’s total annual revenue.

The two *Junta* appointed administrators in the *Estado da India* were located at Goa. The *superintendente* or supervisor of their activities was the Royal Treasurer (the *Vedor da Fazenda*), the highest ranking Crown fiscal official at Goa, or in his absence the chancellor do *Estado da India* or one of the High Court judges (*Desembargador de the Relação*). Initially, the supervisor’s involvement in the monopoly’s activities was limited, although that official received a payment for his time. The role and importance of the superintendent increased when the Crown questioned some of the behavior and practices of the administrators toward the end of the period and the superintendent lobbied for being included and sharing in the administrator’s sales commissions.

The administrators operated as commercial agents and were remunerated by commissions on the sales of tobacco. They were responsible for the functioning of the monopoly over the vast territory assigned to them. There were minor but important variations in how they organized the monopoly. They coordinated the reception, and handling (including customs clearance and warehousing), of the tobacco and snuff that arrived from Portugal. They oversaw and participated in the triennial negotiations between the Crown and the Goa tax farmers of the commodity as well as the delivery and commercialization by the Goa tobacco contractor. Nearly all of the Brazilian tobacco and snuff was destined for the successful contractor, who was, usually, a prominent Hindu, merchant or association of merchants. Table 1 reconstructs and names the *rendeiros* of the monopoly at Goa. This *rendeiro* commercialized tobacco in Goa, its environs, and more distant contractually non-excluded markets.

Initially, the administrators contractually excluded small quantities of tobacco and snuff, which the relief of Mozambique, in 1678 and 1681; 2) extraordinary expenses by the *Estado da India* in 1684 and 1686; 3) the Mormungão public works project from 1696 on an ongoing basis; 4) donations to the *Estado da India* from 1689 on an ongoing basis; and 5) beginning in 1689, the repayment schedule over 3 to 8 years of the loans to the *Estado da India* provided by the church silver of the island of Goa and Salcete, see: *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 100-A, “1708 Petição e mais papéis que fizeram para a Junta Geral de Comércio de Mozambique.”

24 For the annual income generated from the Goa tobacco renda and the annual accounts from 1700 to 1760, see: *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 98, renda report for 1700 to 1724 and *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 97 to 105, annual accounts.

25 For details of the *Estado da India*’s income and expenditures around 1684 to 1687, which permits the calculation of this percentage estimate, see Hanson, *Economy and Society*, p. 212.

26 For the Crown’s *halten* concerning this point during the superintendence of António Pasc de Sande and its strict instruction that the Viceroy was not to be involved in the administration of the monopoly, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da India*, Maço Unico (MF 3369, number 3), Lisbon, 12/III/1681.

27 *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 96 to 103, annual letter reports.
Table 1: Rendeiros of the Crown’s Tobacco Monopoly at Goa, c.1677 to 1774

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Rendeiro(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1675-83</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1684</td>
<td>Gaspar Dias de Gonçalves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685-87</td>
<td>Santa Naique and Apagi Naique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688-91</td>
<td>Malpa Charizy and Viorgi Duluiy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692</td>
<td>Crisna Naique and F. Naique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1693</td>
<td>Crisna Naique and Ragu Sinaiy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1694</td>
<td>Pedro Soares and Salvador Pereira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1695</td>
<td>João Alfonço and Goinda Sinaiy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1696-97</td>
<td>Crisna Naique and Goinda Legadu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1698</td>
<td>Crisna Naique and Pedro Soares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1699</td>
<td>Crisna Naique and Ramogi Naique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Massan Sinaiy and Vitogi Sinaiy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701-09</td>
<td>Viorgi Sinais and Rama Sinais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710-12</td>
<td>Santopa Naique and Ramogi Naique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1713-15</td>
<td>Boquia Camotisi and Haz Camosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1716</td>
<td>Gunca Camotisi and Rama Crisna Parbu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717-18</td>
<td>Gunca Camotisi and Rama Crisna Camotisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1722-24</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1725-27</td>
<td>Santopa Sinais and Borbuda Sinais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728-30</td>
<td>Soria Pay and Vences Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731-39</td>
<td>Santopa Naique and Vencer or Vencu Naique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740-42</td>
<td>Fondu Camotisi and Rama Camotisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743-45</td>
<td>Vasu Camotin and Rama Camotin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746-48</td>
<td>Soirea Naique and Vencu Naique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753-57</td>
<td>Goinda Naique and Narari Naique with Soirea Naique and Vencer or Vencu Naique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758-60</td>
<td>Virigi Sinais and Nerlicar Panduraga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761-66</td>
<td>Virigi Sinais Nerlicar and Panduraga Sinai Nerlicar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767-69</td>
<td>Custam Camotim and Hari Camotim Marniy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770-72</td>
<td>Narba Camotim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773-74</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

was sold directly and administered by Portuguese Crown officials, judges in these instances, in East Africa (Rios de Senna and Mozambique) and in Northwestern India (the port cities and fortresses or praças that included Diu, Daman, Chaul and Basscin, which formed what the Portuguese called the Provincia do Norte). The administrators, subsequently, excluded additional geographical territories via negotiation with the Goa renda contractor and arranged for the monopoly’s tobacco and snuff to be sold directly in Solor and Timor, and Macau by Portuguese Crown administrators, the Governors of Solor and Timor and of Macau. Eventually, they appointed specific representatives of the monopoly in China, who handled sales and revenues in China from Macau and, for a period

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The representatives were responsible to the administrators and the Crown for their handling of the monopoly’s affairs even after their death. For example, the representative in the 1750s in Macau was Manuel de Sande e Vasconcelos, upon his death his heir, his nephew, Rodrigo de Sande e Vasconcelos, had to respond to the Crown inquiry over his