

Learning to Import from Your Peers*

Márta Bisztray
Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Miklós Koren
Central European University,
Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and CEPR

Adam Szeidl
Central European University and CEPR

June 21, 2017

Abstract

We use firm-level data from Hungary to estimate knowledge spillovers in importing through fine spatial and managerial networks. By identifying from variation in peers' import experience across source countries, by comparing the spillover from neighboring buildings with a cross-street placebo, and by exploiting plausibly exogenous firm moves, we obtain credible estimates and establish three results. (1) There are significant knowledge spillovers in both networks. Having a peer which has imported from a particular country more than doubles the probability of starting to import from that country, but the effect quickly decays with distance. (2) Spillovers are heterogeneous: they are stronger when firms or peers are larger or more productive, and exhibit complementarities in firm and peer productivity. (3) The model-implied social multiplier is highly skewed, implying that targeting an import-encouragement policy to firms with many and productive neighbors can make it 19% more effective. These results highlight the benefit of firm clusters in facilitating the diffusion of business practices.

*Emails: bisztray.marta@krtk.mta.hu, korenm@ceu.edu, szeidla@ceu.edu. We thank Krisztian Fekete, Gabor Nyeki, Jeno Pal, Balint Szilagyi, and Andras Vereckei for outstanding research assistance, Christian Fons-Rosen and seminar audiences for comments. Koren and Szeidl thank the financial support of the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) ERC grant agreements number 313164 (Koren) and 283484 (Szeidl). Bisztray thanks the financial support of the Lendület Grant 'Firms, Strategy and Performance' of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

1 Introduction

Imports have large positive effects on firm productivity (Amiti and Konings 2007, Halpern, Koren and Szeidl 2015), yet there is much heterogeneity in similar firms' importing behavior. One explanation for this heterogeneity is the presence of informal trade barriers, when specific knowledge or a trusted partner is needed for a productive import relationship. When informal barriers are active, importing may diffuse from firm to firm through personal and business connections. Mion and Oromolla (2014), Mion, Oromolla and Sforza (2016), Fernandes and Tang (2014) and Kamal and Sundaram (2016) document such diffusion for exports, but at present we have limited evidence on the—equally important—import side of the market.^{1,2} Are there knowledge spillovers in importing? If there are, what factors facilitate or limit diffusion? The answers can shed light on the puzzling cross-firm heterogeneity in importing and its productivity benefits; and can guide trade policy to exploit indirect effects.

In this paper we use firm-level data from Hungary to document and analyze knowledge diffusion in importing. In doing so, we make three main contributions. First, we develop a portfolio of empirical designs which rule out many alternative explanations and help advance the identification of trade spillovers in spatial and managerial networks. We address firm heterogeneity by identifying from source country variation, exclude spatial omitted variables by exploiting the precise neighborhood structure, and also use plausibly exogenous firm moves. We consistently find significant spillover effects. Second, we investigate the factors associated with stronger diffusion. We find that knowledge flows are stronger when firms or peers are larger or more productive. Knowledge flows also exhibit complementarities in firm and peer productivity, showing that beyond the number of connections, positive sorting can also increase the overall adoption of importing. Third, we demonstrate in a counterfactual analysis how network density and positive sorting combine to shape adoption patterns. We document that the model-implied social multiplier of importing is highly skewed in the number and type of peers, implying that import subsidies targeted at firms in buildings with many productive neighbors are much more effective.

¹ We review the literature on knowledge spillovers in trade in detail below.

² From the results on exports one cannot generalize to imports: finding a foreign supplier is probably easier than finding a foreign client, increasing the supply of, but decreasing the demand for, knowledge diffusion.

In Section 2 we present our data. We use a firm-level panel that contains rich information about Hungarian firms during 1993-2003. We combine three data sources: the Hungarian firm register, balance sheet data from the National Tax and Customs Administration, and trade data from the Hungarian Customs Statistics.³ The firm register contains, for the full universe of Hungarian firms, the precise address of the firm, all owners with their country of origin, and all firm officials with signing rights, as well as changes over time. As a result, we can trace changes in spatial and ownership links and the moves of people. The balance sheet data include additional information on the foreign ownership share and the industry of firms. And the customs data contain annual export and import flows at the HS6 product level for each firm, separately for each destination and source country.

Section 3 presents our first main contribution: the empirical strategy and results on import spillovers. The key identification concern with estimating spillovers is one common to studies of peer effects (Manski 1993): that a firm and its peer's import choices may be correlated for reasons unrelated to learning. For example, firms in a particular industry may make correlated location and import decisions. We address this endogeneity problem using two main research designs exploiting progressively narrower sources of variation, in combination with placebo tests and sample definition choices that rule out several omitted variables.

Our first research design is a linear probability model measuring the effect of peer firms' country-specific experience on a firm's decision about starting to import from the *same country*. We implement this design by including firm-year and country-year fixed effects, effectively exploiting variation within a firm in a given year: we ask if having a peer which has past experience with a given country increases the probability of starting to import from that country. To increase comparability we only look at four source countries similar in terms of imports: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Russia. And to ensure that all firms are the same distance from the border we only consider firms located in Budapest.

We use this research design to estimate knowledge diffusion in two networks: close spatial neighborhoods and managerial networks. We work with three types of spatial peers: firms in the

³While firm register and balance sheet data cover a longer period, we do not have access to detailed trade data after 2003.

same building, firms in the two neighboring buildings, and, as a placebo, firms in the two closest cross-street buildings. Peers in managerial networks are defined as firms from which an official with signing rights has moved to the firm of interest. To limit confounding effects we always exclude ownership-connected firms—defined as those which share an ultimate owner with the firm of interest—from the peer groups of interest.

Our first design yields significant positive import diffusion estimates. For neighborhood networks we document highly spatially localized spillovers. Having a same-building peer with import experience increases the probability of starting to import by 0.2 percentage points, which roughly doubles the baseline probability of starting to import from one of the four countries. The effect of neighbor-building peer’s import experience is only one-fifth as large; and the effect of cross-street peer’s import experience is insignificant and small. In managerial networks the same design yields spillover estimates which are twice as large as the same-building effect.⁴

This design addresses several omitted variable problems which often plague estimates of knowledge diffusion. Most directly, by exploiting variation across source countries it addresses the basic concern that importers tend to be connected to other importers. Specifically, in the absence of source country variation the firm-year fixed effects would soak up all the variation in peers’ import experience.⁵ In addition, our controls and placebo also address more subtle country-specific omitted variables. By controlling for ownership links, we remove omitted variables based on joint ownership. Results below show evidence on diffusion across industries, addressing concerns with same-industry clustering. Most important, the neighboring building versus cross-street building comparison rules out any remaining omitted variable as long as knowledge spillovers decay faster than the spatial correlation in that variable.

One remaining concern with our first design is that it does not make explicit the source of variation in peer firms’ experience, and therefore it may be subject to some unspecified—highly spatially concentrated—omitted variable. In our second design we address this problem by exploiting a concrete plausibly exogenous source of variation: firm moves. We conduct an event study of

⁴ The results for ownership networks are even larger, but because diffusion in ownership networks need not be an externality, our main focus is on the spatial and managerial findings.

⁵Mion et al. (2016) study the market- and product-specificity of *export* experience of managers moving across firms. They find similarly strong spillovers even conditional on firm-year fixed effects.

the impact of firms with country-specific import experience moving into an address where no such experience was present earlier. The move is a positive shock to local country-specific knowledge. We show that firms located in such an address start to import from the country known by the mover with a higher probability than from other countries, relative to firms in addresses where the mover had no such experience. Consistent with the logic of diffusion, the response of imports to the move is gradual. The magnitude of the estimate is comparable to that of our first research design. The consistency of the results identified in different networks and from increasingly narrow sources of variation further supports the knowledge spillovers interpretation.

In Section 4 we present our second main contribution: the heterogeneity of the spillover effect. We explore heterogeneity both to internally validate our estimates and to obtain lessons about mechanisms. We measure heterogeneous effects both by the characteristics of the firm and those of the peer, as well as their interactions. Focusing on same-building peers, we find that larger, more productive and foreign-owned firms benefit more from peers' import experience. Firms also learn more from peers which are larger, more productive or foreign-owned. And spillovers are also stronger when the peer is more successful in importing, or when more peers have import knowledge. These results are all consistent with the knowledge diffusion interpretation: better firms are likely to be both more receptive to information and more effective in passing it on, and higher-quality information or multiple sources should further increase the rate of diffusion.⁶

We then document that the strength of the spillover also exhibits *complementarities* between the firm's and the peer's characteristics. We show that high-productivity firms tend to learn even more from higher-productivity peers than low-productivity firms do. Similarly, we show that the effect of peers operating in the same industry or importing the same product category is significantly larger than that of other peers. At the same time, spillovers from peers operating in different industries or importing different product types are still significant. The results on complementarities are potentially quite relevant because they imply aggregate increases in importing from encouraging interactions between similar firms. Thus, in combination, our first and second main contribution indicate that both the number of connections and the extent of sorting create social gains in the

⁶ The effects are broadly similar but weaker for neighbor-building and managerial connections.

adoption of business practices.

In Section 5 we present our third main contribution: a counterfactual analysis to assess the policy implications of the estimated import spillover effect. Our results imply that spillovers should be stronger when (i) the number, and (ii) the productivity of experienced peers is higher. To quantitatively evaluate the combined impact of these forces, we compute the model-implied social multiplier effect of a firm entering into an import market, also taking into account spillovers over the next five years. We calculate the multiplier using the same-building estimate which accounts for heterogeneity by the productivity of the firm and its peers. Because the number and productivity of peers varies across the sample, we obtain a separate multiplier for each firm which has not imported yet from one of the four countries.

The results show substantial skewness in the social multiplier as a function of the number and composition of peer firms. In particular, we find that the five-year social multiplier is 1.03 for the median firm and 1.12 for the firm in the 90th percentile. Thus, while accounting for spillovers is not important for the typical firm, it is potentially quite important for a substantial share of firms. An implication is that there may be significant gains from targeting trade policies. We confirm this by showing that a targeted import subsidy policy treating firms for which spillover effects are largest can be 19% more effective than a non-targeted one. Because computing the indirect treatment effect only requires public information on firms' balance sheet and address, this policy is directly implementable. The result quantifies the benefit of clusters—especially of firms with high productivity—in facilitating the diffusion of good business practices.

Literature. We build on a literature on knowledge spillovers in trade, most of which studies the diffusion of exporting. An important part of the literature explores spatial spillovers. Early work focused on the diffusion of the decision to export, and obtained mixed results.⁷ More recent work studies the diffusion of specific knowledge, such as export experience with a particular country or product, and generally finds evidence for spillovers (Koenig 2009, Koenig, Mayneris and Poncet 2010, Poncet and Mayneris 2013, Castillo and Silvente 2011, Ramos and Moral-

⁷ For example, Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997), Barrios, Görg and Strobl (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Lawless (2009) and Pupato (2010) found negative results, while Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Lovely, Rosenthal and Sharma (2005), Greenaway and Kneller (2008) and Dumont, Merlevede, Piette and Rayp (2010) found positive effects.

Benito 2013, Mayneris and Poncet 2015). Using uniquely rich data on trade partners Kamal and Sundaram (2016) document the diffusion of concrete export partners. And Fernandes and Tang (2014) document export spillovers using for guidance a formal model that allows them to test specific predictions of the learning hypothesis.

All these papers define spatial neighborhoods to be cities or similarly large agglomerations. Our spatial spillover results improve identification by using substantially more precise measures of neighborhoods. When networking benefits decay rapidly in space (Arzaghi and Henderson 2008), spatial networks should be measured at a fine resolution to avoid confounding variation from omitted spatially correlated variables. Our results show that spillovers do decay fast, highlighting the relevance of our precise measures. More broadly, we also contribute to this literature by our focus on imports, our analysis of heterogeneous effects and the implications for targeted trade policies.

Another part of the export spillovers literature studies spillovers through managerial moves. These papers show that having a manager with prior export experience join the firm increases the likelihood that the firm starts to export (Choquette and Meinen 2015, Mion and Opromolla 2014, Mion et al. 2016, Sala and Yalcin 2015, Masso, Rõigas and Vahter 2015). We contribute to this work by focusing on import spillovers; by having a comprehensive study in which we compare spillovers in managerial networks to spillovers in spatial networks; and by our analysis of heterogeneous effects and the implications for targeted policies.

Concerning import spillovers, the only work we are aware of is Harasztosi (2011) and Harasztosi (2013), who estimates import spillovers in Hungarian NUTS4 agglomeration units. Our contribution to his work is to use more precise neighborhood definitions, a variety of empirical designs that limit confounding factors, a more comprehensive analysis of multiple networks, and the policy counterfactual analysis.

Finally, we build on a literature on network effects in economics, especially firm networks and diffusion in networks. Chaney (2014) builds a model in which firms can acquire trading partners through existing contacts; Fafchamps and Quinn (2016) and Cai and Szeidl (2016) show that managerial meetings can facilitate the diffusion of business relevant information; and Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Dufflo and Jackson (2013) explore network-based targeting of microfinance in the

presence of knowledge diffusion. Our study documents and analyzes these sort of network effects in the novel and important context of import spillovers.

2 Data

2.1 Data sources

We create our panel of Hungarian importers by combining data from three sources.

Firm registry 1993-2003. Data from the Hungarian Company Register contain basic information for the full universe of Hungarian firms, including the firm’s name, tax identifier, and precise address: zip code, city, street, number, floor and door number. These variables have associated start and end dates, allowing us to track firm moves over time. The registry data also contain information about the firm’s owners, and officials with signing rights which include directors, board members, the CEO, and some employees. As the employees with signing rights are usually at or near the top of the firm hierarchy, we sometimes—slightly imprecisely—refer to these people as managers. For firm owners the data contain the name and registry number; and for person owners and officials the name, mother’s name and home address. These records also have start and end dates. We use the name, mother’s name and address to create an anonymous unique identifier for each individual in the data. We use this identifier to track individuals across firms and over time. Our method allows for typos and slight variations in names, such as omitting the middle name.

Balance sheets 1993-2003. We have balance sheet data for all double-bookkeeping Hungarian firms from the National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary. These data also include the firm’s industry at the 2-digit NACE level (Revision 1.1), and the shares of its capital owned by foreign entities, domestic private entities, and the Hungarian state.

International trade 1993-2003. Detailed firm level trade data come from the Hungarian Customs Statistics. These data contain yearly exports and imports by each firm to and from each foreign country at the Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit product category. The reason that our sample period ends in 2003 is that the firm-level trade data are not available for later years.

We use unique firm identifiers to link these three datasets.

2.2 Main sample and variable definitions

Firm sample. We focus on imports from four countries that are comparable in terms of their exports to Hungarian firms: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia and Romania. To avoid variation in distance from the border, we use only firms with headquarters in Budapest, which account for over 20% of all the firms in Hungary. Accordingly, when a firm moves its headquarters out of Budapest, we let it exit from our sample. These exclusions result in our *main firm sample* which contains 211,598 firms and 1,189,402 firm-year observations.

We conduct most of the analysis using our *analysis sample*, a (firm, source country, year) panel derived from our main firm sample. In this three-way panel we only include observations in which a firm in the main sample has not yet imported from the given source country up until the previous year. This sample construction allows us to estimate the probability that a firm first *starts* to import from a particular country. We also make three additional exclusions. (1) We exclude firms for which the headquarters' address is missing, because for them we cannot define spatial networks. (2) We exclude firms which have more than 50 same-building peers to ensure that our results are not driven by large hubs. (3) We start the data in 1994 because separate trade data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia are only available starting 1993 and the analysis sample requires importer status of peers in the previous year.⁸ After these exclusions, the analysis sample contains 88% of the firms in the main firm sample and has 3,778,517 firm-year-country observations. About 5% of the firms in the main sample import from at least one of the four countries at least in one year during 1993-2003.

Variable definitions. We define the firm to have import experience with a a country in a year if it has imported from that country in that year or a previous year. This definition captures the idea that the firm has acquired import experience specific to that country by that year. We define experience with exports or with foreign owners in an analogous way. We classify a firm as foreign-owned in a year if it had majority foreign ownership that year.

We classify imported products by their purpose using the Broad Economic Categories (BEC)

⁸For the same reason we cannot include firms in the first year they appear in the data. We also exclude those observations—1550 firm-year pairs—in which the firm has no address data from the previous year and no spatial peers can be defined.

classification, as well as with an alternative classification proposed by Rauch (1999) into goods traded on an organized exchange, reference-priced goods and differentiated products.⁹

Using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology we estimate from the balance sheet data total factor productivity (TFP) for each firm in each year, assuming a Cobb-Douglas revenue production function with capital and labor as factors and materials as an input, allowing coefficients to vary by two-digit industries. We normalize log productivity within each 2-digit industry to have mean zero in our main firm sample. We then assign firms to productivity quartiles in each year t , based on the average of their yearly 2-digit-industry-specific productivity percentile over the years $t - 2$, $t - 1$ and t . Taking the average over three years reduces noise, and results in a smooth but time-varying productivity index.

2.3 Firm networks

A key ingredient in our analysis is data on peers in firm networks. We work with three classes of peers, defined based on spatial, personal and ownership connections.

Spatial peers. We use a highly localized definition of spatial connections. We create three different spatial peer groups. (i) Same-building peers, defined as firms with the same street address up to building number. (ii) Neighbor-building peers, defined for a firm with building number n as firms in buildings in the same street with numbers $n - 2$ and $n + 2$.¹⁰ (iii) Cross-street peers, defined as firms in buildings in the same street numbered $n - 1$ and $n + 1$. From all three peer groups we exclude firms which have an ownership link—as defined below—to the firm of interest in the given year. Because the address data has dates, all these peer groups are year specific.

Person-connected peers. We define a firm B to be a person-connected peer of firm A in year t if some person X is an official with signing rights of firm A in year t and was an official with signing rights of firm B at some earlier date. We will often focus on person-connections that can transmit import experience with some country c , which happens when firm B had import experience with c before person X left that firm.

In all person-connected definitions we exclude people with signing rights who are liquidators—

⁹The classification is available at http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/rauch_classification.html.

¹⁰Streets in Budapest have an even and an odd side.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	All firms	All importers from				
		any of the 4 countries	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Romania	Russia
Number of firms	211,598	10,575	5,807	4,534	3,534	2,005
Age	5.5 (3.8)	8.2 (5.7)	8.1 (5.6)	8.2 (5.8)	8.1 (5.1)	8.4 (6.7)
Number of employees	8 (229)	124 (1,515)	104 (1,558)	118 (1,422)	124 (1,637)	191 (2,073)
Log sales	9.0 (2.1)	12.1 (2.4)	12.2 (2.2)	12.1 (2.3)	11.8 (2.5)	12.1 (2.7)
Export share	0.04 (0.17)	0.14 (0.26)	0.12 (0.24)	0.12 (0.24)	0.15 (0.26)	0.21 (0.31)
Log total factor productivity	0.00 (0.96)	0.07 (1.08)	0.09 (1.04)	0.07 (1.07)	0.04 (1.08)	0.07 (1.22)
Share of foreign-owned	0.13 (0.33)	0.32 (0.47)	0.35 (0.48)	0.30 (0.46)	0.28 (0.45)	0.36 (0.48)
Share of state-owned	0.004 (0.060)	0.018 (0.134)	0.016 (0.127)	0.018 (0.133)	0.016 (0.126)	0.027 (0.162)
Number of distinct addresses	78,453	9,428	5,403	4,617	3,648	2,221

Notes: Sample includes firms with headquarters in Budapest, 1993-2003. We present log total factor productivity as a difference from the 2-digit industry average in Budapest. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

officials assigned to handle liquidation of the company—as well as people who are officials or owners of more than 15 firms in the given year. We also exclude from the set of person-connected peers firms which are likely to have shared decision makers with the firm of interest: those ever connected to the firm through ownership links (as defined below), and those that have the exact same address including floor and door number. But we do include peer firms which are located outside Budapest.

With slight imprecision, we sometimes refer to the person-connected network defined this way as the managerial network.

Ownership-connected peers. We classify firms A and B to be linked by ownership in year t if they have a common ultimate owner. This includes two types of connections: (1) when A and B have a direct or indirect common owner; (2) when one of the firms is a direct or indirect owner of the other. We also include peers located outside Budapest in the ownership-connected peer group of a firm.

Table 2: Number of firms and importers by year

year	Number of firms					
	total	importing from				
		any of the 4 countries	Slovakia	Czech Republic	Romania	Russia
1993	50,982	1,810	758	753	563	509
1994	63,592	2,702	1,225	1,175	754	675
1995	74,516	3,514	1,599	1,642	956	822
1996	86,702	4,197	1,905	2,029	1,127	937
1997	99,858	4,885	2,185	2,489	1,381	1,025
1998	113,366	5,530	2,410	2,916	1,631	1,137
1999	122,407	6,064	2,588	3,304	1,786	1,231
2000	133,031	6,578	2,784	3,683	2,018	1,292
2001	142,433	6,989	2,955	3,948	2,211	1,338
2002	148,574	7,305	3,095	4,207	2,382	1,365
2003	153,941	7,696	3,311	4,506	2,620	1,386

Notes: Sample includes firms with headquarters in Budapest, 1993-2003. Columns 3-7 report firms that have imported at least once by the given year.

2.4 Summary statistics

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the firms in our main sample. The first column refers to all firms in all years, the second column to firms in years in which they have already had import experience from one of our four source countries, and the remaining columns to firms with import experience from specific countries.

Comparing between columns 1 and 2 shows that importers are on average older, larger, more likely to be foreign owned, more likely to export, and have higher productivity than the industry average. These patterns are familiar (Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2009). The remaining columns show that importers from the four countries of interest are fairly similar in terms of all the variables in the table, consistent with our intuition that these source countries are roughly similar in terms of their associated import barriers.

Table 2 shows the number of firms and importers over time during our sample period. The rapid increase in the number of firms is likely due to the development of the capitalist economy in the 1990s. And the increase in the number of importers is probably a consequence of several factors: more firms, lower formal trade barriers, and a country more deeply embedded in the international economy. The considerable increase in importing shown in the table is a key source of variation for

Table 3: Number of peers in various networks

Number of peers (n)	Percent of firms in 2003 with n peers in				
	same building	neighbor building	cross-street building	person network	ownership network
0	22.3	31.0	49.8	86.7	48.4
1	13.3	13.7	12.4	8.2	19.5
2	9.0	8.5	6.9	2.5	10.3
3	7.4	6.2	4.7	1.1	5.9
4	6.1	5.3	3.7	0.5	3.6
5 or more	41.9	35.3	22.6	1.0	12.3
Average number of peers	8.4	5.2	3.3	0.3	4.7

Notes: Same building: the building of firm i with street number N . Neighbor building: buildings in the same street with numbers $N + 2$ and $N - 2$. Cross-street building: buildings in the same street with numbers $N + 1$ and $N - 1$. Person network: firms in which a current manager of firm i had signing right previously. Ownership network: firms having a common ultimate owner with firm i .

our analysis below.¹¹

Table 3 reports the distribution of degree (number of peers) in the different firm networks. The average degree—shown in the bottom row—is highest for the same-building network (8.4) and lowest for the the person-connected network (0.3). The neighbor-building and cross-street networks are between these two extremes (average degrees of 5.2 and 3.3) and although the latter is more sparse, have a roughly similar degree distribution. In all networks, a substantial share of firms are isolated, i.e., have zero neighbors. This heterogeneity in degree across firms is one key reason for our finding below that targeting import subsidy policies can substantially increase their effectiveness.¹²

3 Estimating import spillovers

This section presents our empirical strategy and results on the effect of peers' experience on a firm's import decision. Our main hypothesis is that importing requires source-country specific knowledge, which in turn diffuses in various firm networks. As a result, we predict that firms which—other things equal—have peers with experience importing from a particular country are more likely to start importing from that country.

¹¹ In Appendix A.1 we present additional summary statistics on firms' import patterns, including evidence that there is much independent variation in firms' import and export experience.

¹² Additional descriptive statistics about networks and imports are contained in the Online Appendix.

Table 4: Share of importers with experienced peers

(a) peers in same building			(b) peers in neighbor building		
Share of firms starting to import	Firm has peers with import experience		Share of firms starting to import	Firm has peers with import experience	
	only from country C	from any other country but C		only from country C	from any other country but C
only from country C	44%	18%	only from country C	34%	21%
from any other country but C	48%	78%	from any other country but C	61%	75%

(c) peers in person network			(d) peers in ownership network		
Share of firms starting to import	Firm has peers with import experience		Share of firms starting to import	Firm has peers with import experience	
	only from country C	from any other country but C		only from country C	from any other country but C
only from country C	45%	18%	only from country C	55%	14%
from any other country but C	44%	76%	from any other country but C	41%	82%

Notes: Table reports the share of firms starting to import from a specific country in all firms starting to import from at least one of the four countries and firms having peers in a given peer group with specific import experience. Weighted average across the four countries, with the number of observations in a country as weights. Sample includes firms starting to import from at least one of the countries and having at least one neighbor of the given type - one for each panel - with import experience from a specific country in the first column and from any of the other three countries - but not from that country - in the second. Percentages in a column do not add up to 100%, as we exclude those firms which start to import both from country C and from another country. See notes to Table 3 for the definition of networks.

We divide this section into three parts. We begin by presenting motivating evidence which highlights a key component of the logic for identification: variation in peers’ import experience across different source countries. We then present two empirical designs. The first design directly exploits this source country variation, and yields spillover estimates in both spatial and managerial networks as well as placebo estimates that confirm the logic of identification. The second design further improves identification for spillovers in spatial networks by exploiting plausibly exogenous firm moves.

3.1 Motivating evidence

Table 4 shows how we exploit source country variation in peers’ import experience. The table reports the probability of a firm starting to import from a particular country in a year, conditional on it starting to import from one of the four countries that year, and conditional on different

importing patterns of its peers. The four panels correspond to peers defined by the same-building, neighbor-building, person-connected and ownership-connected networks. Within each panel, the top row shows the share of firms which start to import from a country c , while the bottom row the share which start to import from a different country.¹³ The left column computes this share for firms with peers that have import experience with c but not the other countries; and the right column for firms with peers that have import experience with a different country but not c . We report the average share when c runs across the four countries, weighted by the number of observations per country.

The table shows that in each network, the share of firms starting to import from country c is always higher when peers have c experience than when peers have non- c experience. This fact suggests that peers' experience influences firms' import decisions and forms the basis for our identification strategy. We now turn to more fully develop this empirical approach and derive statistical inference, explicitly address confounds, conduct placebo analysis and incorporate additional plausibly exogenous variation.¹⁴

3.2 Research design 1: Peers' country-specific import experience

Our main specification is the following linear hazard regression equation

$$Y_{ict} = \sum_n \beta_n X_{ic,t-1}^n + \alpha_{it} + \mu_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict}. \quad (1)$$

Here i indexes firms, c indexes source countries and t indexes years, thus each observation is a (firm, source country, year) triplet. We estimate the regression in our analysis sample, which contains observations where firm i has not yet imported from country c before year t . The left-hand-side variable Y_{ict} is an indicator for i becoming an importer from country c in year t . On the right-hand side we include indicators for the presence of country-specific import experience in various peer groups n . Specifically, $X_{ic,t-1}^n$ is an indicator which equals one if there is at least one firm in firm i 's peer group n in year $t - 1$ which has import experience from country c at time $t - 1$, that

¹³ Percentages do not add to 100 as we exclude firms which start to import from both c and another country.

¹⁴ We present further suggestive evidence in Appendix A.1.

is, which imported from c in $t - 1$ or earlier.¹⁵ We use lagged peer experience because we expect information diffusion to take time. We consider the five different peer groups (n) defined in Section 2.3 above: (1) firms in the same building; (2) firms in the two neighboring buildings, (3) firms in the two cross-street buildings; (4) person-connected peers; and (5) firms in the same ownership network. Finally, α_{it} denotes firm-year fixed effects, μ_{ct} denotes country-year fixed effects, and ϵ_{ict} represents other sources of variation in importing.

Our main hypothesis is that, due to knowledge spillovers, $\beta_n > 0$ for the spatial and managerial networks. We also expect $\beta_n > 0$ for the ownership network, but in that network the mechanism need not be a spillover: it is also possible that the common owner’s knowledge causes firms in the network to import from the same country.

Because they play an important role in identifying our key coefficients, it is useful to discuss the fixed effects in equation (1). The firm-year fixed effects α_{it} control for any omitted variable driving import behavior which is specific to the given firm in the given year. This is a rich set of fixed effects, and the only reason it can be included is because the data have an additional panel dimension: multiple source countries. In particular, estimating equation (1) in the absence of data on source countries, or with a single source country, would not be feasible because the firm-year fixed effects would soak up all the variation in the dependent variable. In this sense the key β_n coefficients are identified from source country variation. An implication is that standard firm controls, such as sales, employment, ownership status, or other balance sheet variables need not be included in the regression, since they are already picked up by the firm-year effects. In turn, the second set of fixed effects μ_{ct} pick up country-year specific variation, for example business cycle fluctuations in a source country that might affect the supply of imports. Due to their presence, we do not need to include country-specific controls such as the exchange rate or GDP of the source country.

Beyond import spillovers, slightly modified versions of equation (1) can also be used to estimate other kinds of spillovers. We will look at cross-activity spillovers where on the right-hand side of

¹⁵ Subsequent specifications will reuse the notation for variables Y , X , and coefficient β with slightly different meaning. To minimize the risk of confusion, we will explain the notation of each estimating equation directly after it is introduced.

the equation we measure peer firms’ experience in a different domain, such as exporting or having a foreign owner; and (in Appendix A.4) we will also use a variant to present evidence on export spillovers.

Identification. Since equation (1) is essentially a peer effects regression, the main threats to identification are those highlighted by Manski (1993): endogenous peer groups and correlated omitted variables.¹⁶ Endogenous peer groups might arise because of clustering or because of peer choice. An example in the spatial network is when firms from one industry, or “high-type” firms, tend to both co-locate and make similar import decisions, creating spurious correlation between $X_{ic,t-1}^n$ and ϵ_{ict} . An example in the managerial network is when a firm hires a manager because of her or his import knowledge. And an example of correlated omitted variables is when particular physical locations are better for importing from a country c , perhaps because they are close to c .

Our first research design addresses these concerns in three main ways. (1) Source-country variation. By using this variation we address the basic concern that importers tend to be connected to other importers. As discussed above, if we were to estimate equation (1) ignoring the source of imports, the firm-year fixed effects α_{it} would soak up all the variation. The implication is that remaining threats to identification must be based on country variation: for example, if certain types of firms tend to import from certain countries and co-locate with each other. (2) Sample definition. We use comparable source countries; firms based in Budapest; and we omit ownership-based links from the spatial and managerial networks. Our sample choices mitigate several concerns. Because the source countries are similar, it is less likely that “high-type” firms import from one, while “low-type” firms import from another. Because all firms are in Budapest, omitted variables based on distance from a country are muted. And by removing ownership links we address the concern that correlated decisions may be driven by a common owner. In addition, by focusing on imports we limit the concern of endogenous manager choice as knowledge of importing seems less likely to be a driver of hires than for example knowledge of exporting would be. (3) Placebo spatial peers. Perhaps the most convincing component of our design is that by exploiting the fine spatial structure we can compare same-building and neighbor-building spillovers with a cross-street “placebo spillover”.

¹⁶ We do not face the reflection problem because we focus on the effect of peers’ *past* import experience on the firm’s import decision.

As long as spillovers are more spatially concentrated than the omitted variables—an assumption consistent with the results of Arzaghi and Henderson (2008)—estimating higher β coefficients for the closer spatial networks is evidence for knowledge diffusion.

For the above reasons we feel that the most plausible confounds are accounted for by our current research design. Still, a possible concern is that, because the design does not make explicit the source of variation in peer firms’ experience, it may be subject to some remaining—highly spatially concentrated—omitted variable. In the next subsection we address this concern by combining the current design with plausibly exogenous variation in peer firms’ experience due to firm moves. Although that approach requires weaker identification assumptions, it can only be used to estimate spillovers in spatial networks. We therefore begin the analysis with the current design to demonstrate that knowledge spillovers about imports are present quite broadly across different types of networks.

Results. Table 5 reports estimates of regression (1). In this and all subsequent tables reporting regression results, coefficients are measured in percentage points. To account for spatial correlation in the error term, in all specifications we cluster standard errors by building.

Column 1 focuses on spatial spillovers. The estimated effect of having a same-building peer with import experience is a significant 0.22. Intuitively, having a peer with experience importing from a particular country, e.g., Slovakia, increases the probability that the firm starts to import from that country by 0.22 percentage points. For comparison, the baseline probability that a firm starts to import from a specific country is 0.19 percent; thus having a peer with experience importing from a country more than doubles the probability of entering that import market. Column 1 also reports that the estimated effect of having a peer with import experience in a neighboring building is a significant 0.04. This is a fifth as large as the same-building effect, and shows that while spillovers to neighboring buildings are also present, their intensity declines rapidly with distance. The cross-street spillover effect is an even smaller and insignificant 0.03. This result lends support to our identification strategy: if a spatially correlated omitted variable was driving our estimates, we would expect that variable to also affect firms in buildings across the street. Taken together, these estimates strongly support the presence of spatial spillovers in importing.

Table 5: Effect of peer experience on same-country imports

Dependent variable: starting to import	Type of other experience					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Exporter (5)	Owner (6)
Import experience						
Same-building peer	0.22*** (0.03)			0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
Neighbor-building peer	0.04** (0.02)			0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Cross-street peer	0.03 (0.02)			0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Person-network peer		0.46*** (0.09)		0.44*** (0.09)	0.43*** (0.09)	0.43*** (0.09)
Ownership-network peer			0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)
Other experience						
Same-building peer					0.03 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Neighbor-building peer					0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Cross-street peer					-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Person-network peer					0.07 (0.08)	0.25 (0.29)
Ownership-network peer					0.14*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.07)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—as defined in Table 3—with country-specific import or export experience—column (5)—, or with owners from the country—column (6)—in the previous year. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Column 2 reports the analogous estimate for the person-connected networks. Having a firm official who had prior experience importing from a country increases the probability of importing by a significant 0.46, or almost half a percentage point. This estimate is twice as large as the same-building spillover effect. The larger magnitude seems intuitive: same-building diffusion is likely to be more limited because interactions between members of different firms are probably less common

and less intense. In contrast, for person-connected spillovers, interactions are all but guaranteed since the manager now works for the firm.

Column 3 shows the analogous estimates in the ownership-connected network. Here we estimate an even larger coefficient of 0.54. Importantly, this coefficient cannot be interpreted as a knowledge spillover because it is likely partly driven by a common owner making sequential import decisions for her or his firms. Indeed, the reason we include this specification is to show that controlling for the common ownership channel—which we do by excluding ownership-connected firms from the other networks—is important to convincingly document knowledge spillovers in spatial and managerial networks. Column 4 shows that including all three types of networks in the same specification has negligible effects in the estimates, indicating that the different networks represent genuinely different spillovers. We conclude that there are significant import spillovers in both spatial and managerial networks.

In the final two columns we extend equation (1) to also include spillovers from different types of foreign experience in the peer group. Specifically, we explore whether having peers, in any of the networks who have *export* experience with a country (column 5), or who have been *owned* by entities from a country (column 6), affects a firm’s import decision. If importing from country c requires knowledge specific only to country c , then we expect similar coefficients for these cross-activity effects; but if importing also requires knowledge specific to the activity of importing then the estimates should be smaller. The results seem more consistent with the second hypothesis: although the coefficients continue to be positive, they are generally smaller and less significant. While general experience with a country also matters, import-specific experience with the country appears to be the more important driver of knowledge diffusion about importing.

3.3 Research design 2: Peer moves

In our second research design we use one specific, plausibly exogenous source of variation in peer knowledge, which is created by firm moves. Focusing on the same-building spillover, we explore the effect of a peer with particular import experience moving into the building on a firm’s subsequent import decision. This design has power because moves are quite frequent, with more than 25%

of the firms in our main sample moving at least once.¹⁷ As it is unlikely that the mover would internalize the effect of its import experience on other firms in the building when it chooses its location, we can plausibly assume that country-specific experience brought by the mover is an exogenous shock for the local firms. Similarly, the owner of the building might want to attract good firms, but not firms with specific import experience.

We estimate the impact of moves using an event study, in which the event is when a firm moves from another address into a building. The sample consists of (i, c, t) , that is, (firm, source country, year), observations where firm i is located in a building in some year t which is subsequent to some other firm j moving in the same building. The event is the earliest date at which another firm moves into the building of i . To limit the confounding effects of preexisting neighbors, we restrict the sample to observations in which no incumbent firm in the building had import experience with the country c prior to the event. We do not require that the mover firm j has import experience with the country c .

Using this sample, we estimate the following regression equation


$$Y_{ict} = \sum_{\tau=1}^5 \beta_{\tau} \cdot D_{it}^{\tau} \times X_{ic} + \sum_{\tau=1}^5 \gamma_{\tau} D_{it}^{\tau} + \alpha_{it} + \mu_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict}. \quad (2)$$

Here Y_{ict} is an indicator for firm i having imported from country c in some year up to and including t . D_{it}^{τ} is an event-year indicator which equals one if the mover firm came to the building of i exactly τ years before t ; and the $\tau = 5$ category also includes those observations in which the move occurred more than 5 years ago. X_{ic} is an indicator for the mover firm having had import experience with country c by the time of the move. As before, α_{it} and μ_{ct} denote firm-year and country-year fixed effects and ϵ_{ict} denotes the error term.

In this specification the coefficients γ_{τ} measure the baseline dynamics of importing from a country c following a move by any firm. The coefficients of interest are the β_{τ} which measure the additional gains in importing when the mover had prior experience with country c . Because of the firm-year fixed effects, similarly to the previous research design, this regression is also identified from variation across source countries.

¹⁷ We present descriptive statistics on moves in Appendix A.4.

Figure 1: Effect of experienced peer moving into building on same-country imports



Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs with the firm located in a building where a new mover arrives, and where no firm has imported from the country before, observed in years after the move. The solid lines show the estimated difference in the number of importers τ years after the move in buildings with movers having country-specific import experience vs with inexperienced movers. $\tau=5$ includes 5 or more years. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval, with standard errors clustered by building. Panel (a) shows estimates without fixed effects and panel (b) shows the same estimates including firm-year and country-year fixed effects in the regression.

Figure 1 presents visual evidence from the event study by plotting the estimates of β_τ together with their 95% confidence intervals. The first plot shows the results from the specification without fixed effects, while the second from one that includes the full set of fixed effects. Although the point estimates in the second specification are somewhat lower, and the standard errors wider because of the large increase in the number of controls, both specifications show the same basic pattern: a gradual and eventually significant increase in the probability of importing from a country subsequent to a new neighbor with country-specific import experience moving in. The fact that the increase is gradual is consistent with the idea of knowledge diffusion.

Considering the more conservative fixed effect specification the insignificant first-year effect of 0.12 percentage points increases to a significant 0.78 percentage points after four years.¹⁸ These estimates have the same order of magnitude as the estimated same-building effect of 0.22 percentage points in research design 1, but highlight the importance of explicitly considering the dynamic response of moves. The pattern revealed here serves as one motivation for examining the dynamic

¹⁸See Table A9 in Appendix A.4.

response of import subsidies in the counterfactual analysis of Section 5 below.

In summary, our research designs 1 and 2, exploiting different sources of variation, different networks, as well a placebo design, consistently yield evidence in support of the presence and economic relevance of the knowledge diffusion hypothesis. For completeness in Appendix A.2 we present a range of additional specification and robustness tests - changing the sample and the definition of connecting people - which further confirm the basic patterns identified here. We conclude that knowledge spillovers in spatial and managerial networks play an important role in shaping firms' import decisions.

3.4 Benchmarking magnitudes

To get a better sense of the magnitude of the spillover effect here we compare it to two benchmarks that have been explored in the literature. As our first benchmark we use export spillovers, the existence of which was documented by Mion and Oromolla (2014), Fernandes and Tang (2014) and Kamal and Sundaram (2016) among others. To make this comparison meaningful, we use the same data and empirical approach: we employ our identification strategy 1 to also estimate export spillovers in Hungary. Table A10 in Appendix A.4 presents the results. Both the patterns and the magnitudes are similar to our import spillover results. For example, the same-building effect is 0.16 percentage points, the neighbor-building effect is 0.04 percentage points and managerial peer effect is 0.37 percentage points. Relative to the baseline hazard of starting to export, 0.21, these estimates correspond to an increase in export probability of 76%, 19% and 176%, while the analogous numbers for the increase in import probability relative to its baseline of 0.19 are 116% , 21% and 226%. Export spillovers, like import spillovers, are also highly concentrated in space. We conclude that diffusion of knowledge about importing is about as strong as diffusion of knowledge about exporting.

As a second benchmark we ask what increase in firm productivity would predict the increase in the probability of importing created by knowledge spillovers. In our sample the probability of starting to import from a country is 0.19% for not-yet-importer firms in the lowest productivity quartile, 0.28% in the second quartile, 0.47% in the third quartile and 0.58% in the highest quar-

tile. Consequently, the estimated same-building import spillover effect of 0.21 percentage points is comparable to the predicted increase in the probability of starting to import as a firm moves from the second to the third productivity quartile. This result further confirms the economic significance of the estimated import spillover effect.

4 Heterogeneity and Mechanisms

In this section we investigate the heterogeneity of import spillovers by firm and peer characteristics. We focus on same-building spillovers because these were the strongest and most cleanly identified.¹⁹ We first explore heterogeneous effects separately by firm and peer characteristics, and then investigate how the interaction between these characteristics influences the strength of diffusion. This analysis yields lessons about the mechanism of spillovers, highlighting the potential benefits of clusters and targeted policies, which we then quantitatively evaluate in the counterfactual analysis of Section 5 below.

4.1 Strength of diffusion by firm and peer characteristics

Firm heterogeneity. We estimate heterogeneous effects by firm characteristics using the following regression, which is a modification of research design 1:

$$Y_{ict} = \sum_{h=1}^H \beta_h \cdot X_{ic,t-1}^{sb} \times I_{it}^h + \text{controls}_{ict} + \alpha_{it} + \mu_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict}. \quad (3)$$

Here h indexes firm categories by a characteristic, such as productivity quartiles; and I_{it}^h is an indicator which equals one if firm i in period t is in the particular category h , such as the highest productivity quartile. The variable X^{sb} is an indicator for peers' import experience in the same building network. Accordingly, the coefficients β_h measure the effect of peers for firms in category h . For completeness, the controls include the analogous interactions of the category indicators with import experience in the four other networks (neighbor building, cross-street building, managerial

¹⁹ In the Online Appendix we include the corresponding heterogeneity results for spillovers in other networks.

Table 6: Heterogeneity of peer effect by firm characteristics

Dependent variable: starting to import	Firm groups by		
	size	productivity	ownership
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Same-building importer peer			
Group 1	0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Group 2	0.62*** ^o (0.12)	0.20*** ^o (0.05)	0.81*** ^o (0.11)
Group 3	1.45*** ^o (0.29)	0.38*** (0.07)	
Group 4	3.32*** ^o (0.87)	0.61*** ^o (0.09)	
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience in the previous year, interacted by firm group dummies. Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. Firm group 1 is the lowest category in columns (1) and (2), with size cutoffs 5, 20 and 100 employees, and productivity quartiles by 2-digit industry. In column (3) group 1 is domestic and group 2 is foreign firms. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. ^o denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from that of previous group at 5%.

network, owner network).²⁰ As usual, α_{it} and μ_{ct} denote firm-year and country-year fixed effects and ϵ_{ict} denotes the error term.

Table 6 reports the results from estimating heterogeneous effects by firm size, productivity and ownership. Column 1 focuses on size measured as employment, and categorizes firms into four groups. Group 1 includes those firms with at most 5 employees, group 2 those with 6-20 employees, group 3 those with 21-100 employees and group 4 includes firms with more than 100 employees.²¹ The coefficient of 0.07 percentage points shows significant spillover effects for the smallest firms in group 1. The subsequent coefficients imply that the spillover effects for larger firms are larger than that for firms in group 1, and are increasing in the firm’s size category. T-tests show that the

²⁰ Omitting these controls have small effects on the reported results.

²¹In all three columns we include firms having no information on the specific firm characteristic in group 1. The estimated patterns are robust to putting these firms in a separate firm group.

difference between the estimated coefficients of subsequent groups is significant at 5% in each case (denoted by \circ in the table). Larger firms are more likely to respond to import knowledge in their building.

Column 2 reports heterogeneous effects by firm productivity quartile, defined using our TFP estimates introduced in Section 2. Here we find no spillovers for firms in the least productive group, but significant and increasingly strong spillovers in the higher productivity quartiles. The coefficients of subsequent groups are significantly different in two of the three cases. Finally, in column 3 we look at ownership: group 1 represents domestically-owned firms and firms without information on ownership, while group 2 represents foreign-owned firms. Spillovers are significant in both groups and significantly larger for foreign firms. Taken together, these results suggest that absorptive capacity (Lychagin 2016), which is more likely to be present in larger, more productive, and foreign firms, is important for the adoption of import knowledge.

Peer heterogeneity. To estimate heterogeneous effects by peer type, we use

$$Y_{ict} = \sum_{h=2}^H \beta_h \cdot X_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(h) + \text{controls}_{ict} + \alpha_{it} + \mu_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict}. \quad (4)$$

Here too we create categories for a characteristic, such as size, and $X_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(h)$ is an indicator for having a same-building peer with import experience which is in category h . Thus β_h measures the effect of having a peer in category h . The controls include the analogous variables for the other networks.

Table 7 reports the results. Column 1 shows spillovers by peer size, using the same cutoffs of 5, 20 and 100 employees already used above.²² Spillovers are significant even from peers in the smallest group. Although the differences are not significant at 5%, the point estimates show that spillovers are larger when peers are larger, except for peers in the highest quartile where the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. Column 2 shows the analogous specification using peers' productivity quartiles. Here too, spillovers are always positive, and point estimates are larger for higher productivity groups. The difference between the third and fourth quartile is significant.

²² As before, we assign peers for which we lack information on the specific characteristic to peer group 1.

Table 7: Heterogeneity of peer effect by peer characteristics

Dependent variable: starting to import	Peer groups by		
	size (1)	productivity (2)	ownership (3)
Same-building importer peer			
Peer in group 1	0.17*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)
Peer in group 2	0.26*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.40*** ^o (0.05)
Peer in group 3	0.35*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.04)	
Peer in group 4	0.15 (0.10)	0.34*** ^o (0.05)	
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience in the previous year, separately for each peer group. Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. Peer group 1 is the lowest category in columns (1) and (2), with size cutoffs 5, 20 and 100 employees, and productivity quartiles by 2-digit industry. In column (3) group 1 is domestic and group 2 is foreign peers. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. ^o denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from that of previous group at 5%.

Finally, column 3 shows significant spillovers from domestic peers and significantly larger spillovers from foreign peers. Although the coefficients in this table are slightly less precisely estimated, their general pattern strongly suggests that the import knowledge of larger, more productive and foreign firms is more likely to be adopted. These firms may be more successful importers or more trusted peers, both of which would imply that their practices are more likely to be adopted.

Quality of experience. To specifically investigate whether diffusion is stronger from “more successful” importers, we next consider heterogeneous effects by the recency and length of the peer’s import experience. We start with a measure that defines a peer as a “successful” importer from country c in year t if it has imported from c in at least two years within the three-year period $[t - 1, t + 1]$. Column 1 in Table 8 shows that successful importers have an additional

Table 8: Heterogeneity of peer effect by peer success in importing

Dependent variable: starting to import	Recent successful experience	Length of experience measured by	
		total number of years	number of recent years
Specification:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Same-building importer peers			
All peers		0.17*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
Successful importer peers	0.35*** (0.05)		
Other peers	0.20*** (0.03)		
Longest additional import experience		0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience in the previous year. In column (1) separate indicators are included for successful peers—importing from the country at least twice in the period $[t - 2, t]$ —and for peers with other import patterns. In columns (2) and (3) we include additional indicators instead, measuring the length of peers’ additional import experience in years. We use all years when the peer with the longest experience imported from the country in column (2), and only recent continuous experience, allowing for single-year gaps in column (3). Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. \circ denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from that of the other group at 5%.

diffusion effect relative to peers with different import patterns, consistent with the idea that these importers have more valuable knowledge. In column 2 we measure success with the length of peer import experience, measured as the maximum number of years during which a peer firm imported from country c minus one. And in column 3 we report a similar specification in which length of experience is the longest continuous import experience allowing for single-year gaps. Consistent with our hypothesis, both of these specifications show that longer import experience by the peer is associated with higher adoption.

Number of peers. Finally we explore whether having more peers with country-specific import experience increases the probability of importing. Simple models of diffusion would predict such

Table 9: Effect of peer import experience by number of peers

Dependent variable: starting to import		
	(1)	(2)
Number of same-building importer peers	0.20*** (0.03)	
X same-building importer peers		
X=1		0.17*** (0.03)
X=2		0.36*** ^o (0.06)
X=3		0.82*** ^o (0.14)
X>=4		1.02*** (0.21)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are the number of previous-year peers with country-specific import experience in a given peer group in column (1), and indicators for the firm with X number of such peers in the given peer group in column (2). All peer types defined in Table 3 are included, but only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. ^o denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from that of previous group at 5%.

an effect as with more peers there are more opportunities for the firm to learn the import-specific knowledge. We consider a specification in which the effect is linear and use the number of peers with country-specific experience as a right-hand side variable. Column 1 of Table 9 shows that increasing the number of experienced peers in the same building by one increases the average probability of import entry by 0.2 percentage points. Column 2 presents similar results from a more flexible specification in which we separately estimate the effect of having exactly k experienced peers in a specific peer group. These coefficients are comparable in magnitude to the 0.2 effect of the linear specification, and given the standard errors we cannot reject that in this range the number of experienced peers linearly increases the probability of importing.

Taken together, the above results reveal plausible heterogeneity in knowledge spillovers: diffusion is stronger when firms are better, when peers are better, when the quality of knowledge is higher, and when there are more learning opportunities.

4.2 Interaction between firm and peer characteristics

We turn to explore how firm and peer characteristics interact in shaping diffusion. Interaction effects are potentially important because their presence indicates that sorting firms can further increase the adoption of good business practices.

Productivity complementarities. We explore complementarities between firm and peer productivity using the following specification

$$Y_{ict} = \beta \cdot X_{ic,t-1}^{sb} + \beta_{hl} \cdot X_{ic,t-1}^{sb} \times I_{it}^h + \beta_{lh} \cdot X_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(h) + \beta_{hh} \cdot X_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(h) \times I_{it}^h + \text{controls}_{ict} + \alpha_{it} + \mu_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict}. \quad (5)$$

For simplicity we just use binary indicators to proxy for productivity, let h stand for high-productivity and l for low-productivity firms, and let I_{it}^h be an indicator for firm i in year t being in the high-productivity category.²³ Since $X_{ic,t-1}^{sb}$ is an indicator for import experience by (any) peer while $X_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(h)$ is an indicator for import experience by a high-productivity peer, β measures the spillover to a low-productivity firm from a low-productivity peer, β_{hl} and β_{lh} the marginal gains in the spillover from increasing the productivity category of the firm or the peer, and β_{hh} the complementarity effect of interest.

Table 10 shows the results from estimating this regression. Column 1 reports a specification in which high productivity is defined as the top quartile in the productivity distribution. The fact that the coefficients of the non-interacted indicators of high-productivity firm and high-productivity peer are positive and significant is familiar from the previous subsection. The key novelty in the specification is that the coefficient of the interaction between high-productivity firm and high-productivity peer is a significant 0.5 percentage points. In column 2 we change the definition of the indicator for high-productivity firm to be above the median of the productivity distribution. The patterns obtained here are similar, and in particular the coefficient of the interaction continues to be significant and positive. From these results we conclude that there are statistically and economically significant complementarities between firm and peer productivity for the adoption of good business practices.

²³ We include firms with missing productivity data in the low-productivity group.

Table 10: Complementarities between peer and receiver firm productivity

Dependent variable: starting to import		
Definition of high-productivity:	top quartile	above median
	(1)	(2)
Same-building importer peer		
All peers	0.10*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
All peers X High-productivity firm	0.29*** (0.10)	0.17** (0.08)
High-productivity peers	0.13*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
High-productivity peers X High-productivity firm	0.50*** (0.18)	0.40*** (0.11)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience in the previous year, separately for high-productivity neighbors and also interacted with high-productivity firm indicators. Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. High-productivity is defined as a 3-year average TFP above the 75th percentile of the 2-digit industry in column (1) and above the 50th percentile in column (2). The baseline firm group also includes firms having no productivity data. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

A key implication of these results concerns the benefits of sorting. Because of positive complementarities, sorting firms by productivity in a given neighborhood structure can generate aggregate gains in the overall adoption of good business practices. This force is conceptually distinct from the basic result of Section 3 that more firm-to-firm links increase importing: the point here is that by changing the sorting between firms and peers we can further increase adoption rates.

To empirically show the distinct effects of the number of peers and the quality of the match in a single regression, we next estimate

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{ict} = & \beta_{ul} \cdot N_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(l) \times I_{it}^l + \beta_{hl} \cdot N_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(l) \times I_{it}^h + \\
 & + \beta_{th} \cdot N_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(h) \times I_{it}^l + \beta_{hh} \cdot N_{ic,t-1}^{sb}(h) \times I_{it}^h + \text{controls}_{ict} + \alpha_{it} + \mu_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict} \quad (6)
 \end{aligned}$$

where $N(l)$ is the number of low-productivity and $N(h)$ is the number of high-productivity peers,

Table 11: Complementarities between peer and receiver firm productivity with peer effect increasing in the number of peers

Dependent variable: starting to import	
	(1)
Number of same-building peers	
Low-productivity peers X	0.12**
Low-productivity firm	(0.05)
High-productivity peers X	0.16***
Low-productivity firm	(0.04)
Low-productivity peers X	0.31*** ^o
High-productivity firm	(0.07)
High-productivity peers X	0.73*** ^o
High-productivity firm	(0.13)
Firm-year FE	YES
Country-year FE	YES
Observations	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are the number of low- or high-productivity peers of a specific type—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience, interacted by a productivity group indicator for the firm. Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. High-productivity is having a 3-year average productivity above the 75th percentile of the 2-digit industry. The low-productivity group also includes firms having no productivity data. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. ^o denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from that of previous group at 5%.

I_{it}^l is an indicator for firm i in year t being in the low-productivity category, and controls include the analogous interactions for the other four peer groups.

Table 11 shows the results, using the top productivity quartile for the definition of high-productivity firms. The positive and significant coefficients show that spillovers are positive for any firm type and peer type, so that having more knowledgeable peers increases the probability of importing. And the fact that β_{hh} is much larger than the other coefficients shows the complementarity effect: diffusion is stronger when both the firm and the peers are more productive. We will use this specification in the counterfactual analysis of Section 5 when we quantify the implications of these two forces.

Same-industry and same-product effects. We then turn to explore whether spillovers are larger between same-industry firms, and within a given imported product category. For same-industry effects our strategy is to include separate indicators for experienced peers operating in the same

Table 12: Effect of peer experience within industry and product

Dependent variable: starting to import	same industry		same product			
	All firms (1)	Manufacturing firms (2)	Consumer goods (3)	Industrial supplies (4)	Capital goods (5)	Parts and accessories (6)
Same-building importer peer						
with different industry/product	0.17*** (0.02)	0.36*** (0.12)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
with same industry/product	0.59*** ^o (0.09)	1.00** (0.44)	0.17*** ^o (0.03)	0.17*** ^o (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.18*** ^o (0.03)
Not yet importer from destination	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	376,739	3,821,755	3,805,958	3,828,759	3,829,629
Baseline hazard (in %):	0.19	0.41	0.07	0.11	0.05	0.05

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. Column (2) contains only manufacturing firms. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience in the previous year. Separate indicators are included for peers in the 2-digit industry of the firm or in a different industry in columns (1)-(2), and peers importing the same or different product categories in columns (3)-(6). Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. In columns (3)-(6) only imports in the given product category are considered, both for creating the sample and defining the dependent variable. Products categories follow the BEC classification: BEC 1 and 6 are consumer goods, BEC 2 and 3 industrial supplies, BEC 41, 51 and 52 capital goods, and BEC 42 and 53 parts and accessories. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Baseline hazard refers to the share of importers in the estimation sample. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. ^o denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from that of previous group at 5%.

2-digit industry as the observed firm and operating in different industries. We do this for all networks, but only report the results here for the same building network. Column 1 of Table 12 shows that same-building peers have a larger effect if they operate in the same industry as the firm. Relative to the significant different-industry spillover of 0.17 percentage points, the same-industry spillover is larger by 0.42 percentage points. Column 2 shows a similar pattern for the restricted sample of manufacturing firms, but perhaps due to the reduction in power the difference between the effect of the two peer types is not significant any more. The positive and significant cross-industry spillovers mitigate identification concerns related to clustering by industry. And the larger same-industry spillovers highlight the societal benefit of sorting firms based on industry for increasing the overall adoption rate of good business practices.

To measure import diffusion within product category, we modify our specification in two ways. First, we estimate separate regressions for each product category, using a sample of observations in which the firm has not yet imported the given product category from a specific country, and including as controls indicators for whether the firm has imported before other product categories from that country. Second, our right-hand side variables are indicators for “same-product importer peers”—that is, peers which have imported in the past the given product category from the specific country—and “different-product importer peers”—that is, peers which have only imported in the past different product categories from the specific country—. The last four columns of Table 12 show the results for each of four product categories defined based on the BEC categories. The effect of peers in both groups are significant and same-product spillovers are higher in all the four product categories. The difference between same-product and cross-product spillovers is also significant in three out of the four categories. We conclude that spillovers are larger within a product category, which is intuitive if part of importing knowledge is product-specific and further strengthens the argument about sorting firms based on industry to maximize spillovers.²⁴

5 Counterfactual policy analysis

In the presence of spillovers, policies that encourage firm trade can have additional indirect effects through a social multiplier (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 2003). And when spillover effects are context-dependent, so is the size of the multiplier, opening the possibility that targeted trade policies generate larger social gains. In this section we use our estimates of the import spillover effect in a counterfactual analysis to explore how the size and composition of a firm’s peer group shape the social multiplier.

Our goal is to compute the model-implied effect on the number of importers of a non-importer firm’s exogenously induced entry into importing. To do this we assume that import spillovers follow a simple diffusion model, with parameters given by our above estimates. For simplicity, in the model we only allow import spillovers between peers in the same building. We assume that the

²⁴ In the Online Appendix we also explore a related specification in which we show that conditional on a firm starting to import from a country, it is more likely to import the product category in which its peer has had import experience.

probability that a non-importer gets “infected” is linear in the number of importing peers.²⁵ We allow the diffusion probability to depend on both the sender and the receiver firm’s productivity type, measured with an indicator which equals one if the firm is in the highest productivity quartile. We also allow firms to become importers independently of spillovers, with a baseline probability which is constant over time and across source countries, but can depend on the firm’s productivity type. We assume that all spillover and baseline adoption realizations are independent from each other and over time. Given these assumptions, the model generates a Markov process, and we can track its dynamics, for each building, with four state variables: the number of importer and non-importer firms, for each of the two productivity categories, in the building.²⁶

To parametrize this model we use the estimates from specification (6), reported in Table 11, which gives different spillover estimates by firm and peer productivity category. We calculate baseline probabilities by firm productivity category using the subgroup of firms which have no experienced peers in the same building. Starting from an initial year s which we set to 2003, we then compute dynamics in the diffusion model over a five-year horizon separately for each firm located in a building in which there is at least one other non-importer peer. In this calculation we assume that firms do not move in or out of the building and firms do not enter or exit production. We also perform this calculation for a benchmark case of no spillovers, in which the diffusion parameters of the model are set to zero.

The social multiplier. A key object of interest is the 5-year social multiplier of importing that results from exogenously inducing a firm i to import, defined for each firm i which has not started to import from country c as


$$\eta_s^c(i) \equiv \frac{E[M_{a(i),s+5}^c \mid T_s^c(i) = 1, \text{ spillovers}] - E[M_{a(i),s+5}^c \mid T_s^c(i) = 0, \text{ spillovers}]}{E[M_{a(i),s+5}^c \mid T_s^c(i) = 1, \text{ no spillovers}] - E[M_{a(i),s+5}^c \mid T_s^c(i) = 0, \text{ no spillovers}]} \quad (7)$$

Here $M_{a(i),s+5}^c$ is the number of importers from country c on address a of firm i in year $s+5$ and $T_s^c(i)$ refers to the “treatment status” of firm i in year s , taking the value 1 if this firm is induced to start importing from country c . The numerator shows the expected change in the number of importers

²⁵ This assumption is consistent with the results of the flexible specification reported in Table 9.

²⁶ We present the transition matrix and the forecasting equations of this Markov chain in Appendix B.

Figure 2: Distribution of the 5-year social multiplier for firms with non-importer peers in the building



Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in which the firm and at least one other firm in the building have not yet imported from the country in 2003. The 5-year social multiplier is the additional number of firms in the building starting to import from a specific country within 5 years after one firm in the building is induced to start importing from the country, normalized by the same difference in the absence of spillovers. For the calculations we assume that import spillovers and the baseline probability of starting to import are constant over time and across countries, but heterogeneous across firm and peer productivity groups; spillovers exist only within the same building, and increase linearly in the number of peers; and there are no firm entries, exits or location changes.

after 5 years of firm i being treated. This term incorporates import spillovers. The denominator is the corresponding treatment effect in the benchmark model in which import spillovers are set at zero. Thus the multiplier measures how much larger is the treatment effect in the presence, relative to the absence, of import spillovers.²⁷

Figure 2 plots, in increasing order, the implied 5-year social multiplier for all non-importer firms that have non-importer peers in our data in $s = 2003$. The figure reveals substantial heterogeneity. Interestingly, for about half a percent of firms the multiplier is smaller than one: treating these firms results in a smaller number of total importers in the presence of spillovers than in the absence of spillovers. This is because spillovers have two effects: they increase the impact of treating firm i , but they also increase spillovers from other importers in the building. Because of this second force,

²⁷ The conditional expectations can be calculated by iterating the Markov chain forward, as we explain in Appendix B.

the indirect effects arising from treating firm i can become less important as indirect effects from other peers can substitute for them. However this subtle force only overcomes the more intuitive positive effect for a small share of observations.

The median multiplier in the figure is 1.03. This implies that inducing the median firm to import is 3 percent more effective in the presence than in the absence of import spillovers: in expectation there are 3 percent more additional importers from this treatment because of spillovers. The 90th percentile of the multiplier is 1.12. Thus inducing a firm to import which is located at this point of the multiplier distribution is 12 percent more effective once import spillovers are taken into account. These results suggest that while spillovers may not be very important for the typical firm, they are quite important for a significant share of firms. An implication is that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the benefits of trade policies.

Targeted trade policies. We next use our counterfactual to evaluate a hypothetical import-encouraging trade policy, which demonstrates how targeting can improve policy effectiveness. For policy evaluation the object of interest is not the multiplier, but rather the numerator of equation (7), which measures the five-year treatment effect of inducing firm i to import. In our analysis we compare two policies: one in which we target firms for which this treatment effect is large, and another with no targeting. We assume that treating a firm results in it starting to import from a particular country.

Our targeted policy is to treat the 1,000 firms for whom the estimated treatment effect is largest, while our non-targeted policy is to treat 1,000 randomly chosen firms. To avoid complications arising from treating multiple firms in the same building, we restrict both policies to treat, for any given source country, at most one firm per building. And to induce some amount of diffusion we only treat firms which have not yet imported from the country and which have at least one other non-importer peer in the building. Evaluating the targeted policy is straightforward, as it requires computing the numerator of (7) for the selected firms. For the non-targeted policy the impact also depends on the specific set of firms treated. To measure its average effect, we draw the 1,000 random firms 1,000 times, compute the treatment effect for each draw, and average over draws.

The differences between the impacts of the two policies are remarkable. The targeted policy

yields after five years 204 additional importers for a total of 1,204 importers. In contrast, the non-targeted policy yields, on average, 14.6 additional importers (95% confidence band (12.7, 16.6)), for a total of about 1,015. In this example the targeted policy is about 19% more effective than the non-targeted policy ($(1,204/1,015 - 1 = 0.19)$). Since the heterogeneity in the treatment effect is entirely driven by observable firm characteristics such as the productivity of the treated firm and its peers in the building, the policies explored here are directly implementable using public data. These results highlight large potential gains from easily-implementable targeting policies.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we documented evidence for import spillovers. Exploiting source-country variation, precise spatial neighborhoods and plausibly exogenous firm moves in two complementary research designs, we obtained credible estimates of diffusion in spatial and managerial networks. We also documented that spillovers are stronger when firms or peers are better, and exhibit complementarities in firm and peer productivity. Taken together, these two results show that both high network density, and positive sorting in a given network, can increase diffusion. We then conducted a counterfactual analysis showing that due to the combination of these two forces the social multiplier of importing is heterogeneous, so that targeted import subsidy policies can have substantially larger effects. In combination, our results highlighted one concrete benefit of firm clusters: that of facilitating the diffusion of good business practices. More broadly, our analysis contributes to a growing literature highlighting the importance of business networks in shaping economic outcomes.

References

- Aitken, Brian, Gordon H Hanson, and Ann E Harrison**, “Spillovers, foreign investment, and export behavior,” *Journal of International Economics*, 1997, 43 (1), 103–132.
- Amiti, Mary and Jozef Konings**, “Trade liberalization, intermediate inputs, and productivity: Evidence from Indonesia,” *The American Economic Review*, 2007, 97 (5), 1611–1638.
- Arzaghi, Mohammad and J Vernon Henderson**, “Networking off Madison Avenue,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2008, 75 (4), 1011–1038.

- Banerjee, Abhijit, Arun G Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo, and Matthew O Jackson**, “The diffusion of microfinance,” *Science*, 2013, *341* (6144), 1236498.
- Barrios, Salvador, Holger Görg, and Eric Strobl**, “Explaining firms export behaviour: R&D, spillovers and the destination market,” *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 2003, *65* (4), 475–496.
- Bernard, Andrew B and J Bradford Jensen**, “Why some firms export,” *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2004, *86* (2), 561–569.
- , —, and **Peter K Schott**, “Importers, exporters and multinationals: a portrait of firms in the US that trade goods,” in “Producer dynamics: New evidence from micro data,” University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 513–552.
- Cai, Jing and Adam Szeidl**, “Interfirm Relationships and Business Performance,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.
- Castillo, Juana and Francisco Requena Silvente**, “Export dynamics and information spillovers: evidence from Spanish firms,” 2011. Department of Applied Economics II, Universidad de Valencia, Working Papers 1103.
- Chaney, Thomas**, “The network structure of international trade,” *The American Economic Review*, 2014, *104* (11), 3600–3634.
- Choquette, Eliane and Philipp Meinen**, “Export spillovers: Opening the black box,” *The World Economy*, 2015, *38* (12), 1912–1946.
- Clerides, Sofronis K, Saul Lach, and James R Tybout**, “Is learning by exporting important? Micro-dynamic evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1998, pp. 903–947.
- Dumont, Michel, Bruno Merlevede, Christophe Piette, and Glenn Rayp**, “The productivity and export spillovers of the internationalisation behaviour of Belgian firms,” 2010. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper, 201.
- Fafchamps, Marcel and Simon Quinn**, “Networks and Manufacturing Firms in Africa: Results from a Randomized Field Experiment,” *The World Bank Economic Review*, 2016, p. lhw057.
- Fernandes, Ana P and Heiwai Tang**, “Learning to export from neighbors,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2014, *94* (1), 67–84.
- Glaeser, Edward L, Bruce I Sacerdote, and Jose A Scheinkman**, “The social multiplier,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2003, *1* (2-3), 345–353.
- Greenaway, David and Richard Kneller**, “Exporting, productivity and agglomeration,” *European Economic Review*, 2008, *52* (5), 919–939.

- Halpern, László, Miklós Koren, and Adam Szeidl**, “Imported inputs and productivity,” *The American Economic Review*, 2015, 105 (12), 3660–3703.
- Harasztosi, Péter**, “Export and import spillovers in Hungary,” 2011. Unpublished manuscript, Central European University.
- , “Essays on agglomeration economics and trade.” PhD dissertation, Central European University 2013.
- Kamal, Fariha and Asha Sundaram**, “Buyer–seller relationships in international trade: Do your neighbors matter?,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2016, 102, 128–140.
- Koenig, Pamina**, “Agglomeration and the export decisions of French firms,” *Journal of Urban Economics*, 2009, 66 (3), 186–195.
- , **Florian Mayneris, and Sandra Poncet**, “Local export spillovers in France,” *European Economic Review*, 2010, 54 (4), 622–641.
- Lawless, Martina**, “Firm export participation: entry, spillovers and tradability,” *Applied Economics*, 2009, 41 (5), 665–675.
- Levinsohn, James and Amil Petrin**, “Estimating production functions using inputs to control for unobservables,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2003, 70 (2), 317–341.
- Lovely, Mary E, Stuart S Rosenthal, and Shalini Sharma**, “Information, agglomeration, and the headquarters of US exporters,” *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 2005, 35 (2), 167–191.
- Lychagin, Sergey**, “Spillovers, absorptive capacity and agglomeration,” *Journal of Urban Economics*, 2016, 96, 17–35.
- Manski, Charles F**, “Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection problem,” *The review of economic studies*, 1993, 60 (3), 531–542.
- Masso, Jaan, Kärt Rõigas, and Priit Vahter**, “Foreign market experience, learning by hiring and firm export performance,” *Review of World Economics*, 2015, 151 (4), 659–686.
- Mayneris, Florian and Sandra Poncet**, “Chinese firms’ entry to export markets: the role of foreign export spillovers,” *The World Bank Economic Review*, 2015, 29 (1), 150–179.
- Mion, Giordano and Luca David Opromolla**, “Managers’ mobility, trade performance, and wages,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2014, 94 (1), 85–101.
- , —, and **Alessandro Sforza**, “The Diffusion of Knowledge via Managers’ Mobility,” 2016. CEPR Discussion Paper 11706.
- Poncet, Sandra and Florian Mayneris**, “French Firms Penetrating Asian Markets: Role of Export Spillovers,” *Journal of Economic Integration*, 2013, pp. 354–374.

Pupato, Germán, “Non-Market Interactions and Entry into Export Markets,” 2010. Available at SSRN 1777327.

Ramos, Roberto and Enrique Moral-Benito, “Agglomeration matters for trade,” 2013. Banco de Espana Working Paper.

Rauch, James E, “Networks versus markets in international trade,” *Journal of international Economics*, 1999, 48 (1), 7–35.

Sala, Davide and Erdal Yalcin, “Export experience of managers and the internationalisation of firms,” *The World Economy*, 2015, 38 (7), 1064–1089.

Appendix

A Additional supporting evidence

A.1 Further suggestive evidence

Peers from multiple groups: Table A1 shows the share of observations within a firm group with a specific pattern of experienced peers, in which the firm has ever imported from the country. This share is higher for firms with an experienced peer than for firms without such peers, and even higher for peers with country-specific experience (column 3). The share of importers with peers having only import experience is higher than the same share with peers having only export experience, suggesting that the same type of experience matters more. At the same time, the share of importers is the highest if there are both importing and exporting peers, suggesting that both types of experience are valuable. Finally, the share of importers is higher in those groups which have experienced peers from multiple peer groups, suggesting that all the different channels are important.

Multiple peers from the same group: Table A2 shows that the share of importers is higher among those firms which have more neighbors in the same building, and even higher if these peers have import experience. This suggests that not only the existence but also the number of experienced peers matters.

Table A1: Share of importers with different patterns of experienced peers

Patterns of experienced peers ...	Share of observations in the peer category where the firm imports from the country	
	country-specific experience	experience about any of the four countries
... by type of the experience		
export only	2.3%	1.9%
import only	3.6%	2.3%
ownership only	1.3%	1.1%
export and import, but no ownership	5.7%	3.9%
export and ownership, but no import	1.6%	1.3%
import and ownership, but no export	2.1%	1.7%
all the three	5.2%	3.4%
... by peer group		
geographic only	2.7%	2.0%
person-network only	7.1%	5.6%
ownership-network only	5.8%	4.0%
geographic and person-network, but no ownership-network	11.9%	8.3%
geographic and ownership-network, but no person-network	8.2%	5.3%
person-network and ownership-network, but no geographic	15.6%	10.0%
all the three	16.8%	11.8%
no experienced peers	1.2%	1.1%

Notes: Sample includes firms with headquarters in Budapest, 1994-2003. The first column shows the share of importers in the subgroup of firms with a specific pattern of peers having country-specific experience. The second column shows the same share in the subgroup of firms with a specific pattern of peers having experience with any of the four countries.

A.2 Robustness checks

Ownership: We check if our results are moved by firms being owned from one of the four countries. In the Online Appendix we show that results are robust for excluding those firms which have owners from any of the four countries.

Connecting person definition: We use alternative definitions for people connecting firms. Column (1) and (2) of Table A3 use the broadest definition, in which connecting people can have any type of connections to both the firm and the peer. Column (3) and (4) use those owners of the firm

Table A2: Share of importers with different numbers of same-building peers

Number of peers in same building	Share of importers	Number of observations
all peers		
0 (=p25)	1.5%	1,149,640
2 (=p50)	1.6%	463,728
6 (=p75)	1.7%	200,228
13 (=p90)	2.4%	56,280
importer peers		
0 (=p90)	1.5%	4,127,941
1 (=p95)	4.4%	260,025
2 (=p99)	6.9%	56,998

Notes: Sample includes firms with headquarters in Budapest, 1994-2003. Unit of observation: firm-country-year. We create the firm groups by the number of peers in the current year. The first column shows the percentile of the distribution a firm with the given number of peers or importer peers corresponds to. The second column presents the share of importers in the specific firm group and the third column shows the number of firms in the firm group.

who also had signing rights in the peer previously. Most of our results are robust to these definition changes. The only exception is the estimated effect of person-connected peers. If firms purposefully hire experienced managers, reverse causality might be a problem biasing our estimates. The definition we use in columns (3) and (4) provides a potential remedy for this identification issue, as it is less likely that firms get new owners in order to help in importing. At the same time, considering only owners as connecting people might be too restrictive, biasing our estimates downwards. Still, we can conclude that the estimated effect of experienced peers in the other peer groups is not sensitive to changes in the definition of person-connected peers.

Changes in the sample: In our baseline specification we estimate the effect of experienced peers on the import entry of firms which have not yet imported from a country before. Table A4 shows estimation results answering somewhat different questions, for which we define our estimation sample in a different way. In these specifications the dependent variable is an indicator showing if a firm actually imports from a specific country in a specific year. Columns (1) and (2) include all firm-country pairs in all years. These specifications answer the question whether a firm imports from a country in a year with a higher probability if it has peers with country-specific experience, irrespective of the firm's own import experience. Columns (3) and (4) include each firm only in that year when it starts to import from the group of the four countries for the first time, with

Table A3: Peer effects with different definitions of person network

Dependent variable: starting to import	Connecting person definition			
	any connection		from signing right to ownership	
	Type of other experience		Type of other experience	
	Exporter	Owner	Exporter	Owner
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Import experience				
Same-building peer	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
Neighbor-building peer	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Cross-street peer	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Person-network peer	0.27*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.10 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)
Ownership-network peer	0.51*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)
Other experience				
Same-building peer	0.03 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Neighbor-building peer	0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Cross-street peer	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Person-network peer	0.00 (0.06)	0.17 (0.18)	0.25** (0.10)	0.20 (0.22)
Ownership-network peer	0.14*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.07)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—as defined in Table 3—with country-specific import or export—columns (1),(3)—experience or with owners from the country—columns (2),(4)—in the previous year. Columns (1)-(2) use managers with any connections to both firms—signing right, supervisory board or ownership—as connecting people. Columns (3)-(4) use those previous managers of the peer firms who became owners in the firm of interest. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

a separate observation for each of the four countries. This specification shows if a firm starts to import from a country with a higher probability if it has peers with country-specific experience, conditional on starting to import from the group of the four countries for the first time. Columns

Table A4: Peer effects with different sample definitions

Dependent variable: importing						
	all firms		first ever importers		not yet importers	
	Type of other experience		Type of other experience		Type of other experience	
	Exporter	Owner	Exporter	Owner	Exporter	Owner
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Import experience						
Same-building peer	0.78*** (0.08)	0.78*** (0.08)	9.12*** (1.84)	9.04*** (1.84)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)
Neighbor-building peer	0.08 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	1.38 (2.36)	2.18 (2.33)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Cross-street peer	0.18** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.43 (2.68)	0.07 (2.70)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Person-network peer	1.84*** (0.26)	1.84*** (0.26)	10.80*** (3.87)	12.00*** (3.78)	0.39*** (0.09)	0.40*** (0.09)
Ownership-network peer	2.14*** (0.15)	2.21*** (0.15)	22.00*** (2.70)	23.20*** (2.68)	0.43*** (0.05)	0.44*** (0.05)
Other experience						
Same-building peer	0.11** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.07)	2.08 (1.88)	11.40*** (3.48)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Neighbor-building peer	0.04 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	4.07* (2.36)	-4.39 (3.68)	0.03** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Cross-street peer	-0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.09)	0.06 (2.60)	4.16 (4.15)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Person-network peer	-0.04 (0.24)	0.39 (0.69)	8.07** (3.68)	12.60 (12.00)	0.11 (0.07)	0.15 (0.23)
Ownership-network peer	0.61*** (0.11)	0.68*** (0.24)	7.26*** (2.59)	7.97 (7.41)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,845,272	3,845,272	23,404	23,404	3,663,512	3,663,512

Notes: Sample: all firm-country pairs in all years in columns (1)-(2); firms with all four countries in that year when the firm started to import from the group of four countries for the first time in columns (3)-(4); firms with all four countries in those years when the firm has not imported from any of the countries until the previous year in columns (5)-(6). The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm importing from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—as defined in Table 3—with country-specific import or export—in columns (1),(3),(5)—experience, or with owners from the country—in columns (2),(4),(6)—in the previous year. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

(5) and (6) are the closest to our baseline specification, but these specifications exclude those firms entirely which already imported from at least one of the four countries. Patterns are similar in all three cases. Country-specific importer and owner experience of same-building neighbors, import

Table A5: Effect of peer experience on successful import entry

	Dependent variable: importing twice in [t,t+2]	
	(1)	(2)
Same-building importer peer		
All peers	0.07*** (0.02)	
Successful importer peers		0.18*** ^o (0.04)
Other peers		0.07*** (0.02)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES
Observations	3,051,413	3,051,413
Baseline hazard (in %)	0.02	

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for starting to import successfully, i.e. the firm imports from the country at least twice in the period [t,t+2] where t is the current year. This excludes firms in their last year of observation from the estimation sample. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience in the previous year. Similar indicators are included for successful importer peers importing from the country at least twice in the period [t-2,t]. Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Baseline hazard refers to the share of successful importers in the estimation sample. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^o denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from that of previous group at 5%.

experience of person-connected peers and import and export experience of ownership-connected peers has a robust effect on import probability. This shows that our main results are robust to specification changes.

Successful import entry. We also explore whether spillovers increase the probability of a “successful” entry to import markets. To do this, we use our definition of successful imports as a dependent variable, defined here as importing in at least two of the three years during [t, t + 2]. Column 1 in Table A5 shows a positive effect of peer import experience on successful importing, and column 2 shows that the effect is even larger when the peer is itself a successful importer.

A.3 Other forms of heterogeneity

We now briefly discuss some additional forms of heterogeneity: by the industry of the firm, and by the type of the imported product.

Table A6: Heterogeneity of peer effect by industry

Dependent variable: starting to import	Grouped by industry of the	
	firm (1)	peer (2)
Same-building importer peer		
Industry A-C	-0.21 (0.28)	0.02 (0.20)
Industry D	0.50*** (0.12)	0.29*** (0.06)
Industry E-F	0.13 (0.10)	0.26** (0.13)
Industry G	0.59*** (0.08)	0.23*** (0.04)
Industry H-I	0.19** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)
Industry J-K	0.09*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.06)
Industry L-Q	0.09* (0.05)	0.14 (0.14)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES
Observations	3,778,517	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience in the previous year, interacted with a dummy for the firm's industry in column (1), and having separate indicators for peers in different industries in column (2). Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Firm and peer industry. Column 1 of Table A6 shows estimation results by the industry of the firm. We use industry groupings based on 1-digit NACE categories. The table shows that the same-building effect is present in almost all industry categories, but it is the strongest for firms in manufacturing (NACE group D) and trade and repair (NACE group G). Column 2 of Table A6 shows the heterogeneity in the estimated spillover effect by the industry of the peers. We include peers without any information on their industry in a separate group. We find a similar same-building effect for peers in multiple industries: manufacturing (NACE group D), electricity, gas and water supply and construction (NACE groups E-F), wholesale and retail trade (NACE group G) and financial intermediation and real estate (NACE groups J-K).

Table A7: Heterogeneity of peer effect by product type

Dependent variable: starting to import	
	(1)
Same-building importer peer	
Goods in the reference category	-0.05 (0.07)
Differentiated goods	0.21*** (0.03)
Reference-priced goods	0.18*** (0.05)
Firm-year FE	YES
Country-year FE	YES
Observations	3,778,517

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not imported from the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—all types defined in Table 3 included—with country-specific import experience with a specific type of good in the previous year. Only coefficients on same-building peers are presented. Goods are categorized following Rauch (1999). Unclassified goods and goods sold in an organized exchange are the reference group. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Product type. Table A7 classifies peers based on the type of the product the peer imported from the given country before. We use the product classification of Rauch (1999) to separate differentiated and reference-priced goods. The first category includes goods traded on an organized exchange and some non-classified goods, the other two categories are differentiated goods and reference-priced goods. Results show that the experience of same-building neighbors in both differentiated and reference-priced goods matters, but the former is somewhat stronger. We do not find positive spillovers from peers which imported goods in the first category.

A.4 Alternative research designs

Mover design. Table A8 presents some descriptive statistics about the data we use in the mover design. It shows that almost half of all incumbent firms—staying in the same building from one year to the next—has a firm moving into its building, and about 9% has a mover with previous import experience. 88% of the incumbents are on addresses with no import experience from at least one of the four countries. Almost half of these firms has a mover coming into the building and the mover

has country-specific experience for 5%. 22% of the addresses has no import experience from one of the countries and attracts a mover firm, and 2% attracts an experienced mover. These numbers show that we use quite a few firms in many distinct addresses in the research design exploiting firm moves.

Table A8: Descriptive statistics for buildings with new firms moving in

	Number of			
	incumbent firms	addresses with incumbents	incumbent firms	addresses with incumbents
	all addresses		addresses without import experience	
Total	211,453	76,433	184,978	66,596
With a mover	105,214	19,976	87,754	16,833
With a mover having previous import experience	18,163	2,251	8,951	1,478
... from Slovakia	8,907	1,036	3,231	598
... from the Czech Republic	11,362	1,255	3,415	645
... from Romania	6,696	749	3,124	475
... from Russia	4,798	563	2,462	352

Notes: The number of incumbent firms which are on a given type of address, excluding the movers themselves. A mover is a firm changing its address within Budapest from one year to another. An address without any import experience is defined as all the firms being present in the same or neighboring buildings in years $t-1$ or t —except for the mover coming in t —have not imported from that country up to that year. The mover might or might not have import experience.

Table A9 presents the same estimation results we show in Figure 1. We also include the table to make it easier to see the precise estimates and the standard errors.

Export spillovers. Table A10 shows estimates for export spillovers, using the same identification strategy with which we estimate import spillovers in our baseline specification. As we describe it in Section 3.4, spillover patterns and magnitudes are comparable to those of import spillovers.

Table A9: Effect of experienced peer moving into building on same-country imports

Dependent variable: importing		
	(1)	(2)
Event-year N * Experienced mover		
N=1	0.38*** (0.11)	0.12 (0.13)
N=2	0.83*** (0.18)	0.38* (0.23)
N=3	0.98*** (0.23)	0.65** (0.30)
N=4	1.29*** (0.31)	0.78** (0.38)
N>=5	1.33*** (0.45)	0.73 (0.55)
Event-year indicators	YES	NO
Firm-year FE	NO	YES
Country-year FE	NO	YES
Observations	1,907,407	1,907,407

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in the years after a mover firm entered the building of the firm, excluding those firm-country pairs in which any firm in the building—apart from the mover—has experience with the country by the time the mover comes. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm importing from the country. Right-hand side variables are event-year indicators showing the move occurred N years ago, interacted with an indicator for the mover having country-specific experience. We winsorize event-years at 5. Column (1) also includes event-year indicators separately, and column (2) includes firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A10: Peer effect in exporting behavior

Dependent variable: starting to export	Type of other experience					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Importer (5)	Owner (6)
Export experience						
Same-building peer	0.17*** (0.02)			0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)
Neighbor-building peer	0.04** (0.02)			0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Cross-street peer	0.04 (0.03)			0.04 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Person-network peer		0.40*** (0.09)		0.38*** (0.09)	0.37*** (0.09)	0.37*** (0.09)
Ownership-network peer			0.49*** (0.05)	0.49*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.05)
Other experience						
Same-building peer					0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Neighbor-building peer					0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Cross-street peer					-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Person-network peer					0.07 (0.09)	0.58 (0.36)
Ownership-network peer					0.09** (0.04)	0.12 (0.08)
Firm-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,772,739	3,772,739	3,772,739	3,772,739	3,772,739	3,772,739

Notes: Sample includes firm-country pairs in those years when the firm has not exported to the country until the previous year. The dependent variable is an indicator for the firm starting to export to the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for the firm having a specific type of peer—as defined in Table 3—with country-specific import or export experience—column (5)—, or with owners from the country—column (6)—in the previous year. All specifications include firm-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B Social multiplier calculations

The transition matrix for the number of importers in a building with N^l low-productivity and N^h high-productivity firms is $A^{(N^l, N^h)}$ with states (m^l, m^h) , where m^l is the number of low-productivity importers, m^h is the number of high-productivity importers, with $m^l \in 0, 1, \dots, N^l$ and $m^h \in 0, 1, \dots, N^h$. We denote an element of $A^{(N^l, N^h)}$ with $a_{(m_1^l, m_1^h), (m_2^l, m_2^h)}^{(N^l, N^h)}$, which shows the transition probability from state (m_1^l, m_1^h) to (m_2^l, m_2^h) . If $(m_1^l \leq m_2^l)$ and $(m_1^h \leq m_2^h)$

$$a_{(m_1^l, m_1^h), (m_2^l, m_2^h)}^{(N^l, N^h)} = \binom{N^l - m_1^l}{m_2^l - m_1^l} \cdot (p_l + m_1^l \cdot \beta_{ll} + m_1^h \cdot \beta_{lh})^{m_2^l - m_1^l} \cdot (1 - p_l - m_1^l \cdot \beta_{ll} - m_1^h \cdot \beta_{lh})^{N^l - m_2^l} \cdot \binom{N^h - m_1^h}{m_2^h - m_1^h} \cdot (p_h + m_1^l \cdot \beta_{hl} + m_1^h \cdot \beta_{hh})^{m_2^h - m_1^h} \cdot (1 - p_h - m_1^l \cdot \beta_{hl} - m_1^h \cdot \beta_{hh})^{N^h - m_2^h}, \quad (8)$$

and zero otherwise. p_l denotes the baseline probability of starting to import for a low-productivity firm and p_h is the baseline probability for a high-productivity firm. $\beta_{gg'}$ is the estimated effect of an additional peer in productivity group g' on the import entry probability of a firm in productivity group g , with $g, g' = \{\text{low, high}\}$.

The 5-year transition matrix is given by $(A^{(N^l, N^h)})^5$, with elements $a_{(m_1^l, m_1^h), (m_2^l, m_2^h)}^{(N^l, N^h)5}$. Then the expected number of importers conditional on having (m^l, m^h) as the initial state is:

$$\sum_{k^l = m^l}^{N^l} \sum_{k^h = m^h}^{N^h} (k^l + k^h) \cdot a_{(m^l, m^h), (k^l, k^h)}^{(N^l, N^h)5}. \quad (9)$$

The numerator of our social multiplier measure for firm i on address a starting to import from country c is given by :

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{k^l=M_{a(i),s}^{c,l}+I_{g(i)=l}}^{N_{a(i),s}^l} \sum_{k^h=M_{a(i),s}^{c,h}+I_{g(i)=h}}^{N_{a(i),s}^h} (k^l+k^h) \cdot a_{(M_{a(i),s}^{c,l}+I_{g(i)=l}, M_{a(i),s}^{c,h}+I_{g(i)=h}), (k^l, k^h)}^{(N_{a(i),s}^l, N_{a(i),s}^h)5} \\
& - \sum_{k^l=M_{a(i),s}^{c,l}}^{N_{a(i),s}^l} \sum_{k^h=M_{a(i),s}^{c,h}}^{N_{a(i),s}^h} (k^l+k^h) \cdot a_{(M_{a(i),s}^{c,l}, M_{a(i),s}^{c,h}), (k^l, k^h)}^{(N_{a(i),s}^l, N_{a(i),s}^h)5}, \quad (10)
\end{aligned}$$

where $M_{a(i),s}^{c,g}$ is the number of peers in productivity group g in the building of firm i in year s importing from country c . $I_{g(i)=g}$ is an indicator for firm i being in productivity group g , and $N_{a(i),s}^g$ is the number of firms in productivity group g in the building of firm i in year s , with $g = \{\text{low, high}\}$. We use the same formula for the denominator, setting the $\beta_{gg'}$ parameters to zero.