

On Coconuts and Plumps: Immigration Policy and Foreigners' Political Integration

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- ▶ Scarce knowledge due to difficulties of measuring immigration policy across contexts, and endogeneity
- ▶ Evidence is mounting that lenient naturalization policy has exogenous positive effects (Hainmueller 2017)
- ▶ Little is known about short-term migrants, and long-term migrants who are not eligible or do not decide to naturalize

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- ▶ Coconut policy: hard at the border and soft in the inside (selection + long-term incentive)
- ▶ Plump policy: soft at the border and hard inside (competition mechanism)
- ▶ We focus on political integration and labor market policy
- ▶ 2 empirical strategies: external and less external validity

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- ▶ Controls: gender, education, income, age, age squared, and country controls
- ▶ Hierarchical Linear Models with individuals nested in country-years



Predicting satisfaction towards democracy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Immigrant	0.671*** (0.09)	0.919*** (0.07)	-0.243** (0.10)	0.418*** (0.05)
External regulations	-1.220 (1.18)			
Internal regulations		1.679*** (0.45)		
Ratio external/internal regulations				-0.795*** (0.21)
Ratio conditions/security			0.336 (0.49)	
Immigrant*External regulations	-0.541* (0.30)			
Immigrant*Internal regulations		-0.880*** (0.15)		
Immigrant*Ratio external/internal regulations				0.124* (0.06)
Immigrant*Ratio conditions/security			1.270*** (0.17)	
Constant	5.195*** (0.65)	3.615*** (0.56)	4.490*** (0.62)	5.173*** (0.48)
Country-Year Intercept Variance	0.424*** [0.306,0.589]	0.364*** [0.262,0.505]	0.428*** [0.309,0.594]	0.359*** [0.259,0.498]
Individual Intercept Variance	4.706*** [4.667,4.746]	4.705*** [4.665,4.745]	4.704*** [4.664,4.744]	4.706*** [4.667,4.746]
N	107666	107666	107666	107666
N Country-Year	73	73	73	73
BIC	472819.8	472778.8	472764.5	472807.7



Predicting political trust

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Immigrant	0.100*** (0.03)	0.216*** (0.02)	-0.034 (0.03)	0.058*** (0.02)
External regulations	-0.249 (0.42)			
Internal regulations		0.617*** (0.16)		
Ratio external/internal regulations				-0.279*** (0.07)
Ratio conditions/security			0.341** (0.17)	
Immigrant*External regulations	-0.019 (0.10)			
Immigrant*Internal regulations		-0.261*** (0.05)		
Immigrant*Ratio external/internal regulations				0.050** (0.02)
Immigrant*Ratio conditions/security			0.217*** (0.05)	
Constant	-0.200 (0.23)	-0.710*** (0.19)	-0.535** (0.21)	-0.144 (0.17)
Country-Year Intercept Variance	0.053*** [0.038,0.073]	0.044*** [0.032,0.061]	0.050*** [0.036,0.070]	0.044*** [0.032,0.062]
Individual Intercept Variance	0.504*** [0.499,0.508]	0.504*** [0.499,0.508]	0.504*** [0.499,0.508]	0.504*** [0.499,0.508]
N	106876	106876	106876	106876
N Country-Year	73	73	73	73
BIC	230521.9	230523.7		


Marginal effects on democratic satisfaction




Marginal effects on political trust



Random slope immigrant predicting democratic satisfaction



Random slope immigrant predicting political trust



Predicting immigrant association with democratic satisfaction

	OLS	FGLS	OLS Bootstrap SE
Ratio conditions/security	0.829*** (0.27)	0.829*** (0.26)	0.829*** (0.24)
GDP	0.000** (0.00)	0.000** (0.00)	0.000** (0.00)
Unemployment	0.021 (0.02)	0.021 (0.02)	0.021 (0.02)
Social Spending	0.042*** (0.01)	0.042*** (0.01)	0.042*** (0.01)
Trade Openess	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Constant	-1.372*** (0.35)	-1.372*** (0.33)	-1.372*** (0.37)
Adj. R-Square	0.378	—	0.378
N	64	64	64

Predicting immigrant association with political trust

	OLS	FGLS	OLS Bootstrap SE
Ratio conditions/security	0.454* (0.24)	0.454* (0.23)	0.454** (0.22)
GDP	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Unemployment	0.014 (0.02)	0.014 (0.01)	0.014 (0.02)
Social Spending	0.015 (0.01)	0.015* (0.01)	0.015* (0.01)
Trade Openess	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Constant	-0.545* (0.31)	-0.545* (0.30)	-0.545* (0.31)
Adj. R-Square	0.075	—	0.075
N	64	64	64

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
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- ▶ But internal rights and full family reunification allowed: COCONUT


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- ▶ Ethnic Minority British Electoral Study 2010 (country of origin and year of arrival)


RD estimate with 1962 as arrival threshold




Education balance



Income balance



No sorting assumption



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- ▶ On average, lenient/liberal policies associated with better outcomes
- ▶ But, coconut policies outperform: a bit harder at the border, and softer in the inside
- ▶ Mechanism: selection effect?
- ▶ Mechanism: long-term settlement incentive?