Herzog’s notion of market society is broad enough to encompass contemporary consumer society, the “commercial society” that Smith optimistically endorsed, and the realm of “civil society” that Hegel heralded as the realization of subjective freedom in the modern world, even while stressing—more systematically and unambiguously than Smith had—the market’s need for a redemptive state presence. For Hegel, some elements of the state (i.e., the “external state”) had to be embedded with the market in civil society (an administration of justice, the police, and corporations) to limit and stabilize the market’s “chaotic and Dionysian play of forces” (p. 58). Hegel’s view of the market is pessimistic at heart because, Herzog tells us, he approached it as a “relict of the state of nature” (Philosophy of Right, §200). As such, it was “inherently unstable and unpredictable” (p. 54) in a way that perpetually threatens to turn civil society into “a spectacle of extravagance and misery” (Philosophy of Right, §185). Hegel also had no expectation that the market would reward desert; and on the question of poverty, Hegel informs us that his pessimism shades into outright fatalism. An especially thorny problem for Hegel is “the rabble”—the alienated poor who, unable to establish or maintain a professional identity, are denied the honor and assistance that would come with membership in a corporation. Crucially, for Hegel, members of the rabble are deprived of the opportunity for personal and moral formation, of the “Bildung” that one acquires through work” (p. 108), so that “in the end, Hegel resignedly notes that the best solution might be to let the poor beg for themselves, as all other measures fail” (p. 107).

Contrary to his libertarian caricature, Smith also accepts the necessity of government intervention. His difference with Hegel is, here again, presented by the author as largely a matter of degree. Unlike Hegel, Smith—an optimist—sees the market as a glass half full, expecting many social problems to be solved naturally as progress toward opulence proceeds. For Smith, “the relation between the market and state is a question of knowing what tasks have been taken care of by Nature’s wise contrivances and what tasks need to—and can—be fulfilled through intentional political activity” (p. 37). Not all of nature’s tendencies deserve our assent, but Smith believes that many do and so “should be reinforced, while others should be curbed or channeled” (p. 25). We even have a mechanism of moral reflection—the impartial spectator—to help us make these determinations. Smith, Herzog argues, also believes that markets reward desert and that the problem of poverty could be overcome “if the market is liberated from unjust remnants of feudal times” (p. 106).

Herzog probably overstates Smith’s optimism and, in doing so, may overlook a certain ironic, even tragic, sensibility in his work. She is even less convincing in identifying deism as standing behind his optimism on the basis of his occasional allusions to Providence or a Divine Creator. Perhaps Smith, a keen student of rhetoric, is simply speaking to his audience in terms it would appreciate. He clearly believes that the market justifies itself as an engine of material prosperity that functions according to empirically established regularities of human nature. This is probably enough. That he furthermore believe that markets reward desert and that, for him “it is almost a metaphysical requirement” (p. 88) that they do so seems as unnecessary to argue as it is difficult to establish. Herzog carefully and self-consciously reconstructs the Hegelian notions of Geist and Sittlichkeit so as to rid them of their most controversial metaphysical or mystical underpinnings. Redescribed as expressions of intersubjectivity, they are rendered more plausible and relevant to contemporary approaches. Yet in Smith’s case, the author insists on a reading founded in deism.

In the course of a discussion of Smith and positive liberty, Herzog mentions the case of the “poor man’s son,” from Part IV of his Theory of Moral Sentiments. The story describes a son’s lifetime of toil prompted by his overweening ambition for material riches. For Herzog, the story is taken as a simple acknowledgment by Smith of the problem of inauthentic desires in the market. Undoubtedly we are meant to see the son’s ambition as misplaced or irrational. However, Herzog omits mention of Smith’s ironic verdict on the son’s destructive self-delusion: “It is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind” (Theory of Moral Sentiments, IV.I.10–12). This sort of tragic disjunction between the good of the individual and of society may not be fully appreciated if Smith is read as too straightforwardly optimistic.

Those objections aside, Inventing the Market wonderfully demonstrates the value of placing the market more squarely in the foreground of our normative and political investigations. It helps the reader pose the right sort of questions about our moral-economic environment even as it contributes meaningfully to the specific literatures on both Smith and Hegel.

**Radical Cosmopolitanism.** By James D. Ingram. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. 352p. $35.00
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A thing can be described as “radical” if it gets to the “root” of something ( radix). So how does James Ingram’s Radical Cosmopolitanism aim to get to the root of this universalist and highly contested conception of the “good life”? In short, Ingram offers a unique and compelling case for flipping the way cosmopolitanism has been approached by
the overwhelming majority of political theorists, a shift away from what he calls “top-down” approaches to pursue instead the ideal from the “bottom up”—through universalization and democratization. In this ideal approach, cosmopolitanism is no longer a vision of morality or of specifically determined institutions but an ongoing “process of challenge and contestation” to anything that would deny or limit political equality and freedom (p. 151). The book is a much-welcomed turn in the literature on cosmopolitanism, helping to shift theorization from its standard moorings on Kantian and liberal premises toward a “negative-processual view of cosmopolitics” that the author labels a “critical-democratic politics of universalization” (pp. 4–5) or “a democratic, egalitarian politics from below” (p. 20).

The book is clearly written, structured lucidly, and largely free of the jargon that typically accompanies philosophical manuscripts of this nature. Ingram is also a master sign poster; previous arguments or themes are consistently repositioned later on in subsequent chapters, so that the narrative carries across the book as a semantic whole. This not only makes for ease of comprehension but fortifies his central argument that, by the end, appears quite convincing. Essentially, Ingram’s argument is two-fold. Firstly, he argues that the tradition of cosmopolitanism has mired itself in visions of ideal justice that tend toward particularism, and which are far removed from politics. Secondly, to overcome these limitations requires a cosmopolitanism from below in which people (“agents”) take center stage and in which cosmopolitanism is a sphere of global contestation and openness against anything that would limit “political equality and freedom.” In this way, Ingram pushes cosmopolitan ethics to live up to its universal vocation to become a disruption to existing ideas and institutions that would deny freedom (pp. 6–7). This renders cosmopolitanism an inherently critical exercise to perceive such exclusions and overcome them, an exposition of anything that would deny others full ethical respect (p. 10). Rather than moralism and determinacy, the “basic claim” of an emancipatory cosmopolitan politics is “indefinitely expansive” and an “ininitely repeatable” process of equal freedom and autonomy (p. 18). In short, Ingram’s goal is nothing less than “to rescue cosmopolitanism from cosmopolitans” (p. 14).

The manuscript is divided into two parts. The first is an extended critique of the top-down approaches to cosmopolitanism across history, ethics, and politics. One could equally call this a critique of traditionalist forms of cosmopolitan thought—that are institutionalist, closed, and ethically particular. The second part focuses on the alternative notion of cosmopolitanism from the bottom up, an attempt to overcome some of the primary limitations in traditional cosmopolitanism identified in Part I. Chapter 1 offers an excellent overview of the development of cosmopolitan thought—from its Socratic origins to international law, from revolutionism to its postwar revival. This chapter is a useful stand-alone resource for any scholar interested in the history of ideas. More than this however, it forms Ingram’s foundation for his entire critique of traditional, top-down cosmopolitanism.

The author demonstrates convincingly how cosmopolitanism has been afflicted by the contradictions inherited from its Kantian origins. As discussed throughout the book (but particularly Chapters 1–3), Kant could not realize his vision of Perpetual Peace not only because his model created a system of hierarchies between different peoples whose asymmetrical relations afforded political equality but also because he could only identify agents of moral rather than political change (pp. 141–42). Traditional cosmopolitanism has largely remained stuck in this particularistic and apolitical approach that is both an “unreliable guide” and “highly ambivalent” (p. 101). Martha Nussbaum’s approach fares little better, for she seeks to act over others from a privileged position (pp. 72, 75). Neither can anthropology nor the proceduralism of John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas provide an adequate grounding: The former falls to exclusions and hierarchies, the latter to indeterminacy. For Ingram, following Theodor Adorno, the point is to criticize the circumstances in which these problems of cosmopolitanism as a position (and imposition) from above arise. That is, Ingram’s bottom-up approach is situated as a corrective to these dangers, setting forth the conditions that would be less unjust and is, therefore, an inherently provisional and “endless” critique of those things that would deny “the principle that all should have a say in what affects them, the principle of equal freedom” (p. 100). The question is not defining what the universal is but to “specify what would be involved in saying what it is” (p. 84).

If the dangers of universalism are that it can be particular and judgmental and can presuppose power/knowledge over others (p. 148), Part II is Ingram’s answer to why freedom and equality must be realized directly and against any hegemonic notion of universalism. As he affirms, his cosmopolitanism “is always a claim against the status quo” (p. 182). In Chapter 4, from Judith Butler, Ingram suggests that the point is not to articulate a version of universalism but a process that challenges all false universalisms, and through Pierre Bourdieu he comes to see equal inclusions as grounding any critique of false universalisms. In Chapter 5, Ingram develops from Hannah Arendt the notion of cosmopolitanism as fulfillment of participation in public life, and from Jacques Rancière that politics is the struggle towards such participation in public life (p. 224). These serve to develop the alternate framework of cosmopolitanism as a principle of democratic contestation, one that sees it as open-ended transformative logic against obstacles to
political equality, rather than a specific form of institutionalization.

In the final chapter—that one could be forgiven for assuming would deal directly with the sociopolitical aspects of human rights in direct relation to cosmopolitanism—Ingram conjoins the various threads of his argument (particularly Arendt) to make political practice the center of concern for cosmopolitanism (p. 246). Here, the principle of equal participation is to be transformed from a right to have rights, to a right to politics. Stated positively, this constitutes a right of all individuals to participate in the decisions that affect them, or stated negatively, as a claim against that which would deny freedom and equality (p. 247). Moving decidedly away from conceptions of human rights based on coercive power or law and institutions, Ingram extols a new interpretation of human rights as a means to contest exclusions through an “open-ended” reading of the principle of equal freedom. Rights are agental and action based, rather than something bestowed by external powers onto passive subjects. Here, the questions of how these types of human rights are to be safeguarded by ourselves (p. 261), or what “social and political capacities” or “distribution of power” must underlie them (p. 292) are pointed toward but not addressed.

One could argue that perhaps a focus on lived struggles toward political freedom/equality/autonomy would have moved Ingram’s argument further toward the “radical” promise of his book. Moreover, his “negative” approach does seem to reduce cosmopolitan values to the notion that all individuals have an “equal” say in the “rules and arrangements that affect them” (p. 17). This normative horizon does not seem too far removed from the liberal cosmology of individual autonomy, rather than the radical variant of public participation toward which Ingram sometimes gestures. Nevertheless, his position does have the key benefit of circumventing any relativist or particularist tendencies by not vouching for any particularism at all: It does not assert some “perfect cosmopolitan justice” but positions itself as a critique of those conditions that would be more or less unjust (p. 99). This means that cosmopolitanism can be consistent with a politics of difference and identity.

One key limitation is a lack of engagement with social relations that could make this project actual rather than purely visionary. Of course, Ingram’s primary interest is in the theoretical development of cosmopolitanism as an idea, rather than contemporary conditions that could make this realizable. Moreover, the author does recognize the importance of social relations on a number of occasions (esp. pp. 99, 142). Yet without concerted development, Ingram’s argument is susceptible to the critique of realism (i.e., that it is too far removed from practice) that he raises in the conclusion, or of R.B.J. Walker’s critique regarding those who do not engage with the possibilities of politics that Ingram raises in the introduction. That is, in the absence of an account of the social relations necessary for this type of radical cosmopolitanism to emerge, Ingram’s “realism of possibility” (p. 270) remains underdeveloped.

In light of this limitation, the question then becomes how he can bring into his analysis the social agency of cosmopolitan community required to bring it about (inclusive of, but not restricted to, ethical life, colonialism, gender, class, race, environment and so on). I say this as a spur to further work rather than as a detraction, for this book can be seen as a theoretical ground-clearing exercise that sets up the basis for which this sociopolitical analysis can emerge. As Ingram states, any ideal theory is an “incomplete moment of moral and political reflection” (p. 269).

One can only hope that he will soon pen a follow-up book that will deal decidedly with these questions. Regardless, Radical Cosmopolitanism offers an important contribution of acute relevance to students and scholars across political philosophy and international relations and should be read widely.

The Foreign Policy of John Rawls and Amartya Sen.
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