PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: GENDER PERSPECTIVES AND WOMEN’S ROLES

FINAL REPORT
‘PREVENTING CONFLICT AND COUNTERING FUNDAMENTALISM THROUGH WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY MOBILISATION’ (2016-2017)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research report explores the links between women’s roles and perceptions, gender relations, and the spread of fundamentalist ideologies and extremist violence. Based on a pilot project in Indonesia, it synthesises research evidence on the participation and leadership of women and women-led organisations into strategies to prevent violent extremism (PVE). In doing so, it directly addresses the lack of gendered analysis of counter-terrorism (CT), countering violent extremism (CVE), and PVE dynamics and agendas in South-East Asia.

Indonesia was chosen for the research due to its significance as the world’s largest Muslim majority state, its history of Islamic fundamentalism leading to conflict, the participation of its citizens in global jihadi networks, and its strong democratic women’s movement. Four research sites within Indonesia were selected to ensure variation in urban/rural, conflict and non-conflict-affected settings, and for their varying proximity to past political violence or terrorist events, and known extremist jihadi networks.

A rigorous methodology was developed to examine women’s perceptions of violent extremism, their contributions to its prevention and the challenges it poses. Through almost 100 interviews and focus groups the research team engaged with a diversity of women and women’s perspectives on their roles as family members, teachers, workers, religious leaders, students, and as members of civil society. Participants were asked about their perceptions and experiences regarding fundamentalist ideologies and extremist violence; their observations of warning signs for rising extremism and terrorist violence; and how, in what ways, and why they have been involved in countering or preventing extremist attitudes and behaviours.

Five overarching research findings emerged from this research:

1. CONTINUUM OF FUNDAMENTALISM, EXTREMISM, AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM:
The research identified the existence of extremism in every research site examined. It also identified a relationship between the spread of fundamentalist political ideologies or groups and rising extremism, including violent forms. Women unanimously expressed opposition to the use of violence. However, communities and government actors often condone fundamentalism.

2. EVERYDAY WARNING SIGNS:
Gender-specific warning signs were observed in everyday life and were critical early indicators of fundamentalism and extremist behaviour and violence. This included a change in social norms relating to women and girls’ dress, veiling, mobility and religious practices. While the degree of constraint being imposed upon women varied across the research sites, this behaviour was broadly perceived to be increasingly coercively enforced by extremist actors and/or seen as a form of protection employed by women in response to rising extremism. The research found that observing and responding to the activities of Islamist groups in everyday life is as important as responding to major terrorist events in terms of preventing such acts from occurring.
WOMEN'S AGENCY IN PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM:
The research revealed an impressive variety of ways in which women are individually and collectively acting to prevent violent extremism. There exists great potential to scale up support to finance such activities. This will likely enhance their impact on the prevention of extremist and terrorist-related activity and violence. Women’s capacity to prevent and counter violent extremism extends far beyond their family roles. For instance, many women-led PVE activities remain publicly unnoticed, as do processes of radicalisation and recruitment into extremist networks more generally. Yet women’s leadership and authority within their workplaces and communities – including in state, religious, women’s and youth networks – itself represents a challenge to fundamentalist ideologies that script men as leaders and women as passive members of society.

GENDER EQUALITY AND RELIGIOUS COUNTER-DISCOURSES:
Promoting gender equality is potentially the single most powerful counter-discourse to extremist interpretations of religion. In particular, women ulama (religious leaders: singular also ulama²), are playing crucial roles in challenging extremist ideologies and individuals, and drawing on Islamic teachings and texts that promote tolerance and gender equality. Promoting gender equality within the family is a primary preventative factor for extremist behaviour, as family norms and structures that exemplify equality confront fundamentalist views that invariably subordinate women to men.

BUILDING A PREVENTION-FOCUSED MOVEMENT:
Investing in women’s participation has the potential to prevent violent extremism in Indonesia and in South-East Asia. This is because women bring perspectives and experiences to the perception of ‘security’ that encompass the wellbeing of the family and the community – something distinct from – and frequently absent from – male-dominated conceptions of the purpose and maintenance of security. Supporting women’s initiatives to identify and prevent extremist behaviour – through training and networking – may in turn encourage women’s greater participation in these initiatives and enhance the overall impact of women’s PVE efforts. Enabling women and women-led organisations to participate in the development of CT, CVE and PVE strategies may improve the effectiveness of those strategies and their broader reach. At present, however, there are no explicit government or intergovernmental frameworks and/or institutional mechanisms for recognising and supporting women’s PVE roles and activities in Indonesia or in South-East Asia.

These research findings are described throughout the research report, with relevant recommendations that warrant attention for all actors engaged in CT, CVE and PVE analysis, policy development and programming.
INTRODUCTION AND CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS
2. INTRODUCTION AND CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS

This section outlines the overarching purpose of the research project to identify how key objectives of the international Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism agendas (CT/CVE) can be brought together.

First, it examines the normative developments and intersections of these related policy areas, and the steps that key stakeholders – Governments, donors, the UN, and other regional and international organisations – need to take to promote gender perspectives in order to accelerate efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. Second, although the distinction between preventing and countering extremism in research and in policy and programming is explored, this research is firmly directed at the former. Third, consolidated recommendations for various actors are outlined.

Violent extremism and acts of terrorism are a major threat to global peace and security. In South-East Asia, these are having a visible, and growing, impact on women and girls’ security. Although there is substantial awareness of the gendered and unequal dynamics and impacts of armed conflict on men and women, there remains far less understanding of the gender-specific causes and consequences of violent extremism. In South-East Asia, there is a paucity of research information, programming and policy-relevant resources on the contributions of women to violent extremism and its prevention; there is also a lack of engagement with women and women’s groups working against fundamentalism and violence in the development of CVE and CT strategies.

2.1 WPS AND CVE FRAMEWORKS

In seeking to address this gap at the international policy level, there has been increasing attention on the role of women and gender perspectives in CVE. A growing body of literature, policy analysis, and practical work is being undertaken to draw connections between the responses of the UNSC and the multilateral system to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism on the one hand, and the Women, Peace and Security policy agenda on the other. Indeed, the role of women in propagating and Countering Violent Extremism, and the specific impacts of violent extremism, are under-researched but critical security issues which directly relate to the implementation of the WPS agenda (see Huckerby 2015; de Jonge Oudraat and Haynie 2017).
The purpose of this research project is to identify how commitments under the international Women, Peace and Security agenda and the CT and CVE agendas can be correlated, relying on the specificities of a selected country case study. In recent years there has been increasing international policy attention given to the importance of understanding the gender dynamics of violent extremism, as summarised in Box 1.5 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security first emphasised the critical contributions of women and women’s organisations to conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. More recently, UNSCR 2122 (2013) introduced terrorism to the WPS agenda, identifying the importance of women in countering violent extremism and delegitimising and reducing support for extremist groups. Since 2013, increasing global attention has also been paid to the connections between CVE and terrorism and the WPS agenda, with particular reference to Boko Haram and Islamic State (IS).

Box 1: WPS and CVE Policy Advancements

2013: **UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate** (UN CTED) mandate renewed by passage of UNSCR 2129. Includes: ‘increase its attention to women, peace and security issues in all relevant thematic areas of work on its agenda, including in threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’ (UN Security Council 2013).

*September 2014*: **UNSC Resolution 2178** focuses on the emerging threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and calls for the need to empower women as a prevention response and a means of mitigating the spread of violent extremism and radicalisation (UN Security Council 2014a).

*October 2014*: **Security Council Open Debate on WPS**, a Presidential Statement reiterating the role of women’s participation and empowerment as a buffer to the spread of extremism, while also noting the specific consequences of violent extremism on the rights of women and girls (UN Security Council 2014b).

*October 2015*: **UNSCR 2242** built on the connection between the CT/CVE and WPS agendas, emphasising a gender perspective in prevention, and opportunities for experienced women to participate in high-level decision-making where strategies are designed and implemented.

*October 2015*: **Global Study on the Implementation of 1325** raises the issue of rising cultural and religious fundamentalism and the connections to the WPS agenda as an important issue for women’s organisations working in the Asia Pacific region, based on consultations with them.6

*December 2016*: **UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism** has identified gender equality and empowering women as one of its seven priority areas for action.

*2016*: **Fifth review resolution of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy** – adopted by consensus in September 2006 – called upon all UN Member States to empower women and consider the impact of counter-terrorism measures on women’s human rights and women’s organisations, and to arrange for the provision of funds within these efforts to further women’s rights and empowerment.
This report highlights that in order to implement these international commitments in South-East Asia, a more nuanced gender perspective than current perceptions of the problem is required to design, and redesign, CVE policies and programs. It builds on and supports recent research that stresses the importance of contextualised approaches to women’s participation and gender perspectives in CVE/PVE. This research addresses issues such as:

- The need to establish an inclusive, discursive conception of empowering women as an alternative to prevailing simplistic notions of empowerment. This is crucial to preventing violent extremism. Moreover, it is essential in remediating the enormous burden of responsibility currently falling to women, and which the state evades, constituting vital issues of governance that contribute to ongoing conflict and radicalisation;
- Overcoming and redressing CVE gender research and policy’s prevailing emphasis on women’s roles as mothers in preventing violence;
- Protecting the safety of women and women’s organisations by ensuring they are not targeted if identified as being involved in CVE-related activities (see UN Women 2015; Ni Aolain 2015).

This inclusive, calibrated approach necessarily requires the active participation and representation of women and girls – and the involvement of women’s organisations – and their perspectives and experience in the development of CVE and PVE strategies (see Women Peacemakers Program 2015). There is potential for the CVE and WPS policy agendas to be mutually supportive if these conditions are met – for this reason close attention is given to women’s empowerment in creating safe spaces for individual women, and to women-led organisations seeking to be heard and to develop their agency in creating positive change within their communities.7

2.2 ‘COUNTERING’ VERSUS ‘PREVENTING’ VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Most research to date examining women’s roles and the gender dynamics of terrorism and violent extremism in Indonesia has concentrated on either the radicalisation of women (IPAC 2017; also Parashar 2011) or the initiatives of wives and mothers of terrorists (Chowdhury et al 2016; YPP 2016; Varagur 2017). Such research helps to understand strategies for countering terrorism and violent extremism once it is already a problem or identified as a threat. It is less helpful in identifying the causative role of gender dynamics and gender relations in regard to extremism – the pathways leading to violence and non-violence, which need to be understood if we are to develop long-term prevention strategies.

Women, peace and security advocates and scholars have been cautious in embracing the integration of WPS and CT/CVE agendas, in part because they view CVE as importing militarised strategies and short-term solutions to countering, rather than preventing, violence.
In contrast to this are hard-line military and policing counter-terrorism responses aimed at halting the repetition or escalation of conflict – which may exacerbate or create new insecurities that entrench a cycle of violence. However, if the intention is to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, then it is the breadth of social conditions that need to be investigated and changed to reduce the propensity for violence.

Extremist networks commonly undergo an extensive socially directed phase before entering a period of operational terrorism (see Lentini 2013). This preparatory period can include practices that reinforce a sense of exclusivity and group belonging in gender-defined terms, such as ‘brothers-in-arms’, and encourage antagonistic gender distinctions that assert repressive control over women’s dress and mobility (see Iman and Yuval-Davis 2004). If gender identities and gender norms are mobilising factors for terrorist networks and violence, then empowering women and men in new forms of gender relations is one way to transform these social conditions. Integral to such change is the role of civil society organisations, including religious organisations, concentrating on women’s rights and gender equality (see also Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic and Women Peacemakers Program 2017).

Significant potential exists for current violent extremism and terrorism prevention strategies to be profoundly improved by an inclusive understanding of women’s perspectives, a conscientious apprehension of gender dynamics and gender relations, enhancement and promotion of gender equality, and the active participation of women and women-led organisations in developing CT and CVE strategies.

Section 3 outlines the research methodology and design, including the analytical approach taken, research questions, site selection, interview and focus group methods and ethics. This Section introduces the challenge of violent extremism in Indonesia, and the terminology used in the research on ‘countering’ versus ‘preventing’ violent extremism that has shaped research methodology and design. It also introduces the feminist research frameworks employed in the research, and discusses the importance of the research in recognising the diversity of women and women’s roles as critical in underpinning the research process.

Section 4 discusses the research findings in depth, organised in five themes that emerged from the research process. They are: 1) the continuum of fundamentalism, extremism and violence; 2) everyday warning signs for violent extremism; 3) women’s agency and preventing violent extremism; 4) religious counter-discourses and gender equality; and 5) building a prevention-focused movement.

Lastly, Section 5 discusses the significance of the research findings, focusing on how the research can inform the Australian Government’s programming and policy engagement in relation to gender equality, WPS, CT and PVE/CVE. The findings assimilate the challenges and the lessons learned in CVE and PVE from a gender perspective, taking into account women’s diverse roles and activities.
2.3 OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations aim to identify practices that integrate women’s rights and gender into CVE and PVE efforts undertaken by governments, civil society, international organisations and researchers.

I CONTINUUM OF FUNDAMENTALISM, EXTREMISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

For All Actors
• Substantially increase the provision of support to initiatives that observe and respond to activities of Islamist groups in everyday life, and accommodate this support as a crucial terrorism-prevention strategy.

II EVERYDAY WARNING SIGNS

For All Actors
• Observing and responding to activities of Islamist groups in everyday life – including in the four gender-specific warning signs of extremist activity (the shifting use of the hijab; constraints on women’s mobility and exclusiveness of mosques; social naming and ‘hate crimes’; and threats or acts of gender-based violence, such as advocacy of child marriage) – should be integrated into PVE strategies.
• Changes in women’s dress and mobility should be systematically monitored at the community level to inform a localised approach to PVE and the promotion of tolerance and women’s rights.

For Security Sector, including police, military, defence policy and justice
• Security sector actors, including the military, police and justice sector, must ensure political and civil rights of citizens are upheld, and provide civil protection, especially to groups and individuals who are contesting fundamentalism.

III WOMEN’S AGENCY IN PREVENTING AND COUNTERING EXTREMISM

For All Actors
Initiatives supporting women and women’s organisations to prevent extremism should be financed and scaled up, in particular those where women: are working directly with women in communities; are using a religious framework; are strengthening women’s religious leadership; and are working closely with men.
Governments and International Organisations

- A Regional ASEAN Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security is urgently needed to mobilise and coordinate women’s participation in the development of CT/CVE strategies, to promote lessons learned across communities, and to ensure robust and nuanced integration of the CT and CVE agendas as relevant to the ASEAN region.8
- Existing and future National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security in the South-East Asian region would be more comprehensive were they to include PVE and CVE, given the direct and negative influence of violent extremism on women’s security.
- Governments must support the role of women, girls, and women’s organisations in discussions and negotiations relating to conflict resolution, peacebuilding, CT and CVE, particularly women living in State-identified radical territories.
- Promote and support women to participate actively in the security sector, which is likely to be a positive influence on the work of women in the community in countering violent extremism.

For the Australian Government

- Ensure the planning, development and implementation of the Australian Government’s second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security incorporates international normative developments on gender and CVE; includes gender-aware and evidence-based analysis regarding the gender dynamics of CVE/PVE; involves women as decision-makers in all policy responses; and provides long-term financing and support for women’s organisations engaged in CVE/PVE work.
- Strengthen regional financial assistance to women’s groups in South-East Asia that are confronted by extremist threats of violence.
- Ensure Australia’s funding to the Global Acceleration Instrument on Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action incorporates long-term funding to women’s rights organisations engaged in CVE/PVE-related work, as well as research and capacity building to support efforts across different regions of the world.

IV PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY AND RELIGIOUS COUNTER-DISCOURSES

For All Actors (including civil society)

- The promotion of gender equality is potentially the single most powerful counter-discourse to extremist interpretations of religion, in both theory and practice.
- Providing education on the importance of gender equality – enabling critical engagement with religious texts within religious communities and organisations is a crucial strategy for promoting a culture of tolerance and peace.
• Empowering women religious leaders to interpret religious texts and engage with communities should be a major concern of PVE initiatives.
• Support for counter-discourse by religious leaders, especially women religious leaders, needs to be increased and strengthened across formal and social media platforms.

For the Indonesian Government
• The Government should increase funding to join up and scale up counter-discourses and prevention activities in order to ensure broad impact, and to enhance coordination of those activities.
• The government should ensure that CVE and PVE interventions are context-specific in relation to major urban areas – for instance, Jakarta requires particular attention given its unique political dynamics and influence on the other Provinces.
• Supporting both men and women migrant workers, including education on gender equality norms, is an important strategy in establishing preferable social alternatives to extremist behaviour for those who work away from home and social networks, and for spouses at home aiming to counter extremist influences in their community and family.

For the Australian Government
• Invest in technical expertise on gender and PVE/CVE within DFAT, including as part of the Indonesia program, the Gender Equality Branch, and as part of the Australian Civilian Corps Standby Cadre to provide policy and programmatic advice.
• Update or provide complementary guidance and resources to DFAT’s 2017 framework, Development Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism, to ensure that all planning, design and implementation of CVE-related investments includes context-specific and robust gender analysis.
• In Indonesia, ensure all CVE-related development programming comprises reliable gender analysis, and that monitoring is supported by action research exploring gender dynamics.
• The government should continue to enhance policy, program and research engagement on integrating gender analysis and gender perspectives into Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PVE/CVE) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) work, ensuring regular engagement with Australian, regional and international research institutions and civil society, including refugee, migrant and diaspora women in Australia, to develop evidence-informed policy and program work across government.
• Continue its leadership role in advancing integration of the Women, Peace and CVE agendas within the UN Security Council and other international and multilateral fora in which Australia is engaged and has scope to influence, including the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the Commission on the Status of Women.

V BUILDING A PREVENTION-FOCUSED MOVEMENT

For All Actors
• Engaging men: Actively involve men in their roles as husbands and fathers, including through parenting education that includes education on gender equality.
For All Governments

- Governments should mainstream a gender perspective into all national and sub-national CVE programming and policy.
- Governments should ensure long-term and sustainable support for women’s initiatives at the community level as part of PVE and CVE strategies and programming, both in conflict and post-conflict settings.
- Government actors must uphold civil and political rights of citizens, including women’s rights to freedom of movement, dress, association and religious practice, and, pivotally, hold perpetrators accountable for violations of women’s human rights.
- States must not relinquish their roles in CVE and PVE to civil society, community initiatives or international donors. Support to communities must be clearly defined to ensure it does not justify minimal state involvement and/or result in women bearing additional burdens of volunteer community work.
- Governments should recognise the contradictory potential of CT/CVE funding to strengthen or undermine gender equality and peace, depending upon whether the funds support militarised responses rather than community level prevention initiatives. Governments should undertake audits to assess and ensure that CVE and PVE resources benefit women and men equally.

For Security Sector, including police, military, defence policy and justice

- Security actors should encourage greater coverage and promotion of individuals, organisations and networks, including women who are actively working to prevent violence, in order to counter the commonly occurring narrative in Police statements that only acknowledges help ‘from Muslim communities’.

For International Organisations and Donors¹⁰

- The UN, donors, and the international community should continue to support and invest in evidence-based and context-specific research, including technical expertise, as a means of improving understanding of – and ensuring that – all CT, CVE and PVE-related work takes into account the gendered social relationships within communities, organisations and movements.
- Implement the updated UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2016) recommendation that calls upon all Member States to consider the impact of counter terrorism measures on women’s human rights and women’s organisations, and to provide funds within CT/CVE efforts to further women’s rights and empowerment.
- Provide long-term and core support to women’s organisations working in CVE/PVE, and support cross-regional opportunities to connect women-led organisations and their strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- Foster coordination across peacebuilding and CVE/PVE program and funding streams, thereby helping to safeguard the reflexive process of learning from experience within peacebuilding practice in the integration of gender analyses.
For Civil Society

- Provide long-term support and capacity building for volunteers working on community-level activities to prevent and counter extremism.
- Engage with and support women and men who have undergone programs of de-radicalisation, including people convicted of terrorist offences – this encourages open community dialogue.
- Promote solidarity between women and men working in different movements and alliances – this advances gender equality, women’s rights and human rights, as well as pluralist religious organisations and LGBT groups, and has the potential to expand and broaden an anti-violence platform from which to support the prevention of violent extremism and terrorism.

For Researchers

- In peaceable and conflict-affected areas, families and community organisations might maintain better access to vulnerable individuals than international and governmental organisations. They may also be more effective than governments in leading movements against fundamentalism and violence. This approach remains an unexplored area of research on terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism agenda.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 ANALYTICAL APPROACH

This research uses gender analysis to explore the ideas and strategies of fundamentalist and extremist groups, and to examine women’s perceptions, experiences of, and approaches to negotiating and preventing violent extremism.

Neglecting gender dynamics in the study of violent extremism and terrorism results in unsatisfactory analysis and contextually incomplete understanding of causative and preventive factors. Extremist groups, such as ISIS\(^{10}\), have a deep understanding of gender relations within the societies in which they operate – and use this knowledge in recruiting and retaining soldiers (Quilliam Foundation 2015). For instance, ISIS has developed gender-specific strategies for recruiting young women and men through social media networks – individuals who are isolated from their communities: international students, migrant workers, and second-generation immigrants (Brown forthcoming). Moreover, the violent targeting of women and girls that has accompanied the transnational rise of extremism has been premeditated, systematic, and strategic – it has been used to mobilise men as foreign fighters with the promise of sex slaves and wives. ISIS is thus not merely an insurgency: it is a patriarchal counter-cultural movement. Gender-based symbolism, such as that used in sharia hijab – gender segregation and the seclusion of women and girls – not only signifies male power and group identity in some Islamic communities, but where forcibly imposed, it can also operate as an identifiable marker of extremism.

The efficacy of gender analysis in the study of violent extremism is threefold: First, a gender perspective broadens conventional analysis of terrorism and violent extremism – which typically responds only to major terrorist attacks and events – to consider the everyday violence and extremism that is concealed, tolerated or condoned within communities. This includes community tensions and confrontation, domestic, gender-based harassment and violence (e.g., Sjoberg 2015). Such an approach is crucial in order to prevent extremism before it becomes violent and leads to acts of terrorism. Indeed, everyday violence, including violence that women face, should be a cause for alarm and needs to be pre-empted. Second, gender analysis provides insight into the private sphere of familial and close community relations, which with few exceptions has largely been excluded from CT/CVE strategy and programming. Yet, as several decades of feminist scholarship has demonstrated, ‘the personal is political’: the human body is the baseline of politics (see Enloe 1989; Wilcox 2015). Women’s traditional gender-specific roles and engagements in the family and community permit access to this realm. Thirdly, gender analysis enables in-depth exploration of hidden structures and forms of power: gender-sensitive questions and can reveal visible and imperceptible warning signs for extremism and violence.
Drawing on this analytical approach, this research project addresses three main questions:

1. What are women’s perceptions and experiences of fundamentalist ideologies and extremist violence? Have they observed warning signs for extremism and terrorist violence, such as forms of gender-based violence, or their or others’ radicalisation?

2. How – in what ways and through what initiatives – and why are women (as individual family members, teachers, and members of community and civil society groups) countering ideologies and practices that are fundamentalist? What makes them more or less effective in their efforts at the family, community and national levels?

3. How can an environment conducive to women’s rights and gender equality in social, political and economic life engender community resilience against fundamentalist ideologies and the use of political violence?

Appendix A contains a full list of the semi-structured interview questions posed to research participants in the four sites, in either individual or focus group interviews.

3.2 VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN INDONESIA

Indonesia was chosen as the case for this research due to its significance as the largest Muslim-majority state worldwide, its history of Islamic fundamentalism leading to conflict, the participation of Indonesian citizens in global jihadi networks, and its strong democratic women’s movement promoting gender equality. Indonesia is also a priority country for Australia’s foreign policy, maintaining one of its most important bilateral relationships; Australia and Indonesia have significant and relevant current diplomatic, defence, policing and developmental relations concerning counter-terrorism, CVE, transnational crime, and law and justice.

Despite its reputation for religious tolerance, Indonesia has been facing growing Islamic fundamentalism and increasing threats of violent extremism. Since the Bali bombings in 2002, the nation has experienced home-grown terrorist attacks, including ISIS-claimed bombings in Jakarta (January 2016 and May 2017). Of the estimated 1200–1800 foreign fighters from the South-East Asian region to support ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Indonesia has contributed the largest number (Jawaid 2017). As mentioned above, there is little research on Indonesia that explores the root causes of jihadi or foreign fighter recruitment, and while there is some emerging research on women participating in violent extremism, we have located no relevant research exploring women’s roles in countering and preventing violent extremism. The Indonesian Government’s counter-terrorism policy framework, developed in 2008, has been overwhelmingly martial and tactical in its response, deploying Densus 88 Special Forces (the National Police Counterterrorism Squad) to uncover and suppress known terrorist and extremist
networks. Little attention has been paid to preventing violent extremism through non-military, whole-of-government, and civil society approaches, including research into the effectiveness of such strategies. This research is thus informed by and has been designed to explore non-military strategies to prevent violent extremism, in particular those strategies employed by civil society.

By deliberately selecting sub-national sites, this research study comprises data obtained from disparate demographic contexts; given the transnational connections among jihadi groups in the South-East Asian region and their connections to extremist networks, the findings from this analysis are expected to be of high relevance to other countries in the region.

Until relatively recently, Indonesia was regarded as the least likely Muslim-majority country to experience Islamic extremist violence, due to its multi-ethnic, democratic state ideology and the advocacy of tolerant, moderate Islam within Indonesian post-colonial and democratic movements, including the women’s movement. In step with recent globalising transformations across most facets of human interaction, trans-regional and geopolitical influences have caused profound political and religious change throughout Indonesia, enabling religious fundamentalism to prosper. Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia covers a broad spectrum of groups and networks. These organisations use subtle and overtly violent means to disseminate ideology (Azca 2011). After the Bali bombings (2002) and the implementation of Shariah Law (the establishment of local bylaws incorporating Islamic values) in Aceh in 2002, Islamic fundamentalism and extremism has become a major problem in Indonesia; the country has been the site of seventeen terrorist attacks since 2002, including in Jakarta, Cirebon and Poso – the research sites in this study (Komnas-Perempuan 2015).

In response to Bali, the government established the Regulation for the Substitute of the Law on Counter Terrorism (Perpu No 1/2002) and the Law on Combating Terrorism 15/2003. In 2003, the Police Department constituted the new anti-terror squad Densus 88, which monitors, arrests, and tortures terror suspects (Hermawan 2015). This organisation tightly controls and monitors targeted groups suspected to be supporters of terrorists and their families. The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) has documented the torture and killing of jihadis by Densus 88 in approximately 121 cases between 2007 and 2016 (Ramadhani and Afrida 2016). Many civil society and religious groups as well as parliamentarians argue that this coercive approach to counter-terrorism has increased rather than reduced violent extremism (Hermawan 2015; also Zammit and Iqbal 2015). In 2010, the government established the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) to coordinate its counter-terrorism program. Currently there is considerable domestic political pressure for the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) to be involved in counter-terrorism. This research was largely conducted in Indonesia between April and October 2016. To place this in the context of Indonesian terrorism-related events, it occurred prior to the 4 November and 2 December 2016 rallies in Jakarta, organised by religious leaders (The Jakarta Post 2016a); it was also completed before the arrest of four women in West Java and Jakarta for their alleged involvement in terrorist activities, including a suicide bombing in the Presidential palace – circumstances that have reignited debate regarding women’s roles in violent extremism. Although as yet poorly-coordinated, civil society initiatives such as public rallies in Jakarta have been organised in response to these events, with the intention of promoting national tolerance and diversity.
Responding to societal and international concern, the Indonesian government is reviewing its strategies, including revising the 2003 Law on Terrorism in recognition of the need for tighter, human rights-compliant laws (The Jakarta Post 2016b). The President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, has also urged other countries to embrace tolerant Islam in order to balk the global spread of terrorism (Anjaiah 2016; Halim 2016). However, non-violent preventative approaches to the problem of terrorism and violent extremism are under-developed and poorly resourced. The Indonesian National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) has acknowledged that it needs to upgrade its de-radicalisation programs (Ribka 2016), as well as recognising the necessity of improving cooperation with other countries and with the major Islamic organisations to promote moderate Islamic teaching.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

SITE SELECTION

Within Indonesia, four research sites were selected due to their differing positions within the logistical/supply chains of extremist and jihadi groups. Specifically, these research sites provided variation with respect to:

- sites of terrorist events;
- sites of recruitment, radicalisation, and jihadi networks;
- socio-economic status;
- ethnic and religious diversity; and
- rural and urban context.

This range of research sites enables comparative analysis, which is crucial to identifying patterns in women’s perceptions and understanding of extremism, warning signs of violence, and types of prevention activities; it is also vital to identifying and defining relationships between rising extremism, gender relations, and women’s roles in preventing violent extremism.
Jakarta is Indonesia’s capital – its largest urban environment and the site of successive terrorist attacks. Both pro- and anti-violence activists have staged demonstrations here. Issues of violence against women have been raised in the public realm, such as calls for anti-polygamy laws, and for contraversion of the Pornography Act (No. 44, 2008), which allows for victims of sex trafficking and exploitation – typically women and children – to be treated as criminals. Jakarta’s urban population includes multiple religions and mixed ethnicities, and maintains a higher socio-economic and education status than the rest of Indonesia.

Yogyakarta is a major satellite city comprising a monarchical government, strong educational institutions and multicultural traditions. Serving as a logistical support base for fundamentalist group actions, it has become a significant location for terrorist movements, with two Islamic boarding schools spreading fundamentalist ideology, and Islamist groups that have violently disrupted NGO and civil society activities. There is no military control in Yogyakarta. Women’s initiatives to counter fundamentalism are visible and diverse, rather than clandestine, and are conducted by various institutions including women’s Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), academic, and religious organisations.
Cirebon, West Java is a minor satellite city – boasting three Islamic boarding schools, is a strong base for Indonesian Islam. There are more than fifty Islamic boarding schools devoted to Indonesian Islamic culture, and these subscribe to the specifically Indonesian form of Sunni Islam promoted by the moderate religious civic institution Nahdatul Ulama. In 2011 the city was the site of a suicide bombing in a police compound mosque, indicative of rising violent action on the part of extremist fundamentalist groups. The Fahmina Institute – a progressive religious organisation operating in Cirebon – plays a crucial role in helping to prevent the rise of such violence. In May 2017, Babakan village, Cirebon, home to approximately forty Islamic boarding schools, became a venue for the first Women’s Ulama Congress in Indonesia.

Poso is a socio-economically marginalised rural area in Central Sulawesi. Since 1998 it has been the site of inter-religious sectarian conflict, in the period 1998–2001 alone causing over a thousand deaths, rape and sexual violence. Poso has since been occupied by the military and is a known site for established jihadi groups and ideological recruitment. The most famous Indonesian jihadi leader, Santoso, sought covert refuge in Poso and was killed by security forces in July 2016.

Figure 2: Research sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Known Jihadi Base – Recruitment</th>
<th>High Violence (Conflict)</th>
<th>Low Violence (Terrorism)</th>
<th>Minimal (Disturbance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cirebon (2011)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Minor Jihadi Network – Logistics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
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DIVERSITY OF WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ROLES

Gender analysis is employed in this research to explore women’s perceptions of fundamentalism and extremism and their roles in preventing violent extremism. There is a vital need to apprehend women’s experience, understanding and knowledge in regard to this, given their regular exclusion from most discussions and initiatives related to CVE and terrorism. A central component of this analysis recognises that critical to understanding women’s roles in PVE is ensuring that women are not treated as a homogeneous category. As such, diverse groups of women were engaged with respect to their location, profession, socio-economic status, age, and their roles at work and in the community. Further, the study has built upon existing research, which to date has concentrated on women’s family roles as mothers and daughters, and extended...
this analysis to women’s public roles as community and NGO leaders, educators, government employees and religious leaders.

The research paid particular attention to ensuring women’s grassroots community organisations were involved in each location in identifying civil society and community groups, schools and initiatives in which women participate and lead. Most of these women either worked for or were members of religious organisations and NGOs, voluntary or social welfare groups – both internationally and locally. Once participants were identified across these groups, a chain-referral method was used to include other participants, frequently establishing connections and relationships between those involved. As a means of obtaining correlative data, a specified series of questions and themes were explored across the four sites with each research participant.22

**INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP METHODS**

In May 2016, an inception workshop was held in Jakarta with approximately 25 participants from NGOs and civil society organisations and all members of the research team. This workshop was followed by a pilot research field visit to Cirebon, West Java with the Monash GPS chief investigators to refine the interview questions and approach. Religious leaders and teachers at three Islamic Boarding Schools were interviewed, as well as leaders and members of *Fahmina*, the Islamic education NGO. Following initial research, two further visits were made to the remaining three sites, Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Poso, involving interviews and focus groups.23

Dr. Sri Wiyanti Eddyono (coordinator researcher in Indonesia) and Ms Dini Anitasari Sabaniah (researcher) worked with research assistants in these sites to ensure that all interviews and focus groups were conducted in local languages and dialects. Three research assistants were chosen for their local knowledge of the sites and the issues within them in order to be able to assist with access to research participants: Enik Maslaha (research assistant for Yogyakarta site only), Salma Masri (research assistant for Poso site only) and Yurra Maurice (research assistant for Jakarta site only). Twenty-two individuals were interviewed, twenty-seven in Yogyakarta, and forty people in Poso in focus group settings. Appendix B provides a list of CVE activities undertaken by women’s organisations, and Appendix C, available on request, provides a list of the research participants, the categories they represent and the dates of the research interviews.

Transcription and translation into English of audio-recorded Indonesian interviews was carried out by Monash University translators, male and female, with no conflicts of interest according to Monash University policy.

**COMPARATIVE APPROACH AND FEMINIST METHODOLOGY**

Comparative analysis conducted across the diverse individuals and groups of women revealed consistencies and variances in their experience, understandings of and approaches to identifying and preventing violent extremism. Comparison enabled us to assess how these patterns may reflect the varying experience of fundamentalist ideologies and extremist violence across the different sites. This included considering whether – and which – women in particular locations or with specific demographic characteristics are more likely than others to be attracted to fundamentalist ideologies; the extent to which location and context affects the threat of their being victims of gender-based violence. For instance, the research team anticipated that women experiencing socio-economic and political marginalisation due to conflict may be attracted to subversive ideologies and may be more vulnerable to
violence. At the same time, some forms of marginalisation and vulnerability to violence may induce women to participate in individual and collective action to oppose fundamentalism. In particular, the research aimed to understand what motivates women to prevent or counter fundamentalism and extremism.

The study is informed by a feminist research ethic (Ackerly and True 2010). First, this involves attending to power relationships throughout the research process as a means of practicing – as well as studying – feminist empowerment. In particular, this research process has sought to empower young researchers as part of the research team and to share the methodologies and analysis of English-speaking and Indonesian members of the research team throughout the process. Second, the feminist research ethic seeks to empower the research participants through their involvement in the research process. For example, this approach allowed the research team to ask individual or community group participants to ascertain what they considered to be measures of success in countering and preventing fundamentalist ideologies, rather than assuming that the researchers would understand how to interpret the effectiveness of their activities. We explore how women evaluated their strategies to prevent violence, and attempt to illustrate and assess the impact of these strategies. Feminist research methods try to ensure that research participants are active contributors in the research process, that they are involved in the analysis of our findings, and that these findings and the recommendations following from them are communicated and shared at the community level as well as in policymaking forums. As such, as well as disseminating the research findings in Canberra and Jakarta, we plan to return to the community research sites to share a summary of the findings and to engage in further community discussion of their action-oriented implications.

ETHICS

Human subjects research ethics approval was granted by the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC) – approval number CF16/1011-2016000540 7 April 2016–7 April 2012. All research participants provided informed consent to be included in this study. Some allowed their names to be used, but for the purposes of this report quotations are only attributed by location and to the type of respondent. A full list of participants is provided in Appendix C, excluding the names of those who wished to be anonymous. Research questions and the research design were discussed with participants, sometimes at length, who had the opportunity to ask any questions. They were also provided with an explanatory statement on the research project in Indonesian, read and spoken by all participants.
4

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS
4.1 CONTINUUM OF FUNDAMENTALISM, EXTREMISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The research sought to understand the extent to which, and in what ways, increasing religious fundamentalism is connected with the threat of violent extremism in Indonesia. These two factors are identified in the literature as causally connected. With respect to Indonesia, for example, Hikam (2016) suggests that to combat violent extremism, the ideology of fundamentalism must be countered. To ensure context-specific and detailed exploration of this relationship, the use of concepts and terminology such as ‘fundamentalism’, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘extremism’ and ‘violent extremism’ were tested in the Jakarta inception workshop.

The research team was initially willing to use proxy concepts for CVE and PVE such as ‘preventing conflict’ and ‘promoting a culture of peace and tolerance.’ However, at the inception workshop and during pilot research we found that virtually all participants identified these terms as acceptable. They appeared comfortable in both defining and using them. As a result we determined to use the conventional CVE and PVE terms. Participants also used other terms in relation to countering fundamentalist ideologies, including ‘tolerant Islam’, ‘progressive Islam’, ‘knowledgeable Islam’, and ‘Islam for all’.

In Poso, women critically observed that extremism and terrorism for them were not only conducted by those who they would describe as ‘fundamentalist’, but also by state actors. While for realists and cynics alike this is not an unlikely circumstance, it is nonetheless an important insight in terms of the extent to which the public is aware of this, and, more importantly, the extent to which coercive state responses to non-state terrorism may reinforce the cycle of violence and be perceived as part of the same problem.25

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. Extremism exists in all research sites, and women unanimously expressed opposition to the use of violence.

2. A relationship between the spread of fundamentalist political ideologies and groups and rising extremism – including violent forms – was cited by most participants.

3. Religious or Islamic fundamentalism was connected to a sense of safety and to patriarchal protection/order.

4. Consensus among research participants that fundamentalism is a problem when force is used.

5. Greatest contestation of any causal relationship between fundamentalism and violent extremism was observed in Jakarta.
Addressing our first research question concerning perceptions of religious fundamentalism and radicalism, almost all participants acknowledged that concepts and ideologies of radicalism and fundamentalism exist in their communities. Participants considered religious movements in Indonesia according to a set of disparate and sometimes overlapping categories that did not immediately distinguish moderate from radical Islam, understandably contextualising the meaning of ‘fundamentalism’ within the national and local circumstances confronting them. The broad movement subscribing to the ritual purity of Islam was identified as radical on the basis of fundamentalist ideology. This jihadi movement has sought to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state. Second, ‘political Islam’ was considered as a grouping of more pragmatic actors using Islam to achieve their political interests. Instances of this are prevalent during local and national elections, and the activities of such politically oriented organisations are not primarily based on Islamic ideology. In all research sites, participants were acutely aware of how Islam is and can be used, and abused, to mobilise people for a political cause. For instance, one participant in Jakarta stated:

“[T]he easiest way to gain political support is to flare up religious sentiment. It’s just a matter of gaining enough momentum to get popular support and mobilise the people into action in order to achieve these political interests. And perhaps these masses also pine for…genuine spiritual fulfilment and connection.”

Similarly, a participant in Poso stated:

“The truth is people in Poso feel secure already – there is no need for military force. Because of the political interest [in counter-terrorism], this makes the situation insecure. With the large number of military forces, it has become an excessive terror.”

The third category identified was ‘pious Islam’, which emphasises religious observance (cf. Rinaldo 2014). This does not hold any necessary relation to Islamism, but rather is an affirmation of the freedom to practice religious belief. Overall, the research participants prioritised the need to map which movement is a significant threat in each context or location. Some participants identified the political version of Islamic fundamentalism as the most threatening, while others felt the increase of jihadi movements is becoming the greatest concern.

Most participants were aware of growing fundamentalism in their communities and stated that the other members of their families, workplaces and organisations shared their concern over fundamentalist ideology spreading through society. Numerous examples of fundamentalism and extremism were identified, from subtle instances to more visible forms. This included:

- Groups that openly identify as militant defenders of Islam. This includes two jihadi groups that link with Al Qaeda through Jamaah Islamiyah, led by Abu Bakar Baasyir, and a third group is a component of the ISIS network. These jihadi organisations aim to conduct jihad and to advocate Islam by attacking non-Muslims, and practised this through suicide bombing – in Bali by Al Qaeda’s members, and in Sarinah Thamrin by ISIS. Completing this category is the militant Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defence Front).
- Violent acts perpetrated against minority groups (e.g., Ahmadiyah, Shiah, Christian and LGBTI groups), such as the ongoing intimidation, assault and persecution of minority religious groups by the FPI – closing down minority places of worship, destroying their houses, disturbing NGO activities addressing the violence.
- Conflict in Sampang and Madura (East Java), and in Poso.
• Increasing numbers of public figures and senior officers in government arguing their policies by reference to religious values.
• Hundreds of new local and regional bylaws (Peraturan Daerah) created specifically to impose repressive Shariah rules on women and girls – curfews, dress codes, and the criminalisation of prostitution. 29
• Hate speech directed at minorities becoming increasingly prevalent in Mosques, social media, and on television.30
• The Ulama Fatwa, which prohibits Christmas greetings.31
• The increasing presence of symbols and practices of religious authoritarianism – the hijab syar’i (long black hijab); recital groups, now frequently occurring in office environments; the multiplying number and amplification of adzan (the call for prayer); and the burgeoning presence of religion on television.32
• Rising fundamentalism at all levels of education, proselytised by senior students and alumni.33
• Growing nationalism in schools adopting the practice of saluting Indonesia’s flag every Monday. 34
• Schoolbooks and curricula explicitly encouraging jihad.35
• Recruitment of jihadis by means of influencing women migrant workers.36

Jakarta participants considered the phenomenon of religious and Islamic fundamentalism and its connection to security and gender:

“Religious fundamentalism offers a sense of safety because [its adherents] could feel like they belong – ‘we are all in the same position of duress here’. These people do not feel safe to be by themselves…it’s very visible for outside observers…it is clear that they have found people that they can click with in social terms.

The political system does not enhance the welfare of its citizens. It’s corrupt. Democracy does not better the lives of the citizens. It is beneficial for the elites. People are pining for a governance system that could give them security…. That’s why religion has become a refuge for people. That’s why there is a renewed surge for Islam because there is an urgent sense for Muslims to find security.”
“[It] is a product of the clash of different individual backgrounds… the core of the problem is… the use of Arabic as the official language of Islam and amongst Muslims – the gender bias in the religion is heavily influenced by the inherent gender bias in Arabic as a language…. There is no noun without a gender. There is a differentiation between masculine and feminine, but God is introduced in the relationship between the linguistic masculine and feminine – hence the people themselves hold a subconscious gender bias.”

According to a respondent from the Commission on Child Protection, the heavily patriarchal culture and its misogynistic interpretation of Islam is a significant factor:

“[A]ctually, Islam provides space for women and men as equals, similar responsibilities as well…. Al Quran states that the duty as a human being is to worship (beribadah), where each woman and man is a caliph of the earth…. this demonstrates there is no gendered distinction of status in Islam. The problem is at the level of implementation. The principle of Islam is very egalitarian, but it is because there is a patriarchal culture that constructs society’s thinking that women’s roles are restricted.”

Nonetheless, the confinement of women to roles in the domestic sphere admits significant exceptions in Islamic culture. For instance, it does not apply to Muslim women employed abroad as migrant workers. A more immediate example occurs in one Islamist group in which women’s roles extend into the public sphere, as identified by a Jakarta NGO respondent:

“… HTI [Hizbuttahril Indonesia] is quite moderate…[in term of woman’s role]…. Women have space in HTI. I am surprised, since beforehand I thought that in these kinds of groups there is a prevailing domestic repression of women as secondary citizens. But not in HTI. They have clear guidelines, which I also maintain. Women need to participate: that is why in rallies women are always in the front line, because there is an understanding that women have social responsibility – that they not only contribute in the kitchen, but participate in politics.”

There was consensus among research participants that fundamentalism is a problem when force is used. For many participants – who are cognisant of the existing social and political freedoms women exercise – violence and the use of force is the most pressing issue, as a society reliant on perpetual coercion severely weakens the value of the individual within a community. For example, women forced to wear stipulated restrictive dress are subject to repressive social measures irrespective of their religion. As a participant from ALIMAT in Jakarta stated:

“For me, it’s violence. Any kind of violence, regardless of whether it is carried out in the name of God, or not. It’s a sign of the absence of tolerance. We shouldn’t see it as a matter of religious violence or simply pay attention only to religious violence. We can’t discriminate violence on the grounds of religion alone. Violence is violence, full stop.”

Participants were divided on whether an increase in religiosity – defined as strongly pious views, including aggressive monotheism – is simply an expression of private religion or contributes to fundamentalism. A few participants did not regard the ideology of fundamentalism as a threat unless it exercised violence such as bombing, destruction or social intolerance.
These views also differed according to the research site.

IN YOGYAKARTA, most research participants felt that an increase in religiosity is related to an increase in extremist violence. For instance, dress restrictions are equated with fundamentalism and intolerance and seen to be propagated by an increase in religiosity in public spaces.

IN POSO, participants viewed extremism almost unanimously as linked to political interests rather than to Islam or other religious ideology. As observed here, ‘Fundamentalism emerged when Santoso appeared’. They expressed concern about increasing religiosity and rising extremism, averring particularly to the intra-religious bullying of minority sects as indicative of rising intolerance. ‘My worry has become stronger. They already feel different from their fellow Muslims; can you imagine how they feel towards the Christians? The possibility of future conflict will only grow if this isn’t confronted.’ Observing that fundamentalism had also increased among Christians, participants perceived any force or constraint imposed on women by religious leaders – regarding dress, mobility, or otherwise – as benefiting them in terms of protection and safety in the context of the escalating, politically motivated sectarian conflict.

IN JAKARTA, we found the most divergence occurred on causality between religious fundamentalism and violent extremism: Whereas some participants viewed increased religiosity as unobjectionable, others viewed the trend as dangerous, although not always fundamentalist or extremist. As one participant from a women’s religious organisation in Jakarta stated:

“They could mistake me as a fundamentalist because I appear to be very Islamic. But I would be seen as secular in the pesantren [Islamic boarding school] environment.”

The differences across the research sites show that the understanding of fundamentalism / fundamentalist or extremism / extremist depends greatly on the context. For instance, one participant who studied in Australia commented on her experience:

“When I saw Indonesians [in my neighbourhood in Australia] I saw they are extremely strong [on Islamic fundamentalism].... I was confused....I was surprised because I never found this kind of perspective when I was in Indonesia....”

In Poso, some participants were genuinely concerned about changing relations in the community as a result of the rising number of members from radical groups distinguishing between good and bad Muslims. In one village a woman mentioned that there is a separation between those who are members of radical ideological groups and those who are not:

“She was a good friend of mine, but our relation is different now since she is the member of a radical group.... This group has co-opted one mosque in our neighbourhood. One day I wanted to pray in the mosque, but the man who takes care it told me that I was not supposed to pray there. Since when is the mosque only owned by a particular group in this village? I was very shocked.”

In Poso, expressions of religious fundamentalism are highly normalised due to the recent history of religious conflict, ongoing tensions, and the influence of jihadi groups located there, but the response is a pragmatic one. In Yogyakarta, where there are many educational institutions, a multicultural tradition, and monarchical government, expressions of fundamentalism are not normal and they are strongly opposed.
and contested in public space. In Jakarta, fundamentalism is also publicly contested, although the divergence in participants’ views on whether or not they are linked to violent extremism ironically suggests an environment even more conducive to the manipulation of religion for extremist purposes than Poso, where people are aware of the danger of radicalism. Many current recruits to terrorism are urban, educated, and middle-class – able to connect to a broader virtual community through social and online media.41

If we want to prevent rather than counter violent extremism, we need to be able to identify and break the complex causal chain linking the adoption of fundamentalist beliefs to hateful practices towards others, and to involvement in a group or network committed to violence.

For the purposes of prevention, observing and reacting to the activities of Islamist groups in everyday life is therefore considered as important as post-hoc response to major terrorist incidents.

**RECOMMENDATION:**
Support initiatives that observe and respond to activities of Islamist groups in daily life as a primary terrorism-prevention strategy.

*IMAGE CREDIT: AUTHORS’ OWN*
4.2 EVERYDAY WARNING SIGNS FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM

If you want to know what the security situation is, what the indicators of safety are – don’t ask the military, don’t ask the government, ask the women (paraphrased, Poso participant).42

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. **Four indicators of increasing radicalisation** were consistently identified by the interviewees: the shifting use of the hijab; constraints on women’s mobility, including gendered exclusivity in mosques; social naming and hate crimes; threats and acts of gender-based violence.

2. **Shifting use of the hijab**: Across all research sites, women regarded their publicly tolerated coercion – physical assault; threatening verbal abuse – concerning their dress as a prevalent warning sign of radicalisation. This most commonly pertained to the context-specific moving target of the hijab, especially the shari hijab.

3. **Constraints on women’s and girls’ mobility** in everyday life was frequently mentioned as a warning sign, and also defined as a form of violence. A number of religious imperatives constrain women and girls’ mobility and rights in public spaces, including in mosques. Increasing social exclusion was identified at all sites, including at Friday prayers, at work, and at school. Its rising incidence and weak public opposition was typically cited by women as spreading a message of intolerance.

4. **Social naming and hate speech** against those who follow a different religion is increasingly being disseminated openly through social media and television. This includes an increasing degree and greater visibility of intolerant views and behaviour (Wardah 2015) directed at sexual minorities such as transgender individuals and LGBTQI groups, religious minorities such as Ahmadiyah, Christian, Shia, and indigenous peoples. This growing prevalence of hate in social media extends to open propagation of threats by Islamist groups against innumerable minorities, such as women activists who campaign to oppose violence against women.

5. **Gender-based violence** as a warning sign of radicalisation was not explicitly explored in the research. However, it was identified – violence against women and girls (VAW), and intolerance towards LGBTQI groups in the community were recognised as warning signs for violent extremism in all sites, as was early marriage.

That is where we are defeated. In the end, instead of experiencing terrorist attacks such as in Paris or Belgium, discrimination will occur. For whom? Women and minority groups. (Yogyakarta, NGO participant)
In all research sites, participants noticed changes in dress styles and greater use of the more conservative ‘shari’ hijab from the Middle East. Young and adult women wearing black and long hijab (‘shari’) dress was a common sight in the markets, department stores, streets and airports of all research sites. Muslim women in Poso are strongly encouraged by religious leaders and other members in their community to wear the hijab. It is conspicuous as a form of dress: “From the appearance it is easily identified whether you are Muslim and non-Muslim and you will therefore be very careful when talking about your religion to those who are of a different religion.”

Although Poso women participants generally accept the hijab, some noted that it results in strong division between groups. Similarly, in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, while many participants saw the hijab as a benign form of religious identification, they remarked how particular directives from religious leaders on the type of hijab could be divisive. For instance, one participant’s sister in a Jakarta state primary school was compelled by her teacher to wear the hijab:

“Initially, there were only seven students who did not wear hijab. Then, in second grade, there were only three students. After that, in third grade, my sister was the only one left without a hijab, and the teacher urged her to wear one. Could you imagine being [required to wear the hijab as] a third grader? ‘Hey, hijabs cannot be colourful. Your hijab is too colourful. It shouldn’t be colourful… no, no, it’s not right. It should be like this, you see. Hijabs should be black. Something like this. Any other colour, as long as…’"

Further, in both Jakarta and Yogyakarta, participants observed pressure on girls in schools to comply with a certain dress code. For instance, one participant’s sister in a Jakarta state primary school was compelled by her teacher to wear the hijab:

“Initially, there were only seven students who did not wear hijab. Then, in second grade, there were only three students. After that, in third grade, my sister was the only one left without a hijab, and the teacher urged her to wear one. Could you imagine being [required to wear the hijab as] a third grader? ‘Hey, hijabs cannot be colourful. Your hijab is too colourful. It shouldn’t be colourful… no, no, it’s not right. It should be like this, you see. Hijabs should be black. Something like this. Any other colour, as long as…’"

Participants in Yogyakarta discussed the hijab as an increasingly compulsory dress code for girls in state schools, who are now mostly Muslim:

“This is because there is the changing of school uniform: from shorts to the long pants and shirts for male students, and long skirts and shirts for female students…. In Yogyakarta, state schools used to be a neutral area where students from different religions can study without worrying about their religious identity.” (Anonymous)

Gender-specific warning signs were observed in everyday life and were critical early indicators of fundamentalism and extremist behaviour and violence.
“They got through an after-school activity called rohis [Islamic extra-curricular spiritual group]. My daughter attended the state Junior High School No. 8 and told me that students were prohibited from wearing jeans. They must wear the hijab correctly. They had to pay a fine if their hair was out of the hijab. I objected strongly because my daughter was frightened. This is a state school, right? Yes. Every Muslim girl has to wear the hijab. In some areas, non-Muslim girls must wear hijab as well.”

Another participant also observed this sudden change and pointed to society’s affirmation of its abrupt public prevalence. More importantly, she adverted to society’s endorsement of the presumption of authority by others to adjudge women’s piety and morality based on their dress, describing the rapid escalation of this social licence to present circumstances in which pietistic reproach forms part of the much broader coercive authority of others to determine what women wear:

As well as discussing its enforcement in schools, some participants recounted how the hijab was increasingly expected to be worn in workplaces and as a requirement for promotion:

“Women are seen as the source of the community’s moral standing. That’s why women are first targeted by the Sharia laws to wear hijab at all times. Their role as a public citizen is questioned. Some legislation forces Muslim women to wear a hijab. If a woman civil servant does not wear her hijab, then she would miss out on promotion. She would be ostracised.” (Jakarta NGO)

Not all participants viewed the dress code as an early warning sign for extremism or violent extremism. However, this is also a sign that fundamentalist ideology is progressively intervening in women’s lives, promoting particular norms and practices that dictate to women how and what constitutes being a good Muslim. As one participant stated:

“When I returned from America, I was absolutely astounded. Why was everyone wearing hijab? Without realising it, we are overwhelmed by hijab – it has become a part of the collective identity. A ‘good’ woman equals hijab.”

“The hijab phenomenon is a relatively recent one. I mean, it was weird to see a person wearing hijab then. I think it was 2000 onwards. After the fall of the New Order, the Islamist movement was no longer kept in check and the fundamentalists grew stronger. I kept seeing more and more people wearing hijab. I also saw it in my own family. They are quite devoted. More and more of them are choosing to wear hijab fairly recently. Sometimes when I wear shorts, they’d scold me for committing a sin. They’d question my shorts. If I don’t wear a hijab, then I’d get scolded – even though previously I have never been treated this way” (Jakarta individual)
A participant from Yogyakarta observed that those who now attack women’s dress are ‘people who used to wear beards and now walk around clean-shaven with backpacks on’:

“The shifting has started and now women wear hijab. Personally, I think it is not a problem for it is a freedom to decide one’s appearance. The problem is due to the act of judgement that has blossomed over the years and has only become stronger.... When we met last Ramadan, there was another shift from the previous year. There was a dalil [rationale based on Islamic law or Quran] that is circulating that if a woman did not wear a hijab, her father will suffer a great sin. If the said woman is married, then her husband will suffer a great sin; which, I think, is exceptionally judgemental. This has become a great pressure for women. The hijab used to be a personal matter for me, now it is not anymore because people would ask me why don’t I wear a hijab. It’s a serious matter. For me, the problem does not lie in the hijab itself, but in the judgement [whether women wear one or not].”

(Yogyakarta, NGO)

Many participants in all sites agreed – it is the widespread moral reprobation and its accompanying coercive dictates regarding what not to wear that is of most concern. One participant in Jakarta observed that:

“[I]t’s finding faults in another woman’s hijab. They would say that my hijab, for example, is not proper in accordance to Sharia laws. There are many women like that. They would suddenly wear long hijab even though they have never worn one before. It’s obvious. These people would suddenly tell me off [concerning] how to wear a hijab properly – to the point that they would scold me if my hair was out of place. They started wearing one yesterday and they’ve already told me off! I mean, I’ve been wearing a hijab for years!”

(Jakarta NGO)

Restrictions on women and girls’ everyday lives can be a warning sign of violent extremism, and potentially constitutes a form of violence against women (under the 1993 UN Declaration on Violence Against Women (DEVAW). Some participants discussed how women they knew had adopted the hijab on the order of their husbands, indicating male domination and the threat of domestic violence underlying the change in dress in some, if not all, cases. The National Commission on Violence Against Women in Indonesia (Komnas Perempuan) analyses this as violent discriminatory policy against women (Chandrakirana 2010; Komnas-Perempuan 2015). For example, one participant in Poso described the situation of her friend:

“Last night I was called by Ms. Yuni. She asked me how I was doing. As women, we can come and talk to each other. [I can say,] ‘I don’t have any mission to make you remove your veil after this.’ What I am concerned about is that she came to the decision to wear a veil because of a recommendation that did not originate in her belief, did not come from her calling, or because she just wanted to be seen as different from others.”

(Poso)
It has been argued that a causal relation exists in many fundamentalist movements between their political contestation over the role of religion in the state and prescription in women’s appearance (cf. Yuval-Davis 1997). In one participant’s words: ‘They need a symbol to prove their existence’. It is ironic that the symbolism of women’s dress suddenly makes them visible and political agents, where previously their relevance to the political sphere may have been largely ignored. Participants identified a change from no hijab to hijab, from colourful, modern hijab to the short, plain hijab, to the ‘shari hijab’. The context-specific conspicuousness of the hijab, especially the shari hijab, and the coercive directive to wear a hijab – present in all our research sites – were seen as forewarnings of radicalisation. The presence of fundamentalism in everyday life needs to be monitored, such as the changes in women’s dress and mobility, the intolerant attitudes towards those who are different (i.e., of a different religion), the permissive attitude towards child marriage, and so on.

CONSTRAINTS ON WOMEN’S MOBILITY

As well as the enforcement of dress codes, the research found that there are an increasing number of religious practices constraining women and girls’ mobility and rights in public spaces, including in mosques, at work, and at school. In some places in Indonesia, women have been told that they cannot go out at night. A participant from Jakarta cited a particular case:

“[A] mayor issued an official edict that women can’t work at an internet cafe after 11pm if they are not accompanied by other women. The reason is to protect women from being sexually assaulted. Women are the victims, but why does the government want to limit the victims’ rights? They don’t go after the perpetrators. The state should facilitate a safe working environment for men and women at any given time.” (Jakarta NGO)

Some Jakarta participants also noticed cultural shifts in their office:

“We used to celebrate birthdays and broadcast birthday wishes throughout the office, for example. We stopped doing it because it is not part of the fundamentalist teaching. Wishing somebody a ‘happy birthday’ is not right, apparently. We also stopped praying together before events” (anonymous).

Another participant described her experiences working in a state-owned company which monitors employees’ involvement during prayer time and weekly religious recitation:

“The office over the past two years has allowed religious activities during working hours and organises recitation weekly…. [which] introduced the members [to] Islamic polygamy and shari dress code. I find this Ustaz has a link with a radical movement in the Poso area…”

The respondent further observed that management condoned newly introduced practices such as watching a TV program during working hours that discusses Islam.

In Poso, participants at a focus group described the case of a friend who, following her husband’s directive, limited her public movement and socialisation with others:

“She came once when she was invited to an organisation’s meeting. She had not worn her veil yet, but she’d changed, she did not want to interact with men. She had to be escorted by her husband wherever she went, she couldn’t take ojek [motorcycle taxi]. The changes
were severe. And she chose to live in a plantation. Well. In her language, she said ‘The Islam that I knew was not the real Islam.’ I asked her what the difference was. ‘The difference is the one my husband introduced to me made me want to read the Koran. I even cry when I read the Koran. Before that, I felt plain.’ Well, that… ‘And my husband taught me its tafsir [interpretation]…’ Dangerous tafsir. I underline that keyword, tafsir. How could he bring a woman to interpret [the Koran] the way they wanted?” (Poso, anonymous)

The directive to women in some families and religious communities not to work was also raised by participants as an increasing constraint on women’s mobility and rights. Many ‘smart women are choosing not to pursue their careers’, and the number doing so is on the rise, one Jakarta participant explained. ‘Having a career is not seen as part of the religious teaching’ and women are encouraged ‘to return to domestic life. Families are seen of the utmost importance and children need to be…controlled so they are brought up properly.’ (Jakarta NGO)

Local discriminatory ‘sharia’ bylaws in almost all regions in Indonesia regulate women’s mobility and rights. Komnas Perempuan has urged the Indonesian government to remove these local bylaws. However, to date they have not been reviewed or repealed. While the government recently dismissed 700 local policies in April 2016, none of these related to local bylaws discriminating with respect to gender.45

Women participants in all sites described being confronted by increasing social exclusion when seeking to access mosques. In Jakarta, some mosques spread messages of intolerance during Friday prayers. In Yogyakarta, a number of mosques are now under the control of fundamentalists, prohibiting entry to many moderate Muslims. This is also the case in Poso:

“I went [to the mosque] with a neighbour, with an old man whose many children also live here. I asked him about the mosque and he said, ‘Actually this is a special mosque, not a public one…. This is special for the congregation of Tablighi Jamaat, this is not for public. The one for public is the mosque over there.’ Even mosques are different. So I am really seeing it. This is the threat we are facing.” (Poso)

SOCIAL NAMING AND HATE CRIMES

Participants in Jakarta and Yogyakarta described increasing incidences of social exclusion through derogative naming. One participant, a journalist in Jakarta explained:

“I keep hearing rumours about people turning over to ‘the other side.’ Sometimes I would hear my friends calling other friends ‘Ji – short for Haji’ [with the connotation that they are a religious conservative/fundamentalist]. This is happening socially.” (Jakarta, journalist)

Hate speech against those who follow a different religion is more openly disseminated through social media and television. In Yogyakarta and Jakarta, parents and teachers introduce this intolerance to their children, inculcating social divisions from an early age. Children learn to identify their friends by whether or not they belong to the same or a different religion, and this limits their interaction. Public and institutional intolerance of in-group non-conformity is increasingly apparent across distinctions of religion, culture, nationality, and gender. As with all forms of bigotry, this
public intolerance is often directed at non-conforming groups regarded as minorities, seen to be deficient in characteristics the in-group ostensibly values. While such deficiencies might be physical, moral, or defined by gender, the disproportionate level of persecution minorities are subject to is frequently explicable in terms of inequality and disempowerment: they comprise small proportions of the population; lack proximity to wealth and the ruling elite; and are unable to effect retributive action or to access or influence institutional mechanisms of justice and governance. This includes sexual minorities such as transgender individuals and LGBTQI groups, religious minorities such as Ahmadiyah, Christianity, Shiah, and indigenous peoples. Fundamentalists ‘perceive that the religion condemns transgender persons; that it is a disease to be cured.’ (Yogyakarta Ibu Sinta). Social media amplifies this hatred. As one participant observed:

“It is incredible to see it happening in social media. It’s scary to read the comments. It truly is a public broadcast of hate. It’s surprising how much hate there is against the minorities.” (Jakarta NGO)

Reports by both Komnas HAM (Wardah 2015) and Komnas Perempuan (2013) suggest that the degree of intolerance in Indonesia is increasing. This intolerance has a specific impact on women. During the course of this research, in Yogyakarta and Jakarta in March and April 2016 Islamist groups threatened women activists who campaign to counter violence against women. Although in many situations police and government officers have been witness to these incidents, the response to victims in invariably institutional silence. For example, in Yogyakarta fundamentalists tried to force the closure of a pesantren to prevent transgender persons pursuing their religion. A member of a focus group in the city highlighted how sexual autonomy and rights are increasingly the target of fundamentalist violence:

“We, [the organisation], are very aware of the challenges of fundamentalism; this radicalism is related to the [organisation] – issues that are being fought for, which are said to be haram issues – e.g., regarding reproductive and sexual health. Very few are taking care of this issue because this is a big taboo in the general public, especially for teenagers. Also, we have worked with marginalised citizens, sex workers, LGBT, street children, gays, ladyboys. We truly understand that this is a very sensitive issue. The basis of our activities are that every person has the right to reproductive and sexual health and that is a right for each and every individual, regardless of their sexual orientation or occupation. So, this is the journey to defend the reproductive rights for the community. This year you can really feel it...there were big issues surrounding LGBT, communism, and Papua... Now the issue is growing from sexuality – an easy target for these groups to begin attacking again.” (Focus group – civil society – Yogyakarta)
Gender-based violence constitutes an exercise of power made possible by structural inequalities – it is intended to reinforce group boundaries in jihadi groups, as indicated by secondary research and documentary evidence gathered in this project. Yet there remains a lack of research exploring whether the incidence and extent of gender-based violence is a forewarning of violent extremism. Given that discussion of these issues can endanger participants and may not elicit trustworthy responses, this research did not intentionally investigate the relationship between violence against women and rising extremism. Regardless of this, some participants volunteered relevant examples concerning indicators of violent extremism.

During the conflict and post-conflict period (1998–2007), sexual violence against women and girls in Poso was perpetrated by both extremist groups and counter-terrorism security forces (Trisubagya 2009). This secondary data was confirmed by interviews and focus groups conducted in Poso. Participants also referred to the growing category of new local bylaws that physically punish women; one woman cited the case of Bulukumba, where women are caned for engaging in extra-marital sexual relationships, consensual or otherwise. Others mentioned local laws in Aceh that punish women without investigating the charges against them (Eddyono et al. 2016).

A number of participants were recruited to jihadi groups as university students while away from home and their social networks, with one volunteering details of the occurrence approximating date-rape sexual assault:

“They got me drunk, then they brought me to their dorm, told me they had pictures of me. In that condition, I didn’t understand, I was still naïve. I didn’t understand what they wanted. But I then started retreating and closing up. I didn’t want to get involved, but then I got even closer to that person. My circle started expanding, not limited to that person. I became less critical too. Then we talked about religion, looking at it pragmatically. Well it’s typical of us students. Then I met their older siblings, from the UKM at the student centre; [it was] a bit weird. I don’t remember what happened to me that night…. But then I was reminded of how powerless I was. How were they able to get access to photos [of me naked]? Like it or not, I had to step back from my social life. They were planning something that involved lives, and one of them included destruction.” (Yogyakarta – civil society).

As one of our research participants in Yogyakarta pointed out, ‘fundamentalists view sexual violence as one of the failures of modernity’:

“They say these things would not have happened if Islamic values are applied in our society! You were raped because you didn’t wear a hijab. Men are enticed by women in public. Why would anyone leave their house without a hijab?” (Yogyakarta, University Lecturer)

Early marriage of child brides was also mentioned as warning sign of violent extremism:
“One of the strategic issues that we are currently tackling is the issue of child brides. Currently, KPAI’s [National Commission on Child Protection] recommendations were rejected. Instead, MUI’s [Indonesian Ulema Council] fatwa was used by state officials, regents, and governors as the point of reference. This is wrong because they should have used the state’s constitution, legislation, or other legal and regulatory framework as their points of reference to make policy.”

(anonymous)

One respondent at a focus group in Jakarta discussed the strong religious backlash against providing reproductive health services, particularly family planning services, including regular check-ups, and abortions:

“…the state’s [de facto] policy, both in state institutional structure and in some line ministries has been coloured with Islamic conservatism. Religious fundamentalists are everywhere, including the KPAI’. It is a tiring fight.”

(Jakarta, Focus group, women’s NGO)

Violence against women and girls (VAW) and intolerance towards LGBTQI groups in the community were recognised as warning signs for violent extremism in all sites where research was conducted. There is a need to monitor these particular forms of violence as a means of averting violent extremism and terrorism.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

• Observing and responding to activities of Islamist groups in everyday life – including in the four gender-specific warning signs of extremist activity – should be integrated into PVE strategies.

• Changes in women’s dress and mobility should be systematically monitored at the community level to inform a grounded approach to PVE and the promotion of tolerance and women’s rights.

• Security sector actors, including the military, police and justice sector, must ensure political and civil rights of citizens are upheld, and provide protection especially for groups who are contesting fundamentalism.
4.3 WOMEN’S AGENCY IN PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. Women are individually and collectively acting to prevent violent extremism in many ways. **Women’s Family Activism:** Women are often the first responders in their families and communities to address extremism.

2. The role of mothers, sisters and daughters in opposing, countering or preventing extremism within the family (particularly of male family members) has increasingly been documented. Supporting and empowering women to be attentive to the potential of family members influenced by extremist ideas and/or recruited by extremist groups remains a critical prevention strategy.

3. Empowering women and men, as parents, is a critical prevention strategy.

4. **Women’s Educational Empowerment and Leadership:** Women leaders, and civil society organisations led by women, are actively engaged in prevention-focused educational initiatives that counter fundamentalist groups’ own educational strategies and recruitment.

5. **Education that teaches critical thinking** and analysis has major impacts on empowering individual women and women leaders to break through fundamentalist ideology and develop counter-discourses.

6. **Women’s Peacebuilding:** Women’s capacity to prevent and counter violent extremism also extends far beyond their family roles. Many women-led PVE activities occur unnoticed, such as their leadership and authority within workplaces and communities – including state, religious, women’s and youth networks – which represents a challenge to fundamentalist ideologies about gender roles and relations.

*The role of women in preventing fundamentalism is rarely seen. Funding to prevent terrorism is normally sourced from BNBP [National Counter-Terrorism Agency]. The efforts made by women are usually overlooked. (Poso)*

If we do not recognise women’s participation in extremist organisations as agents of violence we will not be able to observe and understand the unique ways in which women are positioned to prevent or counter violent extremism. Consistent with much of the feminist scholarship on women and political violence, the research does not attribute any innate peacemaking ability to women (see Porter 2007; Cockburn 2007). Rather, the
research findings in this report suggest that due to social structures and gender norms women are uniquely positioned to prevent violence without the use of force.

In each of the four research sites there was tension between those promoting fundamentalist ideology and those promoting multiculturalism and human rights. Individual women and women’s organisations were observed to have engaged in direct and indirect contestation of fundamentalism and extremism. In all research sites they have been involved in promoting radical and fundamentalist ideology. In Yogyakarta, women were involved in rallies organised by fundamentalist groups that attacked women’s NGOs campaigns against VAW. In Jakarta, many women participated in rallies coordinated by fundamentalist groups. Women have also been involved in planning and conducting suicide bombing in Indonesia, as the four arrests in December 2016 have revealed.

The research has identified three primary modalities for women’s participation in preventing extremism and violent extremism: women’s family activism; women’s educational empowerment and leadership; and women’s peacebuilding.

All research participants were involved in some way in prevention of violent extremism programs – whether or not they were referred to or titled as such. Only one respondent in Jakarta was not officially a part of any organisation; nonetheless, she related a personal experience of prevention in which a friend tried to recruit her to a fundamentalist group. Existing research on groups and networks, such as Sisters against Violent Extremism (SAVE), has highlighted that women’s voices can be compelling when they speak out – on their own behalf, for family members and friends who are victims or survivors of terrorist attacks, or as partners and family members of terrorists and fighters – by dispelling the notion that fighting is laudable and by identifying the material and emotional reality that such ideological mobilisation can impose on families and communities (see Iman and Yuval Davis 2004).

**WOMEN’S FAMILY ACTIVISM**

The role of mothers, sisters and daughters in opposing, countering or preventing extremism within the family, particularly in relation to male family members, is increasingly being documented and dominates much of the discussion of women’s roles in CVE (IPAC 2017; CHRGJ 2012; Chowhury et al. 2016). This research builds on the existing record and also provides further evidence on the significance of empowering women to be attentive to the potential for family members to be influenced by extremist ideas and/or recruited by extremist groups. Following are participants’ examples of women’s family activism.

- Participants in Islamic boarding schools in Cirebon emphasised that mothers must give permission for their sons (and daughters) if they are to commit jihad – as such, in the theory of Islamic teaching, they are a crucial action in preventing violence.
- Several research participants with male siblings had challenged the extremism of their brothers and brothers-in-law. One participant prevented her brother from instituting strict sex-segregation at her family-led Islamic boarding school. She now develops teaching methods to challenge the students to open their minds on the diversity of interpretation of Islam,
Participants in Poso established the ‘School for Women’ to prepare mothers to be ‘agents of peace’, basing their motivating concept on beginning to promote peace within their own family. In their words:

“The mother is a madrasa [educational institution] because she is the first place to educate her children about life. That is why we chose to work with women because the future generation is born out of the women, and we would like to ensure that they have the capacity to raise the future generation in the right path. This is why we believe in women to be agents of peace. That’s why [we emphasise] education… we try to raise the point that Islamic movements are beyond just what the public perceives as terrorism…. We raise questions such as: does the international community see Indonesia differently now because of these movements? What do we, as Indonesians, understand as radical?”

One participant in the Poso ‘Women’s School for Peace’ focus group expressed her gratitude for the peacebuilding organisation and how she was able to share her learning at the school with her family members:

“[Gradually I am able to explain… before we heard that Islam was pretty harsh. We also heard that if one killed a kafir [infidel], one would be raised to heaven. Well, something like that [and you’d be] going to heaven. So, gradually I try to instill in my nieces and nephews’ minds at home, and also share this with my younger siblings at home, that it is not true.”

The expectation that mothers will bear the burden of work of preventing violent extremism is unrealistic and unintended. However, the focus on empowering women and parents, including men, is critical – as one of our Jakarta research participants stressed:

“We were in touch with a mother who tried to get her child to come back home from becoming a terrorist. It is a difficult task. We have tried to convince mothers to undergo a parenting course so that we can detect early signs in their children – this is also done in churches. One of the pressing concerns voiced by the mothers was their husbands. There is a need for a parenting course for men as well. Some of the women who are migrant workers faced difficulties with their husbands. Thus, there is a need for a short course to cater for the husbands and this is currently an ongoing process.” (Indonesia Peace Alliance: AIDA, Jakarta participant)

Given what we know about the recruitment of female and male migrant workers to extremist groups, it seems crucial to address their particular situation. Targeted education like that provided at the Poso Women’s School for Peace, which incorporates gender equality education, may provide a positive pathway. Civil society focus group participants in Jakarta regarded gender equality education as a preventative factor in combating extremist and gender-based violence, emphasising the importance of establishing gender equality awareness in the family, where children are first socialised. If Islamic fundamentalist views hold that women are subordinate to men, then family norms and structures that exemplify gender equality effectively confront fundamentalism and its spread:
“If the child experiences or observes gender inequality from their family, then they would bring that particular understanding to the wider public. ALIMAT [Alliance for women’s rights in Muslim families, NU] attempts to build a modern Islamic family concept that is just and equal – because the existing Islamic concept of family is gender-biased, where men are expected to be the head of the family and the decision makers. ALIMAT has been conducting some research on the changing roles of women in families. I would like to specifically highlight the role of women in a migrant worker’s family because their role is opposite to the traditional Islamic family: the mother is the main breadwinner. This is the new normal. The problem is that decision-making authority has not shifted to women even though they are increasingly becoming financially important to the family. For example, representative rights over a daughter’s wedding proceedings would be granted to the father even though the mother has long been the sole income-earner for the family.” (Jakarta, focus group, civil society)

As this participant conveys, gender relations in the family and in society have not kept pace with economic and demographic change. This creates tensions that exacerbate, rather than strengthen, the potential for gender equality and women’s rising economic status to counter and prevent violent extremism.

There is also potential for economic incentives to strengthen the role of wives of former terrorists in prison to prevent the continued activity and involvement of their husbands in terrorist or extremist networks.

“There is a range of motivations as well [for wives of terrorists and prisoners]. Of the 52 participants interviewed, those who chose to be ‘agents of peace’ were concerned by the consequences of state policies on women, their existing burden to fulfill expectations as a wife and mother, their desire to protect their children from being orphaned, the fear of social stigmatisation (from their own families or from the greater public), difficulty to find work (for themselves and their husbands), the fear of financial hardship, other economic issues to fulfill basic needs, and personal disbelief at the organisation’s vision or mission (i.e., the Caliphate being a utopian dream). These women have realised they would instead commit to loving their husbands in order to raise a good family. There are also safety issues – i.e., being chased by Densus 88, Indonesia’s anti-terrorism unit” (YPP 2016).

WOMEN’S EDUCATIONAL EMPOWERMENT AND LEADERSHIP

The provision of education by extremist groups through their own schools, extracurricular activities, mosque teachings, social media and television, as well as programs of recruitment, comprise an immense yet largely hidden institutional phenomenon. Fundamentalist groups use a popular descriptor such as ‘education based on modern and religious, comprehensive Islam’ (*Islam Terpadu*: Integrated Islamic Schools), that entices people to participate. Preventing or countering violent extremism must therefore employ a robust educational strategy capable of contending with populist appeal. Our research identified that women leaders, and civil society organisations led by women, are already closely engaged in prevention-focused educational initiatives.
Some women working in the community identify strategies they use as very promising in preventing radicalisation. For instance, women lecturers in Jakarta and Yogyakarta who integrate their pro-human rights, gender equality and tolerance activism into their university curriculum and pedagogy believe they can influence most students. For example, one university lecturer who has integrated critical thinking about fundamentalism into her teaching distributes tests preceding and subsequent to her courses in order to assess the change in views towards fundamentalism among students. This is undertaken regularly and has proven that greater critical knowledge and analysis of Islamic religion is effective in reducing support for fundamentalist ideas. Another university lecturer has connected methodology for interpreting the Quran with modern social science. AGPAI, a religious teacher’s association, conducts programs that allow religious teachers – many of whom are women – to discuss issues of fundamentalism.

Safii Maarif Institute has created a youth network spanning religious groups with the goal of promoting peace in six cities across Indonesia (Jember, Malang, Madura, Bogor, Bekasi, dan Bandung). It publishes books and movies and has organised a jamboree for youth from different cities. Girls and boys have participated these programs, although there is no gender-specific programming.

There are many informal educational initiatives carried out by NGOs that seek to empower women. For example, Indonesia Peace Alliance (AIDA) and Ledokombo (a local organisation in Jember) have developed parenting school for mothers who are migrant workers. The purpose is to prevent the spread of drugs and violent extremism in teenagers (in Ledokombo dan Jember, East Java). In Poso, women’s community education begins on common ground, with personal connection:

“We said, ‘let’s start with our own families, [and] we can hear their stories.’ Finally, I found someone, she was my playmate. Her name was Aminah. She’s wearing veil now, but when I came to her, I came with memories of our childhood. She removed her veil and we laughed out loud. We could not forget how we missed all those, our childhood, and there was no distance between us.” (Poso)
One woman ulama moved from Malang to Yogyakarta in 2012. Her neighbourhood was very simple. It had no community activities, no playgroups, and many teenagers mucking around with nothing to do. She discussed with her husband the need to build something for the community:

“So I started with establishing a community library and playgroups for children, since I found this community did not have playgroup. I used this room [the living room in her house]... we did teaching in here, but now we have a different building...just beside this house...now we have more spaces for learning...the number of students tends to rise. The resources to build the new school building were donated by my colleges. Here, there are neighbours who wear black hijab...there is a school as well. The Islamic radical groups are very, very assertive...they tried to promote their ideas covertly, through programs in the community. This is the battle...I have tried to drive it in a smooth way, by keeping my position as village officer in order to protect this community. Through this position [as a council member] I can influence the village officer to block their ideas...we have to be smart and.... One day, I found my student did not come to my centre in a few days. I have got information that his parent did not want her child to continue study in this centre. The mother said that it was because I have a teacher who does not wear hijab. Because of it, I informed the other parents that even though I’m a woman ulama, I have developed this centre for everybody, and the teacher here is also plural. I try to maintain diversity through different teachers so the students are aware that we – the society – is a diverse society.”

This ulama is now developing a program for youth concerning reproductive health and mobilising her friends from different NGOs and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) to be involved in her program. She is also a teacher of two majelis ta’lim in her community.

Education that teaches critical thinking and analysis has also major impacts in empowering individual women and women leaders. During the research, two ex-jihadi women informants told their story of being recruited to jihadi groups as university students, away from home and their social networks. They both left the groups following transformational educational experiences. The first research participant joined a jihadi group when she was a new student in Bandung. She experienced culture shock, having moved from an Islamic boarding school to the more liberal student life in Bandung (for instance, she found her roommate had had three abortions). An old friend from her boarding school days invited her to be part of a group and informed her that this would address her anxiety. She was more convinced to join when her friend introduced her to a university lecturer who was also part of this movement. Our informant recruited more women students and organised activities to encourage students to join the group. However, she decided to leave the group when she began to realise that something was not right, and that many of the group’s rules did not make any sense. She told other students under her direction about her plan and advised them also to leave. The informant went on to study for a Master’s degree in gender studies at the University of Indonesia and completed an internship in a women’s NGO focused on gender equality within Islam. She married a man of Chinese ethnicity with a different religious background. In her work with different NGOs she makes efforts to be close to her female friends and family members so that they are not influenced by fundamentalist ideology.
The second informant was a jihadi leader who was inspired to join an extremist group in senior high school. Her brother was also involved in the group. She was eager to learn different perspectives, but once she understood more about the group and had undertaken a leadership role, she lost interest. At the same time, she had joined a university student discussion group that promoted critical thinking about the Soeharto regime. Learning about feminism in the group, she adopted its principles, abandoned the hijab, and took up employment as director of a feminist journal. She is now working with an independent body addressing issues affecting women in Indonesia.

These stories, while unique, illustrate the power of critical, informed education and discussion to break through fundamentalist dogma – to empower individual women to be leaders and to develop counter-discourses.

**WOMEN’S PEACEBUILDING**

The natural peace is the one created by ladies in the markets, fishmongers, chocolate buyers – that is natural peace. (Poso participant)

Women’s leadership and authority in community organisations challenge fundamentalist beliefs that leadership roles are exclusively the purview of men, and women’s place is in the home. Cirebon and Poso offer strident examples of women leaders, and Yogyakarta boasts many women-led education-based initiatives in universities and schools aimed at preventing extremism. In Jakarta, the prevalence of community organisations is less in than the other sites, owing to its demographically heterogeneous composition. A number of initiatives led by women’s NGOs are discussed in this section that seek to confront extremism and build women’s capacities to prevent it. Respondents assessed their organisational efforts positively, and the research team was able to analyse their materials and engage with some of the participants during their activities in focus groups.

**Rahima-Islamic Women Resource Centre for Women’s Rights** engages with religious leaders and religious organisations. The members publish their own magazine on women and Islam, which includes articles and comics promoting progressive interpretations of Islam. Most importantly, they run programs training religious leaders in critical and gender-aware approaches to conservatism and fundamentalism.50 One such program offers leadership training to women ulama and religious teachers working in majelis ta’lim and Islamic boarding schools. The women ulama who are active in promoting peace in Yogyakarta and Cirebon interviewed in this study were alumni from Rahima’s training program. Rahima has found that many women ulama who participated in their programs become pioneers in promoting tolerance in their communities. Yet, this program is not affiliated with high-level advocacy institutions, and remains under-resourced and generally unacknowledged by policy makers.

**AIDA (Indonesia Peace Alliance)** is a woman-led civil society organisation that has established reconciliation forums between victims of terrorist bombings and ex-jihadis using these forums as a platform for campaigning against violent extremism. The **Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP – Institute for International Peace Building)** is a...
foundation that also engages with ex-jihadi women (YPP 2016). The union of victims and ex-jihadis against extremism creates a persuasive and popular message, relying as it does on the concept of restorative solidarity – a sentiment as appealing to conservative audiences and values as it is to progressives. Realising this, AIDA uses it as a central part of a non-violence and anti-radicalisation education campaign targeted at schools. AIDA has found that it is very challenging but effective to encourage collaboration between ex-jihadis and bombing victims in order to promote peace and tolerance among youth – the sharing of experiences between jihadis and victims has attracted the attention of many students. Some students who have engaged with the topic have broadened their thinking and revised their opinions about Islam and jihad. Moreover, AIDA has created a program to prevent students in senior high school joining radical groups by training student assistants in critical interpretations of religious knowledge (Rohani Islam/Rohis). They have engaged with teachers and students in several Indonesian cities to establish in-school early warning systems to prevent radicalism.

The National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) has long worked on issues of fundamentalism and organised non-violence advocacy programs for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in East Timor, Poso, and Aceh. Komnas Perempuan has produced several programs on women in conflict-affected areas as well as studies on the politicisation of Islam and the development of discriminatory local bylaws. It has also engaged with government institutions (Presidents, Ministry of Justice and Defence National Institution (Lemhanas) regarding the inequitable and unlawful discriminatory and Shariah local bylaws across 33 provinces, and have developed tools and training for monitoring these laws.

Women’s School for Peace, Poso. AMAN has established ‘women’s schools’ for encouraging women to be peacebuilders at home and in their communities. There are 20 groups in 6 provinces (8 districts). Many of the women are victims of conflict in Poso. The school determined to focus on cultural dialogue between Christians and Muslims when its coordinators realised there was no government support for community-level programs or for women. ‘We tried to promote women’s voices – which are not seen as worth listening to, but they served as a model of how to build peace, which finds its roots in everyday life. [The fact is] that peacebuilding does not require weapons.’ The founder explains how the school began (Poso, religious leader):

“The first time we organised this meeting, we were not sure if it was a success. The participants from Christian groups were seated on one side and from Muslim groups on the other side. They wanted to talk but they were suspicious of the program. On the second day, the situation changed. One woman started talking about what happened and other women followed. Everybody cried, and finally they hugged each other when they realised that both were victims. Then we started to analyse why the conflict happened.”

The sharing of emotions helped with reconciliation and peacebuilding – and women are often less afraid to do this than men – and can be more effective in breaking the silence and promoting a culture of tolerance. Women initiate critical discussions with their husbands, children and neighbours about religious conflict and other topics of concern. Their duty is to bring what they learned at the school to the dinner table.

Through this program, Christian women at the school now understand what jihad is, and Muslim women learn that the statue
worshiped by the Christians is not what it seems. Focus group participants cited an instance of

“one woman who put all the books she had from the school onto the dinner table. Her husband got interested [with the topic] and there was a discussion [about it]. Take-home assignments also enable husbands to take part in answering [the questions] and there were discussions to be developed with children and neighbours.” (Poso, focus group, anonymous)

These kinds of conversations are very powerful – the Poso women realised they were all victims, agreeing that the cause of the harm done to them – the conflict – must cease. After the program many women have become agents in their own communities, opening communication with those from different religions. They began to discuss what they wanted to do in future; they decided that the first priority would be to strengthen the women’s movement by rebuilding women’s networks across cultural and religious borders in and around Poso, day by day. One of the key lessons from the community for the Women’s School for Peace was how to reinforce the role of women as peacebuilders in the villages: ‘We believe that if villages are strengthened by the women’s movement, it will be a good thing. At the moment, the ladies are making one-week tours to villages for a month. So it will not require any funding. The people do it themselves.’

Poso women draw on their shared experiences with respect to reproductive health, in their families, raising their children, and in small enterprises making products to sell as the basis for common ground with other women, Christian women and Muslim women who have joined fundamentalist sects, to promote a shared future. One of the respondents described this practical vision:

“The products of those villages become means of negotiation as well as economic empowerment. Afterwards, we did some mapping. We created a map on the villagers’ dreams. The ladies had determined a dream of being free from terrorism, unemployment. How to be free. Then we did mapping on the villages’ potential.”

The Women’s School for Peace in Poso demonstrates the resilience of women in one of Indonesia’s communities most severely affected by conflict. The relative peace in Poso today and the networks that women have established to prevent the escalation of incidents into violence – for instance, the events surrounding Santoso’s death – demonstrate their significant peacebuilding capacities. The educational and cultural initiatives led by women in Poso provide lessons for non-conflict-affected cities and villages in Indonesia also confronting the challenges of rising intolerance and extremism.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

• Initiatives supporting women and women’s organisations to promote tolerance and prevent extremism should be financed and scaled up, in particular those where women are working directly with women in communities; are reliant on a religious framework; are strengthening women’s religious leadership; and are working closely with men.

• Support and enable women and women’s organisations to participate in the development of CT and CVE strategies, which is likely to improve the effectiveness of those strategies.

• A Regional ASEAN Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security is urgently needed to mobilise and coordinate women’s participation in the development of CT/CVE strategies, to promote lessons learned across communities, and to ensure robust and nuanced integration of the CT and CVE agendas as relevant to the ASEAN region.  

• Existing and future National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security in the South-East Asian region could be more comprehensive by including PVE and CVE, given the direct and negative influence of violent extremism on women’s security.

• Governments must support the role of girl’s and women’s organisations in discussions and negotiations relating to conflict resolution, peacebuilding, CT and CVE, particularly women living in State-identified radical territories.

• Promote and support women to participate actively in the security sector, which is likely create a positive influence on the work of women in the community countering violent extremism.
4.4 RELIGIOUS COUNTER-DISCOURSES AND GENDER EQUALITY

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. Four strategies are integral to the work of women’s organisations to promote tolerance and prevent extremism: they work directly with women in communities; they rely on a religious framework; they strengthen women’s religious leadership; and they work closely with men, including male religious scholars and leaders.

2. Working directly with women in communities through a religious approach: Women’s organisations in all research sites are engaged in reinterpreting Islamic religious texts and challenging the ideological basis for violent extremism – which is linked to rigid, patriarchal understandings of Islam.

3. Strengthening women’s religious leadership: Women’s participation and representation in religious institutions and religious teachings are crucial to transforming the social causes of extremism and its justifications for gender-based violence. Governments should prioritise support for and work with community organisations in which women participate and often lead, rather than partnering only with often self-proclaimed community leaders or large, well-established religious organisations, where men are most often in positions of leadership and power.

4. Working together with men: Given women’s extensive local connections, female and male religious leaders and organisational participants working in collaboration is an effective way for the government to reach grassroots communities to spread messages of tolerance.

If women are not actively involved in the discourse, then we would be lost in a gender-biased tafsir.
- Alimat, Jakarta

The women in Poso told us, ‘fundamentalism is not only in the public realm, it is also in the domestic realm.’ Given their social positioning, women may be able to address these issues strategically in both spaces. Various women’s organisations in all four research sites are engaged in reinterpreting Islamic religious texts, challenging the ideological basis for violent extremism, which is linked to rigid, patriarchal understandings of Islam in private and public spaces. Four strategies are integral to their efforts to promote tolerance and prevent extremism: 1) they work directly with women in communities through a religious approach, 2) they use a religious framework, 3) they work to strengthen women’s religious leadership, and 4) they work closely with men, including male religious scholars and leaders.
WORKING DIRECTLY WITH WOMEN IN COMMUNITIES THROUGH A RELIGIOUS APPROACH

Some participants are engaged with their communities through religious teachings (majelis ta’lim) and children’s alquran learning sessions (Taman Pendidikan Alquran/TPA). They told us they want to merebut mic – take back the podium! For example, they learn and teach about the role of women in public life and the economy, as recognised in the life of the Prophet’s, where his wife, Khadijah, was a businesswoman. The public roles of women are also connected with the daughter of the Prophet, Fatimah, who led the settlement of conflict in the religious wars. As one Jakarta participant observed: ‘You don’t need to look very far to find feminist ideas or the perfect ideal for the Islamic woman’s rights activist in Islamic history’. Religious traditions include narratives not only of female sacrifice, and not merely of serving Islam, but also of female empowerment, and it is important to recover these within Islam. Women are engaged throughout Indonesia in religious reading groups, reinterpreting religious texts to inform progressive understandings of the hijab, polygamy, female genital mutilation, and sexual and reproductive rights, including LGBT rights. During the focus group in Jakarta a participant explained how misguided fundamentalist interpretations of Islam are and how important it is to open up critical discussion of Islam to speak back to extremists, to enable women to counter their narratives in their communities:

“Islam does not teach violence. There are many theological interpretations within Islam itself that needed to be developed – these are not monolithic…the people involved in terrorism don’t have a strong background in religious studies. They have studied the ‘five-minute Islam’ version. I don’t think they have gone through the proper religious education system. They don’t have the classical understanding of Islamic theology. They are used to a more superficial Islam, where verses are interpreted by various religious leaders without extensive critical discussion…. All they care about is the hadith. If there is a verse calling for Muslims to kill infidels, then that’s all they care about…. Doctrines that spread violence and the ones that use Quranic verses to legitimise their behaviour…. I think it’s an act of hijacking Islam and it’s related to the superficial study of Islam. You must be tolerant and open to differences if you are truly living out your faith. I mean, it’s like fully subscribing to the idea of democracy. Violence, of any kind, is not part of the deal.”

In Poso, women’s peacebuilding initiatives promote conflict resolution through religious teachings, so that women learn to know their religion better than extremists. At the focus group discussion one participant explained:

“We taught them English, Arabic – according to them, a good education is one that is grounded in religion – so we taught them Arabic. It was not religious at all but the community still saw it as a religious study session. Then we went through some general fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence], fiqh on gender issues, for children and young adults. Every weekend we’d pick up the children and open the library for them. There would be a couple of kids who would attend the study sessions. We would organise these activities over the weekend because that’s when I would be at home. Yes, one’s religious status matters a lot to gain the sympathy of the community…. We had to have a hajj title in our name.”
The Poso women participants explained how they shared women’s stories and ‘taught about the real aims of the terrorists as a political tool’. They stated that staff and participants learned how to be open to others and how to express their personal stories to the public, and that they emphasise the importance of a healthy society for the future. In their words, ‘if discord could be sown, then military intervention could harm the community even further because the consequences would be directly felt by the women and children, as victims of sexual abuse.’ The cases of sexual abuse have never been solved at Poso. Counter-posing meaningful religious teaching with mutual storytelling about the impact of extremist violence was a way of building a peaceful, resilient society for the Poso women’s initiatives.

**DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE FEMINIST-INFORMED RELIGIOUS FRAMEWORK**

A crucial finding of our research is that many of the efforts to counter fundamentalism and extremism involve deep engagement with religion and religious texts (and more involvement of women’s leadership in religion) from a gender-equality perspective, rather than embracing western secularism. Many of our participants across all sites prescribed to a form of religious feminism or Islamic feminism, and argued that such a framework offers the best prospects for the prevention of violent extremism in Indonesia. Most of our participants were members of religious organisations and strongly rooted in religious culture. They believe that their religion provides a framework for non-violence, tolerance and peace. Because of this, many favour a religious approach to counter fundamentalist ideology, both individually and in their influencing in organisations to lead on PVE advocacy and community engagement. Aisyiah (the women’s branch of Muhammadiyah), Fatayat Nahdatul Ulama (women’s wing of Nahdatul Ulama) in almost sites, and Wanita Alkhairat (in Poso, local level) are examples of organisations committed to this approach. Engagement with religious texts and learning matters because they shape real-world interactions, as one informant from Alimat explained:

“In the end, uh…the local ulama do not have much authority. They refer to classical texts to establish their own individual credibility. It could be worse if there is no intervention to raise awareness of gender perspectives. This is what Alimat is working for.”

Participants in Jakarta were committed to using religious frameworks to promote ideas about human rights and gender equality – this approach is capable of controverting the extremist discourse spread through online communities, which are crass and uninformed from a religious perspective. A participant from the National Commission on Violence against Women argued that you have to engage in religious interpretation if you are a human rights institution:

“You have to do it in Indonesia, whether you want to or not. It would not be enough if we only spoke about international human rights conventions. I mean, you’d be talking about human rights and they’d be talking about the Quran.”
Our participants recognised the powerful influence of extremist online communication. Extremist’s sites are often persuasive because they are up-to-date with current events, while their social media functions as an echo chamber, used to reinforce rather than test ideas. Thus, it is crucial to engage in online communication, although to date no organisations have been successful in their efforts to contend with the scale and pace of the dominant fundamentalist discourse online. One participant discussed the model that their organisation, Lazuardi Biru tried to replicate with assistance from the Ministry of Religion. Another Jakarta participant reflected that although some moderate religious groups have responded by creating religious education digital apps, they remain outpaced, as ‘fundamentalists are faster than the moderates at creating new apps.’

More promising are the long-term prevention efforts in Indonesia to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment within the framework of the Koran and Islamic teachings – these efforts establish cross-community toleration and support democratic social change (Muhammad et al. 2007; Rinaldo 2011). A participant from the religious women’s organisation, Alimat, encapsulated the transformative approach to gender within Islam:

“No matter how good a plane is it won’t be able to land or take off without a good runway. When we promote a gender-inclusive approach to Islamic study...Islam, as an ideology and religion, provides a solid runway for men and women to work together towards a more gender-inclusive religion for the benefit of humankind.”

Our research participants discussed some positive individual and organisational experiences of emphasising a feminist or gender equality perspective of Islam. One participant explained her experience of advocating for a progressive interpretation of Islam at her family’s Islamic boarding school, where she was the only female student, and later teacher. Her step-brother returned from Saudi Arabia, bringing with him fundamentalist religious beliefs that ignited her rebellious side:

“I often wondered of the difficulties of being a Muslim woman and was certain that, that it was not the only form of Islam. I wanted to search for a wiser Islam that treats men and women equally. I had that mindset during my time there. I was always the best in the class but I could not travel abroad because of my gender. On the other hand, my brothers had gone to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It has intensified my aspiration for another form of Islam even further. I was distraught because my father, prior to my stepbrother’s return, had been more open and yet he has agreed to my brother’s idea of separating men and women in pesantren” (see also Cordaid 2012).

Another participant described their organisation in Yogyakarta’s initiatives to educate women to understand the consequences of implementation of qanun jinayat, the Islamic Criminal Code Bylaw, using an Islamic feminist approach:

“The local response has been surprisingly supportive. Young people, who may otherwise be uninformed with the issue of gender discrimination, have been involved with discussion groups, ‘circles of friends’, in some campuses. Some discussions on women’s sexuality and the concept of individual consent, which was later brought to the government level, enabled them to understand how women could have been discriminated [against] in current government policies.” (Yogyakarta, university lecturer)
STRENGTHENING WOMEN’S RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP

So I told the community, there is an even better leader for our Pesantren than my deceased husband, God has agreed to lead us and he has asked me to serve him in the role as principal.
– Woman ulama, Cirebon, West Java.

Efforts to develop a feminist-informed Islamic framework to counter extremism in Indonesia are strongly connected to efforts to strengthen women’s religious leadership. Several organisations we investigated have programs that aim to build the leadership capacities of women ulama. They do this through leadership training and publications that help them to develop their critical understandings of Islam in Indonesia. Fahmina in West Java, Rahima in Jakarta, and the Gusdurian Network in Batu undertake ongoing initiatives, and in April 2016 for the first time a three-day Indonesia-wide Congress for women ulama was held in Cirebon (BBC News 2017; Saputra 2017). That Congress issues a fatwa opposing early/child marriage and advocated raising the age of marriage from 16 to 18 years old.

Women ulama are becoming pioneers in the different sites we researched, in applying this critical religious framework to issues of violence, including gender-based violence such as early and forced marriage, rape and sexual abuse, in their own communities, mosques and prayer groups (majelis ta’lim) (see Sabaniah et al. 2010):

“They have direct contact with the communities to speak about women’s rights and Islam. It is important because the discussion would have been over-run by masculine perspectives from the male ustad. It’s very biased and misogynist. Sometimes, I go to the local majlis by myself. I’d feel uneasy when I hear the same material over and over again.” (Participant, Jakarta)

The women’s wing of NU (one of the two largest Islamic religious organisations), Fatayat active programs to prevent religious radicalisation. As one participant explained: ‘They are so active. It’s almost like fighting off a threat. It is a threat against women’s rights. It is also a threat against the safety of this country’. Moreover, another Jakarta participant explained the importance of Fatayat’s advocacy and training with women ulama:

“Many the Fatayat members play important roles with various majlis taklim. This is important because we can bring the discussion to a wider audience through our members. So, the idea of Islam as a benefit for all humankind and religious tolerance should reach these grassroots communities. The danger now is that fundamentalist Islam has reached these communities.” (Jakarta, focus group, National Commission for Violence against Women).

As we found in Cirebon, some ulama also are also leading religious boarding schools for girls and boys. Their resources are religious texts, which they find very powerful sources for teaching. One ulama explained to us how she reinterpreted the meaning of jihad as a non-violent approach to defending religion. Not only that, she argued that continuing study for women is an integral part of jihad, and that mothers have an important role in preventing violent jihad. The women ulama whom we interviewed in three Islamic boarding schools, and individuals in the four sites, used their critical learning to directly engage with members of their community
who did not share their interpretations with the aim of changing their minds. A journalist in Jakarta whom we interviewed argued that this kind of mutual respect and dialogue between majority and minority groups is crucial for societal resilience against extremism. The more common and concerning response by leaders is to ‘keep silent about the debates…this silence is part of the laziness of the middle class and the educated. I think it’s their reluctance to educate the public. Yet, if we do nothing about it the cycle will keep going on.’

Women religious leaders we interviewed reflected on their struggle to be influential and to be taken seriously in their communities. In Poso, a rector at a religious educational institution discussed the challenges in her position, which are not dissimilar to the challenges women leaders face in any society:

“Patriarchy is everywhere – maybe that is what people keep asking about. [As a woman], you have to work twice as hard. You must show that you can be better than a man, and only then they will look at you. You cannot just be average. You need to have an added value. We faced multiple oppositions. From the society – which is, in fact, very patriarchal – and also from friends. Just like that.” (Poso, religious leader)

Another ulama explained how becoming more educated and knowledgeable helped her to surmount challenges associated with rising extremism in her Yogyakarta community:

“I saw indications of things going downwards as they started to call out on other groups as bid’ah [heretical]. The religious symbols have been obvious for these groups. They wore the niqab when they went to the local health centres [posyandu]. They emphasised those details. So, I had to be brave. My limitation was my lack of knowledge. That is what made me felt inferior. Was I capable to influence change? Witnessing such challenges in the village and having gained my husband’s support, I then thought that if I lack the knowledge, then I can make up for it by learning. This is what made me brave.”

Women ulama in Poso exemplify this bravery and courage. They have been able to develop a form of non-threatening leadership, which has been critical to maintaining security in their community, a conflict-affected situation that to outside observers appears to face more imminent threats of violent extremism than the other research sites. However, although community members refuted this:
“[We] have conducted a lot of meetings in many schools recently; we were invited by one of the religious leaders, Ms. Bertha. She also did a lot – if you are seeking advice or you want us to deliver something, that we can do – she is also a university lecturer in religious study, so there are many benefits when she meets the women. [She would say] ‘you should do this, you must do that, you do not just accept whatever raw information you get.’ This was part of Pastor Rosiwuri’s personal experience, which then helped her to establish more forums like these. She approached some of the decaying social groups and she breathed a new life into them. She revitalised the School for Women because the schools were built on the foundation of these personal exchanges. When the Pastor was doing church ministry, she never failed to promote whatever she felt, as an individual. It was thanks to her personal experience that helped to establish the safe spaces in the grassroots community...especially now when there are more news [items] on telly about, uh, who, Santoso, and who died or survived.”

Governments usually partner with often self-proclaimed community leaders or large, well-established religious organisations in which men retain positions of leadership, rather than smaller community organisations which women participate in and often lead. This research finds that women’s participation in religion is a crucial step in transforming the cultural basis for extremism, and justifications for gender-based violence in particular. Our findings are corroborated by AWID (2008, 2015) and Women Living Under Muslim Laws (Helie ed. 2014) research – which recommends empowering women religious leaders in interpreting religious texts as a major focus of PVE initiatives.

**WORKING TOGETHER WITH MEN**

One of the most significant aspects of Islamic feminism in Indonesia – the reinterpretation of religious texts to highlight principles of gender equality, and the empowerment of women as ulama – has been the active support of men, including male ulama. Fahmina, an Islamic education NGO founded by Kh. Husein Muhammed, former Commissioner on Violence against Women, has produced extensive curricula for teaching Islamic feminism and conducts leadership empowerment for women. The foundation also leads initiatives for women-only groups to discuss crucial issues. Ironically, as members of Fahmina told us, ‘women’s issues, where they are deemed important, are usually discussed by men in Islamic religious organisations’. The Gusdurian Network also involves a lot of men who are actively mobilising communities of women and men to discuss gender issues.

The pattern of men and women’s involvement in Islamic feminism, and men’s support of women’s religious leadership, is observed in Christian as well as Islamic communities and organisations in Poso. For our research participants, the strategy of involving men in their activities is necessary to ensure men’s support, which is politically indispensable given traditional gender norms and the need to transform them from within communities. They explained it was not easy at first to gain men’s support, but that now they are used to working together with their male counterparts. Together, they are able to discuss openly how fundamentalist ideology creates deep social problems with respect to gender-based violence and women’s participation in decision-making, and that these problems are especially harmful to women. In Poso men and women work
together to conduct peace and anti-violence community programs. There is no established approach in Yogyakarta for collaboration with men; nonetheless, it is common to have male staff facilitating programs in women-led NGOs. In Jakarta, a new religious network established by ALIMAT brings women and men ulama together to collaborate and discuss common issues – this is in addition to existing connections between women’s NGOs and other human rights-based NGOs.

In some respects Indonesia is more advanced than western societies in efforts to bring gender equality to communities. In western contexts, for instance, forums discussing gender issues or gender equality are attended largely by women. This often comes as a surprise to non-westerners hoping to learn about gender equality from ostensibly developed countries. Liberal democracies persist in condoning the segregation and omission of gender equality concerns, often regarding – and disregarding – gender equality as ‘women’s issues’; they are not seen as relevant or important enough by most men to encourage or justify their engagement. Given the seemingly insuperable challenges of preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, it is a crucial time to revisit the respective roles and relationships between women and men – to promote gender equality as potentially the single most powerful counter-discourse to extremist interpretations of religion, in theory and in practice.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Promoting gender equality is potentially the single most powerful counter-discourse to extremist interpretations of religion, in both theory and practice.

- Providing education on the importance of gender equality, and enabling critical engagement with religious texts within religious communities and organisations is a crucial strategy for promoting a culture of tolerance and peace.

- Empowering women religious leaders to interpret religious texts and engage with communities should be a major focus of PVE initiatives.

- Supporting counter-discourse by religious leaders, especially women religious leaders, is an initiative that needs to be scaled up and supported across media and social media platforms.

- If it is to assert a significant impact, the Indonesian government needs to increase funding to join up and expand counter-discourse and prevention activities, and enhance coordination of those activities.

- The Indonesian government should ensure that CVE and PVE interventions are designed and adapted to respond to the contextual specificities of major urban areas – for instance, Jakarta requires particular attention, given its unique political dynamics and influence on other Provinces.

- Supporting both men and women migrant workers, including in the provision of education on gender equality norms, is an important strategy for the Indonesian government to prevent extremist behaviour – for those who take employment remote from home and social networks, and for their spouses at home aiming to counter extremist influences in their community and family.
4.5 BUILDING A PREVENTION-FOCUSED MOVEMENT

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. A broad PVE movement could be developed that spans gender equality, women’s rights, human rights, pluralist religious organisations, and LGBT groups.

2. CVE/PVE interventions could leverage learning from peacebuilding initiatives in areas prone to radicalisation.

3. Challenges in building a prevention-focused movement include limited government capacity to coordinate non-violent approaches to CVE/PVE, and the lack of available funding for non-violent approaches.

4. Most PVE initiatives identified in this research project were scattered and small in scale – these need to be significantly scaled up.

Research data from this study offer sufficient detail of existing resources and initiatives to assess whether they can be built on to support a prevention-focused movement spanning the three research sites. They are:

CROSS-MOVEMENT ALLIANCES IN THE PUBLIC REALM

Solidarity between women and men working to advance gender equality, women’s rights and human rights, as well as pluralist religious organisations and LGBT groups, expands and broadens an anti-violence platform for preventing violent extremism and terrorism. This approach is particularly important given the targeting of sexual minorities in Indonesia by extremist groups, as identified by research participants:

“The fundamentalists were pretty outstanding…. They organised more than twenty villages – a movement which we called Laler Ijo [green fly] villages. Between January and March, they even announced that LGBT people should be killed. For example, they began cracking down on them by evicting known LGBT individuals from rent houses in the area, even though it was in a domestic neighbourhood. We’ve been pushing for tolerance and democracy social movements. However, the fundamentalist groups have national-level support. (Yogyajarta, civil society focus group)”
In Yogyakarta, there are distinct programs carried out by transgender boarding schools, international conferences on sexual rights, progressive Islamic movements, and sexual reproductive rights campaigns and activities. LGBT groups are publicly visible and relatively free to conduct their activities and maintain close collaborations with women's activists. Such alliances are rare in Indonesia – they are hardly found in Poso, while in Jakarta, few women's organisations and activists are willing to recognise or affiliate with LGBT groups. A further characteristic peculiar to Yogyakarta is that women activists in the Yogyakarta Women Network (JPY) engage in direct resistance to the violence carried out by fundamentalist groups. They collaborate with other civil society groups to conduct rallies and to speak out in public to counter fundamentalist ideas. In many cases, fundamentalist groups try to obstruct these activities, frequently with force.

As the national capital, Jakarta is home to more visible, if fragmented, advocacy to influence government. Here, alliances are being built across women's and other NGOs. However, some NGOs such as ANBTI have been active in promoting pluralism through public awareness, research, and advocacy. These organisations use moderate religious interpretations in order to demonstrate values of toleration in Islam. While these organisations are not women's rights organisations, and rarely consider women's issues, they are often led by women. Such organisations have begun to involve young people without emphasising gender perspectives. Although they do not discuss gender relations specifically, many of the leaders have backgrounds of women's activism and are likely to be accommodating to gender programs. ALIMAT is a successful cross movement, uniting ulama and secular teachers, women's religious organisations from moderate and conservative political backgrounds, and male and female activists. Alimat, Rahima, and Fahmina jointly pioneered the first Women's Ulama Congress in May 2017.

LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEBUILDING

According to research participants, Indonesia suffers from a persisting disconnection between government responses to conflict and to CVE/PVE. A considerable amount of knowledge successfully applied to peacebuilding initiatives is of direct relevance to CVE/PVE interventions. For example, this research demonstrates that women's community peacebuilding initiatives in Poso have been very effective in monitoring and ameliorating the tensions of potential conflict. In conflict-affected as well as peaceable areas, families and community organisations can have better, more extensive access than governments to vulnerable individuals, and may be more effective in coordinating and leading movements opposed to fundamentalism and violence. This approach remains an unexplored area of research and advocacy in the Counter-Terrorism agenda.

CHALLENGES IN BUILDING A PREVENTION-FOCUSED MOVEMENT

There are several major challenges to building a movement directed at preventing violent extremism and terrorism in Indonesia. This research has identified three primary challenges: the ability to engage with government actors, including the absence of state protection and reaction to everyday hate crimes and threats of violence; the state's limited capacity to coordinate non-violent approaches to CVE/PVE; and the lack of funding and coordination to expand and improve counter-discourse and prevention activities.
**Government capacity to coordinate non-violent approaches to CVE/PVE**

The lack of coherent, consistent state action regarding hate crimes and threats of violence in the study sites is of serious concern. Since 2012, there have been numerous incidents in Jakarta and Yogyakarta of violent assault and threats of violence perpetrated by Islamist group members. The primary consequence of these assaults – deterring public expression of non-Islamist ideology – has overtly influenced the capacity of individuals and groups to exercise political freedoms of peaceful organisation and public expression. The other, more significant deterrent is the inadequate, dismissive, and deliberately non-protective actions of enforcement agencies, concomitant with those agencies’ lack of incident reporting, inadequate or absent prioritisation and response protocols, and insufficient or non-existent hate crime-specific training – attributable in the first instance to enforcement bias favouring violent extremists, and in the second to state policy gaps and the failure to enforce existing policy. States subscribing to the rule of law uphold political and civil rights – which in these case studies concerns protection of the individual against violent assault, and freedom of public expression for individuals and groups, including in the confrontation of violence and ideologies of violent extremism. These rights require the consistent, committed support of the state. Yogyakarta has witnessed the lack of such protection, despite the presence of a reciprocally supportive network of organisations and groups dedicated to preventing violent extremism.54 This is less so in Jakarta, partially due to traffic congestion, as official channels need to be organised. In focus groups and interviews, many participants commented on the biased attitude and actions of the police in favour of fundamentalist groups. They also noted that local governments have largely abandoned their responsibilities to support the democratic freedoms of citizens. Since the Jakarta marches at the end of 2016, there has been some change in government responsiveness to the everyday acts of fundamentalist groups.55

**Funding for non-violent approaches to CVE/PVE**

The peacebuilding initiatives and organisations of Poso discussed in this research are largely driven by volunteer community efforts. Despite the termination of post-conflict funding from the government and international donors in 2008, a number of these initiatives have persisted and are thriving. Nonetheless, if they are to expand they will require funding – this will enable greater impact than at present and ensure societal resilience in these communities in the face of spreading jihadi networks and ideology. In the past, when violence levels recede, the state has declared that all is well and withdrawn support from community-level initiatives. As a result, there is no formal ongoing monitoring of violence in the family and the community – a circumstance that may be associated with rising extremism.

In contrast, NGOs in Yogyakarta feel that their efforts are often hopeless due to the lack of state support, in particular from police, who reportedly do not protect their rights to freedom of expression and movement in public spaces. In Jakarta, there are a variety of largely voluntary initiatives and strategies, including programs reliant on non-mainstream media, which women are engaged in. These initiatives are not well-coordinated and have limited resources, which mitigates their societal influence. Ironically, funding for CVE/PVE is often given to programs based in Jakarta, on the condition that they are implemented outside of Jakarta. Similarly, little funding is given to prevention initiatives in Yogyakarta because it is perceived as a harmonious area, despite evidence of contentious public confrontations on issues including human rights, gender identity and sexuality, child marriage, sexual violence and pornography.

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64 PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: GENDER PERSPECTIVES AND WOMEN’S ROLES
Scaling up counter-discourse and prevention activities
Most PVE initiatives identified in this research project were scattered and small in scale. As identified above, the lack of funding available to these initiatives has led to their discontinuation in Poso and Jakarta. For example, the Islamic women’s rights organisation Rahima assists women ulama and Islamic boarding schools by employing a gender perspective in ulama training. However, the organisation has limited resources, does not engage in any high-level advocacy work, and is not known or recognised by policymakers or seen as a CVE/PVE frontline organisation.

In Yogyakarta, many women’s organisations have experience in developing small-scale and cost-effective programs; however, they are yet to establish long-term PVE strategies and activities. While individual strategies appear to be more sustainable, they are less effective due to their scale. The lack of resources and design support for non-violent CVE/PVE strategies has become a critical challenge in Indonesia, particularly since the threat of extremism has increased. As one of our participants from Komnas Perempuan stated:

“[We] still have some way to go before we can fully pass on [the Commission’s] ideas and vision to the grassroots level. I mean, we are working with religious leaders and organisations – those that have extensive connections with grassroots communities. This is part of our strategy. We also do outreach with extra-curricular university campus organisations. We start the discussion about gender equality there. We hope that our friends at the campus can bring our ideas about gender equality and tolerance to their own network, including the communities. It is important to work with civil societies such as Fatayat, Aisyah, PPNU, etc. The problem now is upscaling our activities.”

States have a responsibility to confront the violent backlash against women’s human rights. The government of Indonesia would benefit from sustained policy dedicated to promoting and upholding principles that recognise gender differences and advocate gender equality. Such policy requires a framework founded on principles of egalitarianism – a framework that empowers women to participate in making decisions, not excluding decisions to counter and prevent violent extremism and terrorism.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
For All Actors
• Engage men in their roles as husbands and fathers, including through parenting education that includes education on gender equality.

For All Governments
• Governments should mainstream a gender perspective into all national and sub-national CVE programming and policies.
• Governments should ensure long-term and sustainable support for women’s initiatives at the community level as part of PVE and CVE strategies and programming, in conflict and post conflict settings.
• Government actors must uphold the civil and political rights of citizens, including women’s rights to freedom of movement, dress, association, and religious practice, as well as hold perpetrators accountable for violations of women’s human rights.
• States must not cede their roles in CVE and PVE to civil society, community initiatives or international donors. Provision of support to communities must be clearly defined to ensure it does not justify less state involvement and/or result in women bearing additional burdens of volunteer community work.
Governments should recognise the potential of CT/CVE funding to either strengthen or undermine gender equality and peace – by funding militarised responses rather than community-level prevention initiatives. Audits need to be undertaken to assess and ensure CVE and PVE resources benefit women and men equally.

For Security Sector, including police, military, defence policy, and justice

- If violent extremism is to be confronted, security actors need to adopt principled, internally enforced policy directed at the protection of the civil and political rights and freedoms ostensibly enjoyed by individuals, organisations and networks, including women, who are actively working to prevent violence – this will help to counter the generic narrative of Police statements, which acknowledge assistance only ‘from Muslim communities’.

For International Organisations and Donors

- The UN, donors, and the international community should continue to support and invest in evidence-based and context-specific research, as well as technical expertise, to improve understanding of – and ensure that all CT, CVE and PVE-related work takes into account – the gendered social relationships within communities, organisations and movements.
- Implement the updated UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2016) recommendation, which calls upon all Member States to consider the impact of counter-terrorism measures on women’s human rights and women’s organisations, and consequentially to provide funds within CT/CVE efforts to further women’s rights and empowerment.
- Provide long-term and core support to women’s organisations working in CVE/PVE, and support cross-regional opportunities to connect women-led organisations and their strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism.
- Ensure coordination across peacebuilding and CVE/PVE program and funding streams to ensure corrective knowledge derived from experience in the integration of gender analysis and supporting women’s community organisations is disseminated throughout peacebuilding practice.

For Civil Society

- Provide long-term support and capacity building for volunteers working on community-level activities to prevent and counter extremism.
- Engage and support women and men who have undergone a de-radicalisation process, including people convicted of terrorist offences – this is an effective strategy for engaging community members.
- Promote solidarity between women and men working in different movements and alliances – this advances gender equality, women’s rights and human rights, as well as pluralist religious organisations and LGBT groups, and has the potential to expand and broaden an anti-violence platform that prevents violent extremism and terrorism.

For Researchers

In conflict-affected areas and in locales unaffected by military and paramilitary violence, families and community organisations have potentially more extensive and less confronting access than governments to vulnerable individuals, and may be more effective in coordinating and leading movements opposed to fundamentalism and violence. This approach remains an unexplored area of research and advocacy in the Counter-Terrorism agenda.
5

SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
5. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

This research project has generated important new results concerning the gender dynamics affecting the rise of extremism, and women’s roles in conflict prevention and countering intolerance. The data constitute an extensive foundation of evidence that demonstrates a significant correlation between systemic gender-based discrimination and extremism. These findings can support the development of more effective, gender-aware national and regional counter-terrorism policies. They have critical relevance for Australia’s national, regional and global security, its development and humanitarian policies and programs, and its engagement with regional South-East Asia.

5.1 RELEVANCE FOR AUSTRALIA’S GENDER AND CVE POLICY AND PROGRAMMING

I. AUSTRALIA’S PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING GENDER AND CVE

During Australia’s term of office as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Australian government engaged substantially and substantively with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, in particular highlighting the essential role that women play in conflict prevention and in building sustainable peace in societies. As President of the Council in November 2014, Australia led negotiations on an action plan to implement UNSC Resolutions 2170 and 2178 on countering terrorism and financing of extremist groups, and a Presidential statement on Counter-Terrorism (UN Security Council 2014c). That statement reiterated the need for governments to address the factors motivating recruitment and radicalisation to terrorism, and to counter violent extremism by building community resilience. As DFAT has identified, the issue of foreign terrorist fighters became directly relevant to Australia’s national interests in light of: the growth of networks and flow of fighters fuelling conflicts across many parts of North Africa and the Middle East, the potential repercussions for our own region, and the ability of foreign fighters to return (DFAT 2017b). As such, policy recommendations for the Australian government have domestic and international relevance.
II. DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

This research builds on DFAT’s new framework ‘Development approaches to Countering Violent Extremism’, which was released in February 2017 to guide the delivery of development assistance to counter violent extremism in developing countries (DFAT n.d.). The framework comprises lessons on what CVE-related development programming should involve, based on international practice to date. It also includes cursory reference to the importance of analysing and understanding the role of women and gender dynamics in CVE programming.57 As highlighted by Monash GPS researchers, this framework ‘only sidelines women’s roles, making this another example of a WPS policy area where Australia can do better.’ Moreover, the related statement on CVE by Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Julie Bishop MP, was silent about any plans to integrate a gender perspective across Australia’s aid efforts (see Lee-Koo, Trojanowska and Johnson 2017; Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2017).

This research thus extends and strengthens DFAT’s new CVE framework by exploring the gender dynamics and gender relations cited in a number of ‘key lessons from the field and research’, including to:

- **Understand the local drivers**
  - *Do no harm* – minimise unintended harm – activities should be based on robust analysis; careful selection of partners, methods and communication strategies; and be grounded in respect for human rights;
  - *Promote local ownership* – locally-led projects will be more sustainable, build capacity; be better targeted; and be perceived as more credible than external programs;
  - *Conduct ongoing analysis.*

III. AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

This research is a significant contribution to the Australian government’s implementation of the Australian National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security. The Australian government and DFAT have an opportunity to consolidate and extend their mutual support for the CVE, CT, and WPS agendas in the development and implementation of the second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Integrating the findings of this research into policy and programming processes will support the government to implement its international commitments under the Plan – to promote the participation of women in peace and security, the protection of women’s human rights in conflict-affected settings, and women’s roles in the prevention of conflict and violence.

Recommendations in this research report are consistent with findings outlined in the Fourth Civil Society Report Card on the Australian National Action Plan, released in 2017. The Report Card found that Australian civil society recognised the importance of the gender dynamics of CVE/PVE, emphasising the need for ‘an approach that is gender-aware, evidenced-based, preventative in design, and that includes women as decision-makers in all policy responses’ (Lee-Koo et al. 2017). Further, the Report Card recommended that development of the second NAP needs to demonstrate a nuanced understanding of extremism that

- Is informed by research and gender analysis;
- Recognises that women play a pivotal role in preventing extremism and should be included in all CVE programming;
- Ensures all CVE programming integrates gender as a cross-cutting issue; and
- Includes support for international and national women’s organisations working towards stabilisation, preventing terrorism, and preventing violent extremism (Lee-Koo et al. 2017: 22).
NOTES
6.1 NOTES

1 The full team of researchers and research assistants on the project is acknowledged in the research approach and methodology section. We would like to thank Sarah Boyd, Hannah Jay, Associate Professor Katrina Lee-Koo, and Maria Tanyag at Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre for their comments and advice on this report. We would also like to thank Dr. Swati Parashar, Professor Jude McCulloch, and Associate Professor Pete Lentini for their engagement in a workshop on the analysis of the research findings.

2 *Ulama* – Indonesia has not adopted the Arabic *Alim*/*Alimah* for male/female singular – *ulama* is applicable as both singular and plural forms, without gender differentiation. See Husnin, 2017, p. 65, Ens. 17–18.

3 Significant examples include a good practices document on Gender and Countering Violent Extremism by OSCE (2013); a call for an ‘integrated approach’ to bridge security, development, and human rights’ endorsed by the Global Center on Cooperative Security (2016); and implementing policies recommended by Bhulai et al. (2016).

4 The international Women, Peace and Security agenda is a cross-cutting thematic agenda at the United Nations Security Council. Beginning with UNSCR 1325 (adopted October 2000), it consists of eight resolutions recognising: the differential impact of conflict on women and men; the need to address women’s human rights during and after conflict; the need to promote women’s participation in peace and security processes, including peacebuilding; and the prevention of conflict.

5 UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (S/RES/2242), 13 October 2015, available from: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2242(2015)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2242(2015)). Relevant excerpts from UNSCR2242 on gender and C/PVE (operative paragraphs 11–13): 11. Calls for the greater integration by Member States and the United Nations of their agendas on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, requests the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue throughout the activities within their respective mandates, including within country-specific assessments and reports, recommendations made to Member States, facilitating technical assistance to Member States, and briefings to the Council, encourages the CTC and CTED to hold further consultations with women and women’s organizations to help inform their work, and further encourages the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to take the same approach in activities within its mandate; 12. Urges Member States and requests relevant United Nations entities, including CTED within its existing mandate and in collaboration with UN-Women, to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organizations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses, and to ensure United Nations monitoring and assessment mechanisms and processes mandated to prevent and respond to violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, have the necessary gender expertise to fulfill their mandates, including relevant sanctions experts groups and bodies established to conduct fact finding and criminal investigations; 13. Urges Member States and the United Nations system to ensure the participation and leadership of women and women’s organizations in developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, including through countering incitement to commit terrorist acts, creating counter narratives and other appropriate interventions, and building their capacity to do so effectively; and further to address, including by the empowerment of women, youth, religious and cultural leaders, the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, consistent with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy — A/RES/60/288, welcomes the increasing focus on inclusive upstream prevention efforts and encourages the forthcoming Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to integrate women’s participation, leadership and empowerment as co-re to the United Nation’s strategy and responses, calls for adequate financing in this regard and for an increased amount, within the funding of the UN for counterterrorism and countering violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, to be committed to projects which address gender dimensions including women’s empowerment.

6 For a summary of the Asia Pacific Consultations undertaken for the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, see [http://wps.unwomen.org/asia-pacific-civil-society-consultation/](http://wps.unwomen.org/asia-pacific-civil-society-consultation/).

7 The 2015 Global Study on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 called for the promotion of women’s rights to be detached from counter-terrorism and military planning processes, noting that counter-terror strategies,
These rallies sought to pressure the government to prosecute the governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahja Poernama (Ahok) for blasphemy.

The city of Solo was initially considered, but during preliminary research nearby Yogyakarta was chosen. For fifty years the ancient Central Java court city of Solo has been a major site of radicalisation to violent extremism, centred around Al Mukmin Ngruki pesantren (Islamic boarding school). The two founders of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) established a strong sense of radical community that still exists until today through the Ngruki alumni network. Today, five of the six Indonesians confirmed to have died fighting in Syria and Iraq studied at Ngruki or one of the other JI schools, with four already in the region when the Syrian conflict began (unconfirmed numbers are vastly greater).


International organisations and donors should include the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task force (CTITF) (n.d.) thematic working group on adopting a ‘Gender Sensitive Approach to Preventing and Countering Terrorism’ and the multilateral donor platform, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (n.d.).

ISIS – acronym for ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’, also referred to as Daesh, a translation of the similar Arabic acronym, DIIS. It is an extremist jihadi armed group ruled by Wahhabi/Salafi law, currently fighting for territory in Syria and Iraq.

The majority of known recruits who have travelled to Syria to join ISIS come from Lamongan, the rural East Java town and coastal district.

By pious what is meant is Islamic activism characterized as follows: not aimed at political power; being mainly concerned with the safeguarding of the Muslim identity and the Islamic faith and moral order against the forces of non-Muslims; its characteristic actors being Salafis. By jihadi what is meant is Islamic activism focusing on armed struggle (al-jihad) based on ji hadi ideology (jihadism) with its characteristic actors being jihadi activists (al-mujahid). By political what is meant is Islamic activism which is characterized as follows: involvement in the political process, either direct or indirect, and a general acceptance of the nation-state, working within its constitutional framework; articulating a reformist rather than revolutionary vision, and referring to democratic norms; its characteristic actors being paramilitary and party-political activists.

Informal discussion with Dette Aliyah (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian) and another woman activist living in Solo.

For related news coverage, see Hanifah (2016) and Halim et al. (2016).
of this research and its benefits for them. In the past they have contributed to research projects, but have not received feedback regarding the findings.

24 A feminist research ethic extends beyond ethical review by institutional boards because it is committed to practicing reflexivity throughout the research process. This involves ethical commitment to accommodating different ways of knowing, forms of inclusion and exclusion, relationships to research participants, assistants, etc., and to acknowledgement of the situatedness of oneself as the researcher in the research process (see Ackerly and True 2010).


26 Focus Group Discussion, 2 May 2016.

27 Interview with Dete Aliah, Manager Director, 3 June 2016.

28 Focus Group Discussion, 2 May 2016.

29 Interview with Khariroh Ali, Commissioner in Komnas Perempuan; Maria Utfah Anshor, Commissioner at National Commission for Protection on Children; Anonymous, lecturer, Institute of Quran Studies University, Jakarta.

30 Interview with Nugroho, Wahid Institute, research institute, NGO, 22 November 2016.

31 Interview with Nia Sjarifuddin, ANTBI, an NGO advocating pluralism.

32 Interview with Kharirah Ali, Commissioner in Komnas Perempuan.

33 Interview, Anonymous, lecturer, Institute of Quran Studies University, Jakarta.

34 Interview with Khariroh Ali, Commissioner in Komnas Perempuan; Farha Ciciek, board in AIDA (Indonesia Peace Alliance); Mahnan Marbawi, Secretary General AGPAII (Islamic Teacher Association); Focus Group Discussion, 2 May 2016.

35 Interview with Khariroh Ali, Commissioner in Komnas Perempuan; Farha Ciciek, board in AIDA (Indonesia Peace Alliance); Mahnan Marbawi, Secretary General AGPAII (Islamic Teacher Association); Focus Group Discussion, 2 May 2016.

36 Focus Group Discussion, 2 May 2016. See also Nuraniyah (2017).

37 Focus Group Discussion, Jakarta, May 2016.

38 Anonymous, Dosen PTIQ/ALIMAT Focus Group Discussion, 2 May 2016.

39 See discussion regarding Santoso in notes 20 and 23.

40 Interview with Nurulaela Lamasitudju, Buyunkatedu, 27 July 2016.

41 Online and social media communication has been embraced by citizens of Jakarta, as navigating the sprawling city is increasingly difficult and not facilitated by adequate transport infrastructure.

42 Paraphrased from an interview with Evani Hamzah, Women’s Solidarity for Human Rights, 16 July 2016.

43 Interview with Anonymous office worker, Jakarta.

44 Yogyakarta, Interview, Dr. Inayah Rahmaniah.

45 Informal discussion with Riri Khairiroh, Commissioner at Komnas Perempuan.

46 This participant was able to escape from the group. Her friends’ plans to commit a violent act were not successful and they were arrested. She became a prosecution witness in the criminal trial. However, there was nothing in the proceedings to indicate the nature of the relationship between the gender-based violence she experienced and the extremist violence of the alleged criminals.

47 Interview with Ahmad Imam Mujadid Rais, Syafii Maarif Institute.

48 Interview with Farha Ciciek, researcher, board member of AIDA (Indonesia Peace Alliance).

49 Interview with, Khotimatul Khusna S.Ag, 1 June 2016.

50 See their new website www.rahima.or.id; and Qantara.de (2005).

51 Interview with Hanifa, Director in AMAN Indonesia, Indonesia office for peace regional network.


53 Given the existing societal dissent over sexuality and gender identity in Indonesia, solidarity among progressive groups that support PVE would be expected to face a coincident increase in reactionary extremism. If not mediated by government actors, this would in all likelihood lead to violence and human rights violations (see Between the Reefs blog 2017).
54 In many situations, Indonesian police institutions and national and local government have refused to restrain or to prosecute the violent crimes of assault and intimidation committed by Islamist groups. Numerous victims have described instances in which police officers were present, but refrained from rendering assistance, apprehending perpetrators, or intervening to prevent violence. This occurred during the period of research at research sites in March and April 2016. For example, in Jakarta, police stood by while members of an Islamist group violently disrupted activities organised by women’s survivor groups of the 65 massacre (Sitompul 2016). In Yogyakarta, an Islamist group threatened the forcible destruction of exhibition activities run by young feminist artists. Police supported the threatening demands of the Islamists, refusing to prevent the violence (BBC News Indonesia 2016a). In Yogyakarta, the wilfully unresponsive police presence constituted an overt licence to members of the Front of Islamic Defence to terrorise and assault residents of an Islamic boarding school operated by a transgender community leader. While the Islamist offenders assaulted the residents, members of civil society groups and a moderate religious organisation helped to remove the victims to safety. Police in attendance did nothing to apprehend the criminals (BBC News Indonesia 2016b).

55 See Jakarta Press (2016a) for reports on the Jakarta marches.

56 International organisations and donors should endorse the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task force (CTITF) (n.d.) thematic working group on adopting a ‘Gender Sensitive Approach to Preventing and Countering Terrorism’ and the multilateral donor platform, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (n.d.).

6.2 REFERENCES


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APPENDIX A:
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

Note: Not all research participants were asked all questions.

1. What roles do you play in your community?

2. What is your view on women’s role in your religious community?

3. Have you observed radical or fundamentalist ideas and ideologies being used in your community?

4. What indications have you observed that the presence of fundamentalist ideas and ideologies is growing or increasing?

5. When do ideas and ideologies become potentially harmful?

6. What is your view on these ideas?

7. Do others support your views?

8. Have you been involved in any activities or initiatives to prevent or counter these ideas and ideologies in your community, as well as your home/family, school, workshop?

9. Can you describe these activities or initiatives in detail?

10. What prompted you to start or engage in these initiatives?

11. How do you reflect on your initiative, its effectiveness, the challenges and the opportunities it presents?

12. Do you belong to an organisation or group that receives funding or support to prevent or counter fundamentalist ideologies?

13. If so, from whom? Whether it is continuing or ended, and why?

14. How do you analyse the government’s policy and practices?
## APPENDIX B: WOMEN’S OR WOMEN-LED NGO INITIATIVES ON CVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>NGO’s analyses of fundamentalism</th>
<th>Activities to counter fundamentalism</th>
<th>Impact and sustainability of the program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Rahima, Centre for Education and Information on Islam and Women’s Rights – women’s NGO: focuses on strengthening Islamic interpretation of gender equality and women’s rights, established 2000.</td>
<td>Education Program for Women’s Ulama (Pendidikan untuk Ulama Perempuan, PUP), since 2005. Provides space to discuss multiple strategies in countering fundamentalism through PUP. Declared aim to increase ulama women’s capacity to promote gender equity and equality in their own religious and community contexts.</td>
<td>Follow-up activities based on the participants’ contexts, e.g., developing curricula in their institution (boarding school, university, majelis ta’lim) that comprise gender equality, religious equality, and rahmat (spreading kindness).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The radicalism is stronger since 1998 (the beginning of New Democratic Era). The radical movements intrude into Islamic boarding schools and majelis ta’lim (Islamic recital group). |

| 2.  | Solidaritas Perempuan/SP (Women’s Solidarity, NGO, national and regional (Aceh level), established 1990. | Implementation of the Qanun and Syariah Law in Aceh since 2000 has been very problematic to women. Religious fundamentalism has become a threat for feminist movements in Indonesia – determined to address it. | The participants promote tolerance and gender justice in their daily lives – families, kampong (communities) and in broader society, such as in working places. Some kampong where the SP’s members live are now more open to different opinions, different backgrounds, and women’s roles in community, e.g., in Kampung Tuhapeut, there is an obligation to provide a seat for a woman (quota) as the member of Kampong legislative council. |

   Capacity building programs for women: community discussion and women’s school to promote tolerance and pluralism. Advocacy to challenge the Qanun No.6 /2014 on Jinayah Law (Qanun Jinayat) and monitor the implementation of Joint Ministry Degrees in the development of worship and Jamaah Ahmadiyah. These activities aim to build critical thinking on Syariah Law in Aceh. At national level, judicial review for Qanun Jinayah through Supreme Courts, 22 October 2015, in collaboration with NGOs networks. |

| 3.  | The Asian Muslim Network (AMAN) Indonesia, Muslim and non-Muslim networks in Asia region, established 2009. | Increase in the rate of intolerant acts, beginning in Jakarta and other cities around 2000. | Alumni promote peace and tolerance in their community and run regular discussions in the community. |

   Countering intolerance through peace building and women’s capacity development program (women’s school for peace building) in several cities: Poso, Bogor, Jakarta, Wonosobo, Maluku, Bantul, and Yogyakarta. |
<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Institute for Women's Empowerment (IWE), established 2008, a regional network in Asia with half of the members originally from Indonesia.</td>
<td>The strengthening of fundamentalism is one of the obstacles for women in accessing rights to education, political, economic, and social equality.</td>
<td>Women's Empowerment and Leadership Development for Democratisation (WELDD) (2012–15) in collaboration with Solidaritas Perempuan, Fahmina (Cirebon) and Rahima, committed to promoting peace, tolerance and nonviolence.</td>
<td>The development of Civil Society Network on Syariah in Aceh (Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil Peduli Syariah) that advocates to change Qanon, which discriminates inequitably against women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Aliansi Indonesia Damai (AIDA: Indonesia Peace Alliance) foundation, established by bombing survivors.</td>
<td>The increase of extreme violence, e.g., suicide bombing that involves youth.</td>
<td>Embracing victims and ex-jihadis to work together in promoting peace. Promoting peace through schools by sharing the stories of jihadis and victims. Training for prison officers.</td>
<td>The activities are run effectively – cautiously organised by AIDA, which does not openly publish its activities to the public. This program is only maintained in a limited number of cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Aliansi Bhineka Tunggal Ika/ ANBTI (National Alliance of Unity in Diversity, a pluralist movement of feminist organisations, established in 2006.</td>
<td>Legislative provision concerning betrayal of the Indonesian constitution, Pancasila, and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Indonesian principle of diversity and unity). The challenge is substantial in promoting peace and diversity, e.g., political Islam, particularly when local political dynamics relate to government elections, such as in Jakarta.</td>
<td>Meetings for consolidation of different groups and movements to promote tolerance: With government in promoting education based on Pancasila Working together with NGOs, academics in promoting peace school and curriculum. With religious organisations such as Nahdatul Ulama, Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia (Council of Churches in Indonesia), and Konverensi Wali Gereja (KWI, Bishops Conferences of Indonesia) to develop interreligious program.</td>
<td>Many local governments support the programs and development of the Forum Kerukunan Beragama (Religious Harmony Forum).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wahid Institute Foundation, established 2004.</td>
<td>Violence based on fundamentalist ideas is a very visible threat. However, the most serious threat is religious sectarianism and intolerance.</td>
<td>Developing discourse on Islamic thought, literacy, and ideas; Promoting ideas of diversity through publication, discussion, and networking with boarding schools; Research into radicalisation; Establishing love and peaceable cooperation involving women as part of economic empowerment.</td>
<td>Broader networks with NGOs, governments, and boarding schools.</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>9. Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity, established 2002, an NGO advocating progressive development of Islamic thought.</td>
<td>The increasing provocation of hatred and violence based on disinformation – political Islam.</td>
<td>Education for journalist Enriching youth e.g., youth camp. Media campaign through peace award Publication, e.g., journal.</td>
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<td>10. ALIMAT, a women’s network focusing on reforming Islamic family law with an egalitarian perspective. The members are from different disciplinary backgrounds, mostly religious leaders, established 2009. See <a href="http://alimatindonesia.blogspot.co.id/">http://alimatindonesia.blogspot.co.id/</a>, 6 January 2017.</td>
<td>A growing tendency to mistreat women because: 1) interpretations of Islam that regard misogyny as a form of gender bias perpetuated by mostly men; 2) Islamic knowledge is now viewed as knowledge.</td>
<td>Establishing the new concept of Islamic family law, with gender equality and equity perspectives. Research on women’s circumstances in Muslim families. Promoting gender equality in Islamic families through ulama training and networking with different religious groups, TV and radio talkshow programs, and book publishing.</td>
<td>Loss of a network that requires improved organisational structure.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1. Kelompok Perjuangan dan Kesetaraan Perempuan – Sulawesi Tengah (KPKPST, frontier group for gender equality), Central Sulawesi, a women’s NGO established 2002 in Palu, operational in Poso during 2004.</td>
<td>The religious conflict in Poso was not due to fundamentalism. Rather, the fundamentalist groups arrived from outside Poso after the conflict and attracted the local people (particularly youth), who were drawn to different religions because of the impact of the conflict. The military maintains the existing fundamentalist groups for its own interests.</td>
<td>Organising women from both religions, Muslim and Christian, in 30 villages in six sub-districts in Poso (2004–08). Advocacy to establish local policy for post-conflict support of women and children (2008–12). Established complaint stations (pos pengaduan) in 30 villages to provide emergency response for women who experienced violence (sexual violence by military members or domestic violence, 2008–12). Discussing problems, including threats from fundamentalists to both religions in the community.</td>
<td>Had 500 women’s cadres that conduct initiatives to promote peace in their own communities. Although KPKPST ceased operating in Poso when funding was discontinued, its cadres continue activities in their communities, and maintain collaborations with NGOs, local governments, and community leaders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Solidaritas Perempuan (SP, Women’s Solidarity), established 2012.</td>
<td>The fundamentalist movements in Poso exist because of two factors: 1) steadfast ideological adherence by some; and 2) cynical promotion of ideology to secure interests in local natural resources.</td>
<td>Developing curriculum for routine discussion regarding how to instill values of feminism, and analysing the fundamentalist threat and actions to promote peace, particularly in Pamona sub-district and the coastal area.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>MOSINTUWU, NGO attentive to women’s roles in peace and children’s rights post-conflict, established 2010.</td>
<td>The military exploits the fundamentalist groups to strengthen its position and to access their finances. The military operation detrimentally affects women and communities by occupying their farms, preventing labour. The influence of fundamentalist groups can likewise be prevented by economic programs and the reinforcement of women’s roles in the community.</td>
<td>Established women’s schools for 500 women from different religious in 70 villages. The school is a space for empowering women to voice their interests and needs through the interrelation of economic and educational programs.</td>
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| 4. | Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil (LPMS, Civil Society Strengthening Institution), established in 2003. | LPMS was established to respond to the needs of conflict-displaced people. Locals, especially victims of conflict, support the fundamentalist groups that come from outside Poso because the government has not established effective post-conflict programs for them. | Established curriculum for integrating peace in schools, in collaboration with other NGOs. Providing input for government to establish program for victims. | Some schools have implemented peace and harmony programs. |

| 5. | Wanita Islam Alkhairat (WIA, Alkhairat Muslim Women), membership religious organisation. | Extreme violence and terrorism is a threat requiring prevention. Socialisation of members to avoid involvement with radical groups; critical of those who encourage them to be part of these groups. Established internal system to address the influence of radical groups in their community, e.g., routine weekly majelis ta’lim (recital group). | The members have had success in addressing the disturbances caused by the radical group attempting to expropriate the community mosque, e.g., in Tokorondo village, the majelis ta’lim has occupied the mosque for their activities to deter radical interests. |

| 6. | Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (KPI, Indonesian Women’s Coalition), Poso Branch, established in 2014. | When KPI was established in Poso, the situation was normal, but the impact of the conflict has been extensive, particularly because of the fundamentalist groups. Fundamentalism does not accord with democracy, non-discrimination, gender equity and equality, anti-violence, and diversity, which constitute principles of KPI. | Established women’s discussion sessions and economic groups in communities: providing capital to start economic activities for their families, as economic security decreases likelihood of involvement with radical groups. Members’ analyses about the situation in their communities are strengthened. |
| 7. | Aisyah, women's religious organisation, Poso Branch. | Fundamentalism is the hard line of Islam. | Aisyah in Poso does not have a specific program for CVE, but it conducts several programs responding to the conflict, such as aid for victims, capacity building, and teaching skills relating to health, cookery, nutrition, family finances, and routine majelis ta’lim. Care-provision for other community members by visiting different groups—non-Aisyah and non-Muslim. Economic empowerment for their members. | The program is relatively sustainable, as it receives funding support from members and Aisyah at the national level. |
| 8. | Sekolah Perempuan Perdamaian (SPP Women’s School for Peace, Poso), established 2009. | Poso’s conflict-induced fragility requires the maintenance of peace and values of tolerance. | Establishing 12 schools in 12 villages to promote tolerance and peace and to counter radicalism. The participants come from different religious backgrounds. The school activities are monthly meetings, training, capacity building, e.g., women’s skills, organic farming, cooking, etc., and visiting places of worship from disparate religions (church, mosque, vihara). Networking with different religious organisations such as Wanita Al-Khairat, Sidode Christian Church. | The relationship between SPP and other organisations is very good in terms of administration of the schools. |
| 9. | Universitas Kristen Tentena (UNKRIT Tentena Christian University), established 2010. | The fundamentalists will be difficult to reform as long as victim resentment persists. | Developing curricula and programs for peace building Establishing suitable atmosphere and space for learning in harmony. |
## CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES ON CVE IN YOGYAKARTA

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<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Jaringan Perempuan Yogyakarta (JPY, Yogyakarta women's network), consolidated by activists from different NGOs; focuses on women's rights, human rights, marginalised groups, religious minorities, and democracy.</td>
<td>These fundamentalist groups have expanded commission of violent actions – the government allows these to occur, refusing to respond to their violent acts.</td>
<td>Public campaigning through rallies to counter discourse on LGBT, the shutting-down of transgender boarding schools, and violent attacks on religious minorities groups.</td>
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<td>2. Pusat Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (PKBI, Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association), Yogyakarta branch, established 1967.</td>
<td>Fundamentalist movements ignore various identities in society, such as those who are marginalised; sex workers, gay, transgender, lesbian. There is a risk to discussing sexuality openly; it is a sensitive issue.</td>
<td>Collaborates with JPY in activities to counter fundamentalism. Changing strategy to become more assertive in promoting sexual reproductive health for young women, families, and marginalised groups.</td>
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<td>3. PLU Satu Hati (People Like Us, One Heart), an LGBTIQ NGO in Yogyakarta, advocacy of LGBT rights and provision of space to support LGBTIQ, established 2008.</td>
<td>The activities arranged by this NGO are always targeted for attack by fundamentalist groups – rising levels of fundamentalism are a threat to PLU, particularly when you consider there was a recent anti-LGBT campaign using banners in several streets in Yogyakarta, organized by the fundamentalists. Fundamentalism does not respect the diversity of peoples.</td>
<td>Involved with JPY in developing counter-fundamentalism activities through rallies and discussion. Changing strategy to become more clandestine, rather than organising its activities openly.</td>
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<td>4. Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan (KPI DIY, Indonesian Women's Coalition, Yogyakarta branch), a woman’s NGO, membership-based organisation.</td>
<td>The radical groups committing violent acts in Yogyakarta are not ideologically united – many members are thugs and the unemployed. They join for money.</td>
<td>Open discussion with those who are part of this group.</td>
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<td>5. Solidaritas Perempuan (SP, Women’s Solidarity Kinasih, Yogyakarta branch), a women's NGO, feminist membership-based organisation, established 1999.</td>
<td>Since 2015, established a special program for promoting pluralism, includes: Organising interreligious community dialogue on gender and peace, in collaboration with Fatayat Nahdatul Ulama, women’s wing of Nahdatul Ulama, Yogyakarta city. Involved with advocacy in countering the discriminatory effects of local regulation (bylaws), with national networks coordinated by National Commission on Violence Against Women. Strengthening values of toleration through networks in Jogjakarta, in collaboration with JPY. Developing and promoting the concept of the tolerant village (Kampung toleran)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Mitra Wacana (Women Resource Centre)</td>
<td>The increase of fundamentalism causes disharmony in Yogyakarta, purportedly the city of tolerance. There are different groups, with different links.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Srikandi Lintas Iman, a membership network</td>
<td>The radical extremist groups use violence to terrorise those who are different.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI, Journalist Independent Alliance)</td>
<td>Intolerance not only of religious minorities, but also of any members of the press who try to investigate the news. This is legitimised by police officers, who, for instance, support the demands of radical extremist groups. &gt; During World Press Freedom Day in 2016, an officer advised discontinuing screening of the film Pulau Buru Tanah Air Beta (Buru Island), which concerned the plight of political prisoners. This accorded with the demands of radical activists threatening violence in order to prevent the screening – they asserted the film promotes communism, which, they maintained, is contrary to the values of Islam.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Fatayat Nahdatul Ulama, women’s religious organisation</td>
<td>Two kinds of problem: the strengthening of radicalism by fundamentalist groups, and political Islam, which uses religion to protect personal wealth and political interests.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Aisyiyah, women’s religious organisation, women’s wing of Muhammadiyah, established 1917.</td>
<td>There is movement to change Indonesia to an Islamic state – therefore fundamentalists want to change Pancasila (the Indonesian principle of religious toleration). Established concept and campaign of Women for Islam berkemajuan (progressive Islam). Encouraging women’s leadership in Muhammadiyah (not only in women’s organisations) and the involvement of Aisyiyah in Muhammadiyah decision-making (Muktakmar). Involved in decision-making processes of Muktamar 2015, that reinstated Muhammadiyah support for Pancasila (diversity in different religions) as an essential Indonesian ethical principle.</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Pondok Pesantren Aswaja Nusantara, Mlangi (Islamic Boardiang School) in Mlangi, Yogyakarta, established 2011.</td>
<td>There are different problems: The radical extremists rely exclusively on only one article in the Quran to legitimise their interests. The traditional thought of Islam is very patriarchal, and remains so in the thinking of many traditional religious leaders. Established youth leadership program and sent three students to attend youth leadership program in George Mason University, US, 2014. Support for students’ activities to publish journal on Contemporary and Indonesian Islam. Provide spaces for interfaith dialogue.</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Pondok pesantren Al Fatah (Transgender Islamic Boarding School) in Yogyakarta, established 2008.</td>
<td>Attacks and terror threats made against the board and members of the pesantren to shut down the school. The threats derived from one radical extremist group that also made threats throughout the community to secure local support of its extortion. Provide space for transgender people to learn religion and to connect with different groups. Make links with civil society groups and religious leaders in order to support their activities and to advocate for their right to continue to run a boarding school.</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>The secretary of the followers of Gusdur (religious leader and ex-President RI, Abdul Rahman Wahid), Yogyakarta.</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>SD Tumbuh Yogyakarta.</td>
<td>Education is an important factor in the spread of radicalism and also in the spread of toleration. Develop school environment based on principles of inclusion and equality in culture, gender, religion, ethnicity, class, and disability.</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Pusat Studi Wanita Universitas Islam Negeri SUNAN KALIJAGA, The Centre of Gender Studies, established 1990.</td>
<td>Intolerance is one of the most visible characteristics of the radical extremist groups. It persists because of the abiding perception of blame: that others are not right and that only their viewpoint, based on their interpretation [of religious texts] is the real truth; the consequence is a feeling of hatred of those who are different. It is because of the misinterpretation of religion and the lack of resources. Established research and training on gender, reproductive health, sexuality and Islam for judges in religious court, and other education institutions. Gender mainstreaming in university. Develop program on human rights, democracy and gender equality through seminars and discussion sessions.</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Universitas Gajah Mada (UGM), established 1949.</td>
<td>UGM is one of the target areas for recruitment of the middle class cadres. There are indications that some students organised activities to disseminate radical ideology.</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Institut Seni Indonesia (ISI, Indonesian Art Institute), Yogakarta, established 1984.</td>
<td>Radical extremist groups, such as Hizbuttahrir Indonesia, incorporate their activities through students’ programs (mosque activities on campus), which is contrary with Pancasila. They promote specific rules for producing art, such as a prohibition of painting living creatures. This kind of prohibition was also stated by lecturers in class.</td>
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PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: GENDER PERSPECTIVES AND WOMEN’S ROLES

AN AUSTRALIAN AID INITIATIVE IMPLEMENTED BY MONASH GPS ON BEHALF OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT.