Risk analysis on incursion of exotic FMD viruses into Southeast Asia

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Executive summary

At the 19th South-East Asia and China Food and Mouth Disease (SEACFMD) National Coordination Meeting in 2016, it was recognised that foot and mouth disease viruses (FMDVs) of the lineages O/ME-SA/Ind2001 and A/Asia/G-VII that are present in other FMD-endemic regions of the world potentially pose serious risks to SEACFMD member countries, including the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states (AMS).

To help understand and mitigate these risks, a formal regional risk analysis study was recommended. The study conducted for this report took the form of a qualitative risk assessment of the possible incursion of exotic FMDV and provides recommendations to mitigate the risks of such an incursion.

The likelihood of release of exotic FMDV into Southeast Asia (SEA) and exposure of susceptible domestic livestock were assessed to provide an estimate for the likelihood of occurrence of the undesired event. The assessment of the consequences followed the exploration of different scenarios. In combining the likelihood of occurrence with consequences, a risk estimate was obtained.

The study relied on data gathered in a short period (8 March to 28 April 2017) from published studies, grey literature and expert opinion. Although collection of primary data was outside the scope of the study, short ‘site visits’ to Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Vietnam, Thailand and Bangladesh were conducted. Following the site visits, a workshop was conducted to validate the findings and to make use of the expertise of participants on the relative importance of the risks for release, exposure and consequence.

Results from the study indicate that there is a high likelihood of future incursions of exotic strains of FMDV into SEA. The most likely risk pathways involve imports of live animals and animal products. Most countries in the region conduct these types of import; surprisingly, this even includes countries with FMD-free status. Additionally, several other pathways with a non-negligible likelihood of being the route of incursion were identified, including movements of vehicles, people and wildlife. When developing a strategy to minimise the risk of an incursion, these pathways must also be considered.

The consequences of an incursion of an exotic FMDV strain into SEA are likely to be significant. The consequences are related to compromised animal health and welfare causing production losses, cost of control and, in some cases, loss of valuable trading markets. For FMD-free countries, the loss of a recognised FMD-free status will negatively impact trade for an extended period of time. For the FMD-endemic countries, an incursion of an exotic FMDV is likely to result in extensive regional spread as a result of intense intra-regional livestock trade, weak surveillance and response capacities of the national Veterinary Services and lack of harmonisation of well-integrated and risk-based national FMD strategies.

Overall, we conclude that the risk for incursion of an exotic FMDV is ‘high’. Results indicate that the risk of further incursions of exotic FMDV is not a matter of ‘if’ but rather of ‘when’. The reality of this is underlined by the detection of FMDV serotype Asia1 in Myanmar as recently as January 2017.

Available data suggest that South Asia is a particularly risky source area, especially India and Bangladesh. A significant number of large ruminants are informally imported from India and Bangladesh to supply the demand for animal products in markets in countries including the People’s Republic of China, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. These animals are known to pass through livestock markets where they are in close contact with susceptible livestock, allowing them to easily transmit diseases such as FMD. In addition, data show that several SE Asian countries also source animal products from India, legally and, most likely, informally.
Apart from India, animal products are also imported from several other FMD-endemic countries. These include countries in the Middle East and North Africa. This is important because it puts SEA at risk of an incursion from all of the diverse FMD viral strains circulating in these regions, including SAT2, A/Asia/G-VII, A/Africa/G-IV, Asia 1 and O/EA-3.

Since the study was proposed, the O/ME-SA/Ind2001 lineage has spread extensively in the region and has been detected in Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Results from viral genotyping suggest that this was not due to a single incursion but, rather, that there have been several ‘escapes’ from the Indian sub-continent through the suggested routes, such as the importation of high-risk buffalo products (offal from India) or the viruses have spread from Bangladesh through cross-border movements of livestock and humans (Qui et al., 2017). Global surveillance reports suggest that there has been further onward spread of this lineage to China, Russia and the Republic of Korea after incursion in SEA (King et al., 2017).

In contrast, lineage A/Asia/G-VII has not yet been detected in SEA. Originating in the Indian sub-continent, this lineage is currently known to circulate in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Armenia and Israel as recently as May 2017. This lineage has caused alarm at a global level, not only because of the spread to date but also because of poor in vitro matching results with many commercial vaccines (King et al., 2017).

A regional approach is key to reducing the risk of incursion of an exotic FMDV. There is a need for strengthening of countries’ surveillance and response capacities, particularly in Myanmar, Malaysia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, given the high risk of introduction and/or spread in these countries. As all countries in the region, including China, would benefit from mitigating the risk of an incursion of an exotic FMDV, they are recommended to support this capacity building. Regional coordination and support range from relatively simple mechanisms for instant information sharing between countries to developing contingency plans and conducting simulation exercises, to revising current laws and regulations to facilitate the legal and safe import and trading of livestock and animal products. Additionally, the individual countries in the region may work further on a risk-based approach to FMD control. It is noteworthy that many of the changes needed relate not just to FMD but also apply to improving disease control in general.

However, FMD is not a disease ‘owned’ only by the Veterinary Services. We stress the importance of consulting with and involving key stakeholders from the private and other public sectors. For example, it is recommended to make better use of the ‘boots on the ground’, such as private-acting veterinarians and community animal health workers in matters regarding surveillance, control of FMD and also in raising awareness on disease prevention and building trust between livestock owners and the Veterinary Services. It is important to ensure that these activities include women, as they are often the most important decision makers in the household (Paris, 2000) and involved in the care of livestock. However, it is often men who are generally invited to attend training and talk to extension workers (Distefano et al., 2013).

Concurrently, it is critical to start discussions with key traders on measures and regulations that will motivate them to comply with them. Roles and responsibilities of the private sector need to be discussed in relation to how best the public Veterinary Services may support these measures and regulations. For example, the Veterinary Services have a role in making good-quality FMD vaccines more widely available for the private sector, while the private sector needs to comply with registration in matters such as import documentation and training of their personnel on biosecurity.
Executive summary

Gaps in data and knowledge were encountered throughout the study, as indicated by the high uncertainty associated with most of the pathways (Tables VIII and X). This supports the need for a continued regional approach to further elucidate gaps in data and knowledge.

As both trade routes and the epidemiology of FMD are highly dynamic, the specific results of this study may be valid for only a limited time (months). However, several of the recommendations will be useful, even if the nature of the risks changes. Furthermore, the framework presented here should be suitable to review and update the study as needed in the future.

In conclusion, this study found that there is a high risk of further incursions of exotic FMDV into SEA. Such incursions may result from a number of risk pathways, all of which are associated with significant consequences in terms of production losses, costs of control and trade implications. Results of this study should guide decision makers and support the implementation of risk mitigation measures.

Structure of this report

This report consists of a main report and a number of annexes. In the main report, the reader can find the scope and limitations of this study under Chapter 1 – Introduction. In Chapter 2 – Materials and methods, the reader will find the risk assessment model used, with ten risk pathways for release and six pathways for exposure. In Chapter 3 – Results, the reader will find an analysis of the FMD situation, the use of FMD vaccination and trading relations, followed by the results of our assessment. For details on the elaborated risk pathways and assessment of consequences, the reader is referred to Annexes 2 to 4. Finally, in Chapter 4 – Discussion and recommendations, our findings are discussed and recommendations are given to mitigate the risk of incursion of exotic FMDV. We have categorised recommendations by regional and national level and by short- versus long-term application.
Abbreviations

DFAT  Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DLD-RRL  Department of Livestock Development Regional Reference Laboratory (for FMD)
EFSA  European Food Safety Authority
FAO Stats  Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics
FMD  Foot and mouth disease
FMDV  Foot and mouth disease virus
OIE  World Organisation for Animal Health
OIE SRR-SEA  OIE Sub-regional Representation for Southeast Asia
PVS  Performance of Veterinary Services
SEA  Southeast Asia
SEACFMD  Southeast Asia and China Food and Mouth Disease

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Introduction

At the 19th South-East Asia and China Foot and Mouth Disease (SEACFMD) National Coordinators Meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 17–19 August 2016, it was recognised that foot and mouth disease viruses (FMDVs) of the lineages O/ME-SA/Ind2001 and A/Asia/G-VII potentially pose serious risks to SEACFMD member countries, including the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states (AMS). To help understand and mitigate these risks, it was recommended to conduct a formal regional risk analysis study.

At least two distinct incursions of the emerging FMDV sub-lineage O/ME-SA/Ind2001d were detected in 2015 in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Vietnam and Myanmar. This is likely to be due to changing trade patterns along livestock supply chains from India to Southeast Asia (SEA) and driven by demand for beef and buffalo meat in the People’s Republic of China (Smith et al., 2015).

Furthermore, very recently, in January 2017, an incursion of FMD Asia1 virus was detected in cattle in Rakhine state in Myanmar. Preliminary genotyping results from the Regional Reference Laboratory in Pak Chong, Thailand, indicated that this virus is unrelated to any known FMD Asia1 virus from the last ten years, while analysis by the World Reference Laboratory (WRL) in Pirbright, UK, showed that this Asia 1 isolate is most similar to viruses that were circulating in Bangladesh in 2012 and in India in 2013. Further investigations are under way, but this appears to be another example of incursion of exotic FMDV into SEA.

There is concern about another South Asian lineage of FMDV that spread to Turkey and Saudi Arabia in 2015 (A/Asia/G-VII). Although this virus lineage is not yet believed to be present in SEA, its detection could have significant impact, given present vaccines are unlikely to protect animals and the virus has the potential to lead to widespread outbreaks (King et al., 2017).

Scope

The aim of the study was to conduct a qualitative risk assessment of the possible incursion of exotic FMDV in member countries of the SEACFMD Campaign and provide recommendations to mitigate risks.

The regional FMD risk analysis has been implemented by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), including the OIE Sub-regional Representation for South East Asia (SRR-SEA), utilising SRR-SEA technical expertise, regional knowledge and consultants to undertake a desk review of data and research, engage with country officials and experts, and collect and analyse information on the trade in livestock, livestock products and other risk materials from South Asia. This study builds on the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade-funded (DFAT) analysis of safe animal movement in the region.

In consultation with the OIE SRR-SEA, it was decided to limit the risk assessment to the countries of Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia. Therefore, this study excludes China, primarily because the time provided for this study was short; however, China was also considered a potential source of source of exotic FMD viruses for Southeast Asia.

Challenges of this assessment study

This assessment study had a well-defined objective and time frame. The study was conducted in less than two months, including country visits, a workshop with stakeholders in Bangkok and delivery of the final report. Under these time constraints, in-depth data collection and its analysis were hampered. Five countries were visited to conduct interviews with representatives of the Veterinary Services and key actors on the production and trade of livestock and animal products and to collect additional data needed for the assessment. However, there was little time for preparation regarding the countries visited. As a result, it was not possible to interview a wide variety of stakeholders. Furthermore, the time for follow-up after the missions was very limited; on several occasions, we were promised that further data would be forwarded as soon as possible; however, often these did not materialise.

The findings and recommendations of this study are possibly best seen as a broad framework to monitor and mitigate the risk of incursion of exotic FMDV strains over time. Nevertheless, we believe that the results will facilitate decision making about measures to mitigate the risk of introduction of exotic FMDV.

Follow-up

Findings and recommendations will be disseminated and reviewed by SEACFMD Campaign partners, including AMS, for incorporation in national FMD plans.
Materials and methods

Data sources

This study relied on data gathered from published studies, databases (FMD notifications shared by the OIE SRR-SEA and import and export databases provided by Veterinary Services of some countries), grey literature (reports on animal trade, value-chain analyses and newspaper articles) and expert opinion through in-country visits. These ‘site visits’ were conducted in Bangladesh, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam and consisted of interviews and discussions with representatives and technical staff (laboratory, quarantine, field veterinarians, disease control and contingency planning) of the Veterinary Services, and with representatives of private sectors ranging from farmers and traders to livestock company directors. Expert opinion was assessed through a consultative workshop held on 5 April 2017 with representatives of Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, and staff of the OIE SRR-SEA.

Study components

Under the agreement of this study, the following study components were defined (see also Annex 1 – Terms of reference):

1. study design, under the guidance of the OIE SRR-SEA;
2. desktop review, including collection and analysis of information on the trade in livestock, livestock products and other risk materials from South Asia into SEA;
3. workshop with representatives from Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam to verify the desktop review findings and identify and analyse any additional risks;
4. site visits for data collection through semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from both public and private sectors in Bangladesh, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam (agreed after consultation with the OIE) to verify the desktop review and workshop findings and identify and analyse any additional risks;
5. analysis of the collected and compiled data, and production of the final report.

In discussion with OIE SRR-SEA, the workshop mentioned in point 3 was conducted after site or in-country visits (point 4) as a means to validate the findings of desktop and in-country visits.

Risk assessment

For the release and exposure assessments, risk pathways were identified based on the literature relating to incursions of FMDV to non-endemic countries globally (Wooldridge et al., 2006; McLaws and Ribble, 2007; Collineau et al., 2014). Scenario trees were developed for each risk pathway. The qualitative likelihood of each step of the scenario tree was then estimated using information collected from the desktop review, country visits and workshop. The overall likelihood estimate for each pathway was based on the step with the lowest likelihood, because each step is dependent on the outcome of the preceding steps.

The likelihood estimates were based on the analysis of available data. When the level of completion and/or accuracy of the data was low, there was a resulting uncertainty around the outcomes. Understanding the level of uncertainty allowed for a correct and well-informed reading of the
Materials and methods

The reported levels of uncertainty also highlight knowledge gaps that hampered a more detailed and precise analysis, and hopefully will motivate investigations to fill in the missing information.

Table II provides a summary of the different levels of uncertainty considered for this assessment, as well as the corresponding interpretation.

Table II. Uncertainty levels and corresponding interpretation
(Fournié et al., 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uncertainty level</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>There are solid and complete data available; strong evidence is provided in multiple references; authors report similar conclusions. Several experts have multiple experiences of the event, and there is a high level of agreement between experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>There are some but not complete data available; evidence is provided in a small number of references; authors report conclusions that vary from one another. Experts have limited experience of the event and/or there is a moderate level of agreement between experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>There are scarce or no data available; evidence is not provided in references but rather in unpublished reports or based on observations or personal communication; authors report conclusions that vary considerably between them. Very few experts have experience of the event and/or there is a very low level of agreement between experts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the consequence assessment, the consequences of an FMD incursion were considered at household/farm, national and regional level. Factors influencing the extent of spread were identified and evaluated.

A risk estimation for each pathway was determined by combining the likelihood of occurrence with the consequences, using the matrix presented in Table III. Finally, the overall risk estimation for the incursion of exotic FMDV strains was summarised in one estimate, reflecting the highest level of risk assessed, based on one or more risk pathways.

The likelihood of occurrence for each pathway was assessed by combining the results of the release and exposure pathways using an approach adapted from Moutou et al. (2001) (Table III). It is important to note that the combination of the release and exposure pathways followed a different approach to the likelihood assessment of a single pathway, as the latter reflects a sequence of events rather than a merging of risk parameters.

Table III. Results table for combination of risk parameters
Release and exposure into the likelihood of occurrence
(adapted from [Moutou et al., 2001])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter 1: release</th>
<th>Parameter 2: exposure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Negligible (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible (N)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (L)</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (M)</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (H)</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the consequence assessment, the consequences of an FMD incursion were considered at household/farm, national and regional level. Factors influencing the extent of spread were identified and evaluated.

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Results

Situation analysis

Foot and mouth disease situation in Southeast Asia

The region has both FMD-endemic (Cambodia, China, Laos, peninsular Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) and FMD-free areas (East Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah), Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore). Of the outbreaks reported in 2016, 34% were due to serotype O and 5% were due to serotype A. The rest (61% of all outbreaks) are reported as untyped or with results pending (Table IV).

The use of vaccination to control foot and mouth disease in Southeast Asia

During the 23rd SEACFMD Sub-Commission Meeting in Siem Reap, Cambodia, held in 2017, country representatives presented their current FMD control activities, including the application of FMD vaccines (Table V). For Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, the number of FMD vaccine doses reportedly applied represents a low coverage of the total FMD-susceptible population and were related to short-term donor-funded projects. From these numbers, it can be assumed that the objective of vaccination is not intended to prevent the risk of FMD at a national scale. It may have been applied for emergency purposes to contain a local FMD outbreak or target specific geographic areas or productions systems.

For Thailand and Vietnam, there are national strategies. In Thailand, vaccines are produced in-country by the Department of Livestock Development Regional Reference Laboratory (DLD RRL). National strategies require large quantities of FMD vaccines, as well as the infrastructure to keep the vaccines under cold conditions and the manpower to apply vaccination appropriately in the intended livestock populations. Post-vaccination monitoring and vaccination coverage results are needed to provide accurate measures of vaccine-induced immunity in the target populations. However, for most countries investigated, no information was available about the extent to which vaccination levels were in accordance with target levels or on post-vaccination monitoring to assess the level of vaccine-induced immunity in risk populations. The post-vaccination monitoring studies conducted in Thailand demonstrated that the vaccine-induced titres are short lived and potentially protect only for a limited period of time.

Table V. Compilation of FMD vaccination strategies in 2016 (and 2017 if provided) presented by national representatives at the 23rd SEACFMD Sub-commission Meeting, 9–10 March 2017, Siem Reap, Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Vaccine doses</th>
<th>Serotype</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>164,000</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2016: 300,000</td>
<td>2016: O</td>
<td>STANDZ Australian support, in hotspots and high-risk areas in central Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017: 600,000</td>
<td>2017: O and A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>65% in hotspots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Twice a year in beef, three times a year in dairy cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>In control zones along border with Cambodia and Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.9 million</td>
<td>O and A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STANDZ: Stop Transboundary Animal Diseases and Zoonoses

Table IV. FMDV strains detected in SEACFMD member countries in 2015–2016, as characterised by World and/or Regional Laboratory for FMD (from a presentation by Yu Qiu, 23rd SEACFMD Sub-commission Meeting, 9–10 March 2017, Siem Reap, Cambodia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No outbreaks reported in 2016</th>
<th>Serotype O Topotype</th>
<th>Serotype A Topotype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: The FMDV lineage is present in the country

Risk analysis on incursion of exotic FMD viruses into Southeast Asia
Trading relations between Southeast Asia and other foot and mouth disease-endemic regions

We have made use of Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics (FAO Stats) and the in-country visits to collect information about the importation of livestock, animal products and by-products, volumes and route of import (legal versus informal) (Table VI).

Trading relations within Southeast Asia

Based on FAO Stats databases (FAO, 2013), reports and in-country visits, a matrix of inter-regional trade in livestock and animal (by-)products was developed (see Table VII).

This was used to categorise countries with respect to the extent of their trading relations. It shows that Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam have extensive trading relations with countries in the region, based on livestock and/or animal (by-)products.

It should be noted that the data retrieved from FAO Stats was through the detailed trade matrix. For this sort of data, Laos, Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Vietnam were not available as reporting countries.

During the workshop conducted 5 April 2017, participants were asked to map trading routes of livestock. Although the time to assess the trading routes was limited and the participants may not have been the persons most appropriate to supply this information, the outcome of that exercise supported the results in the report by Smith et al. (2015). The livestock pathways identified appeared to be shaped largely by the high demand for beef in China. That demand seems to continue to grow, as the supply in China cannot keep up with the increasing demand.

As a result, some countries outside the SE Asian region have emerged as new sources of large ruminants, in particular India and Bangladesh, which are adjacent to Myanmar, with the importation of cattle and buffalo by boat to Mawlamyine (Myanmar) and then by road into Thailand. Additionally, increasing numbers of cattle are imported from Australia, particularly into Vietnam and Malaysia. The purpose of these imports may be primarily for consumption in these countries; however, Australian breeds with a high genetic value may well be kept alive as part of a genetic improvement program prior to being slaughtered. If that occurs, clinical FMD may potentially have a greater impact due to higher morbidity and mortality. It is estimated that between 13,000 and 50,000 head of cattle travel through Vietnam to China each year (Qui et al., 2017).

Release assessment

The release component of the risk assessment refers to the introduction of an exotic strain of FMDV into SEA. Ten pathways were considered for this stage (Table VIII and Annex 1).

Eight of the ten pathways considered were assessed as having a non-negligible risk as the route of incursion for an exotic strain of FMDV into SEA. The highest risk pathways were found to be the informal importation of live animals and the import of animal products (legal and informal). There was a moderate-to-high level of uncertainty associated with many of the assessments due to lack of data. A full description of each pathway is included in Annex 1.

It is important to understand which countries would be the most likely origin of an incursion of an exotic strain of FMDV to monitor the FMD situation there and assess the protection that available vaccines would provide (Table VIII). In this analysis, India and Bangladesh were most frequently implicated as potential source areas for an incursion into SEA. This is not surprising because of their proximity to the region. However, it is important to highlight that, for informal trade of animals and animal products, as well as human movements, the origin of the animals/people entering SEA was unknown and they may well come from more distant countries. Indeed, it was interesting to discover the extent of countries from which animal products are imported to SEA; these include countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

As the primary direction of trade is into China to supply the growing demand for meat, it is at risk for incursions of exotic FMDV as well. However, China should also be considered a potential source of exotic FMDV incursion into SEA. Extensive trade of China with SEA, as well as with countries to the north, west and east (Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and South Korea), can act as a bridge of FMDV transmission from these regions into SEA. From the currently available information on FMD occurrence and genotyping in these countries, there is no obvious risk. However, it seems appropriate to follow the FMD situation in China closely.

The introduction of exotic FMDV through biologicals (e.g. vaccines) was not considered in this study. The reason for this was that FMD vaccines make use of killed FMDV and imported vaccines are from renowned vaccine-producing companies that apply strict vaccine manufacturing procedures.
Results

Table VI. Trading relations of SE Asian countries with other FMD-endemic regions of the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Brunei</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Laos</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>A, P, A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>A, P, A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>A, P, A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of information: FAO Stats, reports and field data

A: live animals; P: animal products and/or by-products
Black text indicates legal trade; red text indicates informal trade; underlined bold text indicates extensive trade

The virus strains known to be circulating in countries associated with the risk pathways are listed in Table VIII and based on the EuFMD Global Monthly Report, February 2017 (EuFMD, 2017). Several viral strains are circulating in these countries that are believed to be absent from SEA. Of these, A/Asia/G-VII and Asia1 are perhaps the most concerning, as they are circulating in neighbouring India and (probably) Bangladesh, and the vaccines currently used in SEA will not provide protection against these strains. However, the other strains identified in this analysis (namely A/Asia/Iran-05, O/EA-3, O/ME-SA/Sharqia-72 and SAT2) could also pose a threat and should not be ignored.
Exposure assessment

The exposure assessment identified the pathways by which livestock in SEA could be exposed to an exotic FMDV, following its release. Six exposure pathways were assessed (Table X and Annex 2). Of these, the most likely were found to be direct animal contact between imported livestock and susceptible SE Asian livestock, as well as exposure of SE Asian livestock to contaminated animal products.

For direct animal contact, information from the desktop review (Smith et al., 2015) and field investigations indicated that there is extensive mixing of animals at livestock markets in Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, particularly of animals destined for China. In most situations, these animal markets deal with large ruminants, small ruminants or pigs. However, it is possible that different species are mixed. As a result, these markets represent an ideal opportunity for disease transmission through direct animal and inter-species contact.

Ingestion of contaminated animal products was also found to represent a high-risk pathway by which SE Asian livestock could become infected with an exotic strain of FMDV. This ingestion is most likely, although this is not the only route, to occur through swill feeding. Given that the majority of animal production in SEA is based upon smallholdings, there is evidently close contact between pigs and ruminants. Smallholders often have various FMD-susceptible species on their premises or these will be present in the village. Once the virus is in swill-fed pigs, it is likely to spread widely from there, as pigs are known to act as virus amplifiers. Notably, swill feeding will be uncommon in countries with few pigs, such as Malaysia.

Additionally, susceptible livestock may also be exposed to contaminated animal products by other routes such as scavenging at landfills, inappropriate disposal (i.e. litter) and environmental contamination (Wooldridge et al., 2006). Although these are indirect routes of transmission, the likelihood of susceptible livestock becoming infected should be considered.
Table IX. Compilation of circulating FMDV in countries that have a trading relationships with SEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Release risk pathway(s)</th>
<th>Serotype O</th>
<th>Serotype A</th>
<th>Serotype Asia1</th>
<th>Serotype SAT2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9</td>
<td>ME-SA/Ind-2001d</td>
<td>ASIA/G-VII (a)</td>
<td>Asia1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9</td>
<td>ME-SA/Ind-2001d</td>
<td>ASIA/G-VII</td>
<td>Asia1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9</td>
<td>SEA/Mya-98, CATHAY</td>
<td>ASIA/SEA-97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ME-SA/Sharqia-72, ME-SA/PanAsia-2</td>
<td>ASIA/Iran-05, AFRICA/G-IV</td>
<td></td>
<td>SAT2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ME-SA/PanAsia-2</td>
<td>ASIA/Iran-05, ASIA/G-VII</td>
<td>Asia1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>EA-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1 and 3</td>
<td>ME-SA/PanAsia-2</td>
<td>ASIA/Iran-05, ASIA/G-VII</td>
<td>Asia1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 and 3</td>
<td>ME-SA/Ind2001d</td>
<td>ASIA/SEA-97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ME-SA/PanAsia-2, ME-SA/Ind2001d</td>
<td>ASIA/G-VII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ME-SA/Ind-2001d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Bold indicates FMD serotypes and strains exotic to SEA

Table X. Overview of likelihood of exposure for each of six risk pathways, assessment of level of uncertainty and additional notes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1 Direct animal contact</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Associated with pathways R1 and R2; known to be the most effective mode of FMD transmission; at least some animals imported to SEA are known to enter live animal markets (e.g. en route from India to more lucrative markets in China, Thailand), where there would be ample opportunity for contact with naive animals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 Exposure to animal products</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Associated with pathways R3 and R4; exposure may occur through swill feeding (most effective), scavengers at landfills, inappropriate disposal (i.e. litter) and environmental contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 Exposure to Wildlife</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Associated with pathway R5; little information is available regarding the FMD status of wildlife along the border regions or about the movement patterns of susceptible wildlife species. However, encounters between wild boar and livestock were reported during the field investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4 Human movements</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Associated with pathway R7; moderate likelihood because some risk groups, such as traders, have frequent contact with livestock but taking into account the limited viability of virus over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 Feed/fodder</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Associated with pathway R8; the virus can survive up to 15 weeks in this product; contaminated straw has been implicated in other FMD incursions (outbreak in Japan in 2000; McLaws and Ribble, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6 Vehicle movements</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Associated with pathway R9; exposure may be associated with environmental contamination (relatively inefficient transmission) or direct contact with animals (e.g. during transport), which would result in more effective transmission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that there is a high level of uncertainty in many of these assessments. This uncertainty related to the specific route followed by imported animals, the use of imported animal products, the extent to which people contaminated with exotic viruses contact livestock in SEA and details of vehicle use for livestock trade.
Likelihood of occurrence

To assess the overall likelihood that exotic strains of FMDV will be imported to SEA, the release and exposure pathways were combined as shown in Fig 2, with the resulting likelihood of occurrence summarised in Table XI. It is apparent that informal imports of live animals and animal products are associated with a high likelihood of incursion. However, it cannot be ignored that six further pathways represent a non-negligible likelihood of causing an incursion of exotic FMDV into SEA. Taken overall, there is a high likelihood of further incursions of exotic strains of FMDV into SEA.

Consequence assessment

An incursion of an exotic strain of FMDV into SEA has consequences at several levels: animal, farm/household, national and regional. The consequences that arise may be

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Risk analysis on incursion of exotic FMD viruses into Southeast Asia

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Table XI. Compilation of likelihood of release and exposure into likelihood of occurrence and level of uncertainty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk pathway</th>
<th>Type of trade</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Release</td>
<td>Exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of live animals</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of animal products</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human movements</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feed/fodder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle movements</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2
Combining release and exposure pathways
categorised as relating to (i) animal health and welfare, and production losses; (ii) cost of control; and (iii) trade losses. These are well described elsewhere (Knight-Jones and Rushton, 2013) and therefore are only briefly summarised below.

Animal health and welfare, and production losses. Infection with FMDV typically results in decreased milk production, anorexia, leading to decreased weight gain, lameness, leading to loss of draught power, mortality (particularly in young animals) and decreased fertility.

Cost of control. Control of an incursion of FMD typically involves vaccination (purchase of vaccines and delivery costs), movement controls, diagnostic tests and possibly costs related to treatment and care (Nampanya et al., 2015), culling and compensation.

Trade losses. Infection with FMD can result in access being denied to local, national and regional markets. Currently, three SE Asian countries (Indonesia, Brunei and Philippines) have obtained official recognition of FMD-free status without vaccination and Malaysia has a recognised FMD-free zone. An incursion of FMD into any of these countries or zones would be particularly devastating.

In the case of an incursion of an exotic strain of FMDV into SEA, the extent of the consequences will be determined by several key factors:

1. **Time to detection.** The time to detection of a new strain is critical, as no targeted response will be mounted until it is detected. The capacity of the surveillance system in each country to detect an incursion of a new FMDV strain was assessed (see Annex 3) and generally found to be very low to moderate. Therefore, there is a moderate to high likelihood that detection of a new strain would be delayed. This finding is supported by the events surrounding the detection of viral genotype O/ME-SA/Ind-2001d, when the virus characterisation results were not available for 6–10 months following sample collection (Qui et al., 2017).

2. **Effectiveness of response.** Once an incursion has been detected, the quality of the response will determine its effectiveness to limit further spread. Examining the results of the OIE Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment provides one measurement of the capacity of the Veterinary Services to mount an effective response. A selection of PVS critical competencies deemed relevant to assess the capacity of the Veterinary Services for early detection and rapid response was used to categorise countries according to the strength of their Veterinary Services (Annex 3). As no PVS evaluation was available for Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore, we assessed the quality of the Veterinary Services in Malaysia and Singapore as ‘moderate’ and ‘good’, respectively, based on the level of economic development of each country. The results of this analysis are summarised in Table XIII, and it can be seen that several countries are likely to have limited capacity to implement an effective response to an incursion of FMD. It is concerning that several of the countries with weak Veterinary Services are at a high risk of an incursion as a result of the patterns of legal and informal trade in animals and animal products (e.g. in Myanmar and Vietnam – see release assessment).

An additional consideration in the effectiveness of the response is the availability of a vaccine that provides adequate protection against the strain causing the incursion. Vaccines may be available through existing national stocks, a regional vaccine bank or emergency procurement. The level of protection provided will depend on the potency of the vaccine and the antigenic characteristics of the viral strain. Based on studies by WRL Pirbright, commonly used vaccine strains, such as O1/Manisa and O/3939, seem to provide sufficient protection against the O/ME-SA/Ind2001d field virus; however, for O1/Manisa, it is recommended to use a potency of 6PD50 or above. However, at present, most commercially available vaccines do not provide adequate protection against the emerging virus A/Asia/ G-VII. Therefore, if this strain were to enter SEA, it is likely that it would spread rapidly without a vaccine available to provide protection.

3. **Susceptibility of livestock population to the virus causing the incursion.** The susceptibility of the livestock population to a new viral strain will depend on:
   a) the immunity of the animals due to prior infection or vaccination and
   b) the characteristics of the virus strain and extent of any cross-protection.

Animals in FMD-free countries or zones will be completely naive and the strain will spread rapidly before control is imposed, particularly in areas of high density or with a lot of animal movements. On the other hand, animals in FMD-endemic countries may be fully or partially protected against an incursion because of immunity.

4. **Contact structure of animals and farms.** FMDV is spread most effectively through animal movements and the virus can therefore spread quickly through the trading network and in areas with high animal density.
At the regional level, it is useful to consider the trading relationships within SEA to consider how the virus could spread if it entered different countries. In the situation where a country has very limited trading relations with other SE Asian countries, there is a higher likelihood that an incursion of an exotic FMDV would be limited to local/national livestock production. However, if the incursion occurred in a country with an extensive SE Asian trading network, there is a greater likelihood that the whole region would become rapidly infected.

Three scenarios were identified to explore the consequences of an FMDV incursion further:
1. only one farm/village was infected,
2. spread within the country, and
3. spread within the region (Table XII).

In the event that the incursion is contained within one farm, the consequences will be limited to farm-level animal health, welfare and production losses. Given the highly infectious nature of FMDV, this scenario is considered very unlikely and would only occur if the virus were to enter a very isolated population or one with pre-existing immunity (due to vaccination or previous infection).

If an exotic virus strain spreads within the affected country, there may be additional consequences associated with cost of control (if the country engages in control) and trade losses. Trade losses would be especially important if the incursion occurred in an FMD-free country or zone (Fig. 3). Given that vaccination coverage is low in most Southeast Asian countries and that domestic animal movements are usually not regulated, it is considered highly likely that an exotic virus strain incursion would spread within the affected country.

The final scenario considered spread beyond the index country to the wider region. The likelihood of this scenario will vary according to the quality of the Veterinary Services (influencing early detection and effective response) and the extent of legal and informal trade with other countries in the region (see Annex 4 and Table XIII). The characteristics of the viral strain will also influence the likelihood of this scenario, in terms of its propensity to spread and the protection provided by available and used vaccines.

With respect to the likelihood of consequences, spread of an exotic strain of FMDV within a country and/or a region is almost certain to cause production losses and result in significant costs associated with control efforts. Should FMD-free areas be affected, then significant trade losses will certainly result.

Consequences associated with specific risk pathways are explored in Table XIV. Depending on the risk pathway, some countries may be at higher risk than others and this

Fig. 3
Scenarios for consequence at household, national and regional level with key factors

Risk analysis on incursion of exotic FMD viruses into Southeast Asia
Table XII. Overview of the likelihood of scenario, the type, likelihood and magnitude of the consequence for three scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Likelihood of scenario</th>
<th>Type of consequence</th>
<th>Likelihood of consequence</th>
<th>Magnitude of consequence at national and regional level&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only farm infected</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Animal health, welfare</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>EC: negligible, FA: very high if detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread within country</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Animal health, welfare</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>EC: depends on extent of production losses and control effort, FA: very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread beyond index country to wider region</td>
<td>Low to high</td>
<td>Animal health, welfare</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>EC: depends on extent of production losses and control effort, FA: very high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> According to whether incursion is in an endemic country (EC) or an officially FMD-free area (FA)

Table XIII. Assessed quality of the Veterinary Services, FMD situation, level of trade within the region and the risk of FMD spread within the region, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Quality of Veterinary Services</th>
<th>FMD Situation</th>
<th>Level of trade with countries in region</th>
<th>Risk of FMD spread into region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Not assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Endemic</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Not assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Endemic</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Endemic</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Endemic</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Limited (low volumes)</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Extensive (animal products)</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Endemic</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Endemic</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XIV. Consequences assessment for each of the risk pathways

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk pathway</th>
<th>Consequence</th>
<th>Notes on consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal import of live animals</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Key importers are Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. The consequences of an incursion in Indonesia and Singapore would be high because of their loss of FMD-free status. Malaysia and Thailand have extensive trade with other countries in the region, which could cause spread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal import of live animals</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>This applies in particular to Myanmar, which is believed to be the site of many imports and assessed with a high risk of spread of exotic FMDV strains across the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal import of animal products</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>For the largest importers (Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), the risk for spread within regions was assessed as negligible to low. However, the consequences would be high for Philippines, as it would lose its FMD-free status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal import of animal products</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>There is insufficient information about which countries are receiving these products. However, the risk was assessed as high, as it is likely to cause either loss of FMD-free status or spread within the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are at highest risk from this pathway because of their border regions. Spread within the region is highly likely from these countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human movements</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are at highest risk from this pathway because of their border regions. Spread within the region is highly likely from these countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feed/fodder</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The importing country (Malaysia) was assessed as having a low risk for the spread of exotic FMDV into the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle movements</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are at highest risk from this pathway because of their border regions. Spread within the region is highly likely from these countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Risk analysis on incursion of exotic FMD viruses into Southeast Asia

will influence the consequences. It is notable that FMD-free areas import animals and/or animal products from FMD-endemic countries. This trade puts them at high risk for an incursion of FMD and loss of their FMD-free status. The risk of deboned beef from India, imported by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, has recently been emphasised following the FMD outbreak in Mauritius.

This Table also highlights that Myanmar is particularly vulnerable to an incursion from South Asia because of its proximity to Bangladesh and India, which has resulted in it being the point-of-landing for animals en route to satisfy the demands of markets in China and other SE Asian countries. Vaccination coverage in Myanmar is very low except in OIE vaccination project areas and the PVS evaluation suggests that the country is not well equipped for early detection and response to an outbreak. An exotic strain of FMDV is therefore likely to spread through the country with little control. Myanmar is also extensively connected with the rest of the region by trading networks, making it likely that the incursion would affect the wider region, as is likely to have occurred with the O/ME-SA/Ind2001d strain.

Risk estimation

We have demonstrated that an incursion of an exotic strain of FMDV into SEA may occur through several different routes and that there is a high likelihood of this event occurring through one or more of these pathways.

Regardless of the pathway responsible for an incursion, the consequences are likely to be high because of spread within the region and/or loss of FMD-free status.

The overall risk estimation consisted of two steps. Firstly, we combined the likelihood of occurrence with the consequence of the occurrence for each of the risk pathways. Secondly, the overall risk for incursions of an exotic FMDV into SEA was defined by the highest risk outcome of any of the risk pathways. For all risk pathways except ‘Wildlife’, the likelihood of consequence was assessed as moderate or high. When combined with the consequence (high for all pathways, except for ‘Feed/fodder’), the risk estimation of these risk pathways was ‘high’ using Table III.
Discussion and recommendations

Discussion

Findings from this study suggest that there is a high risk of incursion of exotic FMDV strains into SEA. The import of animals and animal products pose the greatest risk, largely due to the potential for the virus to survive and be transmitted effectively to susceptible livestock in SEA.

Available data suggest that South Asia is a particularly high-risk source area, especially India and Bangladesh. A significant number of large ruminants are informally imported from India to fill the demand for animal products in markets in countries including China, Thailand and Vietnam. These animals are known to pass through livestock markets in which they are in close contact with susceptible livestock, allowing them to transmit diseases, such as FMD, easily.

It is noteworthy that much of this Indian livestock initially enters SEA through Myanmar, because of its geographical proximity to South Asia. Because of low vaccination coverage, livestock in Myanmar are likely to be highly susceptible to any incursion. Furthermore, the PVS analysis reveals that Myanmar lacks capacity to minimise the impact of an incursion through early detection and response. It is therefore likely that an incursion of an exotic FMDV will be amplified in markets in Myanmar and spread onwards to other countries in the region.

In addition to the import of live animals, data show that several SE Asian countries also source animal products from India, legally and, most likely, informally. Data from FAO (2013) show that Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand imported boneless meat from India. A recent incursion of FMD into Mauritius has been attributed to the import of frozen meat from India, demonstrating the potential risk posed by these products (Hamuth-Laulloo et al., 2017). It is important to note that four of the countries importing meat from India are officially recognised as FMD-free (Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore); an incursion of FMD into any of these countries would mean immediate loss of the coveted FMD-free status and the associated privileged trading status.

Apart from India, animal products are also imported from several other FMD-endemic countries. These include countries in the Middle East and North Africa. This is important because it puts SEA at risk of an incursion from all of the diverse FMD viral strains circulating in these regions (see Table IX for the viral strains), including SAT2, A/Asia/G-VII, A/Africa/G-IV, Asia 1 and O/EA3.

Although the import of animals and animal products are the most likely pathways for an incursion, several other pathways were identified with a non-negligible likelihood of being the route of incursion. The risk posed by these pathways will mostly involve neighbouring countries because of cross-border movements of humans, wildlife and vehicles. It is important to consider these lower risk pathways when developing measures to minimise the risk of an outbreak.

Gaps in data and knowledge were encountered throughout the study, as indicated by the high degree of uncertainty associated with most of the pathways. Some of this lack of knowledge is inherent to the nature of informal trade and the associated risks. However, in several places there is scope to collect further data to characterise the risk better, as indicated in the recommendations below.

As both trade routes and the epidemiology of FMD are highly dynamic, the specific results of this study may be valid only for a limited time (months). However, several of the recommendations below will be useful even if the nature of the risks changes. The risk framework provided should also be suitable to review and update the study as required.

Trying to capture the many variables associated with the risk of incursion of exotic FMDV into a defined number of risk pathways and generating an overall estimate of risk is an oversimplification of the reality. However, it is hoped that this study will inform decision makers and supports prioritisation of risk mitigation measures in an environment of limited resources.

Recommendations

In this chapter, we have grouped national-level recommendations by the risk pathways studied and the approaches at the regional or national level. Although the recommendations are written with the intention to prevent and better manage incursion of an exotic FMDV, many of the recommendations also apply to mitigating the emergence of other infectious diseases of livestock into SEA.

We acknowledge the existing initiatives and strategies already in use in the region, such as the SEACFMD Campaign, the Progressive Control Pathway framework and collaborative research projects (e.g. Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and Australian Animal Health Laboratory). However, within the limited time and scope of this study, we have not been able to assess...
the extent to which our recommendations may already have been addressed through these initiatives.

Of the 41 recommendations described here, some require a long-term vision and are best applied in regional strategic framework plans. Other recommendations, however, may be achieved in the short term and are the so-called low-hanging fruits; these are the recommendations to start with to take the first steps to mitigate the risk of incursion of an exotic FMDV. These are indicated as ‘short term’ below.

The highest impact can be expected from facilitating legal animal transport and trading across SEA and into China. When such transport becomes more transparent, it will be easier to monitor and may even be channelled in such a way that the contact between traded and local livestock is minimised.

Strengthening passive surveillance, including farmers’ and community animal health workers’ willingness to report, in-depth outbreak investigation, proper sampling, and swift and complete diagnostics will have impact on early detection and thus allow for appropriate and rapid responses.

**Overarching**

**At a regional level, it is recommended to:**

1. Continuously monitor the FMD situation globally, with particular attention to South Asia, and ensure that the regional vaccine bank has access to vaccines to protect against high-risk strains circulating in South Asia and elsewhere (short term).

2. Ensure that training and awareness-raising activities include women. This is important for effective knowledge transfer because studies have shown that women are often the most important decision makers in the household (Paris, 2000). In smallholder systems, women play an important role in feeding, cleaning and management of livestock, especially pigs, backyard poultry and small ruminants, as well as undertaking other routine day-to-day activities, such as caring for children and perhaps elderly relatives. Unlike many other regions, women in SEA are also involved in retailing livestock products, especially fresh meat (Distefano et al., 2013) (short term).

3. Strengthen intra-regional collaboration to:
   a) share information on the FMD situation in real time, even in situations where diagnostic results are not fully confirmed (short term); b) speed up genetic identification of FMDV samples (short term); c) continue to provide support to coordinated activities (such as through OIE SRR-SEA) to strengthen the capacity of high-risk countries and support any countries affected by an incursion to minimise the regional impact.

4. Define measures to enforce a temporary international animal movement standstill in the event of detection of an exotic FMDV in SEA (short term).

5. Coordinate a regional vaccine stock by defining arrangements with vaccine producer(s) to deliver a matching vaccine in the event of an exotic FMDV strain that is not protected by the FMD vaccines used in routine programmes. Additionally, agree on a vaccine reserve stock to be used in a timely and effective way for emergency vaccination to contain the spread of the exotic FMDV between SE Asian countries (short term); this may be an expansion of the current initiatives of the OIE vaccine bank.

6. Apply all available measures to combat FMD:
   a) apply the various control options (awareness, movement controls, border controls, biosecurity, communication and vaccination) in such a manner that most effective use is made of each option in relation to other options, while accounting for the limited availability of each (short term); b) define roles and responsibilities for all key actors on FMD control; this requires the realisation that livestock owners, traders, private veterinarians and community animal health workers and dairy cooperatives all have a role to play in FMD control (short term).

**At a national level, with regional support, it is recommended to:**

7. Reduce the impact of an incursion of an exotic strain by continuing to improve and progress risk-based control strategies, considering the routes of exotic FMDV release and exposure discussed in this report, as well as endemic FMDV circulation. As a result, risk-based vaccination programmes may target specific border areas, key animal markets, fattening farms and other high-risk populations on the trading routes.

8. Include specific contingency plans within the current national FMD control plans for the immediate response to an incursion of an exotic strain of FMDV in consultation
Discussion and recommendations

with private stakeholders (livestock owners, traders, animal market managers and cooperatives (dairy or beef). This includes:

a) preparedness to investigate FMD outbreaks in more detail when suspicion of an exotic FMDV incursion arises and preparedness to take immediate action;
b) conducting simulation exercises to test the contingency plans;
c) last but not least, allocating the necessary funds/resources to manage the emergence of exotic animal diseases.

9. Strengthen the capacity of outbreak investigation not only by training and equipping field-level veterinarians, para-veterinarians and community animal health workers but also by providing continued technical support and regular information sharing about the results of previous outbreak investigations (short term).

10. Strengthen the flow of information between local and central levels of the Veterinary Services. This may be facilitated by digitising routine reporting or establishing syndromic surveillance and zero reporting (short term).

11. Conduct campaigns to raise awareness of the risk of an FMD incursion and of the biosecurity measures to protect livestock. Involve community leaders, successful farmers and traders on these issues and use success stories from situations where farmers have been able to keep out disease while it was nearby.

12. Study the sensitivity of passive surveillance with a view to identifying specific actions to improve the early detection of an incursion. Such actions may include providing incentives for reporting, facilitating reporting (e.g. through dedicated telephone/SMS numbers), training and technical support of veterinarians and animal health workers (short term). As regards diagnostic capacity building, there is already support for the LabNet-EpiNet through SEACFMD.

13. Strengthen the relationship between livestock owners and animal health service providers (public and private) to motivate livestock owners to actively consult them when livestock become diseased.

14. Include private sector initiatives to increase vaccination coverage in risk hotspots by contracting out vaccination and surveillance activities to certified and accredited private veterinarians and community animal health workers, equipping them with materials to maintain an appropriate cold chain for vaccination.

Relating to import of livestock (legal and informal)

At a regional level, it is recommended to:

15. Establish incentives for key livestock traders to import livestock legally instead of informally. This is the most obvious approach with the highest impact on mitigating the risk of exotic FMDV incursion, although this may seem to be an almost impossible, far-reaching ideal. Nonetheless, it is necessary to start discussions with key traders to identify the facilities needed to reduce the volume of informally traded livestock and animal products (see also recommendation 21).

16. Develop a system to continuously monitor the trends of livestock movements (legal and informal) into and through the region, with respect to the origin, destination and route followed. Monitoring of meat and livestock prices in SEA, India and China may be explored as measurable proxy measures for livestock movements, based on the work by Madin (2011).

17. Advocate that the Chinese authorities review their regulations prohibiting the import of livestock. These regulations are an important driver for the extensive and ever-increasing informal trade of livestock from Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam into China by routes that are changing regularly. Formalising this livestock trade will allow for better control of livestock movements by having the trade channelled and therefore more easily monitored and surveyed.

18. Explore cost-effective approaches to implement active surveillance for exotic strains of FMDV in livestock at entry points and at large animal markets. These approaches may use environmental sampling or pooling swab samples (short term).

19. Discuss and design the requirements for refurbishing large (inter-provincial) animal markets, considering segregation of species and livestock from different regions, provision of cleaning and disinfection for livestock trucks and establishing visual veterinary inspections (short term).

20. Consult with the key players of the private sector (traders and beef-fattening companies) in SEA about the incentives or facilitation needed for them to change their approach to informal import of livestock (short term).

At a national level, it is recommended to:

21. Facilitate the legal import of livestock from South Asia into Myanmar by means of legalising imports, reducing...
the paperwork and entry fees. Concurrently, establish quarantine and vaccination procedures at the border to have imports comply with these preventive measures.

22. Develop a contingency plan for Myanmar for the incursion of exotic FMDV (and other emerging diseases) and request support from other SE Asian countries to strengthen capacity for surveillance and response (short term). There may be a coordinating role for SEACFMD here.

23. Raise awareness with traders in Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand of the risks of importing livestock.

24. Build trust in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam with livestock owners and service providers (in particular women and community animal health workers) to report outbreaks of disease swiftly. As such initiatives have started in Laos and Cambodia under ACIAR-funded projects, it will be possible to monitor and evaluate the impact of such programmes and use this to expand a well-tested approach.

25. With facilitating measures in place (as suggested above), enforce control and regulation of livestock trade and import by increased fines and sentences for non-compliance.

Relating to import of livestock products (legal and informal)

At a regional level, it is recommended to:

26. Develop a system for ongoing monitoring of the animal products imported to the region (legally and informally), the corresponding origin countries and the disease risks (FMDV and other) associated with the origin countries.

27. Conduct a specific risk assessment with respect to the potential release of FMDV for the range of products being imported from FMD-endemic countries, such as boneless meat, offal and bone crush (short term).

28. Follow this up with visits to production plants in exporting countries to audit the production and storage procedures in accordance with the scientific literature and technical guidelines, such as the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

29. Under EpiNet support, strengthen the national capacities to implement risk analysis with a primary focus on import risk assessment based on the OIE guidelines through training public veterinary officials (OIE, 2015).

At a national level, it is recommended to:

30. Use the results of recommendations 26 and 27 to raise awareness about the risks of introducing emerging diseases with the public officials (responsible for animal product import regulations) and key importers in the private sector of animal (by-)products.

31. Find an agreement with the private sector to comply with rules and regulations to mitigate the risk of importing exotic infectious diseases and food safety-related pathogens.

32. Raise awareness of the risk of imported meat products with livestock producers, in particular with swine producers to encourage them to treat swill before feeding it to pigs.

33. Enforce control and regulation of import of animal (by-)products once the above recommendations are in place.

Relating to wildlife

At a regional level, it is recommended to:

34. Coordinate studies on the FMD status and behaviour (especially migration patterns) of susceptible wildlife in the border areas of Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. The results of these studies should be used to inform national strategies on risk mitigation practices, as appropriate. These may include establishing protocols with public institutes related to wildlife conservation and border control.

Relating to human movements

At a regional level it is recommended to:

35. Develop training and communication material to raise awareness with people who have close contact with livestock or deal with fresh and frozen animal products and who are travelling into the region about the risk of transmitting diseases between countries and regions, as well as about biosecurity measures that can reduce the risk (short term).

At a national level, it is recommended to:

36. Use the training material to raise awareness and improve biosecurity in high-risk groups, such as traders, truck drivers, service providers (veterinarians, para-veterinarians and community animal health workers, inseminators and milk collectors).
Relating to the risk associated with vehicles

At a national level, it is recommended to:

37. Register vehicles that are involved with the cross-border transport of livestock and animal (by-)products, manure, feed or fodder.

38. Implement cleaning and disinfection at border posts and animal collection points such as large (international) animal markets.

Relating to feed/fodder

At a regional level, it is recommended to:

39. Conduct a specific risk assessment with respect to the potential release of FMDV from feed/fodder imported to SEA (short term).

At a national level, it is recommended to:

40. If warranted by the risk assessment, develop a system for ongoing monitoring of feed/fodder imported to the region, the corresponding origin countries and the disease risks (FMDV and other) associated with the origin countries.

41. Apply strict regulations for products that carry a higher risk of being contaminated with FMDV (bone meal, straw and manure).
References


Annex 1: Terms of reference

Regional risk analysis for incursions of exotic strains of foot and mouth disease virus in Southeast Asia

Background

At the 19th South-East Asia and China Foot and Mouth Disease (SEACFMD) National Coordinators Meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 17–19 August 2016, it was recognised that FMDV of the lineages O/ME-SA/Ind2001 and A/Asia/GVII potentially pose serious risks to SEACFMD member countries, including the AMS. To help understand and mitigate these risks, it was recommended that a formal regional risk analysis study should be conducted.

At least two incursions of the emerging FMDV sub-lineage O/ME-SA/Ind2001d have been detected in 2015 in Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar. This is likely to be due to changing trade patterns along livestock supply chains from India to SEA, and driven by the demand for beef and buffalo meat in China. Another South Asian lineage of the FMDV had already spread to Turkey and Saudi Arabia in 2015 (A/Asia/GVII). Although this virus lineage is not yet believed to be present in SEA, its detection could have significant impact, given that present vaccines are unlikely to protect animals and the virus has the potential to lead to widespread outbreaks.

The aim of this study is to conduct a qualitative risk assessment of the possible incursion of exotic FMDV (specifically O/ME-SA/Ind2001 and A/Asia/G-VII) to AMS and member countries of the SEACFMD Campaign and provide recommendations to mitigate risks. The regional FMD risk analysis will be implemented by the OIE, including the OIE SRR-SEA, utilising SRR-SEA technical expertise, regional knowledge and consultant(s) to undertake a desk review of data and research, engage with country officials and experts, and collect and analyse information on the trade in livestock, livestock products and other risk materials from South Asia. This will build on the Australian DFAT-funded analysis of safe animal movement in the region and develop recommendations for regional risk mitigation. The findings and recommendations will be disseminated and reviewed by SEACFMD Campaign partners (including a preliminary presentation at the SEACFMD Sub-Commission Meeting, March 2017), including AMS, for incorporation in national FMD plans.

The study will be supported by funds granted by Australia’s DFAT to the OIE World Fund, and in collaboration with Australia’s Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR).

Scope

This study will rely on data gathered from published studies, grey literature and expert opinion. Collection of primary data (e.g. surveys of animal or animal product movements) is outside the scope of the study; however, short ‘site visits’ to conduct interviews and hold discussions with key people in targeted countries is within the scope. This study will also assess and make recommendations associated with socio-economic and inclusive development risks, including but not limited to gender issues (women’s organisations), disability inclusive development (disabled people’s organisations), private sector and civil society engagement.

A consultant who has experience in risk analysis and specific knowledge and experience of South Asia and SEA (region and/or country level) will be employed to lead this study. The roles of the consultant are to:

- design the study under the guidance of the OIE SRR-SEA;
- perform a desktop review, including collection and analysis of information on the trade in livestock, livestock products and other risk materials from South Asia into SEA;
- facilitate a workshop to verify the desktop review findings and identify and analyse any additional risks; the workshop will be attended by representatives from SEACFMD member countries;
- conduct site visits in selected countries (up to five in South Asia and/or SEA in consultation with the OIE) to verify the desktop review and workshop findings and identify and analyse any additional risks;
analyse the collected and compiled data;
write the final report.

Deliverables
study design and work plan (including a breakdown of proposed costs and delivery date for each proposed deliverable) finalised and agreed by the OIE;
desktop review of literature, documents and initial analysis of secondary data;
SEACFMD Sub-commission presentation (outline and preliminary desktop data/findings) by 8 March 2017;
facilitate workshop and pre-workshop questionnaire;
analysis of desktop review data, workshop and site visits;
provide a draft report (no more than 20 pages, not including annexes and executive summary) by 21 April 2017 and final report to the OIE by 1 May 2017.

Total budget available
The total budget available for consultancy costs (including professional fees, site visits, travel and associated costs) is €35,000.

Required skills/expertise
The consultant should demonstrate the following skills/qualities and adhere to the highest review standards and code of ethics as expected by the OIE and its partners:
excellent technical/analytical/risk assessment skills, including practical experience of risk assessment in complex animal health/international development programmes, and the ability to present and use relevant quantitative and qualitative evaluation tools to achieve review objectives;
excellent technical knowledge and experience of FMD and related animal health issues;
exceptional report drafting skills, including the ability to convey complex issues and ideas in simple easy-to-understand forms;
a practical and realistic approach to risk assessment and technical recommendations;
strong cross-cultural and interpersonal skills, as well as specific knowledge and experience of South Asia and SEA (region and/or country level);
good understanding of socio-economic and inclusive development risks, including but not limited to gender issues, disability-inclusive development private sector and civil society engagement;
previous experience of OIE regional programmes, review standards and procedures is preferred, but not essential.
Annex 2: Release pathways

The release component of the risk assessment refers to the introduction of an exotic strain of FMDV into SEA. Ten pathways were considered for this stage.

1. legal import of live animals,
2. informal import of live animals,
3. legal import of animal products and by-products,
4. informal import of animal products and by-products,
5. wildlife,
6. cross-border communal grazing,
7. human movements,
8. feed/lodder import,
9. vehicle movements,
10. genetic material import.

For the introduction of an exotic strain of FMDV into SEA, it is necessary that the pathogenic agent circulates in the country of origin for animals, animal products/by-products and/or fomites moving or being moved to SEA. Table IX presents a short summary of the most recent FMDV strains circulating in countries from where the SE Asian region imports animals, goods and products.

In the following, each pathway will be described and analysed with regards to the risk it poses to the introduction of FMDV into the SE Asian region.

Legal import of live animals

The movement of live animals constitutes one of the major risk pathways for the incursion of FMD. Selecting the trading partners/zones for the import of livestock based on their FMD epidemiological status is key for preventing disease introduction into national territory. However, analysis of data retrieved from FAO Stats on the live animal trade in 2013 concludes that SE Asian countries are importing livestock from FMD-infected countries. Cattle are imported from China, India and Pakistan, mainly to Malaysia but also to Singapore. China is also exporting pigs to Indonesia and sheep to Malaysia. Thailand is importing sheep from Saudi Arabia. Cambodia imports goats from South Korea (Table XV).

As these countries are not free of FMD and FMD is endemic in some of them (e.g. Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia), there is a high probability that an animal may be infected with FMD in the country of origin (Step I). Several of the viruses that circulate in these countries are classed as exotic for SEA (Table IX).

Table XV. Number of live animals imported to SEA in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEA country</th>
<th>Country where FMD is endemic</th>
<th>Country where FMD is endemic</th>
<th>Country where FMD is endemic</th>
<th>Country where FMD is endemic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China, mainland</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The colour code is as follows: red: cattle; blue: sheep; orange: pig; green: goats
However, the very low volumes presented in the official data may not represent the actual volumes traded. In addition, given that underreporting of FMD is considerable in some of the exporting countries, the probability of exported animals being infected is difficult to quantify, but it is likely to be higher than probabilities calculated from formal reports. Therefore, we concluded that there is moderate probability that an animal infected with FMD would be selected for export (Step II).

Based on the in-country visits and the workshop conducted on 5 April 2017, veterinary officials confirmed that control measures to reduce the risk of importing an infected animal are in place in the importing countries, namely quarantine, animal inspection and vaccination. However, mild and subclinical disease, frequent in small ruminants and vaccinated animals, make it harder for disease to be detected (Mclaws et al., 2017). Therefore, even with the implemented control mechanisms, there is a moderate probability that the disease will go unnoticed and the animal will exit the country of origin and enter SEA (Steps III and IV).

Although the period of virus shedding is limited (3.9 to 4.7 days at a 95% confidence interval, according to Mardones et al. [2010] with some variations depending on species and serotypes), it must still be taken into consideration that animals are traded in groups and that, within a group, animals could be in different stages of disease. Nevertheless, the risk mitigation measures in place should reduce the probability of an infected animal releasing the virus into SEA (Step V). Note that we have not taken into consideration the role of the carrier state for this assessment. The role of animals persistently infected with FMD is controversial and it has been stressed that most transmissions occur from an acutely infected animal to a susceptible one (Tekleghiorghis et al., 2014; Weaver et al., 2013).

Provided that each step in the pathway above must occur for the virus to be released into SEA, the risk of incursion of FMD by the legal trade of live animal into SEA is considered to be moderate. Of all SE Asian importing countries, Malaysia is the one posing the greatest risk, considering the trading relations with different FMD-infected countries, and the higher volumes and different species traded.

Although known to be reliable, the data available on the FAO Stats platform were from 2013. In addition, there are few data on the actual prevalence of the disease in the exporting countries, so the perception of the likelihood of selecting an infected animal is not well supported. Therefore, there is a moderate level of uncertainty on this estimate.

Informal import of live animals

Fig. 5
Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through the informal import of live animals
(bold text refers to likelihood of risk)

Unfortunately, because of their unofficial nature, few data are available on the informal trade of live animals. Additionally, it is not a comfortable theme for discussion. Nevertheless, data collected during the field trip mission allowed some insights on this risk pathway. Additionally, some studies have been done on animal trade in the Greater Mekong Sub-region.

Previous studies have reported that live animals are smuggled into SEA from India and Bangladesh (Di Nardo et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2015). There is strong motivation for unofficial trade to take place because of the demand for meat in the region (China, Bangladesh, Thailand and Malaysia) coupled with surplus supply in India, especially as cattle trade and slaughter is forbidden by law. The trade is facilitated because India shares land borders with Myanmar, which is known to have informal trading routes to China and Thailand. Vietnam is another concern, as reports of informal imports of goats and pigs from China are known (Smith et al., 2015).
These findings are supported by genotyping results from outbreaks caused by the O/ME-SA/Ind-2001d lineage in Myanmar, which highlighted the phylogenetic similarity of the responsible FMDV to those from Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Bhutan and other countries (WRL Pirbright report on Myanmar FMD 2016 outbreak batch WRLFMD/2016/00033) (FAO, 2006; Qui et al., 2017). The investigation of the Myanmar–Rakhine FMD outbreak in 2015 suggested that infection had been introduced through the import of cattle from Bangladesh.

Nepal, India and Bangladesh are endemic for FMD, with circulating strain O/ME-SA/Ind-2001d. Additionally, in India and Bangladesh, both A/Asia/G-VII and Asia1 strains circulate (Table IX). The probability of an animal being infected with FMD is relatively high because of the high prevalence of FMD in these countries (countries’ reports from the 3rd South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Roadmap meeting) (Step I).

Therefore, in trading relationships, the FMD situation in exporting countries and genotyping evidence indicates an epidemiological link and a gateway for FMDV from South Asia to SEA. The volume of informal trade of cattle is very high, as suggested in Smith et al. (2015): according to the report, around 365,000 head of cattle and buffaloes are informally traded via Chiang Rai (Thailand) to Menglong (China), most of which originate from Myanmar or India/Bangladesh. This results in a high probability that an animal infected with an exotic strain of FMDV will enter the informal trade route (Steps I and II).

As there are no border controls or veterinary checks for informal movements, infected smuggled animals have a high probability of entering the country (Steps III and IV). The risk of shedding is limited by the infectious period, but, given the lack of control measures that exist in the legal trading routes and the higher volumes traded, the risk of viral shedding is considered high (Step V). Therefore, the overall risk for this pathway is considered high, but with a high level of uncertainty, as few data are available. Myanmar seems to be the main gateway for the introduction of disease through this pathway given its informal trading relationship with neighbouring countries, specifically India and Bangladesh.

### Legal import of animal products and by-products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>Animal product/by-product contaminated with exotic strain of FMDV in origin country</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Contaminated animal product/by-product selected for export</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Contaminated animal product/by-product exits origin country</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Contaminated animal product/by-product enters SEA importing country</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Contaminated animal product/by-product releases virus in SEA</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 6** Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through the legal import of animal products and/or by-products (bold text refers to likelihood of risk)

As above, the risk of introduction of an exotic strain of FMDV depends on whether or not there is such a virus in the countries exporting the animal products or by-products to SEA. Based on data on animal products and by-products for 2013 retrieved from FAO Stats (FAO, 2013), and after excluding the countries that are FMD-free or have a free-from-FMD zone (whether using vaccination or not), we are left with the results in Table XVI that represents the trading relations between SEA importing countries and exporting partners.

It is clear that animal products and by-products are being exported to SEA from FMD-infected countries where exotic FMDV strains circulate (Table IX). Data collected from fieldwork trips showed that a company in Vientiane, Laos, imported 217 tonnes of boneless meat from non-SE Asian countries, mainly from India. It also indicated that three companies in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, imported boneless beef and offal, mainly from India (21,040 tonnes in 2016). The risk of disease introduction will vary according to the products/by-products imported and the transformation processes they undergo, which will influence ability of the virus to survive. Scientific studies show that FMDV can remain viable after the slaughter of an infected animal. The onset of rigor mortis is known to inactivate the virus in bovine carcasses because of a drop in the muscle pH during maturation. However, the virus will still be present in lymph nodes and bone marrow, which is the reason that some FMD-free countries allow the importation of deboned beef from countries with free-from-FMD zones, even if vaccination is practised. In pigs, the maturation process is not reliable in inactivating the virus, as pH levels might stay above 6.0 (EFSA, 2006) (Step V).
Deboned beef is imported to SEA, mainly from India. Although the maturation process and deboning would reduce the risk of incursion of FMDV into the region, investigations of recent FMD outbreaks have implicated Indian deboned beef as the source of the virus (Hamuth-Laulloo et al., 2017). This raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the processes in place in India to mitigate the risk of importing FMDV through the trade of animal products and by-products. A paper by Paton et al. (2010) cautioned that deboned meat can still pose a risk of introducing FMD, even if the maturation and deboning processes are undertaken correctly. Additionally, Qui et al. (2017) report that an investigation of an outbreak of FMD in Vietnam concluded that offal and deboned meat had been imported prior to the outbreak.

Food wastes are being exported from FMD-infected countries in large quantities. Although little is known about how these products are processed and their final destinations, the importation of these products does present a biosecurity risk. Unpasteurised milk can also constitute a risk for disease introduction, as does offal when not treated properly (the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code recommends boiling or soaking for more than 48 hours in solutions with either high or low pH) (EFSA, 2006; OIE, 2015).

Considering the diversity and volumes of products/by-products exported, the endemic FMD situation of the countries of origin and the suggestion that ineffective risk mitigation processes are applied to these products, the risk of products/by-products being contaminated is high (Step I). Some products are traded in large amounts, which increases the likelihood of having contaminated goods selected for export. However, given the measures in place for official trading routes, the risk is considered moderate (Step II). Once selected, the product is likely to enter SEA because of the lack of active surveillance in testing these products for FMDV (Steps III and IV).

With all of this in mind the risk of disease introduction through this route is considered moderate. Malaysia and Thailand are the main importers of these products from India (A/Asia/G-VII and Asia 1) and China, and are therefore more exposed to...
this risk pathway. As with the legal animal trade, the data extracted from FAO Stats are not up to date (FAO, 2013), which introduces additional uncertainty. Additionally, there were no data available for some key countries, such as Myanmar, regarding this topic. The level of uncertainty is therefore moderate.

**Informal import of animal products and/or by-products**

![Fig. 7](#)

**Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through the informal import of animal products and/or by-products**

(bold text refers to likelihood of risk)

As with live animals, few data are available on the import of animal products and/or by-products into SEA (origin, volumes, etc.). Data supplied by the Department of Livestock Development of Thailand indicate that carcasses (frozen and unfrozen) and offal from buffalo, cattle and pigs were informally imported to the country between 2014 and 2017, although the country of origin is not specified. Information collected during the field trip mission suggested that animal products (beef and offal) from India are being exported to Malaysia wrongly labelled as maritime products, even though the Malaysian authorities forbid the import of Indian animal products (except for deboned meat).

The high demand for these products in SE Asian countries motivates the informal import of animal products and by-products. Given the endemic FMDV status of some exporting countries, the risk of having a contaminated product selected for smuggling into SEA is high (Steps I and II). While they are being smuggled, the procedures in place to control the trade of these products are often bypassed. Additionally, people traveling across the region can be responsible for the undetected transport of animal products. A report from the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on the risk of introduction of FMD into Europe considered the constant flow of animal products by travellers a high risk (EFSA, 2006). Although human movement seems to be more intense within SEA than between SEA and neighbouring countries (Sorichetta et al., 2016), one cannot disregard this risk factor.

Although there is a high level of uncertainty, given the lack of data, the risk of disease introduction into SEA by this risk pathway is considered high.

**Wildlife**

![Fig. 8](#)

**Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through infected wildlife**

(bold text refers to likelihood)

In Southern Africa, scientific evidence suggests that, although not fully understood, wildlife plays a role in the epidemiology of FMD. The African buffalo (*Sincerus caffer*) has been particularly studied in this respect (Sinkala et al., 2014). However,
there is extensive lack of knowledge of the role in disease transmission (if any) of other wild animal species (Weaver et al., 2013). Some stakeholders from the public sector have expressed concern about wild boar and have associated their presence with FMD outbreaks, particularly during the dry season when animals gather near scarce water sources/puddles. However, there was also agreement over the lack of data to support this connection.

Despite the uncertainty about the importance of wildlife and livestock interactions in the epidemiology of FMD, the presence of wild animal species in South and Central Asia that are susceptible to FMD (wild boar, deer, gaur, yak, etc.) may pose a risk of disease introduction and/or spread to SEA, particularly given that most FMD reports in South Asian wildlife are from India (Weaver et al., 2013). Wild boar, which are likely to be the species of most concern, are also widespread across the region (Ramos-Onsins et al., 2014) (Step I) and the difficult to control borders with neighbouring countries would allow cross-border movement of wildlife (Step II). Wild boar are not, however, known for their migratory behaviour, and their role in disease transmission is more likely to be restricted to smaller spatial scales. The probability of having infectious wild animals entering SEA from outside the region is therefore considered low (Step III).

The likelihood of an infected wild animal entering SEA and releasing the virus is considered low, with a high uncertainty level.

Communal grazing

![Fig. 9](image)

**Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through cross-border communal grazing**

This risk pathway depicts the probability of an infected animal from a country outside SEA infecting a susceptible animal from SEA through the shared use of pasture that may be bridging national borders or that may lie within one of the SEA countries and where an infected animal has been taken to.

As discussed previously, the likelihood of having an infected animal with FMDV from a country that shares its borders with SEA is high (Step I), as most of them are endemic for FMD.

Given the declared lack of control over animal moments, an animal would move between borders fairly easily (data from field trip mission). However, while communal grazing is commonly practised in the traditional/familial animal production systems that typify the main livestock sector for South, Central and SE Asian countries, there is no evidence that farmers will share pastures with neighbouring countries. Data collected in stakeholder interviews during in-country visits indicate that communal grazing occurs within village domains and surrounding land, and does not involve the sharing of land by livestock from different countries (Step II).

As direct contact is the main transmission route between animals, the risk of FMDV transmission to susceptible animals is considered high (Step III) (EFSA, 2006). Taking into consideration the infectious period and the often large size of co-grazing animal groups, the risk of viral shedding of FMDV is high (Step IV).

In summary, and although it would be likely for an infected animal to move freely, there is no evidence that communal grazing is practised between countries and so the likelihood of this pathway is considered negligible. However few geospatial data are available for mapping the distribution of the regional livestock population, which would help to identify areas where there would be a higher risk of disease introduction through communal grazing based on proximity of production units from different countries. The uncertainty level regarding the estimate is thus high.
Human

![Flowchart](image)

**Fig. 10**
Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through cross-border human movement

(bold text refers to likelihood of risk)

This risk pathway of viral release into SEA requires people to be contaminated with the virus in their country of origin. The people posing this risk are therefore those traveling from FMD-endemic countries. In these settings, there is little tourism. The human movement risk is linked to people who are likely to be in regular contact with animals – farmers, traders, ‘walkers’ (people that move cattle for trading purposes on foot), workers, market workers, veterinarians, animal health technicians, etc.

From Table XVII, we can see that, in general, a high proportion of the population from the South and Central Asian countries work in agriculture. As previously stated, traditional smallholder farms are dominant in these regions, meaning that farmers will own a small piece of land for crops and some draught animals (data collected during field trip mission). There will therefore be a high proportion of people in contact with animals in countries that are endemic for FMD (Table IX) (Step I).

**Table XVII. Proportion of countries’ labour force working in agriculture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of labour force in agriculture (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the virus to be released into SEA, the contaminated person needs to travel to SEA. Although human movements into SEA seem to be less intense than within SEA (Sorichetta et al., 2016), there is still a high probability of human movement along the border, especially if we take into consideration the people involved in animal trade (Steps II and III).

The virus must also survive the trip for it to reach the destination in a viable condition. This would relate to the different types of material (clothes, shoes, skin, etc.) and presence of organic matter (that fosters viral survival). It is unlikely that people coming from such humble conditions will take expensive means of transport such as an aeroplane. They would be most likely to travel by road and/or boat. Although people are not likely to undergo control measures to mitigate disease spread (e.g. disinfection), the virus would need to survive the length of the trip and endure environmental conditions that
are unlikely to favour virus survival, given its sensitivity to heat and desiccation (EFSA, 2006). An EFSA report highlights the relationship of environmental conditions with the natural elimination of the virus (EFSA, 2006). However, the wet season would favour virus survival and therefore the probability of it entering SEA in a viable state is considered moderate (Step IV).

In summary, there is a chance for viable virus to be spread via contaminated people. The risk of introduction of FMD into SEA through this pathway is thus considered moderate. However, as it is based on several assumptions and few data, the uncertainty level is high.

**Feed/fodder**

![Fig. 11](image)

**Fig. 11**  
*Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through importation of feed/fodder*  
(bold text refers to likelihood)

From consultation of the FAO Stats platform, Malaysia seemed to be the sole importer of forage products to SEA (3 tonnes in 2013) from a source that could represent a risk of disease introduction, that is, China (FAO, 2013). However, one does not know to what extent the information regarding the trade of feed with SEA is complete and it is therefore hard to draw reliable conclusions.

Nevertheless, feed/fodder could pose a risk of introduction of FMDV into SEA if imported from an FMD-endemic country. Given the intense agricultural activity in the region and neighbouring countries, and the trading relationship presented in previous risk pathways, there is a possibility that feed is being imported to SEA (Steps I and II). If imported, the product would most likely enter SEA (Step III). Depending on the level of moisture in the feed, the virus would have different chances of survival. However, studies have indicated that the virus can survive up to 15 weeks and thus the probability of the virus reaching SEA in a viable state is considered high (Davies, 2002) (Step IV).

Although there is a high probability of viable virus being present in contaminated feed, there is little chance that this feed is imported into SEA. This pathway is considered low risk with a high uncertainty level (no data on the imports of feed/fodder and few studies on the risk posed by this sort of product).

**Vehicle**

![Fig. 12](image)

**Fig. 12**  
*Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through vehicle movement across the border*  
(bold text refers to likelihood)
This pathway follows the same reasoning as the human risk pathway, in that vehicles are required to be in close contact with animals/animal farms from FMD-endemic countries. For this pathway, we have included equipment used in animal production (shovel, wheelbarrow and tools), as these are often carried on vehicles by those involved in animal production. Assuming that traditional smallholders have no means of motorised transport, it is unlikely that the virus will be introduced to SEA via farm vehicle movements. However, other social actors need to be considered, as they could also be moving across the border into SEA to perform activities related to their work, particularly people involved in the high-intensity animal trade (Steps I and II).

In the event of a contaminated vehicle entering SEA, there are little to no control measures in place to prevent the disease from spreading (disinfection of vehicles) (Step III). Data collected during field trips suggest that vehicles carrying animals are sometimes washed and roughly disinfected, but routine disinfection of vehicles does not occur. The EFSA document on the risk of FMD introduction into Europe stresses that there have been no reports on the introduction of the virus via contaminated vehicles and suggests two explanations for this:

1. the control measures at the border (disinfection); and
2. environmental conditions.

In this case, the reduction of risk would derive only from the latter and there would be an increased chance of virus survival, and thus introduction into SEA, during the wet season (Step IV).

For the probability of virus survival, the risk for this pathway is considered moderate with a high uncertainty level (based on assumption and the perceptions of interviewed stakeholders).

**Genetic material**

**I**
Genetic material is retrieved from animal infected with exotic strain of FMDV in exporting country
Negligible

**II**
Genetic material with FMDV is exported from origin country
Negligible

**III**
Genetic material with FMDV is exported from origin country enters SEA
High

**IV**
Genetic material with FMDV releases virus in SEA
High

Fig. 13
Risk pathway for the release of FMDV into SEA through the import of genetic material
(bold text refers to likelihood)

Virus can be detected in semen collected from an infected animal with viraemia, which then constitutes a risk of disease introduction should a SE Asian country import semen from a FMD-endemic country, particularly because the preservation methods for semen favour the survival of the virus (Callis, 1996; EFSA, 2006). From the field data collected during in-country visits, we conclude that semen is being imported only from countries that are FMD-free (Australia and New Zealand), which means that the likelihood of contaminated semen being imported to SEA is negligible, as the animal health services of these countries are very capable (Steps I and II).

Therefore, although the control measures in the importing countries would be effective to prevent the entry of contaminated semen (Step III), the probability of such material coming from Australia and/or New Zealand is practically nil, and the risk for this pathway is considered negligible. There seems to be consensus on this theme and therefore the level of uncertainty is considered low.
Annex 3: Exposure pathways

For the exposure assessment, six pathways have been considered, as described below:
- animal contact – trade (both legal and informal);
- trade of animal products and/or by-products (both legal and informal);
- wildlife;
- human;
- feed/fodder;
- vehicle.

Direct animal contact – trade

Fig. 14
Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through animal contact as a results of trade
(bold text refers to likelihood)

Before reaching their final destination, animals are moved along trade routes from market to market, where intense animal grouping occurs without any biosecurity measures (Smith et al., 2015 and from field data). According to data collected during fieldwork trips, these animals are unlikely to be vaccinated (Step II). Direct contact between infectious and susceptible animals is the most important transmission route for FMD (Di Nardo et al., 2011; EFSA, 2006) (Step III).

Animals are being legally and informally traded from countries with an endemic status for FMD. Because there is little animal movement control, they can easily reach markets where the probability of virus transmission is high. The risk of exposure through this pathway is therefore considered high. Although there are some data around the informal trade and a shared agreement that animal movement is the main source of introduction and spread of FMDV in the region, there is still a lot of information missing. Thus there is high uncertainty around this evaluation.

Exposure to animal products and/or by-products (both legally and informally imported)

Fig. 15
Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through trade of animal products and/or by-products
(bold text refers to likelihood)

Please note that this risk pathway considers food wastes and swill feeding practices.
Information is lacking about the source, destination and volumes of the products entering SEA, particularly regarding the informal trade. However, previous risk assessments from other settings have identified the plausible routes through which livestock might be exposed to contaminated animal products, such as:

a) swill feeding,

b) landfill waste from restaurants (carried by scavengers),

c) littering (inappropriate waste disposal).

According to EFSA, feeding contaminated food waste to pigs is the most efficient way of establishing disease. Pigs are easily infected by the gastro-intestinal route (Step IV) and, once infected, will excrete large viral loads into the environment, greatly increasing the probability of spread (EFSA, 2006).

Given the origin of animal products and associated volume of trade, there is a good chance that FMDV-contaminated food wastes are being given to pigs. Data collected during the mission to Myanmar and Vietnam suggested that farmers are giving food waste (restaurants and household) to pigs. Under the assumption that the livestock sector is similar across the region, there is good chance that swill feeding is being practised in SEA; swill feeding has been blamed for FMD outbreaks (EFSA, 2006; Scudamore, 2002; Wooldridge et al., 2006) (Step II).

Additionally, some other products, such as offal, are washed and cleaned before being cooked, which poses a risk of environmental contamination (Step III). Given this indirect route of transmission, the likelihood of a susceptible animal becoming infected is considered low (Step V).

The likelihood of a susceptible animal becoming infected with an exotic strain of FMDV through this pathway is considered high. There is a high level of uncertainty due to lack of knowledge on the precise nature of these products and their destination.

Wildlife

Fig. 16
Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through wildlife
(bold text refers to likelihood)

Some stakeholders from the public sector who were interviewed during the fieldwork trips commented that there is occasional contact between wild boar and domestic livestock during the dry season, when the water scarcity forces animals to congregate around the available water sources. However, this was not a common observation and most people interviewed did not mention it (Steps II and VI). Contact between wildlife would be more likely (Step II). Although there is little scientific evidence on the role of wildlife in the transmission of the FMD (except for the African buffalo) (Weaver et al., 2013), this situation could pose a risk for the transmission of disease from wild animals to domestic livestock, as direct contact between...
animals is the major FMD transmission route (Steps IV, V and VII). One possible explanation for the outbreak in Bulgaria in 2011 was roaming wild boar (Alexandrov et al., 2013).

According to the data collected, the risks associated with this pathway would be higher during the dry season. Provided that the reported wildlife contact with livestock occurs infrequently, the risk of exposure by this pathway is low, with a high uncertainty level considering the lack of studies on the incidence of FMD in wildlife, their role in the epidemiology of the disease and its geographical distribution.

**Human**

![Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through human movement](image)

*Fig. 17*

**Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through human movement**

(bold text refers to likelihood)

Given the high proportion of people who work in agriculture (Table XVII) and the intense animal trade, it is likely that travellers will come into contact with domestic livestock at some point (Step II) – for working purposes (traders and ‘walkers’) or for visiting relatives. The likelihood of virus transmission will depend on the route of infection, contamination load and species (EFSA, 2006). However, because this is an indirect route, the probability of an animal becoming infected is lower than that assumed for direct contact (Step III).

Although travellers will probably come into contact with susceptible livestock, given the indirect transmission route, the risk of exposure of FMDV through human movement is considered moderate. There is a high level of uncertainty around this estimate because of a lack of data.

**Feed/fodder**

![Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through feed/fodder](image)

*Fig. 18*

**Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through feed/fodder**

(bold text refers to likelihood)

As seen previously, the virus can survive for up to 15 weeks in feed (Davies, 2002). In the event that the feed reaches SEA, it would most likely end up being fed to animals (Step II). Depending on the species and contamination load, the likelihood of an animal getting infected would vary. However, this sort of product will most likely be used to feed ruminants, which are more susceptible to infection through the respiratory tract. Therefore, it is assumed that the likelihood of viral transmission by the ingestion of feed/fodder is moderate (Step III).
The exposure through this risk pathway is considered moderate. There is, however, high uncertainty around this estimate (there are no data on the purpose of these products or studies on the actual risk they pose with regard to FMD).

**Vehicle**

Fig. 19
Risk pathway for the exposure of FMDV in SEA through vehicles
(bold text refers to likelihood)

Once in SEA, and being a farm vehicle, there would be a chance of it contacting animals or entering areas where animals are usually kept, as few biosecurity measures are in place (data collected during fieldwork trips) (Steps II and III).

The infection of susceptible animals through indirect routes is less likely to occur (EFSA, 2006). Animals would be at higher risk of infection if they were in direct contact with the vehicle, as it would probably contain materials that pose higher risk (e.g. manure). The likelihood of an animal becoming infected takes this into account (Steps IV and V).

The likelihood an animal becoming infected through this exposure pathway is moderate with a high level of uncertainty as a result of the unavailable data and the assumptions made.
Annex 4: Assessment of the Performance of Veterinary Services in Southeast Asia

For the consequence assessment, we used the information available on the PVS, as assessed by the OIE PVS evaluation and gap analysis, as a proxy of the capacity for early detection of and response to an incursion of an exotic FMDV. Of the 47 critical competencies assessed in the PVS, 13 were selected to represent the assessment of surveillance and response (Table XVIII).

Table XVIII. Assessed performance of Veterinary Services using the PVS evaluation reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Issues with regard to critical competencies</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Intra-regional trading (livestock and animal products)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A, data not available as it was not measured (or not shared)

Information about the PVS is available for countries that have been evaluated through the OIE PVS evaluation and gap analysis. Such PVS missions have been conducted for most of the SE Asian countries except for Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore (OIE SRR-SEA, based on report, 2014). With regard to early detection of and rapid response to an incursion of an exotic FMDV, the critical competencies outlined in Table XIX are particularly relevant.

When compiling this assessment on critical competencies in relation to early detection and rapid response, countries are divided roughly into three categories: poor (9–13), moderate (5–8) and good (0–4), related to the capacity of the Veterinary Services (Table XIX). No information is available for Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore. It was deemed appropriate to categorise Brunei and Malaysia in the ‘moderate’ and Singapore in the ‘good’ category.

Table XIX. Overview of critical competencies assessed during PVS evaluation missions that were considered relevant for the early detection and response to an incursion of FMDV into SEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical competency</th>
<th>Assessment for SEA (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-5 Stability of structures and sustainability of policies</td>
<td>Lack of legal authority of Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of a decentralisation/autonomy policy with negative impact on chain of command (ID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-6A Internal coordination (chain of command)</td>
<td>Lack of direct chain of command at provincial/district level, with potential negative impact on disease surveillance and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-8 Operational funding</td>
<td>Routine activities depending on project due to limited operating funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-1 Access to laboratory diagnosis and laboratory quality assessment</td>
<td>In general there is a good infrastructure for laboratory diagnosis, thanks to technical assistance from donor agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-2</td>
<td>Main weaknesses are the lack of national budget, insufficient staff and the incompatibility of databases between the laboratory and the Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Critical competency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical competency</th>
<th>Assessment for SEA (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II-3 Risk analysis</td>
<td>There is lack of formal or documented risk assessment and lack of data to inform risk assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-4 Quarantine and border security</td>
<td>Variety of issues, from lack of resources to enforce control at borders, improper inspection procedures, uncontrolled cross-border movements of animal and animal products, to lack of a data management system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-5A Passive surveillance</td>
<td>Gaps in reporting system, shortcomings in outbreak investigation, insufficient supervision of paraprofessionals and community animal health workers, limited active surveillance programmes, which are often dependent on external funding, and lack of an electronic data management system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-5B Active surveillance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-6 Early detection and emergency response</td>
<td>Delays in reporting from field level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-7 Disease prevention, control and eradication</td>
<td>Insufficient measures employed, such as active surveillance, movement control, biosecurity, preventive vaccination, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-11 Emerging issues</td>
<td>Lack of pro-active monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-13A Animal identification and movement control</td>
<td>No national animal identification systems; live animals cannot be traced, while there is extensive unregulated movement of animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-2 Consultation with stakeholders</td>
<td>Lack of consultation with livestock smallholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-4 Accreditation/ authorisation/ delegation</td>
<td>Lack of legislative framework and authority to delegate official tasks to private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA: Cambodia; ID: Indonesia; LA: Lao PD; MM: Myanmar; PH: Philippines; TH: Thailand; TL: Timor-Leste; VN: Vietnam; CAHW: community animal health worker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* refers to the countries for which the assessment (third column) applies

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Risk analysis on incursion of exotic FMD viruses into Southeast Asia
Annex 5: Risk assessment workshop, 5 April 2017, Bangkok, Thailand

The Regional Workshop to wrap up and review the field investigation findings was conducted on 5 April 2017. The workshop was an avenue to discuss the objectives of the study and to further gather/validate information on risk pathways.

Participants were key persons in national Veterinary Services working on FMD surveillance/control or animal international trade/quarantine. Participants were present from Cambodia, China, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand, with notification from Myanmar and Malaysia that the time was too short to gain ministerial approval to attend.

The workshop’s objectives were to:
1. update participants on the current regional FMD situation, as well as the challenges posed by exotic FMDV strains;
2. review and validate information on risk pathways collected from field investigations;
3. discuss and make recommendations on risk mitigation measures;
4. exchange experiences and lessons learned from FMD surveillance and control.

The approach taken during the workshop was one of consultative sessions using an audience response system. For each of the three components of the risk assessment (release, exposure and consequence), the putative risk pathways were ranked pairwise by the participants. For a total of 77 questions, participants had to vote on which of the two pathways displayed they considered the higher risk in the risk assessment of FMD incursion into the region of SEACFMD.

This approach minimised the risk that a person’s opinion would be influenced unduly by someone else’s. After each pairwise ranking (each question), the results from the workshop participants were displayed as a means to provide immediate feedback.

**Results of pairwise rankings**

**Release pathways**

With regard to release risk pathways, the workshop participants regarded the informal live animal movement as the highest risk pathway for release of exotic FMDV into SEA (risk score: 107). When appearing in a pairwise comparison, this option was often anonymously selected as the higher risk of the two presented.
Second (risk score: 87), came the informal import of animal products, such as meat and milk, but also hides, bone crush, leather, etc.). Interestingly, when participants had to choose between informal animal products and legal live animal movement, 7 out of 19 selected live animal movement as a higher risk.

Legal live animal movement was ranked third, closely followed by ‘fomites’, while the other risk pathways (human movement, legal animal products, wildlife) were ranked lowest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release risk pathways</th>
<th>Human</th>
<th>Fomites</th>
<th>Illegal livestock</th>
<th>Illegal animal products</th>
<th>Legal livestock</th>
<th>Legal animal products</th>
<th>Wildlife</th>
<th>Risk score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human movement (immigration, tourism)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fomites (materials, equipment, vehicles)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal live animal movement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal animal products (meat and milk) and byproducts (off-all, leather, bone crush, hide, etc)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal live animal movement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal animal products (meat and milk) and byproducts (off-all, leather, bone crush, hide, etc)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic animal in contact with wildlife</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 22
Results of pairwise ranking of release risk pathways

Exposure pathways

For risk pathways related to exposure or spread within SEA, informal live animal movements were again considered the highest risk (risk score: 134) and the participants were unanimous about this being the highest risk. Second came informal animal products (risk score: 107).

The next level of risks were ‘fomites’, ‘legal live animal movements’ and ‘communal grazing’, all three related to livestock movements within SEA. These movements of livestock may be local as well as across longer distances within a country or between countries.

The lowest level of risk was attributed to ‘legal animal products’, ‘contact with wildlife’ and ‘swill feeding’. 

Risk analysis on incursion of exotic FMD viruses into Southeast Asia
Improving early detection and rapid response

In the third consultative session, participants were asked to reflect on where the capacity for early detection and rapid response could be improved. The options provided were components of surveillance (farmer awareness, notification and reporting, outbreak investigation, laboratory diagnostics and epidemiological analysis) and contingency (general preparedness, emergency vaccination, animal movement restrictions).

The results clearly showed that participants considered enforcement of animal movement restrictions and general preparedness the most important areas for improvement. These issues typically relate to national and international coordination.

Elements of surveillance came second: ‘Raising awareness with farmers’, ‘strengthening notification and reporting’, ‘local outbreak investigation’ and the capacity to implement emergency vaccination.

The need to improve diagnostic and epidemiological capacity came third.

Other than for the release and exposure risk pathways, there were fewer pairwise comparisons that brought about unanimous responses.
### Results of pairwise ranking of strengthening early detection and rapid response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where to improve to strengthen early detection and rapid response</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
<th>Notification and reporting</th>
<th>Local investigation</th>
<th>Lab diagnostics</th>
<th>Epi capacity</th>
<th>Preparedness</th>
<th>Emergency vaccination</th>
<th>Animal movement restrictions</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raising awareness on risks of FMD with farmers and other stakeholders</td>
<td>6 13</td>
<td>7 12</td>
<td>7 12</td>
<td>5 14</td>
<td>15 4</td>
<td>11 8</td>
<td>17 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the notification and reporting within the Veterinary Services</td>
<td>12 7</td>
<td>9 10</td>
<td>2 17</td>
<td>12 7</td>
<td>12 7</td>
<td>13 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the capacity to conduct outbreak investigation (local level)</td>
<td>12 7</td>
<td>5 14</td>
<td>15 4</td>
<td>9 10</td>
<td>4 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the diagnostic capacity of the central laboratory</td>
<td>9 10</td>
<td>15 4</td>
<td>13 6</td>
<td>18 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the epidemiologic capacity to analyse, interpret and report the FMD situation</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 3</td>
<td>9 10</td>
<td>14 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the general preparedness for a FMD outbreak (contingency plan, roles and responsibilities, vaccine bank, etc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 13</td>
<td>10 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing a quick response by emergency vaccination staff on the ground, cold chain, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing the implementation of animal movement restrictions when there is a FMD outbreak confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fig. 24*

Results of pairwise ranking of strengthening early detection and rapid response
A summary of the results of the workshop is shown in Fig. 25.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational level</th>
<th>Risk pathway</th>
<th>Release</th>
<th>Exposure</th>
<th>Where to improve early detection and rapid response</th>
<th>Risk score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National and international level</td>
<td>Illegal livestock</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>Enforcement of animal movement restrictions</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Illegal animal products</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>Overall preparedness (contingency)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall preparedness (contingency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity for emergency vaccination</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local level (district, provincial)</td>
<td>Legal livestock</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fomites*</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Awareness on FMD with livestock owners</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communal grazing</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to conduct outbreak investigation</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanism for notification and reporting</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central level</td>
<td>Human movements</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal animal products</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Capacity of laboratory diagnostics</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contact with wildlife</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Capacity of epidemiologic analysis</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swill feeding</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 25
Overall results of pairwise ranking for release and exposure pathways and for strengthening early detection and rapid response
*For exposure, the risk pathway of fomites included human movements where human movement was asked analysed separately for release