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Intergroup emotions and gateway groups: Introducing multiple social identities into the study of emotions in conflict

Aharon Levy[1,2] | Martijn van Zomeren[2] | Tamar Saguy[1] | Eran Halperin[1]

[1] The Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center

[2] Heymans Institute for Psychological Research, University of Groningen

Correspondence
Eran Halperin, Interdisciplinary Center P.O.Box 167, Herzliya 46150, Israel.
Email: eranh75@hotmail.com

Abstract

After 2 decades of extensive empirical studies on affective intergroup processes, it is now clear that emotional processes play a critical role in the dynamics of intergroup conflict. However, it seems that much of the research in this domain views intergroup relations in a dichotomous manner of pure in-groups and out-groups despite the developments in the realm of social identity that suggest otherwise. We here suggest that the incorporation of more complex social identity models into the study of affective social science can not only help to better understand intergroup conflict dynamics but can also offer new possible venues for conflict resolution. Specifically, we claim that the presence of groups with multiple identities, which include both the in-group's and the out-group's identity (e.g., biracial groups that encompass both a White and a Black social identity) can impact intergroup emotional processes between the different groups comprising those multiple identities (e.g., between Whites and Blacks). Accordingly, we review recent developments in the literatures of emotion in intergroup conflict and multiple social identity and offer a conceptual integration of the two. Thus, we attempt to enrich the theory in both fields, better explain intergroup conflict, and possibly pave the way for the development of novel conflict resolution methods.

1 | INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2004, two Palestinian children were injured unintentionally as a result of Israeli military operations in the Palestinian West Bank. The first child named Khaled Maher was 6 years old, and he eventually died as a result of the incident. The story of his death was not covered by Israeli media, the Israeli military did not issue any official statement on the matter, and it is almost impossible to find information about that incident today. The second child named Batul Tibi was 5 years old, and she eventually made a full recovery. By contrast, her story received vast media coverage (see Nana, 2004; Waked, 2005; Walla, 2004), the Israeli military issued an official apology on the matter, and, particularly important for current purposes, the Israeli public expressed emotions of guilt and sorrow in response to the

event (Waked, 2005). One intriguing detail here is that Batul was also a relative of Israeli public figure and politician Ahmad Tibi, who is an Arab citizen of Israel (i.e., he has both an Israeli and a Palestinian national identity).

This disparity illustrates two important observations. First, the Israeli public seemed to emotionally respond in very different ways to these different stories, although both children were out-group members. Second, might it be a coincidence that the Israeli public's emotional response was most intense in the case of the Palestinian child that had some Israeli connection? If anything, one could have expected Khaled's mortal incident to evoke a stronger emotional reaction than Batul, who, after all, was only injured. In line with our focus in this paper, we suggest that one important reason for Israelis to react so differently to Batul's story is that Batul's Israeli affiliation made it harder for Israelis to dismiss her injury as just another casualty of war (which is arguably how Khaled was perceived). On the other hand, Batul could hardly be viewed as an Israeli (i.e., an in-group member) either. It is this difficulty in categorizing someone simply as an in-group or an out-group member that we believe is important to theorize and study, as we suggest this may be one explanation for the very different emotional responses to the different cases above. Focusing on the multiple group identities that an individual may hold, and the effects this has on the experience of intergroup emotions, therefore seems timely and important.

Specifically, in this paper, we focus on integrating theory and research from the fields of affective science and social identity processes, in the context of intergroup conflict. Specifically, throughout the paper, we are guided by the assumption that intergroup conflict can entail more than two groups and thus reflect a less simplistic representation of simply in-group versus out-group. This is of course not limited to Palestinians and Israelis. Just as Arab citizens of Israel are not easily categorized as members of one distinct social group, this is also true, for example, for immigrants struggling to adapt to the host culture, or biracial individuals affiliated with both races in the context of inter-racial strife. We are particularly interested in such so-called *gateway groups* (GGs), who are characterized by a unique social categorization that enables them to be categorized as, and identified with, more than one group within the context of intergroup dynamics. This unique categorization strategically places such groups in between social categories, where they may potentially act as a gateway of sorts across social borderlines, hence the term gateway groups. Moreover, the term gateway describes both the spatial and functional qualities of such groups, thus addressing both their unique situation and their potential for intergroup facilitation.

Indeed, the Palestinian child whose injury evoked such strong emotions among the Israeli public was linked to this public through a GG member—an Arab citizen of Israel. This implies that the presence of GGs in intergroup conflict can evoke the experience of intergroup emotions that otherwise would not have been felt.

In the remainder of this paper, we will first review relevant research on intergroup emotions and demonstrate how emotions play a crucial role in the development of intergroup conflict. Then we will consider research on multiple social identities in intergroup conflict, particularly with an eye to the recently developed notion of GGs, and their potential to facilitate conflict resolution. Finally, we will offer possible integrations of these literatures in order to facilitate theoretical conjunction, and to generate new hypotheses in regard to emotions in intergroup conflict.

2 | EMOTIONS IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Recent work in the field of emotions in conflict (e.g. Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014; Halperin & Pliskin, 2015), has underscored the need to incorporate insights about intergroup emotions while addressing intergroup conflict. We would even go as far as to say that to truly understand intergroup dynamics one must take intergroup emotions into account (Halperin, 2016).

Intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2008) is a pivotal part of this emphasis on the role of emotions in intergroup relations (see also Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dandache, Fischer, & Van Der Schalk, 2013; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). According to intergroup emotions theory, intergroup behavior is driven by emotions, but emotions of a uniquely social kind. Such group-based emotions[1] are derived from the self-categorization as a social group member and are targeted at a group related target, which can be the in-group,

the out-group, or specific members of said groups (Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993).

The framework described above has enabled a better understanding of intergroup conflict based on the role emotions play in it. For example, such work has advanced the understanding of different intergroup conflict-related processes such as collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), support for social and political concessions (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010), and support for intergroup aggression (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013; Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011)[2]. More specifically, scholars have mapped several influential discrete emotions, each of which has been found to have influence on unique set of attitudes and behavioral tendencies related to sustaining or resolving intergroup conflicts.

In terms of sustaining intergroup conflict, several emotions have been found to play a crucial role. For instance, when directed toward another person or group, *hatred* has been found to reflect the desire to harm or even annihilate its targets (Bar-Tal, 2007; White, 1996). Accordingly, group-based hatred plays a destructive role in intergroup conflict, affects the preservation of conflict, and represents an obstacle to attempts of conflict resolution (Halperin, 2011). Furthermore, group-based *pride*, under certain conditions, was found to promote intergroup prejudice (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003), justify oppression and violence (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), and legitimize the in-group's wrong doings (Bilali, 2013). Additionally, intergroup *anger* has been found to foster the support for violent actions and military attacks (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), appraise such actions as less risky and more likely to succeed (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and generally lead to the escalation of intergroup aggression and conflict (Halperin & Gross, 2011b; Mackie et al., 2000; Mullen & Skitka, 2006).

In terms of promoting conflict resolution, recent research has begun to address intergroup emotions as possible tools for reconciliation as well. For example, in the context of intergroup relations, *empathy* has been found to raise the motivation to alleviate the suffering of others (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002), it frequently results in helping behavior and altruistic motivations (Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014; Waytz, Zaki, & Mitchell, 2012), and it is negatively correlated with any kind of aggression even in the context of intractable conflict (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, 2017; Shechtman & Basheer, 2005). Similarly, group-based *guilt* has been found to be a crucial step on the path toward reparation and reconciliation (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008) and to raise motivation to repair the damage caused by the behavior of one's in-group (Čehajić, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Additionally, *hope* has been found to be a vital emotion needed to promote conflict resolution. It is associated with a lower desire to retaliate, a higher inclination for forgiveness (Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005), and greater conciliatory and compassionate attitudes towards the out-group (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Halperin & Gross, 2011a).[3]

Furthermore, one of the most recent developments in the field of intergroup emotions research is the introduction of *emotion regulation* into the group-based context (Goldenberg et al., 2016). Emotion regulation posits that emotions are commonly influenced by individuals themselves in the attempt to advance specific goals (Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011). Examples of emotion regulation serving an individual's goals include reducing one's anger or fear to better cope with a certain situation (e.g., an instrumental goal, see Porat, Halperin, & Tamir, 2016) or hedonically increasing one's happiness (Gross, 1998, 2014). The introduction of emotion regulation into the study of intergroup relations extends the analysis of group-based emotion by identifying and specifying the role of regulatory processes involved in group-based emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) and incorporates the notion of self-categorization (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith et al., 2007; Turner et al., 1987) into the existing models of emotion regulation (Goldenberg et al., 2016). When it comes to intergroup conflict, this extension may have significant implications as strategies of emotion regulation have been shown to constitute a tool for promoting conflict resolution (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). Accordingly, given the centrality of emotions in conflict and their far-reaching effects, group-based emotion regulation may prove especially useful in this context.

In sum, these developments in the field of group-based emotions have helped in shaping a more accurate and informed view of the role discrete emotions play in intergroup conflict processes. However, although it seems that

much of the intergroup emotion research assumes a dichotomous, pure in-group and out-group representation of intergroup conflict, recent developments in the field of social identity seem to portray a different and more complex social reality. This more complex approach enables a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of social phenomena. Moreover, this approach might also potentially offer novel ways in which to address the emotional processes mentioned above. In the next sections, we will first present these social identity developments and then discuss their possible integration with the corpus of emotions in intergroup conflict.

3 | GROUP IDENTITY IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) brought about a dramatic change in how social scientist perceived intergroup conflict. The theory, meant to better explain the psychological motivations behind intergroup conflict, introduced social identity as one of the major causes leading to intergroup strife and divided the world of intergroup relation into clear cut "in-groups" and "out-groups."[4] However, although the tendency to categorize people into distinct social groups is one of the most basic and inherent aspects of human social behavior, it seems that the notion of monolithic and distinct social categories may not always accurately reflect social reality. One reason for this is the growing number of interconnections between groups, and the sharing of multiple identities by individuals in a globalizing world (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; Lee & Bean, 2004).

Take, for example, the racial cleft of modern times. Race, at least in the United States, has typically been treated as a dichotomy (e.g., Black or White. Davis, 2010; Hickman, 1997; Khanna, 2010(. Nonetheless, in recent years, a dramatic shift is taking place and its outcome is an increase both in the presence, and in the influence of biracial identity. Over the past 15 years, the Black and White biracial population in the United States has tripled in size numbering over 2.5 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2015), and the current estimate is that by 2050, 1-in-5 Americans will be of mixed-race (Lee & Bean, 2004). Another example for the lack of clear-cut intergroup distinction is that of "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1997) between the Western world and the Muslim world. Whereas this clash is usually portrayed as taking place between two extremely distinct social groups, there are many examples such as Turkey, Albania, Muslims citizens in the United States, the Muslim mayor of London, etc. that do not easily fit into one of these two categories. We are thus particularly interested in contexts that call on multiple group identities, and how this affects emotional experience and emotion regulation.

4 | THE COMPLEXITY OF HOLDING MULTIPLE SOCIAL IDENTITIES

As a result of the growing conjunction between social identities, research on categorization processes has developed to reflect the notion that individuals often belong to more than one group at a time and therefore may hold multiple identities. For example, *dual identity* is a simultaneous identification with a distinct subgroup and a common superordinate group (Dovidio et al., 2009; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013; Sam & Berry, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Another example is *cross-categorization*, which addresses the multiple identities an individual holds, and their potential overlap[5] (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Crisp & Hewstone, 1999; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Migdal, Hewstone, & Mullen, 1998; Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). Similarly, *social identity complexity* also deals with the overlap between different social identities and examines the link between the extent of such overlap and the salience of social categories (Brewer, 2010; Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

The extensive work in the field of complex or multiple social identity described above addresses issues of self-identification and well-being, and issues of attitudes and behavior towards, or from, individuals with multiple identities. What the described work does *not* address, however, is how groups that hold multiple identities may affect the dynamics and intergroup emotions between the groups that represent the respective sources of their identity.[6] In other words, taking the example we presented above, existing literature can now help explain how Arab citizens of Israel identify themselves, it can explain how Israelis or Palestinians may perceive Arab Israelis because of their dual

affiliation with both groups, but it cannot predict how Israelis and Palestinians will feel towards each other in the presence of Arab Israelis. This aspect of the potential of dual identity to act as a possible emotional gateway between the groups that represent the respective sources of the dual identity will be addressed below, and it will be based on a novel conceptual integration of work in the separate fields of intergroup emotions and multiple identities.

5 | MULTIPLE IDENTITIES AS GATEWAYS

A new line of research that has recently addressed this aspect of complex identity and its possible implications in the context of intergroup conflict is that of GGs and their role in intergroup conflict resolution (Levy, Saguy, Van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2017). GGs are characterized by a unique social categorization that enables them to be categorized as, and identified with, more than one group within the context of intergroup dynamics. Due to the fractal nature of social categorization, there can be many different types of GGs. As mentioned above, GGs can exist on a national level (e. g., Arab citizens of Israeli) and on a racial level (e.g., biracials). Additionally, GGs can be found on a smaller scale situated amid specific ethnic groups (e.g., secular and ultraorthodox Jews, Levy, Saguy, van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2017); and on a larger civilizational scale, countries such as Turkey or Albania can mediate between the western world, and the Muslim world which they are both identified with (Keyman, 2007).

Existing research on GG examined such groups in the context of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, in the secular-religious context in Israel, and in the racial context of Blacks and Whites in the United States. Additionally, some of the existing research was also performed in the artificial group context where groups were artificially created in the lab based on the minimal group paradigm but introducing a third, mixed, group which shared attributes of both the artificial in-group as well as the artificial out-group (Levy et al., 2017; Levy, Halperin, Van Zomeren, & Saguy, under review).

This research found that in the context of intergroup relations, the presence of such GGs can improve the perceptions and behavioral tendencies between the groups comprising the identity of the GG. For example, the presence of a biracial GG in the interracial context in the United States led Whites to exhibit lower levels of symbolic racism towards Blacks, and to express higher levels of empathy towards Black violence victims (Levy et al., under review). In additional studies performed in the Israeli Palestinian context, besides just making the presence of the GG (i.e., Arab citizens of Israel) salient, one of the studies also manipulated the extent to which the GG were perceived to have a dual identity by providing participants with information regarding how the GG members perceive themselves. In these studies, the presence of the GG, and the enhanced dual identity perception, led Israelis to have greater motivation for contact with Palestinians, more egalitarian intergroup resource allocation, and diminished support for aggressive policies. These findings were mediated by reduced identification with the in-group, and a more complex perception of social categories (Levy et al., 2017). These findings imply that it is important to consider such multiple group identities in the context of intergroup conflict, particularly with an eye to emotional experience and regulation.

There are two important reservations to make at this point. First, such mediators may suggest that cognitive load might override this effect and restore the simplistic perceptions of dichotomous in-group and out-group (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993). Second, it is possible that stressing the connection between a GG and the out-group can easily become detrimental, especially in the context of severe intergroup conflict. Research has shown that people may judge in-group members more harshly than out-group members for the same actions (i.e., the black sheep effect; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Additionally, people might react more negatively to nonstandard "hybrids" under certain circumstances (Wagner et al., 2010). Hence, the link between the GG and the in-group, which has so far been stressed as a positive attribute, might backfire and lead to having the GG perceived as a fifth column or raise issues of threat and betrayal. Nonetheless, despite this concern, all studies to date have not found any negative outcomes as a result of fleshing out the multiple identity of the GG.

In sum, the integration we propose between the insights from intergroup emotions research and those from work on multiple social identities including GGs has a promising prospect for advancing our understanding of intergroup

conflict dynamics. Below, we will set some first steps toward integrating what we consider to be key insights from the different lines of theory and research we reviewed so far, specifically hypothesizing the influence of GGs on several group-based emotions such as empathy, hatred, and shame, and their possible regulation in the context of intergroup conflict resolution.

6 | GGS AND INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

According to the developments in the realm of social identity and the work done on GGs, it seems safe to assume that intergroup emotions may be affected not only by actions performed by the emotion provoking group, or by the responses of the group experiencing the emotions, but also by the social structure in which these groups are situated. Following this line of thought, the presence and actions of third party groups, especially if such groups partially share the social category of the groups involved, are likely to also significantly affect intergroup emotional processes.

Take, for example, the scenario we mentioned in the introduction, where Palestinian innocent bystanders were killed or injured unintentionally as a result of an Israeli military operation. Because this is a clear-cut example of in-group and out-group, the existing literature on intergroup emotions offers the necessary tools to predict the emotional response of the average Israeli. However, what were to happen if the said Israeli were to hear that the casualties were acquainted with, or even related to Arab Israelis, as in the Batul Tibi case mentioned above. And what were to happen if the said Israeli were to simply hear the news about these civilian casualties while in the company of his Arab Israeli coworker? Would the Israeli's emotional reaction be the same? Would we still be able to explain this emotional process in simple terms of in-group and out-group?

As mentioned above, we believe that the integration of GGs into the existing models of intergroup emotions and emotion regulation can help answer such questions. To illustrate, we will address three such emotional processes (group-based emotions, entitativity-based emotions, and emotion regulation) and examine how GGs may be integrated into the existing frameworks.

6.1 | GGs and group-based emotions

Several emotions are dependent on the ability to clearly distinguish between social groups and to ascribe the emotion-provoking event to a specific group. In other words, there are specific emotions which are group-dependent, and their significance is derived from the ability to link them either with the in-group or the out-group in a clear-cut manner. As such, the generation of group-dependent emotions might be affected by the presence of a GG that might hinder the clear-cut distinction between groups.

Take *empathy*, for example, in which people that recognize emotional experiences in others experience matched sensations and emotions (Batson, 2009). Although empathy towards the suffering of others is an emotion we are all familiar with, it is not uncommon to be exposed to another's misfortune without feeling empathy. In fact, research on empathy has found that levels of empathy are directly correlated with social distance from the emotion target, and a significant perceived social distance might lead to a "failure" in empathy generation (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Halperin, 2016).

This link between social distance and empathy is often referred to as *empathy bias* due to the preferential allocation of empathy to in-group members (Cikara et al., 2011). This bias has been found not only in empathy itself but also in the initial motivation to feel empathy (Porat et al., 2016). Furthermore, rather than just not feeling empathy towards an out-group member's suffering, in situations of intergroup conflict, one might even feel pleasure under such circumstance (Halperin, 2016). This malicious pleasure that group members can take in the suffering of another group is known as *schadenfreude* (Smith, Powell, Combs, & Schurtz, 2009; Spears & Leach, 2004).

In this manner, empathy and schadenfreude can be seen as the opposite ends of a spectrum, and the same event which elicits empathy when happening to an in-group member can be expected to elicit schadenfreude if it were to

occur to an out-group member (especially in the context of intergroup conflict). Whereas there are many factors that situate the emotional response on this said spectrum, it is obvious that a clear social distinction is needed to move from the empathy (in-group) side to the schadenfreude (out-group) side of the spectrum.

Accordingly, the need for social category distinction in the generation of empathy and schadenfreude might mean that once a GG is introduced into the mix and blurs the social borders, one might be able to feel empathy or alternately not be able to feel schadenfreude towards the misfortune of the out-group or out-group members. Indeed, a recent study by Cikara et al. (2014) tested the effect of blurring the boundaries between the in-group and the out-group on empathy bias and schadenfreude and found that blurring the social category lines by displaying social network diagrams in which there were interconnections between the different social groups did in fact reduce intergroup empathy bias and schadenfreude.

In the case described above of the civilian casualties of war, existing empathy bias research would predict an empathic response if the casualties were in-group members. On the other hand, if the casualties were out-group members, existing research would predict such an event would possibly elicit schadenfreude. However, it is not clear what would happen in terms of empathy and empathy motivations if people were to be exposed to such an event occurring to the out-group while in the presence of a GG. Based on the recent work presented above, we suggest that the presence of the GG might affect the empathy bias and even raise empathy motivation towards the out-group. Additionally, while exposed to such an event occurring to the out-group in the presence of a GG, in-group members may not be able to feel schadenfreude as they would otherwise. Similar dynamics can also be expected to take place also with other group-based emotions such as pride, guilt, and more.

6.2 | GGs and entitativity-based emotions

Several emotional processes are dependent on the ability to categorize the target of the emotion as *homogeneous* and to perform generalizations in case the target is a group. This type of approach to groups is also known as entitativity. Entitativity refers to the extent to which groups are perceived as having the nature of a monolithic entity, including common fate, similarity, and proximity (Campbell, 1958). The extent to which a social group is perceived to be a homogeneous and unified entity has a significant effect on intergroup relations and has been found to affect inter-group bias (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998), stereotypes (Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007), and vicarious retribution (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006).

In terms of emotional processes, there are several group-based emotions that are rooted in the notion that the actions of a given social group are a result of a homogeneous and unchangeable aspect of that group (Halperin, 2008; Magee & Tiedens, 2006). The degree of entitative group perception has been found to have a significant effect on both emotional processes within the in-group (Magee & Tiedens, 2006), and emotional responses towards the out-group as well (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; Halperin, Crisp, Husnu, Dweck, & Gross, 2012). Hence, the effect that entitative perception fluctuation has on group-based emotional processes makes it likely to assume that the presence of a GG, with its counter-entitative attributes, might affect entitativity-based emotional processes.

The leading examples of such emotions are hatred, contempt, and shame. Hatred is driven by an appraisal of the out-group's harming behavior as stemming from a deep-rooted, permanent evil character and is one of the most entitative emotions in that it linked to an unchangeable inherent aspect of its target (Halperin, 2008; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011; Sternberg, 2003). Studies have found individuals who experienced short-term episodes of hatred in times of intergroup negotiations, expressed an emotional goal of harming the out-group (Halperin, 2008), tended to reject any positive information about the out-group, and opposed the continuation of negotiations, com-promise, and reconciliation (Halperin, 2011). Often coupled with hatred one might find contempt, which can also be seen as an entitative emotion that arises when a person's or group's character is appraised as bad and unresponsive to change. Contempt's entitative aspect is derived from the fact that it is not an emotion that raises the motivation to change another person's actions but to exclude the other person from one's social network, because the one who is feeling contempt perceives no way to influence or change the other person's entity (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). In

intergroup relations, contempt can lead to short-term derogation, long-term social exclusion, a lack of reconciliation, and the absence of relational improvement (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch et al., 2011). Due to the inherent fixed aspect needed for the development of group-based hatred and contempt, the presence of a GG, which can act as a signifier of social dynamism, might undermine the development of such hatred or contempt.

Furthermore, and in contrast to hatred and contempt which target the out-group, there are also *in-group*-targeted emotions that have an entitative nature. Group-based shame can be seen as an entitative emotion as people are most likely to feel ashamed when it seems that by virtue of their wrongdoing, they tarnish the essence of the identity of the self or the group (Lewis, 1971; Lickel, Steele, & Schmader, 2011). Shame casts a negative metaphoric spotlight on one's global sense of self, and people that feel ashamed often report a strong desire to shrink, hide, or escape from the situation and possible scrutiny (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). The link GG provide with other groups, which are often the groups that actions against cause shame in intergroup conflict context, might be able to transform the shame to more collective and pardonable emotions such as guilt or regret.

In this context of such entitativity-based emotional processes, when GGs are present, they can convey a more flexible and complex depiction of social categories. This in turn may lead to a more permeable perception of the borderlines that define the outline of perceived entities, and to the more heterogeneous perception of social groups that were previously perceived as homogeneous entities. Once the social borders are no longer fixed, and when social groups are perceived as more heterogeneous, it may become more challenging to perceive a given group in an entitative manner. Thus, the unmediated connection GGs have to both the in-group and the out-group may play a crucial role in the ability to maintain strictly entitative perceptions of a given group.

Take, for example, a scenario in which you perceive the out-group to be irredeemably violent in nature. This will probably lead to emotions of hate or contempt towards this group due to their entitative violent traits. Now, what were to happen if a GG is introduced into the situation? This GG that is partially identified with the in-group cannot by definition be entitative, given its double affiliation with both groups. Now the out-group must also take on a more complex nature due to its affiliation with the GG, its more permeable borderlines that enable social category overlap, and its heterogeneous nature that includes a GG. This in turn can lead to emotions of hate and contempt that were largely based on the ability to perceive the out-group in an entitative manner, to be replaced with emotions of anger or disappointment that are more fitting to the new dynamic context.

6.3 | GGs and group-based emotion regulation

Group-members are motivated to experience positive emotions such as group-based pride and respect (Haslam, Powell, & Turner, 2000), and group-based hope (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014). In contrast, unpleasant emotions such as group-based guilt are often avoided (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Moreover, besides such hedonic motivations,

FIGURE 1 The process model of group-based emotion regulation (Goldenberg et al., 2016)

people can also be motivated to experience group-based emotions that might be instrumental to them or to their group even if they are not a necessarily "positive" emotions (Porat et al., 2016). Accordingly, people may be expected to *regulate* group-based emotions in order to increase certain emotions and decrease other emotions (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Most theory and research on group-based emotions seem to overlook that individuals have a relatively extensive ability to regulate their emotions. This regulation ability includes several different techniques that have been formulated into a model by Gross and Thompson (2007) and have been extended and adjusted to the intergroup context by Goldenberg et al. (2016) as can be seen in Figure 1. In the context of emotion regulation, the introduction of GGs into intergroup relations can have several implications, some of which we would like to briefly mention below.

Whereas the presence of GGs has the potential to alter the initial emotional experience, it can also be expected to affect several aspects of the regulation process. Such aspects include emotional disengagement, social category reappraisal, and interpersonal emotion regulation. Based on the process model of emotion regulation, once an individual is exposed to an emotion-provoking scenario, the first regulation technique is disengagement by situation selection or attention diversion. This choice to disengage an emotion inducing event is one of the most basic emotion regulation techniques available, in which an individual simply disengages an event which can provoke unpleasant emotions, by cognitively or actively distancing himself/herself from the situation (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999).

For instance, if a tragedy befalls the out-group one can simply disengage the tragic event, and thanks to the social distance between groups, not pay attention to the situation, or simply focus on something else. However, once a GG, that in a way represents the said out-group, is present it may become more difficult to disengage. In scenarios where in-group actions have significant implications and can possibly evoke guilt or regret, the instinctive regulatory action is very often disengagement (e.g., "ignorance is bliss"). However, the presence of a GG, both passive (by mere presence, see Levy et al., 2017) or active (by explicitly putting these things on the table, see Israeli politician Ahmad Tibi's recent appearance on national television, 2016), challenges the ability to disengage, and might force individuals to face the emotion provoking event, and deal with the consequences of their group's actions.

On the other hand, even if the presence of the GG forced the group members to acknowledge the situation and denied them the option of disengaging, there is still the option of cognitive reappraisal (as can be seen in the emotion regulation process model in Figure 1). Cognitive reappraisal involves thinking about a situation in a way that can change its meaning (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Such reappraisal can be utilized to reduce levels of negative emotional experience and increase levels of positive emotional experience. In the context of an ongoing intergroup conflict, cognitive reappraisal might also be utilized for dealing with the impact of extreme events intractable conflict can foster (e.g., attacks on innocent civilians). This can be done by changing the meaning, or appraisal, of a situation and thus alleviating negative emotions such as anger (Halperin et al., 2013) or elevating positive emotions such as hope (Halperin & Gross, 2011a).

Once the presence of the GG has forced an individual to address an emotion-provoking event that he would have otherwise disengaged from, the same GG can theoretically be utilized as a tool of reappraisal. As mentioned above, the main premise of introducing intergroup emotions into emotion regulation theory is that one can manipulate the perception of social categorizations (of self or of others) as a regulation strategy (Goldenberg et al., 2016). Accordingly, due to the flexible nature of the GG's identity, it is possible that based on the emotion motivation of individuals, and on the group-based emotion provoking events that take place, one might be able to shift the perception of the GG to either in-group or out-group if it serves the purpose of regulating the targeted emotions. In other words, after being exposed to an emotion provoking situation, one can actively regulate the social categorization of the situation. If it is a pleasant situation, its source can be annexed to the in-group thus leading to a positive group-based emotion. On the other hand, if it is an unpleasant situation, its source can simply be exported to the out-group and appraised accordingly.

Take, for instance, the Palestinian civilian casualties example. Israeli group members who wish to feel empathy towards the out-group victims, or sorrow as a result of the event, can utilize the presence of the Israeli Arab GG, and their dual identification with both in-group and out-group, in order to bolster the common in-group identity of all groups involved, and feel empathy or sorrow for the misfortune of the common in-group. On the other hand,

Israelis who do not wish to feel unpleasant emotions of sorrow, but feel that the presence of the GG does not enable them to disengage from the event which is eliciting unpleasant emotions, can conceptually sever the social ties with the GG and affiliate them solely with the out-group in order to respond in a minimally engaged manner.

Finally, the two regulation processes we mentioned so far, of emotional disengagement and social category reappraisal, relate to individuals' attempt to regulate or control their own emotional experiences. However, people often regulate the emotions of *others* and have their emotions regulated by others, both in the interpersonal context and in the intergroup context (Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Hasan-Aslih et al., Under review; Lakey & Orehek, 2011; Netzer, Halperin, & Tamir, Under review; Netzer, Van Kleef, & Tamir, 2015). This type of interpersonal or intergroup emotion regulation usually entails subjecting the others to pleasant or unpleasant stimuli in order to evoke the wanted emotion. For example, in a study by Netzer et al. (2015), participants who wanted to induce performance enhancing anger among their counterparts chose to expose them to anger inducing music clips in order to regulate their emotions. This study also found that participants' motivation to regulate their counterparts' emotions affected the participants' behavior through the mediation of the belief in the instrumentality of emotions. Although the motivations to regulate out-group's emotions have been mapped out by existing research (Hasan-Aslih et al., Under review; Netzer et al., 2015; Netzer et al., Under review), the actual ability and efficiency of regulating an out-group's emotions in the context of intergroup context remain unexamined. Indeed, as a result of physical and psychological barriers that are inherent in intractable intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013), the ability to directly and intentionally affect the out-group in any way, including in terms of emotion regulation, might prove challenging (as can be seen in the different endeavors to promote intergroup communication that often turn awry, Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2014). However, in this context as well, the unique situation and characteristics of GGs might enable them a more immediate and efficient access to both conflicting groups and place the GG in the position to initiate or facilitate intergroup emotion regulation, which may improve intergroup relations.

7 | CONCLUSION

We believe that there is great potential in the integration of multiple identity and GG models into intergroup emotion research. The existing intergroup emotion literature generally relies on the notion that the social reality of conflict between two groups can be reduced solely to these two groups. Thus, situations in which there is no clear-cut distinction between in-group and out-group, such as in the case of GGs, are not fully explained by existing emotion literature, even though such situations are becoming more prevalent in the globalizing world. In fact, it is precisely in these situations that it may be useful to focus on GGs, because they have been found to have a positive influence on intergroup relations. One important way in which they may have such a positive influence is through their effects on group-based emotions. Indeed, the presence of GGs might influence the generation of group-based emotions, such as promoting empathy while decreasing schadenfreude. GGs may also be able to alleviate entitativity-based emotions such as hatred, contempt, and shame. And finally, GGs may have a unique role to play in how individuals regulate their group-based emotions. As such, we hope that future theory and research will pay more attention to these groups, as they may hold the key to the promotion of harmonious intergroup relations.

ENDNOTE

[1] Intergroup and group-based emotions are terms used interchangeably.

[2] Additionally, another important role the collective may have on personal emotional process is group-based appraisal, that is, the social validation of the paring of a specific emotion to a given event (Kuppens et al., 2013; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Even if people perceive the situation as emotion provoking, they may not always know whether fellow group members also perceive situation in the same manner. This information about the social support for one's own emotional tendencies may help to define the experience as collective and shared, and the situation as group based. Therefore, such emotional group-based appraisal validates the emotional reaction and the responses to a given event.

[3] Based on the above, it may seem that emotions play an equal role in sustaining and resolving conflict. However, it is important to note that although emotions such as hatred or anger play an inherent part in conflictual dynamics, emotions such as empathy or guilt do not usually arise naturally in the context of intergroup relations.

[4] One's social identity was defined as the self-concept that is derived from being a member of the ingroup, and as leading to the process of evaluating the self by comparing one's ingroup to a relevant outgroup.

[5] According to research on cross categorization, given that individuals are members of several groups simultaneously (e.g., both Black and female), members of an outgroup on one dimension may be evaluated more positively if they are also ingroup members on another dimension.

[6] For example, the extended contact hypothesis contends that knowledge about cross-group friendships (i.e., knowing that an ingroup member has a positive relationship with an outgroup member) can improve outgroup attitudes and thus advocates the advantages of intergroup contact by proxy (Christ et al., 2014; Wright et al. 1997). Accordingly, the frequency of groups with multiple identities unmediated interaction with both their social counterparts holds the potential for effects similar to the ones observed in the extended contact literature, but this has not been examined to date.

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Aharon Levy received both his Lautman Interdisciplinary BA and his diplomacy MA from the Tel-Aviv University and is currently a PhD fellow in social psychology at the IDC Herzliya and Groningen University. Aharon's research includes Gateway Groups and their potential for conflict resolution, development of racism measures for educational systems, and the effect of bias awareness on political decision making. Aharon is a founding member and a senior consultant at the Applied Psychology Center for Social Change, and a researcher at the Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Reconciliation (PICR) lab. At the IDC, Aharon teaches BA and MA courses on applied psychology and its integration in social endeavors.

Martijn van Zomeren is professor of the Cultural and Political Psychology of Social Relationships at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands). He received his PhD from the University of Amsterdam and various prestigious grants and prizes for his academic contributions to the psychology of collective action and social change. His recent book, *From Self to Social Relationships: An Essentially Relational Perspective on Social Motivation*, showcases the importance of theoretical integration for social psychology, which is an important theme in his academic work.

Tamar Saguy is an associate professor at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. She received her PhD in Social Psychology from the University of Connecticut in 2008 and was then a postdoctoral associate at Yale University. She is the director of the Power and Intergroup Relations Lab at the IDC. Using a variety of methods and considering a range of social contexts, her work examines how power differences and related motivations impact intergroup processes.

Eran Halperin is a full professor and serves as the Dean of the School of Psychology in the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. He has a PhD from Haifa University and a postdoc from Stanford University. He published more than 100 papers in peer-reviewed journals and three books. His main line of research focuses on the role of emotions and emotion regulation in conflicts and conflict resolution, integrating psychological theories and methods to explain intergroup relations and conflicts.