CHAPTER 6

Emancipation and the Limits of Marx’s Cosmopolitan Imaginary

Shannon K. Brincat

Every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man himself.

—Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question”

INTRODUCTION

The entire trajectory of Marx’s thought, from his doctoral dissertation concerned with the free-development of humankind’s self-consciousness to his critique of political economy that exposed the alienating conditions of capitalism, was committed to the goal of human emancipation. Marx viewed human freedom as the positive power to assert one’s true individuality: the active, self-directed unfolding of the totality of the individual’s— and humankind’s—capacities. As opposed to the liberal conception of emancipation defined purely negatively under the principle of noninterference, Marx extended the concept of freedom to include the development of individual powers and consequently devoted much of his work to conceptualizing the ideal form of community (both local and international) in which each individual had the means to cultivate their “gifts” in all directions. The social and economic spheres were thus integral to his vision. Indeed, the movement to communist society was predicated on Marx’s belief that this mode of socioeconomic organization could best provide the conditions necessary for the individual to be self-actualizing with, and through, all others. Yet it was not just the development of productive forces that was to bring forth the “realm of freedom.” Equally important were the fundamental changes in social relations between subjects
that would come about through the abolishment of private property across the globe. Marx’s vision demanded nothing less than a new social world, one that replaced a political economy centered on the accumulation of capital and extraction of value with one concerned with the direct realization of all radical human needs, the fulfillment of the multifaceted individuality of all persons. It is this cosmopolitan aspiration underlying Marx’s notion of emancipation however that has been routinely downplayed in Marxist literature and which this chapter intends to redress.

This chapter explores Marx’s vision of human emancipation through the concepts of species-being, defined as the full self-actualization of one’s individual capacities, and communism that Marx came to regard as the ideal socioeconomic association to bring about the conditions for the creation of the “all-rounded” or “rich” individual. This places Marx’s praxiological commitments for actualizing the potential of all human beings—the “totality of human manifestations of life”—as the key component of his vision of communist association that is a “stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation.” It is contended that Marx’s emancipatory vision remains inadequate because of the limited ethical sphere envisioned in communist society and the underdevelopment of intersubjectivity in cosmopolitan community that has become particularly pronounced in later Marxist accounts. If, as Marx suggests in the opening quote taken from “On the Jewish Question,” emancipation is the restoration of the human world and all human relationships to ourselves, then this totality must necessarily include social relations within the cosmopolitan sphere to make emancipation actual for all. I make two arguments in support of this thesis regarding the contraction of cosmopolitanism in Marx’s thought: (1) the relative underdevelopment of intersubjectivity as a result of the overemphasis on production rather than social relations in communist association; and (2) the curtailing of universality through privileging statist and internationalist forms of political community in opposition to cosmopolitan association. Ultimately, it is argued that full, human emancipation requires a more radical cosmopolitan imaginary than provided by Marx but which nevertheless remains latent in his thought.

**HUMAN EMANCIPATION AND SPECIES-BEING IN EARLY MARX**

The Kantian and Hegelian undertones in Marx’s aspiration of human emancipation are palpable. Marx called for the end of fractured human existence and, in the Kantian refrain, intended to actualize the “categorical imperative to overthrow all circumstances in which man is humiliated, enslaved, abandoned and despised.” Yet, similar to both Rousseau and Hegel, Marx considered attaining such freedom as a social achievement
that hinged on whether the individual related to itself as a universal being with, and through, all others. The variegated nature of an individual’s unique potential could only be realized socially, that is, where the full development of each was made compatible and reliant on the development and freedom of others. Whereas for Rousseau this social realm was to arise, somehow, from isolated individuals shackled together under the organicism of the “general will,” and whereas for Hegel sociality came about through the coercive institutions of the state working in concert with the “cunning of reason” above civil society, for Marx it was to come about through the self-determination of the species itself. This demanded a profoundly different philosophy than Kant or Hegel had hitherto provided—not one of a perpetual sundering of the is and the ought, nor of the postreflective judgment of Minerva who only begins her flight at dusk—but a conscious being making its own history, creating the conditions of its own self-emancipation.

Marx deployed emancipation both as an exhortative ideal for the immediate improvement in human conditions for which the working class, and the universal interest it represented, had a world to gain, and, as a tool of critique to condemn the alienation endemic to capitalist society. The difficulty is that Marx’s specific references to emancipation and communist society are tantalizing in their brevity and presented less systematically than most, if not all, of his other ideas. As many commentators have lamented, it is frustrating that Marx extrapolated so little on a concept so central to his entire thought. Nevertheless, from those passages on species-being, human emancipation and communism, we can infer Marx’s ideal in its positive, albeit, fragmentary form. Despite this definitional absence, and the fact that in his later years the term emancipation is not used as regularly as in his pre-1848 works, the writings of the so-called historic period (1861–1867) and beyond continue to express emancipatory themes so that the concept cannot be sundered from the artistic whole. The unalienated or “total man” of the Paris Manuscripts appears in Capital, and the Grundrisse confirmed that the themes of 1843–1844 regarding human emancipation remained central for the Marx of 1858. As such, Marx’s later writings assume rather than divorce themselves from the ideal of human emancipation and can be understood only in reference to this seminal theme, without which there would be no normative underpinning for his ideal of communist society or his critique of capitalism. This marked degree of continuity in Marx’s thought—as the vast majority of Marxian scholars now agree—can be read as a systematic, unified attempt to ground human emancipation in a new form of society immanent to capitalism.

Marx’s concept of human emancipation first emerged around 1843, well before his study of political economy, his turn to communism, or his discovery of the proletariat. Marx distinguished between various expressions
of emancipation, from the political (general and formal), to the emancipation of specific groups (particular and limited), and “full” or “human” emancipation that he favored. In his famous polemic against Bruno Bauer, Marx deployed the normative idea of human emancipation to highlight the limitations of formal emancipation through the state. While he did not define the concept, textual analysis suggests that emancipation referred to the formation of social conditions in which a person is self-directing in their “life,” “activities,” and “relationships” (a theme that re-emerges in Marx’s notion of non-alienated labor). What Marx designated as full, human emancipation connoted the restoration of the world and all relationships to humankind: the removal of all political, economic, and historical restrictions imposed on the potential development of humanity and every individual in it. Emancipation through communism embodied the “genuine resolution” of a true community and it is this substantive ideal that replaced Marx’s earlier calls for the radicalizing of democracy that he had discovered could only ever be merely formal. Where before 1842–1843 Marx had called for a new form of state that embodied “freer popular consciousness,” his later notion of human emancipation sought to move beyond the egoism of civil society and the institutions of even the most radical democratic polities. In this conceptual movement, we can see that Marx effectively overcame his earlier romanticized notion of democracy as a means to promote freedom in abstraction from the social, economic, and political relations it required. Nevertheless, his account of human emancipation, at this stage, lacked a specific institutional system for its attainment. Indeed, while adumbrating his ideas of human emancipation and species-being in the so-called transitional period (1842–1844), Marx remained critical of communist theory. It was only in the Manuscripts of 1844 that Marx began to embrace communism as the ideal socioeconomic form to realize human emancipation.

How Marx distinguishes human emancipation from existing political forms is critical for understanding his eventual move to communism. Human emancipation is presented by Marx as the sublation of political emancipation as espoused in liberal constitutionalism and the doctrines of the Rights of Man. In this movement, human emancipation both exposes the limits of formal, political equality and rises above the notion of freedom as egoism to what Marx called “social freedom.” Political emancipation confirmed the separation of state and civil society, the battle between egoistic self-interest and an ideal universality. It was neither a complete nor a consistent form of emancipation. The state could formally remove religious, property, or racial qualifications from the ambit of citizenship but this did not mean that people were really freed from them, or, that such differences disappeared from civil society to no longer effect private life. Rather, as the Rights of Man assumed atomized and mutually antagonistic civil relations, it could only serve to confirm the separation
of persons and not their universal association under citizenship. Freedom was reduced to a form of self-alienating individualism preoccupied with positive possession and negative rights, the ability to own and to contract, rather than a freedom of individual self-development expressed socially, in and through, others. Yet Marx did not therefore denigrate the value of political emancipation, or the civil rights that accompanied it. What he did was to reveal the fundamental limitations of this conception of freedom constrained as it was by egoism, private property rights and free competition that, rather than being the embodiment of freedom, suspended its individual expression.

In Marx’s view, political emancipation constituted the highest form of emancipation possible within capitalism and yet its bourgeois ontology actively precluded the expression of other—higher—forms of freedom, such as the freedom to develop one’s full capacities. Political emancipation mired itself in the granting of civil rights and formal protections (as exemplified in the French and American Constitutions), yet these so-called Rights of Man merely expressed bourgeois values of individualism and had little social about them. As in Bentham’s utilitarianism, these documents abstracted the modern shopkeeper as “natural” man, effacing the diversity of humanity under an essentialized type of particularity characteristic of capitalist society and its competitive ethos in which everybody “looks only to himself.” It was bourgeois personhood and not public citizenship that characterized the true and authentic man. In this way, political emancipation abstracted the real differences between the members of civil society and made them appear nonpolitical. The myth that the state was somehow representative of the common interest was based on the notion of the equality of citizenship. Yet formal equality did not abolish the material differences that divided them. The universality of citizenship was “unactual” or “unreal” because in their real existence, persons related to each other only negatively as competitors within civil society so that each led a “double life”: whereas in the state the person considered themselves a “communal being,” in civil society they were a “private individual” that treated others “as means” and reduced themselves “to a means.” The state was relegated to formal, negative activity that was impotent to combat the unsocial consequences springing from the asocial nature of civil society and the glaring material inequalities that rendered the equality of citizenship under bourgeois society a “colossal illusion.”

On its own, political emancipation could not overcome the egoism of civil society to draw all up to real equality under citizenship but it also undermined positive freedoms in relations of community and was thereby a barrier to fuller forms emancipation that could emerge through social power. By reducing freedom to the right of property, contract and the pursuit of self-interest, political emancipation inverted the idea of social
freedom so that relations with others were viewed not as realizations of, but as limitations to, one’s individualized liberty. This was a one-sided understanding of emancipation precisely because it was not based on the association of persons but on their radical separation. As liberalism considered that the only force that brought human beings together was “the gain and the private interest of each,” all that was left for individuals in their relations with each other was “to contract oneself out.” The ontological man assumed in this relationship was the “un-social man” that could only ever reproduce the contradiction between the particular and the universal. Political emancipation was not final or absolute but could only ever be a step in the ongoing process of emancipation. It could not restore the world and human relations back to humankind, just as it could not redeem or make possible the full creative powers of each individual. The limitations of political emancipation could only be sublated by actualizing “social freedom,” by “organising all the conditions of human existence on the basis of social freedom.”

The bourgeoisie’s push for political emancipation, particularly its opposition to the privileges of the nobility as the raison d’etre for its (momentary) revolutionary zeal, had appeared as general emancipation for all classes. For this moment, its aims corresponded to a universalizable but narrow aspect of emancipation. Yet while the “mass” were enthusiastic and interested in the bourgeois revolution for this reason, they did not find their actual interests but, in the end, only the “exclusive power and the political recognition” of the bourgeoisie’s “own special interest.” The rhetorical use of liberal ideals continued only so long as the bourgeoisie sought to erode the privileges of the nobility and ended soon after its capture of state power that it now wielded against the mass. The nature of bourgeois interest was unveiled in its unwillingness to overcome the forms of social injustice that resulted from unequal property rights that it now used the state apparatus—that it had wrested from the hands of the nobility—to formally protect. Instead of furthering the ideals of Liberté, Fraternité, Égalité, the now dominant class used political emancipation to capture and instrumentalize the state as the tool for the promotion of its own interests. In distinction, as would become clear in The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx sought to make such ideals realizable by stripping away the ideological veil of private property rights that hindered their full articulation.

Marx’s critique of political emancipation was also inextricably linked to his break with Hegel. While Marx shared Hegel’s deepest aspirations regarding transforming social reality into a rational order of freedom, this gave way when the harmony of Hegel’s ideal Reichstaat was revealed as sheer fantasy against the reality of bourgeois civil society. Marx subjected Hegel’s conception of the state to a rigorous ontological interrogation, finding that Hegel had merely celebrated its abstract and
speculative “idea” rather than its empirical reality.26 The problem centered on Hegel’s idealist reification of the state that had subjectivized its ideal rather than “active forms.” For Marx, not everyone could feel the independence and self-respect that Hegel assumed within civil society. This intrinsic defect in Hegel’s political program arose from the arbitrariness and egoism lying at the heart of the system that instead of instantiating the ideal of rational freedom, expressed only the interests of the most dominant sections within civil society. Hegel had provided the most complete expression of the philosophy and the state but it lacked any analysis of the state in its concrete existence including its “imperfection,” the “degeneracy of its flesh”—that yawning chasm between Hegel’s ideal union of particular and universal in Sittlichkeit and the atomizing swirl of egoisms in civil society. In Hegel, the state was deployed to subordinate the subjective freedom of individuals expressed in civil society to a higher authority in order to give concrete ethicality to the universal. Yet, Hegel’s specific institutions of the corporation and polizeie did not create the conditions for the flourishing of rational freedom he intended but were limiting conditions imposed externally upon it. The fact that Hegel saw these institutions as necessary to subordinate civil society revealed that the state could not achieve the ideal reconciliation of the universal and particular assumed by his ideal notion of Sittlichkeit but was instead a form of compulsion.27

For Marx, the contradiction between Hegel’s ideal state and the realities of civil society could be resolved only through the radical humanization of Sittlichkeit and the movement toward human emancipation in which each member of the ethical system possessed and exercised actual, rational freedom. In this sense, Marx offered not a rejection of the Hegelian ideal but a radicalization of its vision, an attempt to replace the “illusory form” of the Reichstaat by realizing its essence through “social power.”28 Here, the goal of establishing genuine, harmonious species-life called for nothing less than for the “revolution to be permanent” including overcoming all forms of domination and alienation, moving from mere political emancipation to human emancipation.29 This did not mean fortifying the state, or shackling the egoism in civil society to some fanciful universal, but the sublation of this antagonism itself. Political emancipation had created the demand that it be consistent with its own principles and had armed the mass with the political freedoms necessary for the movement toward full emancipation. What remained to be done, as stated by Bloch, was to transform liberty, equality, and fraternity of the purely political citizen into the “living energies of living men.”30 For Marx, human emancipation could be advanced only when the individual drew back the “abstract citizen” (that included both man in civil society and communal man) into itself, when the private and public essences of humanity were reunited.31 This required the conditions in which species-being could thrive.
So far, we have examined Marx’s normative commitment to emancipation through his critique of the Rights of Man, the bourgeois revolution, and the liberal state. In this context, full, human emancipation is a sublation of the contradictions in political emancipation. Yet this is only the negative overcoming of the political form in Marx’s dialectic of freedom, the positivity of which stems from the idea of species-being that Marx imputed with acute sociopolitical significance—something that could be attained only through human emancipation. The concept of species-being, developed from Feuerbach, had two chief connotations: the social basis of human consciousness and the understanding of ourselves as members of a species; and, the species’ powers, capacities, and needs unique to human-kind, including our potential as social (universal) beings. Species-being is manifested in the sensuous characteristics of being human that establish the framework in which human existence takes place and by the activities that can be achieved only by being human. It was in creating the social conditions in which species-being could be fully actualized—in Marx’s words, “bringing out” all our shared “species-powers”—that formed the normative underpinning of human emancipation. Both connotations of species-being (species-life and species-power) projected the necessity of a form of political community that had overcome the state/civil society duality and elevated life toward unified, social man.

Species-being remained Marx’s lifelong concern, prevalent in both Capital and the Grundrisse (even though it is employed less frequently) and was made the aim of communist society that was to provide the conditions in which the range of “life activities” were given the widest possible expression. Through social cooperation the individual “strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species.” This normative concept also underpinned Marx’s critique of capitalism given that capitalism’s principal defect was how it alienated species-being from humankind, precluding the full development of our unique capacities as individuals and the free expression of our life-activity as a species. This nexus between species-power and species-being meant that “free, conscious activity” were expansive notions that expressed humankind’s unique capacity for creativity and self-determination rather than simply labor. To be a species-being was to be endowed with the capacities to be consciously self-transcending, to re-make one’s own conditions, both individually and collectively. Humanity carried within itself the tools of its self-emancipation and Marx looked to how these potentialities could and ought to be manifested “under conditions most worthy of their human nature.”

As can be seen, species-being and human emancipation formed the nexus between Marx’s conception of freedom and his vision of communist society that was to realize them fully. The egalitarian liberty presupposed in the idea of species-being was to be realized by securing the right of all
human beings to the social recognition of their individual abilities and potentials, in a universal form of association that would bring about these conditions for all. Species-being forms the fundamental driver behind Marx’s account the type of social relations within this new form of communist association. In the Manuscripts, Marx identified species-being on both an individual and general level. Here, species-being as “a being for himself,” represented both an individual person and humanity as a whole, and could be actualized only through human emancipation that would give rise to the conditions in which “objective human relation[s]” could thrive. Here, through a process of reciprocal recognition, albeit one overdetermined by self-consciousness, the “I” can relate to all others humanly because all others now relate humanly to it. As Ollman has observed, this parallels similar accounts of recognition. Through this elevated form of consciousness arises an awareness of being part of humanity, the recognition of others as possessing needs and capacities similar to one’s own and, ultimately, the understanding of oneself—and all humankind—as free beings. Here, the recognitive dimensions to the concept of species-being regarding its inherent reciprocity and social awareness offer the primary resources for the revolutionary transformation of society toward a universal association. The question is whether the radicalism inherent to both human emancipation and species-being could be adequately realized in Marx’s projected ideal of international communism.

THE LIMITS OF MARX’S VISION OF COMMUNIST ASSOCIATION

For Marx, the realization of species-being and human emancipation was possible only through the collective effort of humankind and the full utilization of social power. Based on his notion of the interdependency of the individual in community, his vision was suggestive of the power of cooperation in enhancing the freedom of the individual: as social beings, it was only in “real community” that the individual had the actual means to “cultivate their gifts in all directions” and obtain their personal freedom “in and through their associations.” Ultimately, it was only in the nonalienated sphere of communism—where “universal intercourse” was controlled by all—that individuals would be in a position to achieve such “self-activity” without restriction to develop all their capacities. Marx considered communism a society in which the richest flourishing of human individuality could occur, because it affirmed the free unfolding of all unique capacities in genuine association with all others. It was for this reason that Marx committed himself to the complete abolition of private property because only this could open the space for a social realm of cooperative, free, and associated producers: a “social system free from social oppression and worthy of man.” Communism as a movement toward
human emancipation can be seen as the dialectical sublation of political emancipation—that had separated man’s private and communal self, and, that had abstracted the social basis of human freedom by reducing it to the pursuit of self-interest—as discussed in the “Jewish Question.”

Communism then did not refer solely to changes in the means of production but connoted the radical transformation of the totality of human existence. This view is typified in the Manuscripts and The German Ideology, where Marx described communist society as a place where each person felt at home, positioning notions of care, respect, self-worth, and recognition as central. What emerged was a vision of emancipation premised on two essential themes: a cooperative social sphere with the common ownership of the means of production and a society where the free-development of all had become “a tangible reality, a secular maxim.” Just as important as the freeing of labor time and the abrogation of private property was the association these changes would produce and the different forms of social relations they would foster. In this section, rather than explicating the content of the various models of communism Marx presented—something already addressed by Ollman and others—I wish to explore the type of association that Marx envisioned and how far his notion of community extended. Here, I draw out two of the ways in which Marx’s institutional account of communist association led to a restriction, rather than enrichment, of social relations between all human beings: firstly by an overemphasis on production that contributed to the determinism of Orthodox Marxism; and secondly, by neglecting cosmopolitan social relations in deference to the state and internationalism that served to contract the boundaries of ethical community.

The Contraction of Community through the Emphasis on Production Rather than Social Relations

For Marx and Engels there is a fundamental nexus between freedom and the manner of relations in society because it is only in “real community” that individuals can “obtain their freedom in and through their association.” As they affirm in The German Ideology, “[o]nly in community [has each] individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible.” This view was confirmed in the Grundrisse where Marx stipulated that human emancipation and the rich individual was conditional on the form of association in society. Communism was to be the means by which humankind not only brought exchange and production under their collective control but also the mode of their “mutual relations,” the relational conditions through which “the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being could arise.” The revolutionary dimension of communist society then lies not just in its potential to unfetter production but in its new form of
association that offers the recognition of all our unique needs and capacities and in making their full articulation the goal of social life.

This reciprocity between individuals within real community reveals the presence of a specific recognitive dimension in communist society that is reminiscent of the ideal, if not the letter, of Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology*. As Marx writes, in communist society “individual need” has become a “human need” to the extent—and on the condition—that “the other person as a person has become for [the other] a need.” Here, each individual recognizes their existence, and the existence of the other, as a “social being.” Only through the specific intersubjective relations unique to communist society can the all-rounded individual of Marx’s earlier writings emerge because only here are all persons affirmed in actual and direct association with each other. Indeed, “man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all.” The notion of “association” is therefore given transformative substance, gravitas, in Marx’s account of communism because it is not just in our workplace, productive activity, or free-time, but throughout the ensemble of social relations that we recognize and (re)produce ourselves, and each other, as rich human beings. The actualization of individual capacities within communism was paralleled with an increase in cooperative activities of humankind as a whole and Marx used terms such as “communal activity,” “communal consumption,” “real association with other men,” and the “direct expression of society” as indicative of the enhancement of relations of mutuality in communist society. These new social activities involved a heightened form of mutual recognition where one’s own “immediate activity” confirmed, at the same time, “his own existence for other men... and their existence for him.”

This emphasis on social relations is not just part of Marx’s political vision but fundamental to his ontology, from the concept of species-being to his method of political economy. For example, whereas Feuerbach’s conception of species-being was built on the ontological separation of human agents rather than their relationality within community (or, as Feuerbach expressed it, “on the reality of the distinction between I and thou”), Marx transformed this into an individual within a particular society. Here, “the essence of man” was not to be located in the hypostatized, isolated individual, abstracted from history and community, but was to be found in “its actuality,” that is, within “the ensemble of social relations.” Human beings, for Marx, exhibited their species-being, their essence, in and through their social relations. The centrality of social relations is equally present in “The Method of Political Economy” that Marx outlined in the *Grundrisse*. Here, Marx writes against the tendency to focus downwardly from the abstraction of macro-subjects (such as populations in classical political economy) to even “thinner abstractions,” for such approaches could only
ever arrive at the “simplest determination” of things because they do not consider how such phenomena ascend from “simple relations.” Only by the careful analysis of this ascendency of relations can we move from a “chaotic conception of a whole” to “a rich totality of many determinations and relations.” So while it appears that the “real and concrete” can be adequately grasped at the macro level, it is only by understanding the basic social relations that constitute them that the totality, in all its complexity, can be known.

The centrality of social relations to Marx’s thought is pervasive, extending to the cosmopolitan sphere—though, as we shall see in the last section, not forming a part of his political program. The key example is Marx’s reference to the “universal intercourse” between all persons adumbrated in *The German Ideology.* In this passage, Marx writes of the formation of global relations through the development of capitalism that overcome mere local attachments but which “produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the ‘propertyless’ mass,” “alienation” and “universal competition.” These deformed social relations of “universal intercourse” under capitalism are to be sublated through communism—specifically, the “universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse”—to bring forth “world-historical, empirically universal individuals” in place of alienated, local particularities under capitalism. The totality of social relations that Marx implies in the concept of “universal intercourse” is an expansive one and yet it is one that has since been typically misunderstood by those Marxist scholars who attach importance solely to overcoming the alienation of the property-less mass and bringing an end to generalized want. Yet the conditions of propertylessness, want, and alienation denote a relational absence within global capitalism, an absence not strictly reducible to augmenting material production without corresponding changes to how we relate to property and each other.

*The German Ideology* reminds us that it is not just the mode or function of productive forces but the relational conditions between persons in production that is of key importance for understanding the machinations of global capitalism as well as for human emancipation; indeed, they are two-sides of the same dialectical coin. World-historical individuals are interested in their emancipation from the same, universally alienating conditions of global capitalism as experienced within the context of their unique cultural/local situation in the world economy. Moreover, their interest is not only negative but finds its positive affectation in overcoming (aufhebung) existing forms of universal intercourse and making them social. Yet, it is the fundamentality of such global social relations within communist association that has been significantly downplayed in favor of a deterministic account of productivism that came to dominate the Second International, Dialectical Materialism, and Stalinism (or Orthodox Marxism). Some, based on Part II of *The German Ideology,* believed communism
to be solely reliant on the historical development of production; others on a myopic reading of *Capital*, believed that communism could emerge only beyond the realm of necessity, thereby equating emancipation with material abundance; and others still, lifting ideas out of the context of the *Gotha Programme* and adopting Engels’s later portrayal of communism that neglected any mention of the conditions of full human emancipation, presented the dictatorship of the proletariat as communism.57 Within all these models, full emphasis is placed on production, modernization, and industrialization to attain the place where “springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly.” And in each account therefore, freedom is not only made contingent on the level of production necessary to achieve it but is to be actively subsumed—at least initially—under this goal of production. Against this tide, the philosophy of intersubjectivity in human emancipation that Marx outlined failed to develop in any meaningful sense within radical Marxist currents, until recently.58

Instead of social relations, Orthodox Marxists came to emphasize the necessity of productive forces as structurally determinative of the process of social transformation, subsuming emancipation under industrial reorganization and interests of consumption. Yet such forms of communism appear just as one-sided as “crude” communism that Marx so vehemently dismissed because both neglect the positive sublation of private property that would allow for the reappropriation of “human essence through and for man.” To focus on material abundance as the determination of communism is to fall prey to the same bourgeois reduction of freedom to property, of mistaking acquisition of material goods for actual social freedom. Like crude communism’s ethic of absolute equality, wealth abstracted from the social goals of emancipation and species-being is but an alienated expression derived from purely economic categories that reflect the narrow demands of bourgeois society and its notion of possessory rights.59 Communism would not only remain constrained by bourgeois notions of property but would reproduce them. Such stages of development are not regarded by Marx as true communism, the form that has positively transcended private property relations and restored humankind to its “social” essence. Marx’s ideal was a humanity that was rich not because it had much but because it was much,60 a vision that is lost if emancipation is limited to wealth creation over the enhancement of social relations and the development of one’s capacities.

From the perspective of human emancipation, the totality of capitalism must be understood not by abstracting its beneficial development of productive forces away from how these same processes restrict the expression of socialistic forms of ethical life. In this regard, Orthodox Marxism’s emphasis on production is analytically defunct in at least two respects: it lacks an account of relationalism that can unfetter productive forces in the socialistic manner it so desires; and, its precommitment to the benefits
of development blind it to how capitalist relations are prohibitive to the emergence of social man. Marx is keenly aware of this and indeed, as we have seen, his critique of Hegel’s theory of the state was based on the premise that the class division of civil society precluded the functioning of Hegel’s ideal Sittlichkeit. Because capitalism orients production to exchange-value (profit) it cannot create social relations of mutual freedom but is a fetter upon the type and quality of social relations we can express. The pursuit of self-interest results in mutual indifference or direct exploitation of others that suspends any genuine association from emerging, and is the basis of capitalism’s systemic tendency toward the deformation of social relations. In place of wider solidarities, capitalism compresses the social sphere to one of unequal relations that in turn foster ideologies, consciousness, and interests that are focused on self-aggrandizement rather than mutuality. The end, Marx states obliquely, is “total isolation.”

This contradiction inherent to capitalist modernity is discussed by Marx throughout his writings. In Capital he refers to how the division of labor subsumes not only economics but all social spheres so that fragmented/alieneated individuals emerge everywhere—evidence of a global relational deficiency throughout the “entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market.” Marx had praised the French Socialists because they illustrated this process most clearly. Their critique revealed “the contradictions and unnaturalness of modern life not only in the relationships of particular classes, but in all circles and forms of modern intercourse.” These global contradictions of capitalist modernity are presented in their fullness in the Manifesto, between how capitalism spurs universal interdependence, intercourse in every direction, and gives a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption, while at the same time rendering developing countries dependent on civilized ones, exposing all workers to the vicissitudes of competition, and bringing “uninterrupted disturbance to all social conditions,” “everlasting uncertainty and agitation,” “naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.” Here, there is nothing left of social relations other than “naked self-interest,” and the “callous ‘cash payment.’” By fortifying these very social pathologies in order to reach material abundance Orthodox Marxism has the unwanted side-effect of distorting—if not entirely preventing—the formation of relations of solidarity that the turn to communism is predicated upon. If, as Marx claims in the Gotha Programme, we have to deal with communist society not as if it develops on its own foundations but “as it emerges from capitalist society,” that is, as something “stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges,” then we can discern why attempts at revolution through the production and abundance mantra of Orthodox Marxism have been doomed. For such movements cannot realize the socialistic presuppositions of community, solidarity, and association necessary to sustain the
turn to communism because its emergent ethical life is dictated by, and
unwittingly reproduces, capitalist relationalities.

There is a long historical and geographical trajectory to the painful ex-
pansion of capitalism that is lost if we neglect social relations in favor of
production. Far from being the harbinger of progress, the emergent capi-
talist society of the 18th century subverted new forms of communal rela-
tions from arising, just as it destroyed preexisting forms of the commons
within feudal society. Habermas speaks of “violent onset of a competitive
society” in terms of the breakdown of the family, neighborhood, and guild
relations that it prompted, the disappearance of which were “experienced
as a loss.” Yet the process effaced bonds of community not just in rural
areas or the West, but on a global scale across colonial and indigenous
peoples also. For Federici, in contradistinction to Orthodox Marxism,
capitalism arrested the rising tide of communalism and today requires
ongoing infusions of requisitioned capital through, among others, the
expropriation of women’s unpaid labor, the resources, knowledge, labor,
and lands of postcolonial states and indigenous peoples. Failing to rec-
ognize these contradictions in the dialectic of history, Orthodox Marxism
condemns communities in the periphery—and all future generations—to
some abstract template of historical development that compels the rec-
reation of the horrors of capitalist industrialization in order to achieve
emancipation. It also assumes that such peoples cannot be the agents of
their own freedom given existent levels of economic development. Such
beliefs mystify the nature of alienation in capitalism as a structural neces-
sity and willfully ignore other forms of emancipatory relations that either
preexisted or have survived alongside it.

Retrieving forms of social relations amenable to human emancipation
from the premodern and archaic periods became a noticeable concern in
Marx’s later studies. In particular he focused on how, despite their lack
of productive forces, precapitalist (particularly agrarian) communities re-
tained the kinds of relational resources necessary for communism which
had been lost in Western modernity. In Marx’s famous letter to Vera Zasu-
litch he affirmed the “natural viability” of the commune as a “direct point of
departure for the economic system towards which modern society tends;
it can turn over a new leaf . . . without passing through the capitalist re-
gime.” Within its type of social relations, he claimed, lay the “fulcrum” or
“element” of social regeneration, which was singled out as its “element
of superiority” over countries, which, despite their developed produc-
tive forces, were nevertheless enslaved by the capitalist system. Similar
themes are presented in his 1882 preface to the Manifesto where Marx
theorized that the Russian obshchina, as a form of “primeval common
ownership of land,” could complement the proletarian revolution in the
West. Surprisingly here, it was not the economically developed proletariat
that was given transformative agency but the relations of the common
ownership of land within the obshchina that could “serve” as the “starting point for a communist development.”

The Contraction of Cosmopolitan Community through the State and Internationalism

So far we have seen how Marx’s vision of emancipation and his critique of capitalism were far more relational than many of his Orthodox disciples took account. There were clear intersubjective dimensions to communist society and the way individual freedom was to unfold through the utilization of social power in genuine association. Conversely, it was the deformation of social relations that occurred under capitalism (dominated, as they were, by interests in profit and the extraction of value) that were the focus of his contempt. However, one question that has been consistently overlooked in critiques of Marx’s work concerns the adequacy of internationalism as a form of global political community for bringing about the conditions of species-being and human emancipation for all. If, as we have seen from the Grundrisse, the production of social beings and the rich individual is conditional on the form of association in community and if, as stated in The German Ideology, only in “a real community [can] individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association,” this question becomes critical to the actualization of human emancipation. As many have confirmed—Hobsbawm and Gilbert in particular—Marx’s horizon was firmly international, established on the principles of a unity of the class struggle globally and the simple laws of morals and justice in international relations. The point of institutional mediation between the individual and society was to be the nation-state; beyond it, solidarity was to be outwardly expressed through internationalism. Yet binding association to a national particularity threatens to reproduce the systemic limitations of both the nation-state and the international system upon the expression of human community. While much anarchist critique has been made of the problem of the state and the authoritarian use of political power that arises from Marx’s political commitment to it, the question I wish to pursue here is why Marx deemed internationalism a sufficient global form of ethical community for communist association, as opposed to a wider cosmopolitan ethic implied already in the normative concept of human emancipation.

Part of this question can be answered by understanding the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the process of emancipation, a stage that—returning to themes in The Holy Family and The Jewish Question—equated to the political emancipation of the working class, and the control of the state apparatus in, and by, its own interest. In the Manifesto, this phase is said to be marked by the establishment of democracy and the centralization of the instruments of production in the state, elements
confirmed in Marx’s *Address to the Communist League Manuscripts, Gotha Programme, and the Grundrisse.* On the one hand, Marx describes this notion of communal control as a form of social power that possessed the ability to transcend centralization and in its place develop an association. On the other, this stage embodied a strong centralization of state power in its own terms, with two key differences from the exiting bourgeois state being that it was to be an active rather than parliamentary body and that all delegates were to be immediately revocable. These dimensions were believed to restore the legitimate functions of the state to “responsible agents of society” and, in the place of the state, create “free and associated labor” and “co-operative production.” What prevents this phase from being emancipatory is that its “despotic inroads” against the right of property involve an instrumental use of state power in which the proletariat is ascendant. With the move to material abundance and social relations in which private property had not only been abrogated but forgotten, Marx believed these coercive functions or “political character” of the state would no longer be necessary—the only tasks left being administrative, public functions that would be placed in the hands of the vast association.

Marx’s commitment to the state was premised on raising it to the international level of interdependence and cooperation. As his comments on the cosmopolitan nature of the Paris Commune illustrate, Marx clearly expected the dictatorship of the proletariat to be worldwide phenomena, leading to what he elsewhere referred to as “united co-operative societies.” With the abolition of private property, the basis of the divisions in capitalist society and in the society of states would cease to exist. Yet while there would no longer be a division between states, nations, and natural diversity of the species, this did not mean the creation of a world state or a Kantian federation of states. There was to be no world parliament or army, and as Ollman has observed, aside from the global coordination of production, no world executive. Rather, communism sought to liberate from national/local barriers the connections between the “material and intellectual production of the whole world” so that all people were “in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man).” Through communism, the “world-historical co-operation of individuals” would achieve “the control and conscious mastery of these powers.” Marx placed much emphasis—and hope—in this ever-expanding international union of workers and the reduction of national antagonisms that would go along with it.

The problem inheres not just with the capture of state power that threatens the subversion of emancipation under a new ruling-class but equally the reliance on internationalism that is supposed to override the radical particularism of the state to make emancipation fully human. This tension was played out in the First International. Its proclamations implored workers of the world to unite, for all citizens to be “declared free and
equal, without reserve,” and that “The poor have no country.” Marx’s membership and fraternity were open to all because “the emancipation of labor,” it claimed, was “neither a local nor a national, but a social problem, embracing all countries in which modern society exists.” Yet at the same time, it remained committed to nationalism affirming in 1872 that true internationalism “must necessarily be based upon a distinctly national organization” and that the first duty of each member organization was “to establish their own national independence.” Only in this way, it was believed, could the workers of the world “act together in harmony for their common emancipation.”

There is a clear tension then between Marx’s formal commitments to internationalism and a far more expansive cosmopolitan ethic operating within his notion of human emancipation. The problem has since been how to reconcile the national form of struggle with the totality implied in Marx’s vision of human emancipation. The First International’s rather limited goal of promoting fraternal bonds by acting as a medium of communication between member organizations meant that this contradiction did not arise sharply. As stated by Marx, the International “gives the greatest play to local energy and independence. In fact, the International is not properly a government for the working class at all. It is a bond of union rather than a controlling force.” Of course, Marx implied a far stronger form of international solidarity than what we today understand by the term. Indeed, his views on the emancipatory character of nationalism reflected the populist movements of the time that juxtaposed the old Europe of the Holy Alliance and its aristocratic privilege to the new Europe born of national liberation. Even though he would deride the nationalism of Mazzini and others as “nothing better than the old idea of a middle-class republic,” and long before the nationalistic violence of the 20th century and the increasingly xenophobic nationalism of today, Marx could still consider socialistic internationalism consistent with, and as part of, the emancipation of subordinate classes. Similarly, Marx’s belief that the “simple laws or morals and justice” could prevail in international relations reflected, in part, the relative stability of Europe between the Vienna Congress (1815) and World War I (1914). Nevertheless, his reliance on the nation-state and internationalism appears one of the most confused, if not contradictory, aspects of his entire political program: For if, as he so famously claimed in the Manifesto, the executive of the modern state is “nothing but a committee for the bourgeoisie,” then why did he permit the national ethos that it deploys to cloak itself in legitimacy, to form the boundary of future communist association?

The result is a political trap from which human emancipation cannot be extricated. On the one hand, subordinating human emancipation to national concerns made it prisoner to schemes of the national interest that are given a priori significance. Socialism is made to serve national
ends, rather than the converse. We see this dynamic being played out in many subsequent Marxist revolutions: Cuba’s radical nationalism under Castro that was more Martí than Marx; China’s political program that firmly wedded socialism to Chinese characteristics; or the Soviet Union under Stalin that came increasingly to rely on allusions to Great Patriotism that ended with the dismemberment of any semblance to the spirit of internationalism and a foreign policy that mirrored capitalist America. On the other hand, Marx’s commitment to methodological nationalism also limited how international solidarity could be institutionally expressed. Internationalism is logically dependent on some conception of nationalism, so that its referent is always the nation-state. The limits of internationalism are the limits of the national ideology that underpins it, that is, the belief that struggles at the national level are sufficient to achieve political objectives, even those to be externalized beyond the state. Marx’s prioritization of the national level of struggle was masked by rhetorical commitments to internationalism that hid this contradiction under the universal principles of solidarity, egalitarianism, and equality. Yet these same principles all gestured far beyond, and indeed required far more, than what even a socialist nation-state could offer. The International, committed to nationalism in its very name, was rendered largely impotent in such struggles because solidarity could arise only through national organs and be communicated outwardly. Yet individuals and groups—even the radical working class—confined to the state apparatus, do not dispose of any instrument of political action beyond the national boundary. Beyond legislative influence on foreign policy or executive power that remains firmly in control of the state, they were forced to rely on mere communicative iterations of solidarity.

This form of internationalism then made the mistake of viewing international politics in terms of the “pre-eminence of domestic policy,” with the goal of merely leveling up liberated domestic conditions to the international sphere. Such a view does not attribute any autonomy to the international political system but assumes liberation as a necessary consequence of the transformation of the internal structures of states—the internal transformation of which is then given precedence over all international forms of emancipation. Yet because nationalism gives priority to the independence of the state, principles of international solidarity must be sacrificed in the service of this end. Herein lies the “irremediable contradiction” between the aspiration of the equality of nations in the doctrine of internationalism and their actual political division. Not until the tragedy of World War I would this contradiction come to a head in the Second International. But the roots of this split in the working class lay in the reliance on forms of international, rather than cosmopolitan, solidarity that informed the flawed voluntarist presuppositions of the International. When the working class of Western Europe began to enter progressively
into national political life through democratization and socialization between 1870 and 1914, international solidarity was undone; for these political changes gave the worker a material interest in the power of the nation—and more problematically—an interest in asserting these national particularities over workers in other countries. As correctly observed by Levi, the “impotence of the Internationals in the face of war was not simply a casual episode, but the expression of a structural tendency.” Workers of the world could not unite because the form of solidarity they could express was bounded by a limited, juridical form of community that overrode universal, collective action.

So while Marx clearly aspired to move beyond parochial, local attachments of ethical life toward the universality of human emancipation, at the same time he fortified the national institutionalization of particularism that was supposed to wither away. In so doing, he rejected a form of social relations that could retrieve human emancipation from its contraction between the state and capital: cosmopolitanism. Marx viewed cosmopolitanism in one of two ways: something in the service of bourgeois free trade (“cosmopolitan exploitation”); or, as abstract principles of “justice or humanitarian sentiment.” Whereas “national emancipation” was something concrete and practical, cosmopolitan appeals to “universal brotherhood” were disregarded as vain idealism, or worse, a mask for bourgeois interests. In making this assessment, Marx made a crude reduction of this concept, foregoing analysis for ideology, and thus mistaking the expression of cosmopolitan social relations deformed under capitalism as the limits of human community. That is, he made the surprising mistake of ignoring completely an important sociological dimension to human life that he himself and helped expose in his economic analysis of global capitalism. For cosmopolitanism embodies those social relations that exist in the global sphere across and above state borders, the power of which Marx attested to in *Capital*. Here, Marx had traced the expansion of capitalism across the globe, how it created new forms of intercourse across nations, adding relational dimensions hitherto unknown to older forms of society. In this context, he suggested that because of the expansion of global capitalist relations, emancipatory struggle could no longer be confined to national walls. Viewed in this light, cosmopolitanism is not abstract but refers to the material relations of humankind across the globe; it appears sentimental or vague only when one does not understand the complexity of these material relations.

Yet it is exactly these types of social relations that Marx ignores in deference to national forms of intercourse, neglecting the political importance of the social conditions of human emancipation beyond the state. Focusing on the national dimensions of struggle without integrating them into an analysis of the “rich totality of many determinations and relations” was undialectical and led to a range of omissions in his political
program—omissions that Marx was elsewhere wary of. He wrote in *Gotha Programme* that the “framework of the present-day national state” exists within the economic “framework” of the world market, so that while the proletariat’s “own country is the immediate arena of its [class] struggle” this struggle is national not in content but in form. Yet he reversed this in his political program of the International, making the form of national struggles the content of internationalist solidarity. In this way, the long-term goal of human emancipation was bound to a bypassed form of solidarity no longer effective and soon irrelevant to the nature of human emancipatory struggle that had changed along with the changing nature of the state and capital. Even at the time of Marx’s writing, the solidarity shown by the working class surpassed that of internationalism. For example, the act of workers in Manchester who organized in opposition to Lord Palmerston’s attempts to intervene for the Confederacy in the American Civil War took the form of cosmopolitan solidarity not an internationalist one: British workers blocked the intentions of their own state not in support of American nationalism or the interests of the North, nor to either promote or hinder the state based protections of the British bourgeoisie, but to end slavery and promote the interests of universal labor.

Consequently, Marx’s endorsement of internationalism, rather than cosmopolitanism, can be seen as an incorrect practical application of his political ethics. For the normative model of internationalism exists in the contradiction between the real-politik that necessarily inheres between competing states and the cosmopolitan ethos it projects. As Burke has recently shown, by putting the statist ontology of internationalism into question, we can see that even socialist internationalism that professes incredibly strong cosmopolitan norms remains ethically insufficient because of its acceptance of the notion that human existence is determined by the nation-state. For human emancipation, the realization of the values of solidarity, egalitarianism, and equality can only ever be partially and imperfectly expressed within the state; national liberation can only ever be a stage in an ongoing process of emancipation. This problem requires nothing less than the sublation of the state: a movement that overcomes the contradiction between its particularity and its bounded form and actualizes those principles of solidarity, egalitarianism, and equality it presupposes as universal. There can be no boundaries between members in the ethical system of human emancipation.

**CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, we have seen that Marx’s vision of communism was premised on attaining a universal ethical community of human emancipation in which the unique species-being of each individual could flourish. This vision required at least two conditions: (1) economic conditions in
which “self-activity” corresponded with the “development of individuals into complete individuals” and (2) social relations that brought forth the “human essence” of “social power” through the “universal intercourse.”

Much has been made of the first condition regarding how communism sought to overcome all forms of alienation and replace them with social conditions that confirmed the “actual individual communal being,” the rich individual that is “total” and “all-sided.” Much less weight has been given to the requirements of the second condition and the type of social relations within full, human emancipation presupposed in Marx’s notion of association. This chapter revealed a number of limitations that Marx placed on human community, firstly by an emphasis on production within Marxist thought and secondly, by a reliance on the state and internationalism.

Just as capitalist relations were exposed by Marx as fetters on relations of production, so too are statism and internationalism fetters on the type of social relations that can be expressed across all humanity. By holding to this form, Marx unwittingly reproduced the same limitations he had criticized in the doctrines of political emancipation because communism bounded by the state and internationalism would still involve a separation of social power from humankind “in the shape of political power.” The aims of internationalism are then insufficient for the movement to the worldwide association of human emancipation. The weight given to internationalism over cosmopolitanism clouded the intersubjective social relations necessary to sustain human emancipation in a truly global communist association. Internationalism restricts expressions of global solidarity, by prioritizing national forms of solidarity in which internationalism can only ever be a secondary ethic. What must be reclaimed in cosmopolitanism is the essence of the truly global nature of human social relations, of world community, of humanity, of genuine association.

It is said that in the years prior to Marx and the slogan “Workers of the world, Unite,” the Communist League had inscribed upon its banners “We Are All Brothers and Sisters.” The project of human emancipation is better represented, and would be better served, by this cosmopolitan foundation. For the spectre that haunts must be one far beyond Europe, any national particularity, or international solidarity, it must be a new cosmopolitanism, an emancipatory one.

NOTES


5. Ibid., 275.


11. This idea of emancipation is also visible in some of Marx’s other early works where he relates the “true state” (an ideal Hegelian community) to a “free humanity.” Karl Marx, “The Supplement to Nos. 335 and 336 of The Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung on the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1, trans. Richard Dixon et al. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 292–306.


36. In a note, Marx comments: “In practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself humanly to the human being.” See Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” 303–306.
47. Marx writes in an idiom consistent with Hegel: “self-consciousness, is at home in its other-being as such. It is therefore—or if we here abstract from the Hegelian abstraction and put the self-consciousness of man instead of self-consciousness—it is at home in its other being as such.” See Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” 326ff.
64. The words are expressions taken from Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, ch. 1.
70. Marx, Grundrisse, 172.
Emancipation and the Limits of Marx’s Cosmopolitan Imaginary


85. Ibid.
90. Ibid., 185.
92. Marx’s dismissal of international brotherhood of peoples was a specific attack on the bourgeois pacifist International League of Peace and Freedom that promoted unlimited competition rather than its commitment to humanity. See Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, 21 note 14.
93. See Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ch. 31.
94. Hilferding, Modern Interpretations of Marx.

REFERENCES


