

# 2X e-Strategy;

The evolution of Canada's Military Strategy  
in the face of 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges.



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## Introductory Note

There can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens<sup>1</sup>; National Defence is an essential component of the National Security Policy (NSP)<sup>2</sup>. In the recent speech from the Throne, the Governor General of Canada, and Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces (CF), stated that: Enhancing Canada's security means that we have to invest more in our military as part of defending ourselves at home, in North America and in the world. We have to earn our way in the world (respect), but ours will never be the biggest force, so it must be smart, strategic and focused<sup>3</sup>. Thereby, the Government of Canada (GoC) was signalling serious political commitment as well as setting the tone for the further review of the CF's role as an important institution to assert our national interests, protect and project our values in the world. Let alone however, the NSP, the honourable speech from the throne, public support as well as the upcoming International Policy Review (IPR), will not serve to fundamentally define what is required, from a military perspective, for the CF to carry out its duties in the face of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges. What is truly and fundamentally required is a transformation of Canada's Military Strategy, of our military's vision of how it will bridge today and tomorrow, of how it will regain its place in the world, to truly protect and project Canada and its values. It is quite obvious that Canada has a serious international credibility deficit when it comes to our military. Therefore, the intent of this academic paper is to present a strategic framework, to shape this crucial and strategic evolution.

"We need to change the way we do business. It is now more important than ever that we make choices".  
CDS NEOps Speech, 30 Nov 04. CDS Annual Report, 2003-2004.

## National Security


The new Canadian National Security Policy (NSP) is a long-term strategic framework focussed on three core national security interests: Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies and, contributing to international security. The National Security Policy assesses the threats to Canadians, articulates our national security interests (?) and outlines an integrated management framework for national security issues. It provides a blueprint for action in six key areas - intelligence, emergency management, public health, transportation, border security, and international security<sup>4</sup>. The NSP addresses the historical gap that has always existed in Canada's security, like most allied nations, in the fact that we have traditionally approached National Security in terms of Defence. In light of the Future Security Environment (FSE)<sup>5</sup>, it is quite obvious that Defence alone does not offer a comprehensive and integrated response to our Nation, to serve its overall security concerns and interests. The NSP however, does not suffice to orient our military in terms of its strategic goals and objectives. It does obviously bring a new light to interagency cooperation, and provides important resources to better integrate most Canadian agencies responsible in one way or another for a portion of National Security, bridging the gaps and hopefully setting the stage for further cooperation, integration and collaboration. From a military perspective however, we must translate National Security Policy into Military Strategy.

## Focused e-Forces<sup>6</sup>

The government recognises that the CF constitute an essential national security capability. However, it also recognises that it must be selective and strategic when considering the deployment of our armed forces<sup>7</sup>. The government said it is committed to playing a vital role in countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defusing key inter/intra-state conflicts. It

also said it is committed to making the CF flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range of operations, including working with Canada's allies. In order to do this, the government said it will use its experience in peace building to help developing countries as well as failed and failing states<sup>8</sup>. The current CF paradigms and posture are essentially legacies from the cold war era. The operational tempo as well as the drastic reductions of the 1990s have not allowed the CF to address the fundamental changes tied to the future security environment and to the revolution in military affairs (RMA)<sup>9</sup>. As such, the CF has crisis managed, from year to year, from a changing political and international climate, in the face of 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges, to strive the best it could in this unrelenting context, but the CF has not fundamentally adapted to the strategic realities of the current and future conducts of warfare. The recent NSP, the upcoming IPR and political will, set the right strategic context to redefine the CF's paradigms and posture. Indeed, the NSP highlights key areas that the CF needs to address within revised system, structure and culture, threw its own transformation: Countering Terrorism (CT), Countering proliferation of WMDs (CP), Defusing international conflicts and intra-state conflicts, Building peace, Helping developing countries as well as failed and failing states. These all highlight the Future security environment for which the CF is currently ill prepared, being essentially based on past paradigms. In light of the modern reality of the three block war<sup>10</sup>, defusing, building and helping will become key mission statements. In fact, military analysts are already talking of Fourth generation Warfare<sup>11</sup> and of Unrestricted Warfare<sup>12</sup>. Indeed, there will be a continuing need for stability, peace support and development operations which will often go unmet<sup>13</sup>. And adversaries should not longer count on our reluctance to employ force; on our passivity to events on CNN.

### Canada's Critical Spectrum e-Forces




### National Interests

The International Policy Review will make important recommendations regarding the Government of Canada's diplomatic, defence and development agenda, as well as the structure of the Canadian Forces<sup>14</sup>. This is to mean that increasingly, in the GoC's view, interagency capabilities will be strategic drivers. At present however, the CF is not sufficiently integrated within its own services, lacking a truly joint culture and structure and yet, the government is already prompting it to take on the new paradigm of interagency cooperation. This will require a strategic transformation of how the CF approaches all its future operations within the new battle space; Indeed, asymmetric threats do not distinguish between military or civilian. In this context, all shareholders and agencies responsible for a part or another of our National Security, must be integrated into a comprehensive framework, but more to the point, within each other's operating ideas. For example, permanent inter-departmental positions at the GoC Operations Centre will be created, not

only to allow for enhanced co-operation, integration and collaboration, but to help shape this new culture. Departmental decisions are often limited by bureaucratic barriers and inflexible stovepipe structures, which our adversaries could literally exploit, from immigration, health, commerce, communications etc. In this increasingly unstable future national security environment, Canada must have armed forces that are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range of operations, and that are able to work with our allies<sup>15</sup>. Therefore, a new organisational paradigm is required for the CF, based on our National Interests. In a pragmatic sense, aligning with those of our allies does not mean adopting them; softwood lumber and beef are integral to our national interests, and “War-Mart” might be, but we should also consider interests with emerging powers: China and India, as well as regional powers: Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria... In deed, Canada in the future will need to better justify its national interests for supporting our allies, and in light of the international context, demand will only increase. The idea then, is to find a delicate balance, which could only be based on the clear, unequivocal fundamental definition of our own Military Strategy.

**Paradigm Shift**

The GoC recognises that Canada’s national security interests are well served by working with like-minded countries to ensure the continued and enhanced relevance of both NATO and the United Nations. The former is our best insurance policy in an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable threat environment. The meaningful reform of the latter is our best hope for a truly global peace<sup>16</sup>. Historically, Canada’s interests have been aligned with those of its allies, perhaps less by definition than by affiliation; Canada did not go to wars because Canada was directly interested, but because it felt for its allies. Indeed, the most important defence relationship for Canada is that which we share with the United States<sup>17</sup>. In light of today’s global security environment, Canada has to be pragmatic in picking its fights, because “everybody is our friend”. As such, our Prime Minister likens to say that the CF must be smart, strategic and focused<sup>2</sup>. Smart implies intelligence, knowledge, pro-activity, agility and adaptability. Strategic implies efficient, effective, networks and having leverage. Focused implies pragmatism, core business, critical spectrums. Although there could be numerous interpretations of these thrusts, and our military could be once again faced with paralysis by analysis, these are key strategic drivers for the CF to undergo its transformation program, in order to adapt to the realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, remain relevant and regain respect. In this multidimensional framework, the CF has two main axes: A compulsory Domestic sovereignty one, and a more or less optional extra-domestic one, or if you prefer, an Expeditionary one. Based on the CF’s core capabilities: Command & Sense, Effective Engagement, Support / Sustain and Mobility, and Generate Forces, military strategists should link the Integrated Operating Concepts<sup>18</sup> with our National Interests.




“Would we be running Nortel like DND, we would be out of business by now.”

Bill Owens, CEO Nortel, NEOps Speech, 30 Nov 04

### Operational Business

In recent years, the CF has adopted an equivalent to civilian approach to business planning and managing and this has served the Department (DND) well in managing scarce resources in times of seemingly crisis. However, this is not the operational business militaries should be involved in nor mainly concerned with. This is a reflection and a strategic consequence of the economic impacts of the 1990’s and in this very sense, the CF lost focus of its core business and of its core competencies, which served to distinguish it. In recent times, our warriors have only occasionally, even rarely been involved in live-fire training events. The perverse effect is that our military leaders have been involved, more than ever, in small time politics, which has never been advantageous to any competent military. Both these real phenomenon’s are tied to the obvious political allegiance of our Forces to the government in power, to which it owes respect for its benevolence; Military Operations & Joint Capabilities should be the core business of our military leaders. Not surprisingly, our military strategists have become smarter; master’s in political science and history, literally raging intra-departmental warfare, while in essence, disengaging from the strategic art of war<sup>20</sup>. This in return corrupted the should be pragmatic concept of militaries involved in operational business. From year to year, military and departmental leaders have to fight for the bare essentials for our military. Indeed, efficient and responsible planning of any sort requires a stable and predictable flow of funding<sup>21</sup>. Thereby, our Parliament should have a say in picking our fights, not only the Privy Council Office<sup>22</sup> and it would be in our national interest to devolve effective authority over our forces to our Parliament, breaking the paradigm of military forces serving under governments in power, rather than under a democratic rule. Indeed, there is no more important obligation for democracy, than the protection and safety of its citizens. Parliament, along with a say by the Public, would be the best national interested bodies to pick our fights, and within a new framework of long-term national security funding, there could be true value for money. To further highlight this case, note DND’s corporate overhead ratio, in respect to the CF core capabilities.

### National Defence (DND) vs CF Core Capabilities



Maj J.C.A.E. Dion

### Transformational Approach

Therefore, recognising that our Forces must be combat-capable in any instance, whether for the high or for the low critical spectrums of conflicts<sup>23</sup>, the CF should be organised for the worst plausible scenario; The worst danger that our nation faces, lies at the crossroads of radicalism, technology<sup>24</sup> and imagination. While the American army obviously envisions an exhaustive transformation program, at the end of which they will dispose of a full-spectrum force, a strategically responsive e-Force that provides decisive combat power to operate in the full range of military operations<sup>25</sup>, Canada should consider critical-spectrum e-Forces, combat-capable for a wide range of operations, but employed within critical areas of the spectrum of conflicts, such as pre-conflict interposition, pre-warfare intervention, transition-facilitation operations, which all require a delicate balance of military effectiveness, strategic efficiency and human values. In order to do so, the CF should leverage our national industrial and economic base, distinctive capabilities, basing a new organisational paradigm on Canada's values, edge in knowledge and key e-technologies. In the event of a national or global crisis, these combat capabilities could easily be adapted to best use. Network-enabled operations (NEOps), which we are only at the conception, offers promises of increased combat power and yet unimagined powers of knowledge management, information linking and fusion, decision-making computing and inter-operable digitised networking<sup>26</sup>. The current posture of the Forces actually hampers innovation to a great extent, where the CF culture is tied to stovepipe structural barriers; digitisation provides us with an unprecedented opportunity to break down current stovepipe information structures that have characterised armies throughout the ages<sup>27</sup> and adopt a new cultural mindset. So the most suitable transformational approach for the CF lies in its evolution into Domestic and Expeditionary e-Forces, and their parallel adaptation systematically, structurally and culturally, to face the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

“These (NEOps) concepts must enable our soldiers.”

Bill Owens, CEO Nortel, NEOps Speech, 30 Nov 04

### Organisational Paradigm

The absence of a fundamental review of our national defence policy, until the recently published NSP and the upcoming IRP, have essentially hampered the CF's ability to fundamentally redefine itself; until now. The NSP sets the strategic framework within which the CF will have to operate in the first Domestic axis. This implies a shift from closed national defence planning to an open interagency co-operation paradigm that will necessitate horizontal exchanges between all departments for a variety of functional expertise, based on the overall connectivity and transparency of critical information networks amongst all agencies. This also implies a shift in the CF's traditional paradigm of Domestic operations as complementary and secondary to the roles played at home by numerous other agencies. In fact, in many respects, the CF possesses unique capabilities to deal with many situations we could eventually be facing in the future security environment, things such as pandemics, bio-chemical terrorism, environmental hazards, critical infrastructure failures, civil unrest, transnational criminal reigns. This will require not only an interagency joint posture, but also the core competencies of other agencies to provide expertise, advise and probably leadership. The CF is not ready to deal with these concepts: Reinforcing police riot control, employing non-lethal weapons alongside a lethal arsenal, operating in contaminated and/or urban environments to counter organised paramilitaries, criminal and terror groups, surveilling our streets, borders & networks. On the other axis, the IRP will inevitably set the strategic framework within which the CF will operate extra-domestically, and set expeditionary goals and objectives for our e-Forces, in our national interest. As such, operating as critical-spectrum Expeditionary e-Forces, elements of the CF could pre-emptively deploy to uphold the law in Haiti following a hurricane, could pre-secure a humanitarian zone in Sudan and transfer control over to a follow-on African peacekeeping contingent that we would have helped train, or pre-empt the eruption of civil wars in Congo or Timor, prior to stabilisation by international e-Forces.



## The Author

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