Negativity and Open-Endedness in the Dialectic of World Politics

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This article illustrates the importance of negativity within the dialectical method, aiming to bring clarity to what has been rendered unnecessarily mystical within recent revisions of dialectics, particularly in the conception of “meta-dialectics.” The negative element in dialectics, where in the movement of sublation the subject remains undetermined and nonidentical, is argued to be the productive moment in the dialectical movement that leads to open-ended and ongoing processes of change. The article argues that considerable conceptual difficulties arise if one attempts to counterpose negative dialectics to positive dialectics and particularly in interpretations of Hegel’s Logic and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics that attempt to do so. The two moments of positivity and negativity are shown to be mutually related. If conceived in this manner, dialectical analysis can provide radical insights into processes of social change in world politics that are, and remain, open ended. Keywords: dialectics, world politics, negativity, narrative, Hegel, Adorno

“The circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances.”
—Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

The rendering of dialectics offered by Marx and Engels, encapsulated in the opening quotation, alerts us to the interrelation of agency with structure, structure with agency, rather than an either/or duality that some approaches within the contemporary social sciences presuppose. Humankind and their circumstances are coeval and equally originary.

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That is, they are mutually intertwined and cannot be separated as if one generated its other independently. Building on this ontological precommitment, this article forms part of a wider attempt to reinvigorate dialectics as a viable approach to the study of world politics. The approach taken here is avowedly Left Hegelian in that it characterizes dialectical thought in terms of its emphasis on negativity in social contradiction. Hegel had emphasized that the most important aspect of dialectics as the grasping of opposites in their unity, the positive in the negative. This notion of negativity refers to the idea of the perpetual negation (or determinate negation, bestimmte) of that which exists and has been held to be the “governing principle,” even the “soul” of dialectical thought. For Marx “the moving and creative principle” of negativity was considered to be the outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phenomenology because it conceived the self-creation of the human being as a process. Accordingly this article emphasizes the importance of negativity in dialectical approaches for two fundamental reasons: first, to show how negativity opens up the possibility for change by unmasking the inadequacies of existing concepts and social conditions; and second, by showing how dialectical analysis reveals social change as being conditioned but not determined, that is, as leading to open-ended change toward possible futures.

The power of dialectical negativity is closely related to Hegel’s concept of Aufhebung, translated most adequately as “sublation,” a term that means the dialectical movement that both surpasses and conserves. Hegel introduces Aufhebung as one of the most important concepts in philosophy; it transcends the either/or judgment of understanding and moves to a double meaning of terms in which former understandings of terms are suspended. The power of the negative refers to Hegel’s belief that there is always a tension between any present state of affairs and what it is becoming, a thesis that many dialecticians from Heraclitus to Kaku have affirmed. Stated simply, any “present” state of affairs is in the process of being negated, that is, changed into something other than what it is. As stated by Hegel, contradiction “is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only insofar as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has a drive and activity.” However, while Hegel identified the power of the negative, it was Marx who showed how in Hegel’s objective idealism this negative quality became an affirmative doctrine (“the real is rational . . .”) rather than a critical lens on social processes of change. This article argues that this critical potential in the dialectical method can be reclaimed within approaches to world politics that attach importance to dialectical negativity but which do so in recognition of the mutuality between the poles of positivity/negativity rather than imputing their duality and separation.
What is the importance of dialectics to the study of world politics? Firstly, various dialectical methodologies are discernible in many of the so-called critical approaches to world politics. The most prominent examples include the work of Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox, Hayward Alker, Thomas Biersteker, Benno Teschke, Christian Heine, Heiki Patomäki, R.B.J. Walker, and Richard Ashley, among others.12 Dialectics warrants serious study if only to better grasp the conceptual dynamism that underlies this broad array of critical scholarship. But dialectics offers far more than just a means to understand critical forms of international relations (IR) theory. Dialectics also offers the possibility of reframing the social ontology of world politics from one of alleged stasis in a self-reproducing system (as with neorealism) to one that emphasizes the notion of flux in all areas of social life. As such, the second important feature of dialectics is its ability to enable IR theory to better understand processes of change within world politics. The third important feature of dialectics that I wish to introduce is how negativity in dialectics is able to overcome the skepticism of some forms of postmodernism that assume that dialectics leads to a theoretical monism and the eventual subsumption of difference. In contradistinction, I argue that dialectics affirms the fluidity of social processes and the nonidentical as the productive moment in the process of change. It is the unique differences in social life that leads to what is here called open-ended processes of change, something that does not issue in closed totalities but open horizons of possibility. So while much of the initial discussion here may seem overly technical and even tangential to IR theory, it is intended to show how we might think more creatively about the dynamism of contemporary world politics: about flux rather than systemic-reproduction and about open-ended processes of social change that uphold the importance of difference and human agency.

Negativity in Dialectics

The first stage of the dialectical method in Hegel’s Logic, sometimes simplistically referred to as the “thesis” in a dialectical triad, concerns the initial stage of abstract thinking/understanding.13 Here the mind differentiates and classifies the object, discriminates and isolates the object from its relation to others, and renders a partial understanding of the object, separated as it is from its context, the whole. This is sometimes expressed as the naivety of consciousness in which the world is given and the object itself “speaks.” However, this “moment” gives rise to its own negation as it is dirempted by its own inadequacy, the fact that the concept is ultimately inadequate to its object. As
Bernstein makes clear, this does not mean that this moment is “mechanically confronted by an antithesis” but rather that the inadequacy of the concept is revealed by its own limitations. It is out of the inadequacy of the covering concept to its object that emerges a moment that negates, affirms, and sublates the previous moment (aufgehoben) and reveals the incompleteness of the first stage. The relation between being, nothingness, and becoming are illustrative of this conceptual movement and are discussed below. The original concept gains its determination through its negative relation to another concept that, at the same time, reveals the inadequacy of the original conception and compels conceptual development. That is, dialectics involves the realization of the limitations of this previous stage because of the abstraction of the object from its context and the limited form of understanding that this entails. It is the recognition of this contradiction that compels a movement to a higher conception. As such, negativity is central in Hegel’s objective idealism as it is the negativity in everything (that is, between its potential and what it is, its contradictory existence to itself) that is the cause of development and which compels dialectical sublation.

Consequently, in the field of logical contradiction at least (that is, in thought), the dialectical movement of sublation reflects the necessary development in consciousness to overcome existing conceptual limitations or deficiencies. Dialectics in logic is a process of conscious mediation in which the movement is forced upon the mind as an immediate inference of reflection on the inadequacy of existing conceptualization. As Hegel puts it, “the immediate of the beginning must by itself be deficient and infected with the impulse to lead itself further.” In other words, the object contains its “possibility” of development immanent to it and thus develops out of itself. Pinkard and Hartmann have thus described dialectics as a genealogy of concepts in which the prior concepts are seen as being partial and inadequate, as more “primitive” than later formulations that preserve and move beyond their conceptual “ancestors.” This is not to suggest that the conceptual contradictions driving logic forward are the mere result of our limited understanding so that logic can be dispensed with as soon as our “intuitive capabilities” have improved. The outcome is processual and undetermined, for the answer is not guaranteed to be forthcoming nor is it ever completely adequate.

Against this background, it is important to acknowledge Hegel’s distinction between understanding (verstand) and reason (vernuft) because contemporary accounts claiming that Hegel subsumes otherness/difference usually misunderstand this distinction. Understanding is the cognitive faculty that distinguishes and divides objects of analysis, comparable to the first stage of the Logic, whereas reason is considered
to be a higher mode of thought that brings about an “over-arching unity.”

Hegel acknowledges the limitations of the rationality of understanding that involves making conscious divisions between things and hence his appeal to “reason” that incorporates both division and unity. We cannot abandon the use of understanding even though it divides and reifies the distinction between things. What we can do however, is overcome the abstraction of the division of understanding through the dialectical mode of reason that both preserves and sublates understanding to what he considers a higher mode. Aufhebung both annuls and preserves the lower stage as it moves into this higher form, and Hegel’s use of the word versöhnung (reconciliation) implies that difference remains in this movement. It is only opposition that is overcome.

Hegel’s concept of “reason” is therefore not intended as some totalizing movement but one that mediates and sublates, by preserving both the division of the thing and the unity with its opposite. Dialectics, or speculative thought, consists precisely of this movement, grasping the positive in the negative, and moves thought beyond what Hegel called the “abstraction of identity” to a conception in which difference is inseparable from identity. According to Maker, this leads to a nonreductionist understanding of difference in which Hegel is to be considered “the philosopher of difference, otherness and nonidentity.”

This view is shared by Williams, who disputes that dialectics is a reductive distortion of otherness, a misunderstanding that assumes that the “negation of the negation” results in reinstating identity, thus eliminating difference. Peperzak and Deleuze are paradigmatic of such views, one holding that in Hegel’s phrase the “identity of identity and non-identity” that identity is the controlling term to which difference is subordinate; the other going so far as to assert that in Hegel “difference is crucified.” Such views abound in postmodern readings of Hegel and dialectics, which are marked not only by their close resemblance to each other but by their lack of systematic engagement with the Logic. All revolve around a certain play on the contention that the notion of identity threatens to reduce mediation to self-mediation, or other to self-identity, or recognition to self-acknowledgment. The error they share is a reductive interpretation of the speculative dialectic whereby Hegel is seen to treat otherness as the negation of identity and, through the “negation of the negation,” therefore reinstates the original identity.

However, Hegel demanded that thought be autonomous and self-determining, which required philosophy to conceptualize nonidentity and difference. Such autonomous thought could transpire only through a “conceptual dynamic,” namely dialectic, where identity and difference were mutually implicated and neither were a privileged, originary determining ground.
difference were to be fetishized. Difference was not diminished but equally *originarily* with identity; neither identity or difference were to be privileged, both were “equiprimordial.”

The postmodern thesis is problematic because it has a tendency to “absolutize” the Other and assumes it as purportedly given, as radically separate. Under this guise, thought surrenders to difference “as its master” but it is a move that fails to overcome metaphysics because it simply inverts it. The “Other” becomes an unknowable mind. Somewhat ironically, it is under this postmodern typology that the Other becomes truly “Alien.” Expressed elsewhere by Maker, such approaches make a fetish of difference, which “becomes a metaphysical, authoritarian determining ground in its own right.”

It ignores Hegel’s method where autonomous and self-determining thought acknowledges difference *and* otherness, and instead, glorifies “Otherness,” which becomes in-itself a form of authoritarian reductionism.

In contradistinction, Hegel’s use of the “double transition” (*der gedöppelte Übergang*) in the dialectic of being and nothingness reveals how identity and difference are equiprimordial, and therefore, how difference is not subsumed in his ontological system. In the discussion of being and nothingness in the *Logic*, we have concepts that are absolutely distinct and yet inseparable, where each when pushed to its extreme “vanishes in its opposite.” *Being* cannot be conceived one-sidedly, that it, without “the radical other of being,” *nothingness*. So too, *nothingness* cannot be conceived without “the radical other of nothingness,” *being*. This does not mean a subsuming identity between the two concepts. *They are absolutely distinct but mutually related*. They are conceivable only in the other—hence the importance of dialectics, provides the means whereby speculative thought can grasp the positive in the negative. This affirms the *unity* of being and nothing, and their *diversity* at the same time. Hegel recognizes that the statement “being and nothing are one” is incomplete because it seems to deny difference. Equally so, Hegel recognizes that the term “unity” is defective in that it expresses abstract sameness alone. In so doing, thought arrives at *becoming* in which being and nothing are only distinct moments. Becoming is not the one-sided abstract unity of being and nothing but the “joint and inseparable movement of being and nothing,” and hence Hegel affirms becoming to be the “double determination.” “Being and nothing do not simply vanish in an abstract negation or simple unity; rather, they enter into union with each other as the double movement of becoming.”

The dialectical moment of Aufhebung transcends the either/or of “understanding” in our rational judgment by suspending the meaning of becoming and nothing as each concept has entered into unity with its opposite.
would be to remain at the basic categories of abstract identity (unity) and abstract difference (plurality) in which both are exclusive to each other. “Understanding” judges being as something static, or nothingness as something equally static, and cannot capture the notion of becoming. Dialectical (or speculative) thought, however, overcomes these abstractions by showing how the concepts being and nothingness are related. The sublation of dialectical contradiction is not an annulment of relations but is relation. Here, being does not disappear in its other, nothingness, but appears through it, and vice versa. “Each is equally what it is as the other of its other . . . [and] to be in a mutually differentiating relation with the other is just to be oneself.” As such, we come to see that otherness and difference constitute both poles of identity: identity is differentiation. For Maker, based on the dialectical notion of the negative in the positive, the inseparability of identity in difference means that “autonomous thought necessitates the establishment of difference through the acknowledgement of the other as autonomous in its own right.”

Williams makes a similar observation regarding the double transition in Hegel’s discussion of quantity and quality. For Williams, whereas “single mediation” remains incomplete and partial, one-sided, resulting in the subordination of one term to another (i.e., difference to identity), the double transition means a “mutual, joint, and reciprocal mediation in which both terms are sublated and together constitute a new whole.” The relation must be two-sided and reciprocal because, as expressed by Hegel so matter-of-factly, “a one-sided relation is no relation at all” and elsewhere “sublated contradiction is not abstract identity, for that is itself only one side of the contradiction.” This revivifies the notion of difference as it is only through the doubled movement (gedoppelte Bewegung) that difference “gets its due.” As we have seen, the double transition overcomes the distortions in “understanding” (verstand) when expressed as judgment for these propositions assert identity and suppress difference. The first transition asserts the identity of each term, in their one-sidedness; the second articulates and preserves their difference. It is this reciprocal, double transition that prevents the resulting totality from being “one-sided and reductive.” Accordingly, speculative dialectics does not reduce otherness to identity, nor plurality to self-mediation, but preserves them. It pushes difference to the point of collapse but this determinate negation, Aufhebung, has affirmative significance because it preserves difference; it “holds fast to the positive in the negative”; it means that “opposites enter into relations to each other and become qualified by their relation.” Like Maker, Williams finds textual support for this in the first category of logic, namely being and nothingness, but also in the category of reciprocity.
and teleology.\textsuperscript{60} Similarly, like Maker he finds that it is therefore incorrect to believe—as Deleuze and company so proselytize—that the unity of identity and difference eliminates difference. For Williams, the double transition subverts any monist reading of Hegel,\textsuperscript{61} as the “transition into an other irreducible to the first” is a “double-sided” process that is joint and reciprocal. This has profound implications for difference, otherness, and plurality, as difference is preserved as coequal and equiprimordial to identity. Such an interpretation undercuts any reading of Hegel that regards logic as proceeding by subordinating one term to another, or as involving a reduction of double mediation to singular self-mediation.\textsuperscript{62}

However, the argument regarding the double transition should not be seen as asserting that there are no fundamental problems with the Hegelian dialectic. Rather, it is concerned with showing that it is not essentially monist or reductive of difference. What is of concern is the idealism intrinsic to Hegel’s concept of dialectics that evinces a strong teleology, particularly in Hegel’s concept of the totality of reason as a closed ontological system that is regarded as identical with the rational system of history.\textsuperscript{63} This presents a fundamental problem for a dialectic of social history for it reifies reason with history and thus downplays both human agency and structural conditions. Hegel’s idealism culminated in his assumption that it was through mind alone that the developmental process was achievable. As reported by Engels, Hegel established the “negative philosophy as the absolute philosophy” that held that “over the fate of man also presides a reason which makes him persist in one-sidedness until he has exhausted all its possibilities.”\textsuperscript{64} Hegel’s objective-idealist dialectics is to be criticized for it equates dialectical sublation in logic as consonant in social life. As argued by Marx, Hegel mistakenly takes the logical route from the abstract-simple to the concrete-complex in the process of thought (Mind) as the actual process in reality, so that the concrete-complex reality appears as the end product of the dialectical process of the abstract-simple categories.\textsuperscript{65} Similarly, Engels asserted that Hegel was naive in his belief in the existence of philosophical results and the right of reason to “dominate being”\textsuperscript{66}—a view echoed by Lenin, who posited that the fundamental misfortune of the metaphysical materialism of Hegel was its inability to apply dialectics from the theory of reflection (\textit{bildertheorie}) to the process and development of knowledge.\textsuperscript{67} It was for these reasons that Marx sought to stand Hegel on “his head,” substituting the real material world for the idea\textsuperscript{68} and thus bringing the importance of negativity in social life as the generative mechanism in social change but in a categorically different sense from contradiction in logic. Whereas logic contradiction is a sign of error that necessitates reformulation and correction, in relations of “real”
contrariety between persons, ongoing social antagonism is essentially an unsuccessfully mediated problem of intersubjectivity that may, or may not, be sublated.69

We can see that within Hegel’s dialectic the development of consciousness involves continuous negation, a movement beyond old forms of knowledge to stages of higher reflection. Yet, as Horkheimer argued, this does not mean that previous claims to knowledge are to be dismissed. Instead, they should be recognized as being a “moment of truth,” albeit, “limited, one-sided and isolated.”70 They are not necessarily invalid but are part of the process of thought that is at any moment relative and temporary. Dialectics exposes the unfinished process of the development of consciousness, reveals its incompleteness, and exposes the potentialities that are as yet unrealized but which are, potentially, realizable. The important revision the Frankfurt School would make of the concept of dialectics was the acknowledgment that the limited and ultimately transitory nature of things does not mean that a more complete system will emerge as was assumed in Hegel’s teleological account—and continues to be assumed in some “Diamat” (dialectical-materialist) conceptions of dialectics.71 For Horkheimer, there could be no predetermination or guaranteed progress in history because such movements depended on historically situated human subjects.72 There could be no mechanistic triadic schemata when analyzing social relations because the “formula” must be rooted out, specifically, in each case.73 Under this conception, dialectics neither directs change nor ascribes an endpoint to such development, nor does it endow social transformation with either a positive or negative character; human beings do all these things, and a dialectical inquiry into world politics must therefore move to the real social relations themselves rather than remain at the level of abstract conceptions of historical movement.74

The myth of dialectical “inevitabilism” of unending progress toward the condition of communism or any such utopian blueprint, arose with the dominance of the Soviet Marxist variant of dialectical materialism. This orthodoxy perverted Marx’s humanistic account that had emphasized the need of human struggle for change and substituted a teleological account of the inevitable victory of the proletariat.75 This dogma ascribed to dialectics a mystical agency and shifted an understanding of dialectics from one of possible futures toward strict determinism. Murmurs of the inevitability thesis first began in the Second International and then became consolidated in the Soviet Union, which meant that a return to an open-ended dialectical interpretation of Marx’s thought was unlikely to emerge throughout the intervening Cold War period. To the degree that attempts to return to a possibilist account of dialectics were derided (i.e., Lukacs), was
symptomatic of the crudeness of this form of Marxism, which overlooked how even Lenin with Trotsky (whom the Diamats regarded as their intellectual heirs) took an activist position toward revolution in *The April Thesis*. As Raya Dunayevskaya argued, when Lenin grasped the organic connection between Marx and Hegel, and between materialism and dialectics, it revealed the inevitabilist thesis so popular among his contemporaries to be a gross misunderstanding of Marx. Only a Marxism that viewed socialism as a possibility rather than an inevitability would actively work for its realization, and many Marxists now recognize the need to purge Marxist thought of such inevitabilism.

It is against this background that the Frankfurt School advanced a humanist and open-ended dialectics that broke with the inevitability thesis, a trajectory that culminated in Adorno’s seminal work *Negative Dialectics*. The contemporary importance of this interpretation of dialectics—and why this article focuses so heavily on it in the next section—is that it helps to buttress not only against the myth of “inevitability” but also against postmodern criticisms that continue to assume dialectics to be a form of totality that “erases all difference” and where all human beings are made to agree on the “same vision of things.” As we have seen above, for some postmodernists, dialectics is said to subsume difference in a unitary order of an “over-arching totality,” a totalizing perspective incapable of conceptualizing particularity. Here Hegel’s dialectic is said to reduce all oppositional knowledge to a form of self-knowledge from the higher position of Spirit, and in opposition to this, postmodernism has sought to disallow any “reconstitution, sublimation, or synthesis (any Hegelian *Aufhebung*) of opposing terms.” The poetic hope is to overcome the “monolithic dreams of Hegel” to “give way to the linguistic plurality of Babel.” We have already seen how this postmodern thesis can be disputed by emphasizing the double transition in the dialectic that makes identity and difference equiprimordial rather than reductive. However, what the postmodern thesis also overlooks is the notion of dialectical negativity through which Adorno was able to show the impossibility for ever completely subsuming the object under identitarian thought. Adorno found that in any movement the dialectical relationship is not yet exhausted and instead upheld the truth of the “nonidentical,” the belief that certain aspects of the other remain irreducible. That is, Adorno reacted against the conception of dialectics that had an affirmative basis within Hegel’s objective idealism and instead posited that there remains a realm, no matter how small or repressed, of the subject against totalization (nonidentity).

For Adorno, the difference between subject and object can never be abolished, nor should this end ever be sought by social theory. Re-
ality cannot be grasped from a single standpoint and in attempting to
do so leads to an abstraction of reality that is posed as objectivity—a
limitation endemic to positivist accounts for example. For Adorno,
objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder,
and hence it is only by representations that concepts can approximate
their object. As he expresses it, “an object can be conceived only
by a subject but always remains something other than the subject.”
This is why Adorno constantly utilized constellations and mimetic
expressiveness in his work as being approximate descriptions without
identity and domination of the object. It is also why he conceived of
“dialectical images” as being the “objective constellations in which the
social condition represents itself,” rather than being an ideology, so-
cial product, or something to be crystallized as objective.

For Adorno, there can be only “fleeting, disappearing traces” of
the essence of things when viewed dialectically, which is why Karl Pop-
er so detested dialectics as an ideology because he simply could not
conceive of an approach that willfully sought “to put up with contra-
dictions.” In this sense, dialectics reaches few “results” that the posi-
tivist would count as being a positive research “result,” and it does
not pretend to have discovered ontological first principles but instead
operates in a “perpetual state of suspended judgment.” This is not
something to be lamented however, but celebrated, because it leads
to ongoing and open-ended change that is not reducible to static “an-
swers.” That is, dialectics seeks to prevent the dogmatism and rigidity
of identity thinking and its derivative ontology.

What Adorno calls
his “utopia of cognition” is aimed to provide a new form of philosoph-
ical interpretation that does not force concepts to a certain identity but
imparts to subjects a higher grade of differentiation rather than the
rigid application of identitarian thought. As such, it is important to
understand that while former oppositions are sublated in dialectical
movement, new types of opposition will always emerge, and it is this
creative power of negativity that points always to “fresh begin-
nings”—or what I here refer to as the power of open-endedness.
This notion of negativity means that dialectics can never rest in a
closed totality, and hence the dialectical method can link with the
myriad of oppositional, resistance, or alternative movements for
change without subsuming them under any form of totality.

Meta-Dialectics vs. Open-Ended Dialectics

Recently some mystification has shrouded the concept of negativity in
dialectics through the formulation of a “meta-dialectical” approach to
world politics. While its author, Steven C. Roach, should be com-
mended for taking the dialectic seriously, his attempt to reinvigorate dialectics in IR theory has been rendered unsuccessful because of the problems emanating from its central premise, namely, the counterposing of negative to positive dialectics. The problem is located in the misappropriation of Adorno’s negative dialectics and the false juxtaposition between this and positive dialectics that fails both the formation of a meta-dialectical theory, and Adorno. The determined separation between positive and negative dialectics creates a false duality that does not adequately grasp the interconnectedness, the unity, of these dialectical categories and simply cannot support the weight of any purported meta-dialectical theory. It is suggested that a more thorough interpretation of Adorno’s thought, particularly a more accurate reading of *Negative Dialectics*, is necessary before one can—if ever—begin to appropriate this method to assist in the construction of a meta-dialectical theory. The problems that arise through the alleged duality between positivity and negativity have implications far outside the methodological debates in IR theory as they go to the fundamental nature of the dialectic itself—hence the detailed discussion that follows. Ultimately, the danger of further mystifying the complexity of dialectics outweighs any benefit that may accrue from Roach’s meta-dialectical formula. In this section, I wish to show how the poles of positivity and negativity are mutually related rather than opposed and, in so doing, illustrate the methodological benefits that flow from this understanding into a dialectic that is conceived of as being open ended. This section concludes that dialectics is better conceptualized as an open-ended process, without any metaphysical design or purpose of its own, but which is in fact embedded in social (intersubjective) contradictions and the movements of change this generates in human society. From this argument, the concluding section will go on to posit the methodological benefits of open-ended dialectics for the study of world politics.

The initial problem of “meta-dialectics” is that it implies two meanings: a movement beyond dialectics and a dialectics that counterposes positive and negative dialectics. Yet if the prefix “meta” is intended to signify a movement beyond or above dialectics, it is used inconsistently with its Greek root (“beyond” or “above”) and implies an advancement on dialectics that somehow pushes the method to new heights. Assuming that meta-dialectics has this objective, namely, to extend or expand dialectics, this intention is nowhere coupled with an engagement with the question of the plausibility of formulating such a meta-dialectical theory. To suggest the possibility of formulating a meta-dialectical position that somehow goes beyond dialectics appears theoretically spurious on the precepts of the dialectical method itself. Within the critical tradition the concept of dialectics forms a
significant part of the ontological basis of the theory—the interplay of social tensions or contradictions, the movement of struggle, and the inevitable continuation of this dialectical process. To seek to move beyond this process of contradiction would warrant the question of what is there, behind, above, or beyond the dialectic that one could appeal to while maintaining a critical dialectical position? After all, if something were beyond dialectics then it would be separate or unrelated to it, and hence the title “meta-dialectics” would have little purchase. Alternatively, if it is taken to mean that we can go beyond the dialectic in the sense of going beyond the analysis of social contradiction, then what is proposed is not a meta-dialectical theory but an undialectical one.

Equally problematic is the fact that meta-dialectics aims to move dialectical inquiry from “method” toward “grand theory.” However, dialectics is not directed just at the abstract/conceptual level as the pejorative of grand theory refers but is enmeshed with real-life processes of change. What is abstracted is always reintegrated with the whole. The dialectical approach focuses on the social totality or wholeness and carries with it the methodological prescription that one component of social life cannot be studied in isolation from the rest. Moreover, to render dialectics as grand theory risks mistaking method for theory, wrongly elevating what is essentially a device to help understand social change to a theoretical construction of the world itself. While it is certainly possible to study dialectics in the world—a primary example being the ontological dialectics of Engel’s *Anti-Dühring*—one cannot deduce a theory of the world a priori through dialectics as the dialectical forces are those that exist at a particular point in time and space. So while dialectics can certainly illuminate immanent tendencies in social contradiction and these deductions can assist in the construction of social theory that is geared toward promoting “possible futures,” it should not be mistakenly categorized as grand theory in its own right. Dialectics is a theory of change and while it presupposes an ontology of flux or becoming as being the most expressive of actual *being* in the world, it holds no pretense as being a causal agent in itself. Dialectics “projects” nothing, it does not cause, affect, or alter anything—human beings (and the totality of their circumstances, environmental historical, economic, social, and so on) cause, affect, and alter their social situation, though of course, as Marx correctly observed in the *Eighteenth Brumaire*, not under conditions of their own choosing.

Any assertion of there being a “design” lying within the “rational kernel” of the dialect is highly problematic as it directs dialectical analysis from its situatedness in the world toward metaphysics. It gives volition to the concept of dialectics as if it were something living; di-
alectics becomes an entity of design and purpose; dialectics becomes the actor. Accusations imputing an intrinsic property, design, or projection within dialectics are guilty of hypostasis, giving to the dialectical process a telos that subverts its inherently open-ended nature and robs the concept of its embeddedness in social action. Dialectics, properly conceived, posits no ultimate design or intrinsic character, for such assertions would themselves be undialectical; they would give dialectics a power of volition that a concept simply cannot possess and willfully ignores its embeddedness in social relations and human action. It imputes to dialectics a timeless character that does not recognize the fundamental tenet of dialectics itself: flux. Following Nietzsche, Adorno criticized the philosophical categories that failed to grasp the dynamic processes of the world. For both of them, the world was in a state of continual transition and development and reality was viewed as a process of becoming. It could not be explained by a final state, ultimate standpoint, or as possessing an intrinsic “design.” To attempt to either channel or arrest processes of change through dialectical analysis is therefore anathema—while dialectical analysis can help understand change, it is reliant on human agents to move social change this way or that. In this view, dialectics does not assume the role of grand theory but rather is intended to augment theoretical claims and assertions through an understanding of social processes. Dialectical theorists can continue to value emancipatory change and challenge existing world orders with emergent alternatives, but while recognizing that dialectics, of itself, does nothing to bring about such change.

The array of conceptual problems in meta-dialectics inheres from one crucial problem, namely, the alleged duality between the dialectical categories of positivity and negativity. This bifurcates what is essentially intertwined, and as we have seen from our discussion of the double transition above, fails to acknowledge positivity/negativity as equiprimordial. Instead, it one-sidedly champions negativity and denigrates any affirmative traits; it does not give positivity its due. Ultimately, such an approach fails to acknowledge the mutual relations between dialectical negativity and positivity, a problem that results from its reliance on a problematic interpretation of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. In the estimation of Roach’s meta-dialectics, the paradigmatic example of so-called positive dialectics is that of Hegel and Marx, who deemed that new social practices resulted from the inherent contradictions/tensions in sociopolitical structures. In this conception of dialectics, the realization of new ideals in society registered new forms of positive knowledge. The negativity of dialectics, either through conceptual inadequacy at the level of logic or social relations of contrariety in real social oppositions, are seen to drive the positivity of knowledge and/or social change. In other words, social contradiction and the
sublation of these tensions ultimately lead to greater human freedom, which is heralded as a positive outcome.\textsuperscript{107} In distinction, Adorno’s dialectics is deemed as “negative” because, for meta-dialectics, there is no positive knowledge of social transformation resulting from the dialectical process that instead expresses a “form of complete self-enclosure.”\textsuperscript{108} The implication of making such a distinction between positive and negative dialectics is that it substitutes a value judgment for analysis; it means the dialectician differentiates between bad (negative) or good (positive) social practices that supposedly flow from the dialectical process.

In rather dismissive fashion, Roach here pushes Marx under the banner of positivity because Marx is said to envisage a “positive” formulation of the worker’s experience of oppression in the “self-realized” outcome of their freedom in a “new humane society.”\textsuperscript{109} Adorno’s dialectics on the other hand, is interpreted as “negative” because the reification of the subject in modernity pushes them to identify with the societal objects of their own oppression.\textsuperscript{110} The “positive” label is used to cluster those theorists who elicit an optimistic appraisal of the possibilities in the dialectical process of social change, whereas negativity is used to denote a pessimistic appraisal of dialectics in which change is deemed to lead to further reification/domination. However, this heuristic creates a false juxtaposition and conflicting duality between positive and negative dialectics that results in an erroneous opposition between them on the basis of an evaluative hierarchy of good (positive) and bad (negative) social outcomes.\textsuperscript{111} This conceptualizes the categories of positivity and negativity in a most peculiar way, not just because it follows a dialectical determinism and consequentialism that is not to be found anywhere else in Critical Theory but because it interprets dialectics by the social conditions that are predicted to follow as a result of social contradiction, rather than as being a method that informs and understands such a process. This rigid bifurcation between allegedly separate categories of dialectics fails utterly to reflect their interrelation. By labeling theorists through their optimistic or pessimistic belief in the outcome of dialectical social change fails to appreciate that dialectics is informed by both positivity and negativity. Positivity and negativity are not an opposing duality but rather unified aspects of the same process, two sides of the same dialectical coin.

Any brief empirical study would confirm that dialectical negativity does not always lead to positive overcoming as meta-dialectics assumes. If dialectical positivity always led to affirmation, how then could we explain the many contradictions in social life? For example, Axel Honneth has questioned the existence of social injustice and the absence of any large-scale public reaction against it. The problem revolves around the anomaly that while an understanding of injustice
should have of itself the rational force to convince subjects to create a social praxis of cooperation, it has not yet moved humanity to change.\textsuperscript{112} The perennial lack of progressive change in our social conditions is only in part due to the inadequacy of our philosophical reflection. Reasons why theories of emancipation have yet failed to bring forth desired change have been leveled at the usual suspects including humankind’s alleged “immaturity,” “false consciousness,” the “fear of freedom,”\textsuperscript{113} or growing social pathology under the domination of capitalism and the separation of humankind within the states system. People often act irrationally, in ways that do not accord with their ostensible self-interest, and it is something that the negative/positive dialectical duality cannot explain. A clear example is the deformation of the proletarian consciousness that Marx regarded as self-evident. Marx believed that the “ability to calculate advantages”\textsuperscript{114} was possessed by the proletariat, whatever its degree of alienation. Yet instead of revolutionary fervor, we see a retreat to either religiosity or nationalism, to protectionist trade unionism or the vote for social democracy. One could be forgiven for assuming that the suffering of the proletariat should have rendered their “calculation of advantage” rather easy. Instead, irrationality has conflated to madness, defined as repeating behavior patterns, despite the fact that its repetition does not achieve the desired result. Such examples abound: the internationalization of capitalist norms, acquiescence to the ideal of competition, blind faith in the potential for reward. Here we see the proletariat content themselves with old nostrums rather than new horizons of struggle, conditioned as they are by circumstances—not of their own choosing—but transmitted from the past, to borrow from Marx’s \textit{Eighteenth Brumaire} once again. Human reason is not pure but possesses an “incomplete vision,” it “frets and fumes” as it encounters new problems to which it may create new solutions.\textsuperscript{115} Yet meta-dialectics would wash away the question of possibility to assume unambiguously that positive dialectics always leads to new forms of knowledge firmly in its hand. I contend the process is far more contingent, far more reliant on human praxis than this theory understands.

If we turn to the other side of the duality, negativity, and push the negative inflection of meta-dialectics to its extreme, we find equally problematic assumptions. In this account, history is seen to proceed only through pure negativity, war, and struggle rather than mere tension or contradiction, which manifests in the belief that nothing will happen without calamity. Here history is the “hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.”\textsuperscript{116} This notion can be traced to its Hegelian origins and the “slaughter bench of history.”\textsuperscript{117} but it should not be interpreted as a flawed philosophy
of history wherein change can only occur through the worst forms of social negativism and asociality. Dialectical movement can still take place within “good” (positive) social conditions. Utopia need not preclude change or mean the cessation of history but may offer conditions that are more suitable for fuller expressions of freedom to emerge. That is, one could speculate that where dialectical contradictions are less antagonistic may in fact allow for sublation without the unnecessary distractions that arise through more vexed forms of social relations.

In distinction to the approach of meta-dialectics, I argue that the skillful dialectician should possess a relational understanding of the categories of negativity/positivity in dialectics in a way that recognizes the interpenetration and mutuality of these two poles. First, it is far too simplistic to label Marx and Hegel as “positive” dialecticians by virtue of the fact much of their work was inherently critical, and therefore, even in the typology of meta-dialectics, negative. One might here refer to Hegel’s critical reflections on the Kantian moral conscience and subjective freedom in civil society,\textsuperscript{118} or the critical content of Marx’s \textit{Capital} and the \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts}.\textsuperscript{119} Second, the label of positive dialectics has a tendency to conflate the dialectical method with teleological and determinist outcomes. While the teleological and idealist underpinnings of Hegel’s dialectics have been well documented and will not be contended here, the charge of teleology within Marx’s dialectic is a highly dubious aspersion and seems an unfair caricature of Marx’s thought. Even a cursory survey of Marx’s work reveals numerous, explicit passages in which Marx derides such readings of the dialectic, not least in his demystification of the rational kernel of dialectics from Hegel.\textsuperscript{120} Marx’s dialectical method seems diametrically opposed to any form of teleology as evidenced by his stringent insistence that it is people, real, living people, “that change circumstances”\textsuperscript{121}—and I need not draw the attention of the reader once again to the \textit{Eighteenth Brumaire} for the relation here is obvious.\textsuperscript{122}

Marx placed repeated emphasis on human agency in the dialectical process of social change and instead of portraying the dialectic in a mechanistic fashion leading inevitably toward the telos of freedom, Marx posited historical struggle in which the notion of progress toward communism was anything but a definitive endpoint. While certain Soviet-inspired Diamat accounts rendered communism as the inevitable synthesis of capitalism and socialism, Marx never used the dialectic in a determinative sense. Hence Ball has described Marx as a “political possibilist” rather than a “historical inevitabilist.”\textsuperscript{123} Moreover, the fact that Marx emphasized a continuous process of change, from socialism, to communism, and onward, is a clear indication of the nondeterministic nature of Marx’s dialectic.\textsuperscript{124} It has long been accepted within Marxian thought that the higher stages of sociopolitical
organization would not diffuse the dialectical process. That is, while class antagonism would almost certainly disappear in the movement from socialism to communism, Marx maintained that wider social contradiction would remain, and hence the ongoing fluidity of social life that anticipates my formulation of the open-ended or ongoing character of dialectics.

Following from its caricature of Marx, the meta-dialectical approach of Roach attempts to do the same to Adorno. Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics* is made to serve as the linchpin of meta-dialectics and yet there are a series of misconceptualizations that can only be resolved through an adequate restatement of Adorno’s seminal work. Adorno states in the Preface that the negative dialectical approach seeks to free dialectics from any “affirmative traits” by using an enhanced appreciation of the strength of the subject to break through the “fallacy of constitutive subjectivity.” It looks to that which would be outside the “sway” of the unity principle and finds its experiential content in the “resistance of the other against identity.” The nonidentical is “the thing’s own identity against its identifications,” and the primary task of negative dialectics is to criticize the claim to hegemony over the object in the idealist logic of instrumental reason. Why Adorno calls this form of dialectics “negative” is because it does not claim to possess the truth of the “indigent,” “dissonant” object but remains concerned with the moment in which the object appears as more than what its covering concept fails to cover. As Bernstein notes, negative dialectics is termed “negative” because it is not totalizing; it is not an attempt to arrive at absolute knowing or the absolute idea. It is negative because it is moved by the negative experiences of pain and suffering, because it lives through a continual awareness of contradiction, the negative or “wrong state of things.” So in distinction to Roach’s depiction of nonidentity as the “subject’s withdrawing into itself,” for Adorno, nonidentity is that part of the subject that is resistant to its identification, that which remains non-identical. Moreover, negative dialectics is used by Adorno as the “hinge” by which he hopes to turn the direction of conceptuality toward this so-called nonidentity. As such, negative dialectics does not pertain to a negative (bad) social condition but is both, one and at the same time, positive and negative, the concept and the nonidentical.

The double transition here is obvious, and the analogy need not be laboriously drawn out. What needs expanding is how Adorno, through negative dialectics, sought to champion the dignity of the object against the potentially reifying and totalizing moment of sublation (*Aufhebung*) in Hegel’s dialectic. In Adorno’s estimation, whereas in Hegel the dialectical process ended in absolute or reconciled identity, the dialectical relationship was not yet exhausted, and Adorno upheld the truth of the nonidentical, the belief that certain
aspects of the other remain irreducible. Adorno ultimately rejected both Hegel’s notion of the cognitive dialectical process that would unfold into the Absolute Idea and the conception of sublation as leading to an ultimate, harmonious reconciliation.\textsuperscript{135} In distinction to Hegel, Adorno suggested negativity, the idea that the difference between subject and object cannot be entirely abolished. As Adorno expressed, “dialectics’ positive element would only be determinate negation—criticism—not a final inversion, happily emerging with affirmation in its hand.”\textsuperscript{136} Negative dialectics registers that we cannot subsume the whole, or the other, in a reconciling synthesis, and hence Adorno indicts Hegel’s philosophy as implicated in the axis of domination and reification that distorts relations of identity. That is, Adorno reacted against the conception of dialectics that had an affirmative basis within Hegel’s idealism\textsuperscript{137} and instead posited that there remains a realm, no matter how small or repressed, of the subject against totalization (nonidentity). Negative dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity by virtue of the fact that it does not begin by taking a “standpoint”\textsuperscript{138} and by the fact that it does not seek, nor deem it possible, to ultimately reconcile identity in sublation.

Rather than presenting negativity/positivity in oppositional terms, Adorno’s primary concern was to expose the “ontology of false conditions” and endangered subjectivity. With this intention, Adorno sought to use Hegel’s thought but not his practice to explode the moment of positivity (sublation) in favor of an uncompromising emphasis on negation.\textsuperscript{139} However, Adorno did not therefore accuse Hegel of being a positive dialectician, that is, a person who believed in “good” social outcomes. We must appreciate the analytical distinction that gives the positivity/negativity dichotomy meaning in Adorno’s work by understanding these poles as devices for ordering nonidentitarian (or negative dialectical) thinking, the purpose of which was to save the autonomy of the subject against its identifications. It is the fact that the subject remains nonidentical that leads to the dynamism of negative dialectics for it retains a certain freedom in unique difference, something that is immune from static identifications and attempts at affirmative nomenclature.

In this way, Adorno’s concept of negative dialectics tends to the realm of the possible.\textsuperscript{140} History is open ended. As Rosen has pointed out, the political implications of nonidentity are that history has a “double character,” something being “inert” in the present but which is “potentially dynamic.” What remained outside identification (the nonidentical) revealed the incompleteness of the concept, and because such identification was only partial and incomplete, the nonidentical itself possessed a latent capacity. It remained possible to move beyond what was reified and incomplete, and the task of Adorno’s negative dialectical account was to revivify history to its vital and dynamic
potentiality, which pointed “beyond reified actuality.” While Adorno posited that the capacity of dialectics to transcend opposition is limited (because the grounds for transcendence are circumscribed by history and particular conditions), negative dialectics nevertheless centered on this notion of possibility. In other words, though reality had cheated the object of possibility because its past was given, Adorno maintained that the possible is nonetheless visible. By exploring this possibility, Adorno could investigate the historical process stored in the object, its actualization and limitations. As such, the dialectical horizon of open possibilities is widened by the theory of nonidentity and in a radically oppositional sense to identitarian thinking.

In relation to human freedom, Adorno emphasized the dialectical tension between societal structures and the ways in which these inhibited subjectivity and its desire for freedom. Despite the stifling conditions facing the subject in modernity, Adorno’s explicit recognition of the unremitting tension between social structure and subject clearly reveals that for him the dialectical interplay was not yet exhausted, that potentiality and possibility remained. While conditions seemed unlikely for emancipation within capitalism and the Weberian state, it nevertheless remained—and remains—a possibility. Rather than being a hostage to an intrinsically regressive dialectic, Adorno points us toward the presence of dialectical social tensions and the immanent possibilities within them; in nonidentity, the aesthetic subject, even in the confines and strictures of the one-dimensionality of modernity. Adorno recognized that the “overwhelming majority of human beings tolerate relations of domination, identify themselves with them and are motivated toward irrational attitudes by them—attitudes whose contradiction with the simplest interest of their self-preservation is obvious,” but he also identified that what underlies this “blindly dominating totality” is “the driving desire that it should ultimately become something else.” Even though in certain passages it appears that Adorno viewed modernity as having missed its emancipatory realization, he nevertheless upheld the necessity of projecting freedom in new images and forms so that “in the age of the individual’s liquidation, the question of individuality [could] be raised anew.” Similar passages in Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment reveal that within the reflective opposition of nonidentity, the utopia of reconciliation is preserved. Sherratt has gone so far as to posit the existence of a utopian image that pervades all the major aspects of Adorno’s thought, a sentiment echoed by Pippin, who has identified clear “utopian anticipations” of a “state of realised freedom” in Adorno’s work. As such, negative dialectics does not lead to nihilism and despair, a “we can do nothing” mentality. Far from it. Negative dialectics offers hope—hope of the subject against all attempts at
sublation and identity—a realm of the subject safe from totalizing ideologies.

Consequently, negative dialectics points to what Held calls the “unfulfilled potentialities of emancipation” precisely because the ontological assumption of resistance follows the presence of the nonidentical. In this perspective, if nonidentity remains despite attempts at totalization or sublation, then resistance to forms of identity thinking is not only possible but probable as the social contradiction remains. For Habermas, while negative dialectics becomes indeterminate, contradiction becomes that which opposes reality, and it is in this light that we can appreciate Adorno’s reliance on the aesthetic realm in which he obviates an aesthetic subject that has a minute potential for a utopian, albeit false, life. As Adorno suggests; “Art may be the only remaining medium of truth in an age of incomprehensible terror and suffering.” As dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things its converse is equally true—that the right state of things would be free of it, being neither a system nor a contradiction. And consequently, Adorno looked toward a time and society “that would rid men of coercion” and result in “the objectivity of a reconciled life of the free.” The best picture of such a reconciled life is evident in Adorno’s depiction of negative dialectics as a “no-man’s land between the border posts of being and nothingness” in which nonidentity could exist untrammeled in the unbounded existence between borders that “belonged to no-one.” As against variants of postmodernism’s skeptical nihilism, Adorno ultimately sought to use negative dialectics in a manner that did not issue in ultimate reconciliation but in the tension between “impossible depiction[s] of the right life and the consciousness of how things could be.”

Open-Endedness in Dialectics

One of the important features of Adorno’s conception of negative dialectics is how the emphasis on the nonidentical leaves open the question of possibility and open-endedness in the process of change. If, according to Marcuse, things are never “what they can and ought to be” this negativity, the tension in social relations, can potentially result in human action to bring forth purposive change. For this very reason dialectical approaches have tended to value emancipation and have aimed to contrast the dominant, imposed structures of world politics with emergent alternatives that may supersede them. A key example of such dialectically informed analysis is the method of immanent critique that aims to expose the gap between ideas and reality, to confront the “existent” in its historical context against its conceptual principles in order to criticize and transcend them. In this
vein, the Frankfurt School focused on revealing the contradiction between the idea of bourgeois society and its concomitant universal ideals of justice, equality, and freedom against the actual conditions of bourgeois society; the market, commodity exchange, and the exploitation of human labor. Such a move was made explicit by Adorno in his critique of the material contradictions in liberal society:

If social science . . . takes the concept of a liberal society as implying freedom and equality . . . [and then] disputes, in principle, the truth-content of these categories under liberalism—in view of the inequality of the social power which determines the relations between people—then these are not logical contradictions which could be eliminated by means of more sophisticated definitions, nor are they subsequently emergent empirical restrictions of a provisional definition, but rather, they are the structural constitution of society itself.\(^{162}\)

Employed in this manner, dialectics moves toward a transformative critique that can overcome the separation between theory and history.\(^ {163}\) It assists in exposing societal contradictions and in doing so ensures that avenues for radical transformation are opened.

Yet it is important to note that mere recognition of the contradictions within existing social conditions is not coextensive with the praxis of freedom.\(^ {164}\) That is, critique is by no means a sufficient condition for the overcoming of particular historical situations that can only be filled by conscious, active, human agency. The capacity of dialectics to transcend opposition and contradiction is circumscribed by historical conditions and, though philosophy cannot transform these conditions, a dialectically informed social analysis can help to create the preconditions for their alteration.\(^ {165}\) This is what Horkheimer meant when he reiterated that “dialectics is not identical with development,” it is reliant on spontaneity, resistance, and “constantly renewed struggle for freedom.”\(^ {167}\) The negation of existing social conditions is not inevitable: “liberation,” as Marcuse calls it, requires the “historical action” of humankind. Dialectics remains unconcluded so long as autonomous, emancipatory action is not forthcoming.\(^ {168}\)

In this last section I wish to discuss the importance of this concept of open-endedness in dialectics by illustrating the methodological benefits that accrue from its application. The primary contention is that the benefit of open-ended dialectical analysis lies in its ability to remain unconfined, to not restrict analysis to one causal explanation or abstraction of social change. While limiting the scope of research is necessary in any project, it risks arbitrarily excluding relevant causal factors and objects of analysis, and/or of abstracting and reifying certain causal factors and objects of analysis as primary. Open-ended
dialectics can help overcome these limitations by ensuring that at its level of abstraction of the particular (i.e., where an object, phenomenon, or moment is analyzed in its particularity) is always reintegrated within the whole and, in so doing, renders particularity within its manifold relations and interconnections. Yet dialectics should not be mistaken as being indeterminate merely because it suggests ongoing processes of interaction and transformation. Rather, dialectics seeks to understand things in their movement, the complex nexus between internal contradictions and external relations. Dialectics is therefore not just a way of explaining events after they have unfolded, but offers crucial insights into the process of change itself, the immanent tendencies towards a possible—though nonpredictable—future.

The issue can be understood by distinguishing between systemic and synthetic analysis. The former rests analysis upon the assertion that “the elements of a given structure condition one another,” the former—to which dialectics corresponds—seeks to explain how and why these elements first arose and combined, and to discover immanent tendencies that indicate possible trajectories of transformation. Arthur warns that if we neglect this distinction the danger of determinism looms. At the same time, however, one should not take a reductionist view of reciprocal interaction, that is, reduce dialectics to the mere fact of the interrelatedness of all things. What is of crucial importance is the notion of contradiction in real or objective relations that create the conditions in which change is possible. Dialectics is not just cause and effect, or the relation of things within the whole. The social world contains immanently the seed of its own sublation—yet overcoming contradiction is a matter of human choice and action. This rejects the determinism of the Diamat camp not because capitalism and the state system do not contain within them social contradictions but because these theorists fail to grasp that the very possibility of sublation of these social conditions is reliant on praxis, that is, self-conscious human action. This moves dialectics from mere reciprocal interaction to a higher, social relational account of the contradictions within modernity that may lead to the possibility of emancipation.

The opening quotation of this article, taken from Marx and Engels, affirms that we are both the products of circumstances and the potential changers of those circumstances. For Marx, we are “continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals,” but of course “under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.” This ontology of human subjectivity assumes the possibility of human beings engaging in practices so that they can make their own history, that is, be self-directive and autonomous. This works against both deterministic and voluntarist tendencies in the project of emancipation, for voluntarism ignores
the reality of objective constraints on subjective agency and our ability to direct our lives given historical conditions, whereas determinism overlays the limitations of material capacities and the impositions of structure on human agency. While we are situated within material circumstances that provide the setting for our actions, this does not lead to a passive determinism. Praxis is the coincidence of the changing of oneself with the changing of circumstances. It is with this form of activity that it becomes possible not to transcend our conditions—a vain form of escapist idealism—but to direct or channel these conditions so that they are not something externally imposed but something that we cocreate and cotransform, something that we can direct toward our desired ends. This preempts the charge of subjective idealism because it recognizes that although the autonomy of the subject is real, our being-in-society means that prior to accessing our free will we are embedded in social practices that possess a particular history and unique conditions. Agency and structure are co-present and are related immanently and dialectically. Immanence here is used as an “originary” that describes the relationships between things, what they are, what they have been, and the types of development that can take place within these relationships and conditions. This originary, as a complex array of dialectical relationships, differs from the cause/beginning or effect/solution binaries because these traditions tacitly assume relations as something external and fixed, with the inevitable result that stasis is the natural position of analysis. In distinction, an open-ended dialectics makes politics both possible and necessary for it places human agency as central.

The fact that historical change can only be anticipated does not mean that dialectics is itself indeterminate or that the complex web of social variables is retrospectively unknowable. There is a necessary contingency, an openness, inherent to how the conditioning factors of society are seen to operate through dialectical analysis that is not the same way that they are conceived of in determinist or structuralist accounts. Whereas structural accounts view society as a self-contained unit in which social structures are essentially pre-given and inert, dialectics sees society as a myriad of relations that are in perpetual state of becoming, so that the array of conditioning factors that influence future development are far from being determinative. This movement has been described by Ball as one of “unanticipated development,” leading ultimately to further change at an unspecified and conditional future time. What comes out at the end of a given historical process is not knowable in advance, as it is an outcome of a concatenation of a wide range of happenings, some of which are what people think and act (whether or not their actions are thought to be “free”), some of which are a matter of contingency and some of which are a result of the conditioning factors in operation. It is because
of this dynamic complexity that Horkheimer appropriately described the dialectic as being “unconcluded” (unabgeschlossene Dialektik), or what has been described here as being open ended.\footnote{180}

What this amounts to is a clear rejection of the mechanistic teleology that has been so pronounced in the Diamat school of dialectics. Inevitabilist narratives, notions of endless progression, prediction/prognostication—all such wishful stories are recast as hubris bred from the ideological distortion of dialectics. Yet this does not deny that an open-ended dialectics remains committed to a weak telos, a telos without determinacy. Praxis is intentional and goal oriented and therefore pertains to a weak teleology regarding the potential in humankind for overcoming social contradiction. Max Weber’s observation that all social action is teleological in the sense of being goal oriented may appear truistic and trivial, but for a dialectics that is firmly grounded in social relations, its implications are far reaching. What dialectics offers is the regrounding of teleology as purposive human creation, a property of human subjectivity, agency within given conditions. We may desire and work toward certain ends, but it is not prefigured as a guaranteed outcome. Here human agency and a possibilitist narrative replace the closed structures of the inevitability thesis. Merely because human actions are intentional and goal oriented, does not imply inevitability or a mechanistic teleology. As explained by Neufeld, social contradictions cannot be sustained over time, and dialectics can assist us in understanding how these antagonistic forms may resolve themselves.\footnote{181} Open-ended dialectics leaves development as something possible rather than inevitable; whether and how such social contradictions are to be resolved is ultimately up to us. Social contradictions may not be positively resolved, but neither will they remain inert.

Open-ended dialectics, here conceived, is intended to overcome the propensity of some scholars to insist on characterizing the dialectical method as mechanistically teleological, as holding to “a self-consciously posited goal that awaits actualization.”\footnote{182} There is simply no possibility for a teleological account of world politics that maintains an inevitability thesis or suggests a developmental endpoint when the metaphysical mystifications of dialectics are removed and replaced with an emphasis on social relations and human action. Teleology assumes some force working above the consciousness and purposes of the actors themselves and is therefore incommensurable with a dialectics firmly rooted in the analysis of social relations. Even in Hegel’s idealistic and affirmative account there is no telos given to the dialectic that remains, at all times, a process of change, not the change itself. Rather than an inevitable, progressive movement to the Absolute, we have a history permeated with “unintended results, and the irony of sudden reversals.” As expressed by Kaufmann, the “fateful myth” that
dialectics “is reducible to a rigorous method that even permits predictions deserves no quarter.”  

The erroneous temptation to deploy dialectics as a predictive device reifies its concept and endows it with content that it cannot possess. Such approaches usually retreat to the static dialectical triad (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) in order to pinpoint the social relation or phenomenon from which it is alleged that it is possible to predict any manner of things. Aetiologically this is an impossibility however, for one cannot not know a priori which social factor(s) will have causal effect, nor can one prove that certain processes are historically necessary.

The ontological assumption of dialectics, that sublation is altogether contingent on human thought and action (praxis) combines a focus on intersubjectivity (social relations) with open-ended processes of social change. It rejects the teleological, inevitabilist account of progress, but retains the dialectical emphasis on the notion of flux by focusing on intersubjectivity as being generative of movement in social life. Critical realists have suggested a similar idea, which they refer to as “plausible generative mechanisms.” This alters the emphasis of dialectics from one of automatic progressiveness to one that emphasizes the notion of perpetual unrest without any assumption of how such unrest (contradiction) is going to be mediated or sublated in social life. Dialectics cannot lead to prediction because it deals with social phenomena that do not fit within any pre-given mold of determined behavioralism that would allow one to chart the future of humankind. Contradictions and bifurcations in social life are indeterminate and the possibilities of change are infinite; dialectical forces may return the system to its original position, make it regress, or it may explode to yet another kind of complex dynamics. In this view of dialectics, “later” does not necessarily mean “better.” Moreover, it makes central the fundamental role of human agency in the process of change toward possible emancipation, because without “active resistance and constantly renewed struggle for freedom” the end of exploitation “will never appear.”

This should not be interpreted as an opposition to casual analysis however. For example, Patomäki’s notion of a “causal complex” enables a dialectical view on causality. What dialectics offers is a fuller account of causal links and their interrelation, which is generated through its methodology of abstraction and reintegration between the particular and the totality. As Suganami has suggested, accounts of causality are by necessity nonempirical, but theoretical. They involve counterfactuals that cannot be empirically proven, in that causal processes are not always deterministic but contingent on the context, that is, causal potentialities manifest themselves only when the requisite conditions are met contingently; any outcome is an outcome of a complex set of conditions and similar outcomes are realizable in different
ways, which means there is no clear-cut, one-to-one deterministic relationship between what is the cause and its effect.

A move to open-ended dialectics is a call not only to write history in a particular possibilistic framework but to actually view history in this light as a site of seemingly open-ended possibilities, the outcomes of which are reliant on our social relations, the totality of our conditions, and the choices we make.

Consequently we must be mindful to guard against making a fetish of dialectics as if it were something outside and beyond human action. The danger of the fetishization of dialectics is that it could lead to aporia—alienating the process of change away from ourselves and our capacities, toward metaphysical constructs outside of our control, or to grandiose assumptions of an inevitable human perfection. Under the purview of such alienating suppositions, history would become an external, uncontrollable force imposed from above rather than something that is socially constructed. The ends being produced by humankind would not be comprehended as being shaped by them and would ultimately break away from our consciousness to become reified. The danger of such a view is that dialectics may dissolve into a theory of social collapse, or of alienated processes of change, rather than of conscious social development and change. Instead, the dialectical method should be viewed as a way of thinking that brings into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world, that is, a method that can help illuminate the historical and social processes in world politics.

In this vein, an open-dialectical account intends to mediate complexity in the analysis of the social relations of world politics, where potentialities and their actualizations are held in a possibilistic framework that is reliant on social relations and, for that reason, are open-ended. It represents a “thinking map” where being and appearance are held in tension, where what was deemed obvious, permanent, or perfect is revealed as partial, transitory, and alterable. The dialectical approach favored here is clearly nonidealistic as it stresses the interrelation between all things and, in particular, the intersubjective relations between humanity as the social “materiality” or “causal complex” of social transformation. Change does not come out of the ether, and by taking social interconnections and flux as central, dialectics can tighten our analysis of social transformation in world politics.

Conclusion

To recapture the critical edge of dialectics we must rid it of the telos of inevitability and move to a conception in which negativity means a processual, but not automatically progressive, movement, so that history is never seen to terminate at one fixed position. To borrow from
Rosenthal, from a dialectical point of view “we never stop at any position because we never stop at all.” Here I will make a rare concession to Popper and agree that as the direction of knowledge cannot be predicted, we cannot therefore predict the future direction of history. Yet what Popper failed to offer was an account for the social forces that render history such as this an open-ended process. Similarly, Heidegger was essentially correct to avow the “indeterminacy of the future” but failed to recognize that this indeterminacy exists because social relations are themselves in dialectical process and therefore constitute anything but a “forgetfulness of Being.” In an analysis that improves on both Popper and Heidegger, while retaining their plea for openness, Michel Foucault rightly dismissed certain versions of dialectics as ways of reducing the always open and hazardous reality of social conflict to what he called “a Hegelian skeleton.” My argument can integrate this Foucauldian position through a reinvigorated conception of dialectics accepting of an “open-ended” (indeterminate) ontology of social conflicts—a dialectic which points to ongoing and socially contingent processes of change. It is not a “thick” conception of dialectics that assumes progress or predictability but is intended to involve a deliberate appeal to risk, uncertainty and, most of all, the importance (and contingency) of social action in the process of change. As such, the dialectical account here is indeterminate and open-ended but nevertheless possesses a means by which we can reflect on change, perceive how change is socially mediated, and potentially direct such change to emancipatory ends. So while the predictive abilities of dialectics are foreclosed, the capacity to direct immanent forces of change toward great human freedom clearly is not. My claim is therefore less grandiose than the certainty of old Soviet-styled dialectical-materialism but nevertheless retains the possibility of investigating and promoting the conditions under which systemic transformation may trend toward greater human freedom. While the outcome is not inevitable or predictable, and though we can never safely extrapolate from one historical experience to another, dialectical analysis is both a tool for historical investigation post factum, and can identify present locales of emancipatory possibilities.

This argument should not be taken to mean that we are doomed to regression and conditions of irrationality and unfreedom. The claim that the dialectic is open-ended and dependent on social forces does not commit me to the view that no future progress toward emancipation is possible, but rather that this very possibility is dependent on humanity and the agency of each individual, conditioned as they are by, and in, circumstances not of their own choosing. Moreover it highlights that such change that does occur, inevitably will be one-
sided, partial, and susceptible to the same immanent critique regarding its internal inadequacy and thus itself will be subject to ongoing dialectical change. So while self-reflexive human beings are, in principle, able to understand their social relations (and any contradictions therein) and retain a degree of agency to change them, this does not necessarily mean that they will. Since the resolution of social contradictions is reliant on intersubjective relations, the outcome is inherently indeterminate and altogether contingent on human practices and actions. It is therefore open-ended.

Notes


3. For the so-called Right Hegelians, dialectics was mystified and brought all religious and political evolution to a close; For the Left Hegelians, the dialectic pointed to the fact of perpetual negation. See Frederick Engels, “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy,” in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), Vol. II, pp. 359, 365.


5. Hegel referred to negativity as “the soul of the dialectic.” Similar sentiments regarding the centrality of negativity, though stated with less idealism, are also found in Marx, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. See David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 176ff.


13. I refrain from employing the notion of the triad and other mechanistic interpretations of dialectics as they tend to reduce the importance of human praxis in social change. While the triadic form may valuable as an initial heuristic device, it hinders more than it helps in more advanced conceptualizations of dialectics.

14. As Bernstein and McGilvary have noted, this is not a mechanistic process, for the thought of the negative has an element in it the thought of which negates it, and hence the negative (when thought) presupposes the positive. So too does the positive presuppose the negative which remains implicit or latent in it. This is why I argue in section two for the unity or mutuality between positivity/negativity in dialectics. For a discussion on this point see E. B. McGilvary, “The Presupposition Question in Hegel’s Logic,” *The Philosophical Review* 6, no. 5 (September 1897), pp. 515–516.

15. The term *aufhebung* means “integration,” where the higher-level concept integrates the logic of the lower ones. As described by Terry Pinkard, this movement in the Hegelian dialectic is from noninclusion of the determining other (being), to partial inclusion of the determining other (essence), to full inclusion of the determining other (conceptuality); see Pinkard, “The Logic of Hegel’s Logic,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 17, no. 4 (October 1979), p. 424.


17. This is why Hegelianism is better described as “objective idealism” rather than “idealism,” because the mind conceptualizes objects and cognition mediates the objects of thought. See Pinkard, “The Logic of Hegel’s Logic,” note 15, pp. 428–430.

18. As explained by John Hibben, Hegel’s use of the terms “negation” means the process of negative reason that denies the primary thesis; absolute negation is the process of overcoming this contradiction by another thesis that denies the previous view and therefore constitutes a higher point of view. See “Introduction” in John Grier Hibben, *Hegel’s Logic: An Essay in Interpretation* (New York: Scribners, 1902).


20. Note there are differences between dialectics in logic, which deals with contradictions in thought, and dialectics in social relations that deals with relations of contrariety or real oppositions. See Lucio Colletti, “Marxism and the Dialectic,” *New Left Review* 93 (Sept.-Oct. 1975); and M. Setterfield,
“Keynes’ Dialectics,” unpublished manuscript (Trinity College, Hartford, CT, 1996).


27. Ibid., p. 14.

28. Ibid., p. 49.


30. See Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, note 4, pp. 56, 32–33.


36. Ibid., p. 21.

37. Ibid., pp. 26–27.

38. Ibid.

39. The monist caricature of Hegel fails to acknowledge that Hegel does not hold reality to be a mere extension of logic. The move to the Realphilosophie, the philosophy of nature, takes place at the end of the logic and is viewed as an “autonomous domain” where natural things are not seen as “thoughts or thoughtlike” but are “distinctly and irreducibly non-logical.” Hegel acknowledges that there are aspects of the real that cannot be brought to thought and hence acknowledges the limits of his systematic philosophy. See Maker, “Identity, Difference and the Logic of Otherness,” in Grier, Identity and Difference, note 8, pp. 25–27.

40. This discussion is of fundamental importance because it is only through the double transition that we can see that identity does not subsume difference, or vice versa, within the dialectical process. Williams offers an ex-
42. Ibid., pp. 56, 32–33.
43. As Hegel writes; “But correct as it is to affirm the unity of being and nothing, it is equally correct to say that they are absolutely diverse too—that the one is not what the other is.” Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, note 16, § 88R1.
50. Maker, ibid., p. 23.
51. Ibid., p. 24.
57. Williams offers an excellent discussion of how judgment relates to the double transition that can be entered fully into here. Suffice it to say that, if judgment asserts S is P, only identity is expressed; if, on the other hand, it is asserted that “S is not P” then only difference is expressed. This is not incorrect but misleading; it expresses identity while suppressing difference and thus distorts speculative truth. See Williams, “Double Transition, Dialectic, and Recognition,” note 8, pp. 42ff.
58. Ibid., p. 40.
59. Ibid., p. 43, quoting Hegel, *Science of Logic*, note 4, p. 834
60. Reciprocity refers to the sublation of mechanism and external causal-ity into the “higher unity” of organic life. Here terms that appear alien are seen as moments of one whole, “each of which, being related to the other, is at home with itself, and goes together with itself.” Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §158Z, quoted in Williams, “Double Transition, Dialectic, and Recognition,” note 8, pp. 48–49.


71. I use ‘Diamat’ here to distinguish those who write in the Soviet tradition of dialectics and which assume progressive stages of synthesis. Plekhanov was probably the first to use the term “dialectical materialism” in 1891. It was the first generation of Marxists after Marx’s death that used “Diamat” as a shorthand term that became popular in the USSR. See Tom Bottomore, et al., eds., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 120–121.


82. As stated by Smith for example, Hegel’s “epistemological utopia is


84. Smith, “U-Topian Hegel: Dialectic and Its Other in Poststructuralism,” note 82, p. 244.


96. Ibid., pp. 321 and 323.

97. Ibid., p. 329.


100. This should not be taken as advocating a minimalist conception of dialectics, that is, that it is valid only as a methodological tool. Questions of epistemological, ontological, and cosmological dialectics all inform extremely important debates that cannot be entered into here. On the question of ontological dialectics and the dialectics of nature/cosmology, see in particular Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), pp. 27ff. Michio Kaku provides a more recent attempt, see Kaku, *Hyperspace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 213.


103. “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered from the past. The tradition of


107. Ibid., p. 331.

108. Ibid., p. 331.

109. Ibid., pp. 327, 329.

110. Ibid., p. 328.

111. Ibid., p. 323.


117. Hegel suggests that war has been a factor that has furthered civilization toward freedom, but this does not necessarily constitute a celebration of war. Hegel’s reference to the “slaughter bench of history” can be interpreted as pathos, not glorification. The acknowledgment that freedom has been historically struggled for violently is not to favor such methods. See Steven Walt, “Hegel on War: Another Look,” in J. Stewart, ed., The Hegel Myths and Legends (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1996), 167. See also Errol E. Harris, “Hegel’s Theory of Sovereignty, International Relations, and War,” in Stewart, ed., The Hegel Myths and Legends, pp. 154ff.


119. See Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” in Easton and Guddat, eds., Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, p. 283.


127. Ibid., p. 163.

128. Adorno advocates a move from the discourse of reason and rationality to that of the concept. As Adorno writes; “Insight into the constitutive character of the non-conceptual in the concept would end the compulsive identification which the concept brings unless halted by such reflection. Reflection on its own meaning is the way out of the concept’s seeming being-in-itself as a unity of meaning.” Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, note 79, pp. 12, 161. See also J. M. Bernstein, “Negative Dialectic as Fate: Adorno and Hegel,” in T. Huhn, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3

129. For Bernstein, the “primary task” of negative dialectics is to break with the logical element of the “concept” (the idealist concept of the concept). Adorno’s negative dialectics is intended as an element in the undoing of “concept-intuition dualism” and by extension an elaboration of the notion of “material inference or implication.” The material inference is the claim that what connects two concepts is the specific content, not logical connective. Hence Adorno seeks to use negative dialectic to attempt to reveal how concept-concept relations are inextricably linked to concept-world relations. See J. M. Bernstein, “Negative Dialectic as Fate: Adorno and Hegel,” 37–38, 29, 42.


133. Adorno explicitly defines his enterprise in this manner: “To change this direction of conceptuality, to give it a turn toward non-identity, is the hinge of negative dialectics.” Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, note 79, pp. 24, 12.

134. While the negative dialectics of Adorno seems contradictory to the emphasis on the double transition discussed in Part I, it is being highlighted here to show how negative dialectics is in itself a form of the double transition. While Adorno was not reflective on this point, it seems consistent with his dialectical system and also the value he ascribed to dialectics, namely, to champion nonidentity against totalization.


140. For Adorno, negative dialectics treatment of the object (through its nonidentity) ultimately leads into what he called the field of tension between the possible and the real. See Adorno, “Sociology and empirical research,” in Adorno et al, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 69.
145. Ibid., p. 39, emphasis added.
155. Ibid., pp. 271–275.
156. Ibid., pp. 374, 381.
165. Ibid., p. 204.
In this sense, dialectical and “reflexive” thought are to be distinguished. While there is considerable overlap, and they are by no means mutually exclusive, dialectical thought grasps at forms in their interconnection not just determinate differences. Dialectics perceives the myriad of social relations not as an ineffable organism, but as a complex nexus of interrelated institutions and processes, of volitionally conscious and acting individuals and their dynamic relations. Accordingly, a dialectical perspective would contest the view of a reflexive relation of a “being equal to itself” without its placement within innumerable interconnections with the whole and with the “other.” See Bottomore, et. al., eds., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, p. 122; and Christopher M. Sciabarra, “Reply to Roderick Long: Dialectical Libertarianism: All benefits, No Hazards,” *The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 383.


Ibid., p. 22.


On this point Li Zehou’s work is most illuminating as he engages more fully with the relationship between Kant and Marx. See Woei Lien Chong, “Combining Marx with Kant: The Philosophical Anthroplogy of Li Zehou,” *Philosophy East & West* 49, no. 2 (April 1999): 120–149.


It should be noted that my meaning here differs technically from that of Howard, who reduces the open-ended nature of this dialectical process to one that stresses necessity. It also rejects his claim to republicanism over revolutionism. See Dick Howard, *From Marx to Kant* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).


188. See Heikki Patomäki, *After International Relations, Critical Realism and the (Re)construction of World Politics*, note 7.


190. Horkheimer warned against the danger of the “fetishisation of dialectics.” For him, dialectics can only be a loose set of principles and would be opposed to the strictures of a full-blown, totalizing methodology; see Horkheimer quoted in Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, note 88, pp. 54, 79.


193. As Lenin argued, the characteristic of idealism is the acceptance of the “generic,” the concept or idea, as a separate substance, that is clearly distinguishable from the dialectical approach advocated here. Lenin quoted in E. Shur, “The Theory of the Concept, the Judgment, and the Inference in Formal and Dialectic Logic,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 5, no. 2 (A First Symposium on Russian Philosophy and Psychology) (December 1944): 200.


