

1^e-Force;

21st Century Canadian Force Integration

“Together we are stronger”



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1st April 2006
Ottawa, Ontario

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The ability to challenge ourselves is at the centre of change; it explains our human evolution... A few years ago I wrote a paper titled *e-Forces*. My intent was to shape our Army's *e*-thinking. My idea has evolved. I now realize I missed a crucial point by not pushing my idea far enough. My intent with 1^e-Force is not so much to reinforce *e-Forces*¹. Rather, I intend to take it farther. To put it simply, thinking asymmetrically we must strategically address our own CF weaknesses and shift paradigms to find and fix internal foes: "The ultimate goal is to ensure a more relevant, responsive and effective CF, capable of operating in the dangerous and complex 21st Century²". Indeed, as it had already been recommended that the United States Marine Corps, USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) model be introduced in the Canadian Forces and Army to satisfy the requirements of a Special Operations capability for the 21st Century, I argued in *e-Forces* in fact, that our whole Army needed to adopt an expeditionary and evolutionary posture structurally, by shifting to task-tailored forces, and culturally, by adopting a renewed operational focus based on our Ethos. As the summary of Duty with Honour³ states: "The overriding purpose of Canada's profession of arms is the conduct of military operations". Faced with the challenges of the 21st Century, I concluded that we needed to integrate all stakeholders into Canada's *e-Forces*⁴. But the fundamental idea I didn't push far enough is precisely that of Canadian Forces' integration.

1^e-Force is a metaphor obviously. Spelled out, it reads: One at the electronic exponent-Force. Mathematically, what is interesting is that one, at any exponent, always yields a force of One. The electronic exponent yields leverage derived by the strategic integration of all technologies. However, the electronic exponent implies many other things, necessary to all human evolution. Electronics as we know them, fundamentally need some energy; physical or even psychological. And electronics are themselves integrations of physical, structural, cultural and virtual domains. As such, digitisation provides us the opportunity to breakdown the stovepipe structures that have characterized militaries throughout the ages. But paradoxically, the key to digitisation will not be technology; it will be our willingness to evolve in order to employ technologies to effectiveness. Therefore, adopting an evolved expeditionary energetic electronic posture requires fundamental transformation. Paramount are converging strategic imperatives to integrate the CF into 1^e-Force.

Defence is not well positioned from a management perspective to meet its strategic challenges. The fundamental issues are simple: "Internally, Defence is not well aligned with its own stated mission to protect Canada. Bringing Defence policy intentions and administration into harmony is the next great Defence challenge⁵. Structurally, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) is known as the biggest bureaucracy in town. Its stove piped, generally disintegrated approach to Defence management often serves to justify its own ends. The military forces on the other hand, are still structured to fight a known enemy coming in the March formation, with its Regiments, Battalions and Companies, all Napoleonic formations, more appropriate today for war museums. Culturally, the internal environment operates like an immune system to isolate and expel hostile individuals who challenge current directions or established thinking⁶. Systematically, stovepipes are the construct of Defence (both Department and Force), reinforced by the military hierarchy⁷". Essentially, this Defence posture largely undermines CF innovation and even, its transformation. More to the point: This places increased risk in the defence Canada's sovereignty and security, and in many instances, we, the Canadian Forces, are our own worst enemy managing ourselves. This paper will argue that there is a clear convergence of strategic imperatives naturally pushing the Canadian Forces towards their integration, as to achieve more strategic impact as 1^e-Force... We must no longer refer to the Canadian Forces as many but talk of the Canadian Force as One.

"With a lever long enough, I can single-handedly move the world", Archimedes

Unrestricted Antagonists

When faced with Goliath, the natural posture for any antagonist is to take that of David. The Gulf war of 1990 occurred during the most significant geopolitical shift in modern history; Saddam Hussein overlooked the fact that he was about to face the new Goliath, and stood his ground. The recent invasion of Iraq however, clearly demonstrated that he adapted to the lesson: In the face of a conventional threat or force, adopt an unconventional posture and force. Osama Bin Laden too learned the lessons of insurgency during his years on the CIA payroll in Afghanistan and so did he adapt to his strategic environment in a rather unrestrained fashion, from our perspective. Such is the genesis of the 21st Century global war, led by the United States, a war on a planetary scale, facing global unconventional antagonists, with capital, freedom and democratic values at stake. However, these are merely the tip of an old Iceberg. Indeed, military strategists have long been discussing guerrilla warfare and terrorism. What is new is quite literally their unrestricted nature. Hence, we have entered the era of fourth generation warfare, or as Chinese strategists refer to it, an era of unrestricted warfare⁸, where threats are exponential to technology and to imagination. Most worryingly, is that unrestricted warfare is no longer conducted in the military dimension.


Beyond the capital, as the market lends us to forget, there are people with hearts and minds. The increasing interdependence, accelerated by globalisation, exacerbated existing global inequities. Thomas Barnett refers to this phenomenon as disconnectedness, as if all citizens of the world had the opportunity even to connect, in the absence of the most fundamental human needs and rights. "Humiliation, as Thomas Friedman once noted, is the single most underestimated cause of war". So when Goliath is perceived to bully people through global market rules, antagonists become David. Contextual factors as well as socio-political opportunism, further explain this adaptation. Unrestricted warfare is the result of three main vectors: Knowledge of conventions and rules, in order to be able to view and exploit these from a radically different perspective; imagination, in order to conceive such an approach, and strategic means, often leveraged thanks to globalisation and technology. Unrestricted warfare is the climax of unconventional and insurgency abilities, with strategic capacities and it can be exploited in ideas, space, time, information and society. Simply put, it is beyond the three dimensional block war, which serves to box-us in our minds. Unrestricted warfare is not so much about development, diplomacy and defence; it's about us!

The key to unconventional war, where opportunities become threats and vice versa⁹, is simple: It is the protagonist's ability to adapt to constant change and to mutate into opportunistic threats. Without this ability to adapt, employing the next generation of opportunities to their advantage, antagonists would likely become obsolete and fall victim to our capacity to seize the initiative¹⁰. In essence, all future protagonists' vital ground will truly reside in how they think and adapt. In this potentially dangerous and chaotic environment, "complacency can be lethal for Canada¹¹". Although quantity has a quality of its own, unconventional warfare is about leveraging abilities. Managing unconventional threats with unconventional instruments presents key challenges for a variety of reasons. The tendency to see war and peace as discrete, discontinuous states makes it difficult to build public support for unconventional options, which often employ limited means to obtain limited ends. An unconventional campaign may require restraint, patience, perseverance, and acceptance of ambiguous results, which may be unpopular. Because of political sensitivity attached to such options, unconventional warfare and operations require unique management¹². From this perspective, one better understands the strategic imperative to transform our Force. The simple issue is that the solution no longer resides in the military dimension, but in society. And hoping to fight the wars we would like to will do us great harm, as "Hope is not a method". Thus, one of the operational imperatives pushing the Canadian Force towards integration is that our internal structures, systems and cultures are literally hampering our ability to adapt. And the potential irrelevance of our Force increases the risk to our national security and sovereignty. In this security environment, achieving greater strategic impact is the cornerstone of transformation.

Bureaucratic Puzzle

Before the codification of Law by Draco, which led to the rise of Democracy, as we know it, the social order in Attica and more specifically in Athens, was the outcome of tribalism. The earliest known function of tribalism and the tribes was military. Tribes were corporate bodies with their own priests and officials, as well as being military and administrative units. The original four Phylai in Athens were the Geleontes, the Hopletes, the Argadeis and the Aegicoreis. According to tradition, the Attica tribes were united under one king whose job was to hold them together¹³. But had there been four kings in lieu of one, we would not know of the great history of Athens. Today, the defence of Democracy has become the modern militaries’ single *raison d’être*. But as protectors of Democracy, militaries themselves were never instituted on democracy. To put it simply, the militaries of modern democracies are the legacies of tribalism. Think of the Navy, Army, Air and Special Forces of any military to relate to Attica tribes. Most are united under a single king or head of state whose job it is to hold the nation-state tribes together. In Canada, the Governor General is the symbolic Commander in Chief of the Canadian Forces. However, the very denomination of the Canadian Forces highlights its characteristic and traditional tribalism. The fact there are many kings within the Canadian Forces hampers the rise of a stronger Force.

“CF transformation will fundamentally change the way our interests are defended, operations are conducted, forces generated and trained”. On 1 Feb 2006, the CF stood-up four new commands, which represents a distinct shift in focus: “Our *raison d’être* is to conduct operations, and at time in the past, our (CF) structures have not reflected that. We want to maximize our impact, increase Canada’s profile and increase our effect in the world in a real way, shaping the places where we go in accordance with our interests and our values. This is the guiding light of transformation¹⁴”. However, the fundamental issue, that of integration, is not at the forefront of CF transformation. Rather, the ongoing CF transformation has further disintegrated our ‘should be cohesive’ Force. This is true from a structural point of view as well as from a systematic and cultural perspective. Furthermore, this is especially true from a defence corporate / strategic management perspective. While before two dimensions existed; that of the three Environmental Chiefs of Staff: the Navy, Army and Air Force and to a lesser degree the Joint and Special Forces under the former Deputy Chief of Defence Staff; and that of the Assistant Deputy Ministers for corporate and institutional functions such as our Human Resources, Information Management, Material, Infrastructure and Environment, Finance and Corporate Services, Public Affairs, and Science and Technology, following transformation phases 1 and 2, a third dimension was added to our former matrix. Beyond the former force generators and developers / enablers, are now the force employers. Simply put, transformation has become our box; our bureaucratic puzzle; our Rubik® cube:



Strategic Imperatives

“No (CF) service can survive or even deploy by itself. It’s all elements working together under a unified commander with the same intent, being able to interoperate and communicate with the same ethos¹⁵”. “It’s not about separate land, air or sea components”, added General Rick Hillier. These crucial statements are at the heart of the CF’s ability to deal with unrestricted antagonists. As asymmetric antagonists infiltrate our structures, cultures and systems and literally exploit all organizational fault lines, like walking through open doors, CF integration is now quintessential. Simply put, we could not afford silos and tunnels in our matrix posture because of security risks. Yet, transformation added a third dimension to every business being conducted within Defence. At the tactical level, this might not present itself as a significant challenge and may make sense. But at the operational and corporate-strategic level where leverage and impact is really essential, transformation has exacerbated an already complex matrix structure and turned it into our Rubik. If the art of war is the management of military forces at both the operational and strategic levels, then defence management is the art of war for military forces at the corporate and national levels.

The strategic imperative to transform the Canadian Forces into 1^e-Force is based on fundamental imperatives in the political, economical, sociological, technological and operational dimensions. Politically for any modern democratic government, the necessity to dispose of a credible Force is based on the requirement to protect the nation-state’s sovereignty and secure its global interests. This is based on a very pragmatic, *real-politik* perspective of our market-world, where although Canadian values are quite noble, Canada cannot afford to be a moral superpower without forces. Since the political issue is about the ratio of Force available to government, increasing it is key. Economically, the efficient management of defence is imposed because resources available will always be finite and because we owe to ourselves as taxpayers, the best Force money can build. Sociologically, there are only so many *e*-Soldiers we can have to accomplish our operations and as such, we need to adapt to a smarter, more strategically focused Force that has more leverage. Technologically, we will only leverage advances in all scientific fields if we adopt an integrated seamless Force posture: Strategically, structurally, systematically as well as culturally. Finally, operationally, faced with threats posed by fourth generation/unrestricted warfare, our Canadian Force must be more closely knit than ever before. The CF must form one organism, one Corps.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is the second smallest of the five branches of the U.S. military (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard). With 180,000 active and 40,000 reserve Marines, as of 2005, the Marine Corps is nonetheless larger than the armed forces of many major nations. Namely, it is larger than the British Army or all of the Canadian Force. Yet in the case of the latter, the Canadian Force is further broken down in many stovepipes. Conceptually, this creates more overhead than is needed to manage the entire US Marine Corps. In the U.S. Army, a Corps is the largest tactical formation, the structural instrument with which higher echelons of command conduct manoeuvre at the operational level. A Corps is tailored for the theatre and mission for which it is deployed. Once tailored, however, it contains all combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities that are required to sustain operations for a considerable period. V Corps based in Europe is the only forward-deployed corps. It consists of 2 heavy divisions, a corps support command and 9 separate brigades, totalling 41,000 soldiers¹⁶.

This is not too far from the real number of people available for Operations in the CF at any time. This integrated Corps structure, with its single strategic and operational level headquarters would offset the requirements to dispose of CF headquarters for Navy, Army, Air and Special Forces, and integrate cohesively the new Continental, Expeditionary & Operational Support Commands. It would streamline our entire defence corporate management overhead and increase our force ratio, while the crucial functions of assistant-deputy ministers would be integrated in the Force.

In essence, if all effective components of the Canadian Force were integrated, a Corps is what Canada and Canadians would conceptually dispose of and probably less in terms of capabilities. CF military elements beyond this integrated Corps structure would be accounted under DND's governmental, institutional and corporate management roles. In fact, 31% of our defence budget goes into these roles¹⁷ while we should strive to follow Pareto's 20% rule. However, achieving such efficiencies points to the institutional dichotomy between the Department and the Force.

Institutional Dichotomy

"To ensure the continued excellence of the CF, DND and the rest of the Defence Team must also continue efforts to streamline our processes and ensure that investments represent the best value for Canadians. Tasks include making the decisions required to shed equipment and capabilities that are less relevant to current and future operations. It is now more important than ever that we make choices that favour transforming the CF so we can meet the new challenges facing us. In doing so, we will prepare ourselves to serve Canadians as a relevant, credible, effective force¹⁸". Politically, the government of Canada is interested in the credibility of its Defence as a whole. This is a legitimate requirement for Government considering both our sovereignty and security. Political capital is gained through the efficient economic management of defence overall, and the effectiveness of the Force to protect and project Canada's values and interest, at home or abroad. Clearly, there are two distinct strategic objectives underlying the political credibility of Defence. In essence, it is a delicate balancing act where efficiency is often opposed to effectiveness per se.

However, this perspective is true only if we consider efficiency & effectiveness at the same level. Indeed, efficiency is concerned with the management of defence, at the strategic/corporate level, while effectiveness is concerned with the CF military operations, at the operational/tactical level. Based on this fundamental understanding, we can better apprise that one actually complements the other in that considering finite resources, there will always be a need to strategically manage in order for our Force to be in a better posture to conduct military operations with the right mix of capabilities. Both in the Department and Force, this pragmatic fact of life is misunderstood... The Department accuses the Force of focusing exclusively on military operational effectiveness, but as military leaders understand it, this is their moral and legal obligation as the Commanders. The Force accuses the Department of focusing overly on efficient defence resource management, but as defence managers understand it, it is their moral and legal obligation as the Public Service. The issue is that this misunderstanding fosters a sense of mistrust, unbecoming of collaboration. Hence, internal defence paranoia leads to the building and protecting of self-justifying empires. This in turn internally consumes our finite defence resources to the detriment of CF capabilities.

Defence Economics

In modern economics, transaction costs have become equally and perhaps more important than production costs. This is quite a development considering that the early economic theory focused entirely on production costs, assuming that transaction costs did not exist¹⁹. A transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. For example, when buying any product from a store: To purchase the product, your costs will not only be the price of the product itself, but also the energy and effort it requires you to find out which of the various products you prefer, where to get them and at what price, the cost of travelling from your house to the store and back, the time of waiting in line, and the effort of the paying the product. The costs above and beyond the cost of the product itself constitute the transaction costs. When rationally evaluating a potential transaction, it is important not to neglect the transaction costs that might prove significant²⁰. In the services sector as well, transaction costs are an important part of the overall cost of services. Companies reduce transaction costs to the extent possible, without affecting their core business. In defence management, this would be similar to offering the same internal corporate services, while streamlining the management overhead costs associated to the execution of transactions.

In other words, if for every corporate level service defence delivers internally, let's say HRM, Human Resources Management through policies, the cost of these services are too high from a strategic-level corporate perspective, the issue is not to cut services, but to reduce management. If to implement an HRM policy for example, defence needs to conduct meetings after meetings, after policy revisions on policy revisions, these transactional costs are very simply too expensive. If to form a Joint Task Force for any military operation, their needs to be coordination meetings on coordination meetings, training on training, validation on evaluation; these costs are too high. Although it is practically impossible to financially calculate the actual transactional costs to the CF, intuitively, we can all appreciate that the majority of the defence business is made of these. Any meeting is a transaction cost and only indirectly relates to the final output of CF operations. Anything happening in NDHQ, or any other non-operational HQ for that matter, is a transaction that bears no direct effect on the ultimate output of the defence institution: Operational success. Defence's internal processes, structures, cultures and politics, impose this bureaucratic inertia.

Operations Primacy

Clearly, the Canadian Force's *raison d'être* is to conduct operations. As for the Department, it really has no single *raison d'être* other than enabling the conduct of operations. This is specially true if we consider strategic efficiency and operational effectiveness as a defence management continuum, where the former enables the later or where efficiency clearly enables effectiveness. Indeed, because of the finite nature of resources, a balanced degree of efficiency will always be forerunner to a balanced degree of effectiveness. Thus effectiveness is an outcome of efficiency but efficiency is not a necessarily outcome of effectiveness. To put it simply, effective military operations would not be possible without the good strategic management of defence resources. As such, the existing perspective that one counters the other and vice versa, is fundamentally flawed, if we consider the eternal earthly necessity to manage efficiently our global resources. No one, including our Force, can overlook the fact that efficient strategic management is crucial. Viewing efficiency as a strategic imperative, as important to the effectiveness of our Force as the conduct of operations themselves, is key to understanding the transformational need to integrate. If CF operations are to prime, as they should in our military minds, management is the strategic condition in which operations will be enabled, capabilities developed, generated and employed. Simply put, one or the other cannot make abstraction of our institutional defence dichotomy and therefore, it would simply make more sense to accept this fact of life and deal with it face to face.

As the ultimate output of any military organisation, successful operations are the outcome of an entire continuum of defence strategic management. This continuum starts with the analysis of future security environments and threats, which is often limited to the world we know and lacks in terms of imagination and innovation as the unrestricted antagonists are bound to be exploring. The planning of requirements, capabilities and structures, continues in the defence management continuum and this critical force development process ties in with Research and Development. The next critical process, that of the personnel generation, brings the continuum into the force generation, where following personnel, comes the generation of forces per se: Task Forces etc. Finally, the last but not least of the defence management continuum critical processes is that of force employment / deployment, and this is where operations as we know then are conducted. Obviously, if operations are to prime, the entire defence strategic management continuum is a crucial value-added chain; developing the force, generating the force and employing the force. In essence, operations prime because they are the product of an entire continuum of defence strategic management and because they are the product that the institution delivers to Canada. In it by themselves, operations do not and should not prime over any other defence strategic management critical process, as this would simply equate to not feeding our horses properly. Operations however should always prime in our military ethos as well as in our force culture. In fact, in many regards, this is truly the intent of the expression operations primacy in itself.

Operational Culture

It is generally accepted that the Profession of Arms is a unique and distinct professional Corps: First, it is a collective profession rather than an associational one. Secondly, it serves the State. CF members share a set of core values and beliefs, found in the military Ethos that guides them in the performance of their duty. It allows a special relationship of trust with Canadian society. Indeed, the profession of arms is composed of all military members, dedicated to the defence of Canada and its interests, as directed by the Government. The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self, the lawful, ordered application of military force and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability²¹; as a Corps, the CF embodies the Profession. In most military minds, the expression “the few, the proud”, immediately raises awareness. It is not so much about what it really invokes: the United States Marine Corps (USMC); as much as what it implies: elitism and heritage. In a sense, both are fine, if you are a member of the Corps. Indeed, militaries stand or fall according to the ability to maintain / reinforce military culture²². But perversely, this might also create strategic disconnectedness between the Corps and Society. Furthermore, the disintegration of elitism and interests within the Corps itself can drive conflict. The CF cultural challenge then is to maintain Esprit de corps, while remaining within our Ethos. Hence, societal disconnect is our greatest threat to effectiveness, relevancy and responsiveness.

The requirement for trust between the CF and the Canadian people, together with the complex environment of modern armed conflict, makes it imperative that all members of the country’s military share a common understanding of the concept of military professionalism and how it applies to Canada and its citizens²³. Linking culture to Ethos is crucial to the CF’s credibility: If a military members’ job can be done out of uniform, then what’s the point of being military? Simply put, we must walk the talk! Furthermore, relevance relates to having strategic impact and strategic impact is tied to Esprit de Corps. The success of the CF in recent operations and armed conflicts depends upon CF members having a common understanding of the military Ethos and embracing both a collective and individual identity as members of Canada’s profession of arms²⁴. This understanding of Ethos and Esprit de Corps situates the CF cultural transformational need. “CF Transformation is not just about technology and equipment modernization; it will require fundamental change to the culture of our military to ensure a fully integrated approach to Ops²⁵”. Simply put, together we are stronger; considering the strategic context, we need more strength. If culture is the way it is and Ethos the way it should be, Esprit the Corps is a way to get there. Without fundamental cultural change toward an integrated posture, CF transformation will fail. Indeed, culturally, universality of service is crucial to our CF Ethos and to our Esprit de Corps.

An individual becomes a member of the profession of arms by swearing the Oath of Allegiance and adopting the military uniform, establishing an essential distinctiveness in Canadian society²⁶. Considering the strategic end-state for the CF to become effective, relevant and responsive, than a fully integrated operational culture becomes quintessential. To enable this crucial integration, Esprit de Corps then is crucial to transformation, whereas the CF must strive to become 1^e-Force. The basic military qualification and universality of service for example, are two cultural drivers that in time will have important impacts on the individual and collective identity of CF members. If we consider the necessity to integrate from the outset, as an emerging Task Force is planned, at the very development of its most basic capabilities, its generation and eventually its employment, culture becomes the Esprit de Corps cement that holds the entire Task Forces and Force together. From the outset then, culture needs to be mutually reinforcing to force structure and capabilities. Members of a given Task Force would be regimented not by occupations or by specialities, but as members of that Task Force, for the duration of the mandate, from selection to redeployment. Thus, Regiments as we know them today have become barriers to our CF cultural transformation. Canadian Force members must view themselves not as such, but as the embodiment of the Force: “We are the Force, not in the Forces”; fundamentally it’s about what’s in our heads, not on them!

Strategic Thinking

“New Public Management expresses the idea that the cumulative flow of policy decisions over the past twenty years has amounted to a substantial shift in the governance and management of the (public) state sector. The agenda-setting process in particular, has been heavily influenced by the electoral commitments to improve macroeconomic performance and to contain growth in the public sector, as well as by a growing perception of public bureaucracies as being inefficient²⁷”. Streamlining defence management has thus become the expression of new public management. From this perspective comes the political justification to streamline defence and find efficiencies. Whereas the Department of National Defence is the extension of politics into military affairs and for good democratic reasons too, the Department is the extension of governmental bureaucracy. The Canadian Force on the other hand is not a political instrument, but is a national institution, which by the nature of its powers (legislated use of force, military capabilities and geopolitical capital arising from military credibility) has been diverted by politicians for their own agenda. Government has a clear responsibility to its Canadian Force, as does the Canadian Force to its Government. Simply put, the new public management protagonists should not be permitted to consider the Canadian Force as any form of political capital whatsoever. The Canadian Force as national institution sits besides political institutions, as an essential element of democracy. Most crucial of all, arguing still for the imperative for integration, is the preservation of the Canadian Force’s independence from political interference. The Canadian Force, as military institution of Canada, cannot and must not become the quagmire of political agenda setting. Strategically speaking of one mind must be the corner stone of CF transformation’s impact. To an extent, the CF’s operational focus lends it to forget the necessity for strategic thought.

The key issue is that the government does not have a clear end-state vision, first and foremost, so nobody has an integrated view of how our Force ought to protect and project Canada’s interests. Or do we? Our Government must count on defence professionals within the Department and the Canadian Force, to define just how to implement the intent of protecting Canada and Canadians. Indeed, beyond fourth generation warfare and unrestricted antagonists, the critical challenges to Canada’s sovereignty and security will arise from an unstable global geo-strategic environment. Efficient defence strategic management optimally leads to our military operational effectiveness. As such, the transformation need now is of launch into phases 3 and 4, which should lead the CF into rationalization and into implementation of new Defence strategic management paradigms. This offers a great opportunity to streamline Defence management and augment the Force ratio. This also offers a great opportunity to align our defence posture to our key strategic imperatives. Simply put, our defence posture must not be an impediment to protecting Canada’s key interests. From a currently inexistent national defence and security strategy should emanate one Defence corporate management strategy that would manage capabilities and forces from development to generation and employment in an integrated fashion; structurally, systematically and culturally. This integrated way for the future, should not only envisage the Canadian Force integration, but should also envision the governmental security integration in lieu of our inter-agency adhocery.

The pragmatic reality that the Canadian Force does not speak of one mind only makes us weaker as vital national institution protecting our democratic values, and as an international stakeholder. Simply, Canada’s economic relationships are critical to our standard of living and our interests. And Canada, from its moral high ground, can only hope to be invited to the Security Council or G8 tables, unless it is able to obtain respect and secure its sovereignty with strategic credibility. As such, Canada’s natural beauty is somewhat its naivety, but we need to grow up as a country: Beyond our very noble national values, the fact of life is that we need to focus on those places in the world where Canada can achieve significant strategic impact in light of its national interests, not political interests. This means that a strategic culture is required to safeguard our sovereignty and security, so that national strategic thought flows in an integrated architecture from top-down.

Command Centricity

In the military, the issue of Command is quite fundamental to any well-run military organisation. This has a lot to do with military tradition. There was a time when information was restricted to Commanders. Soldiers had for only guidance that which was judged appropriate and timely for the immediate success of the mission at hand. Command was also imperative in that hierarchy had to be enforced so that information flows could be streamlined to the extent possible to allow effective military operations through communications. Command was also a matter of fostering a sense of trust and confidence amongst subordinates, so that at the crucial moment, they would go over the hill trusting in their Commander's ability. Command centricity still refers in many ways to these military paradigms, where leaders lead and soldiers follow. But one can argue that today, with the advent of the strategic corporals and knowledge warriors that Command has taken on a more refined form. Sure, Command is still about communication and confidence and courage, but it is also much more about collaboration. This paradigm shift is brought about by information flows and crucial knowledge that is available to much lower echelons in the military hierarchy.

With network-enabled operations we have witnessed the emergence of more critical nodes than ever before. A node is akin to a knot, or a juncture on a spider web for example, where networks meet and where exchanges happen. Like road junctures, these are critical to our info-structures. From a military stand-point, the key is to dispose of critical nodes in sufficient numbers to ensure the robustness of our networks, while not overcrowding the net with too many nodes which can literally cause traffic congestions at every intersection. Hence, the more nodes the more problems but the fewer nodes the less impact. If we were to consider the chain of command as a network, we can imagine right away the inherent cultural resistance arising from the Chain of Command. But if instead of viewing commanders as top of pyramids, we would view them as central-nodes, we can foresee not only cultural changes that would ensue but also the structural and systematic changes that would be necessary to effectively adapt the chain of command to net-enabled Ops. Command centricity therefore is still fundamental in our modern military's operational context. The issue however is that fundamental transformation must ensue to adapt its tradition to reality.

If we consider our current defence posture; our box, our Rubik®, we can appreciate that in order to achieve strategic impact for our government, there are many blocks that would be involved in developing a capability, generating that capability and employing it. These three main processes actually constitute the defence strategic management continuum. Within each of these processes there would be sub-processes built around organisational lines. For example, building an Army capability would be the task of a directorate in the Chief of Land Staff and might involve other level one organisation; anything from Material to Information Management. Training that Army capability would be the task of another directorate in a lower level headquarters, likely involving other CF training assets that would start to be grouped together under a Task Force; capabilities from the Air and Special Forces could join in. Personnel from other Regiments as well as other occupations, with different backgrounds would be inserted in the Task Force training regimen. Following certification of training by force employers, Expeditionary or Continental Command would take over the integrated Task Force and exercise command over the generated capabilities.

Now if we simply think of the real application of Command centricity in the example above, we can once again appreciate the multiplicity of contextual command and control relationships. It is not an easy feat to determine whom, how, where, when and over what anyone has command of. In fact, one could very well argue that there is no command centricity, as it changes constantly. This is not imposed by government and is really only imposed by our current defence posture. Think for a moment that these processes could be integrated into a managed readiness system. Imagine the benefits in terms of reducing transaction costs and providing Command-centricity. From the outset, a Task Force would be developed, generated and employed as one sub-entity.

Authority & Accountability

As with efficiency and effectiveness, which really cannot be dissociated one from the other, authority is the opposite face of accountability on the responsibly managed Canadian dollar. Authority has always been a hallmark of military hierarchies, to the point it is even satirical: Everybody assumes that if a higher ranking Officer issues an order or expresses some desire, that the military chain of command will enforce that authority; after all, it really is the law!?! However, as with the law within modern democracies, it is always curbed just a little more. Simply put, without the means to enforce lawful authority, authority only sounds really nice. That is where accountability comes in. Accountability usually rests with the authority holder. It must be enforced by higher hierarchical levels than where authority and accountability are. Accountability has a lot to do with quantitative measures and accounting, primarily because of the market's predominance, which imposes both financial and fiscal measures of performance. The less known face of accountability is the qualitative indicators that point out for example to overall mission success against its objectives, or to unit climate and morale against other units. Accountability is also largely dependant on systematic and cultural conditions, whereas clear authority is largely dependant on structural and legal conditions. Hence, giving authority is the easy face of the deal but it is void of any real practical sense if not reinforced by accountability.

Ideally, accountability would be supported by well-elaborated corporate performance measures that would allow key indicators to drill down to the smallest organisational groupings and pull crucial information to enlighten defence strategic management decisions. This would not only benefit continuous improvement, but also inform better resource allocation decisions, based on factual quantitative and qualitative evidence. Clearly, there are cultural and systematic flaws to this simple argument, which one would assume, could be countered by enforcing authority... The paradox is that, without knowing where to enforce your authority, you might be feeding a dead horse or beating your best one, without ever understanding the impact of your authority. Hence, authority without accountability is simply like having command without any control. The cultural and systematic problem with accountability is precisely that it provides control but that without it, you might be the cowboy on the horse, going nowhere you would like to. Without accountability, authority is a matter of collegial respect and of consensus bridging. On the other hand, accountability can also be seen as an important transaction cost in doing our business but the counter-argument is that without it, you simply have no measure of that.

Accountability does not have to be the full-fledged outcome of a quasi-investigative affair that takes place yearly; that is if we accept to change our defence strategic management paradigms. Namely, zero-based budgeting would be a rather expeditious way to turn the entire institution. Being a significant budgeting exercise, zero-based budgeting could take place on a three-year cycle in synchronization with the CF's integrated managed readiness system that would see the entire defence strategic management continuum covered, from development, to generation and employment. From the moment a Task Force is planned, a Commander would be assigned a mandate with a budget over the life span of the mission, overseeing his forces' management. Being an operational Commander, he would be enabled in his functions by the strategic-level Canadian Force Headquarters (CFHQ) while reporting directly to the Chief of Canadian Force. In closing tenure of command, reports and returns would become the key to accountability and would either make or break that Commander's career; all other postings could be consequential. All members of the task Force would be similarly held accountable for their respective spheres. Other existing measures, such as unit climate / 360° surveys could provide qualitative evidence. As such, the enabling function of efficiency towards effectiveness would literally be leveraged. Commanders would have the flexibility to assume command and risks, and shape their careers. Authority would have accountability based on transparency, as the enforcement power it lacks. In this context, our Commanders would finally be enabled to exercise true mission command.

Mission Command

The German Bundeswehr has been employing *Auftragstaktik* since its inception, as its most fundamental mission command doctrine, which became quite popular with American forces. The basic assumption is that subordinate commanders and subordinates, understanding their higher commanders intents, can better interpret, seize initiative and effectively implement the desired end-state, without further interference or input from the operational level commanders. The manoeuvre warfare doctrine upon which the USMC is organized as well as the nature of the operations it has traditionally been a part of, has caused it to place a premium on decentralized decision-making and the individual abilities of leaders at all levels. This is accomplished through the use of Commander's intent as the guiding principle for leaders. Commander's intent specifies the end-state the commander wants achieved and other key parameters he may lay out. This then allows the lowest possible tactical units to determine how they wish to execute their mission to fulfill this intent. As a result, a large degree of initiative and autonomy is expected of Marines, particularly the non-commissioned-officers, compared to many other military organizations. The Corps pushes authority and responsibility downward to a greater degree than other US services²⁸.

In the Canadian Force context, mission command although extensively discussed, is still largely a conceptual foundation that has yet to reach the status of doctrine, beyond that of a philosophy. In the tactical sense, mission command in the Canadian context is employed on a regular basis, especially in the field where commanders with more operational experience tap into knowledge. However, generally speaking, other styles of command still largely predominate and in certain aspects, even come in conflict with progressive social values. The simple point is that beyond personalities, mission command is very much still a philosophy within the Canadian Force. Mission command however could prove a great way for leaders to change from transactional to transformational styles of leadership. Indeed, mission command should not be the exclusive approach of a few good men. Mission command should literally become the foundation for every business being conducted within the institution of Defence, both Department and Force. In headquarters, our project managers should be trusted to do just that, given the authority and accountability to deliver on their mandate or mission, along with the resources and timeframes. This approach would be more consistent with assuming the risks inherent to mission command, but would also prove a better way of seizing senses of initiative, engagement and achievement. Mission command, is crucial to leverage emergent doctrine, like distributed operations namely.

In fact, mission command is not so much about tactics or operations, as it is about knowledge. Sociologically, the Canadian Force must leverage the competencies, abilities and potential of each and every member in order to achieve greater strategic impact. Mission command vibes with Canada's modern societal values and although the Canadian Force might wish to see itself as guardian of Canada's values, it ought to be the reflection of its values in protecting Canadians. Demographic profiles also indicate an alarming trend for a Force that wishes to expand its ranks, in an epoch where the Canadian youth is offered almost literally, all the opportunity of the world. To put it simply, keeping old authoritative and transactional styles of leadership as hallmark of our Canadian Force will not resolve the societal disconnect between Canadians and their Force. New transformational styles of leadership must be adopted as a crucial sociological evolution within the Canadian Force, reflective of Canada's evolution. Mission command is the closest thing to managing our 'knowledge warriors' the same way they expect to be in any Company. Also, leveraging knowledge and seizing the initiative will be two key determinants of the fourth generation warfare applied against unrestricted antagonists. In transformation, mission command can enable both, while allowing Commanders the flexibility to revert to more traditional styles of leadership based upon the situation at hand. As such, mission command must become more than merely stated philosophy and evolve into becoming the foundation for all our defence business. However, there remain structural and systematic barriers to such *perspectives d'avant-garde*.

Integrated Structure

Through a complete overhaul of our forces structures, which should be closely aligned to our *e*-Capabilities, all *e*-Soldiers need to be employed how, where, when and for what they have most impact; on operations. Indeed, operations are our *raison d'être* and integrated enabling activities need to be no more than that; enabling. Our force structure must flow seamlessly, from our force generation to force employment and deployment. As we know them today, our 'Regiments' have become institutional barriers to our CF transformation. Fundamentally, this is a question of good leadership. And good leaders must learn to become better managers. Expressing clear vision is one thing. Actually having the wherewithal and guts to implement it is another²⁹. Our current forces structure reinforces the three-dimensional box that has become ours in transformation: Personnel and Force Generation are distinct from Force Development and the Force Enablers, and Force Employment is the new kid on the block with its own further force structure needs. Conceptually, if all the parts of a capability together are greater than themselves, and if there is so much money and time that can be devoted to any part or an entire capability, then the optimal posture for our Force is one where integration primes in order to deliver on our promised effects. Simply put, in order to achieve greater strategic impact, an integrated CF structure becomes key.

The current disintegrated posture of our Force is a disfavour to those in uniform and Canadians. As our Army has been telling everyone that it has One Army, One Vision, so too should the CF. In a very pragmatic sense, behind the vision and the strategy, is quite simply our Force structure. The restriction imposed by painting the military positions, places or people boxes, in all colors, hampers our Commanders' flexibility and implicitly limits the capacity of our system to adapt. Why should most or any position be tagged to say, an infantry officer, in defence headquarters? Aren't all Officers leaders, managers and staff officers? Can we afford such micro-specialties? Why does the position need to impose restrictions at the outset, limiting potential candidates? Why does a position absolutely need to be filled by a full-time regular force infantry soldier? Does the Canadian Force mean that all its CF members are not first and foremost *e*-Soldiers? Having force structure positions painted in all colors hampers People, with many other color competencies to fill positions as our Task Forces Commanders would much rather have them. With $\pm 10,000$ military manning overhead or 15% of our effective, these people are employed without positions; this brings the legitimate question as to why they aren't assigned positions? In fact, the real flexibility is with the personnel generation system and not with Commanders.

Hence, to achieve a fully integrated force structure, our whole forces' structure needs adapting. A new force structure paradigm would see all positions designated by rank and career field, and only the critical competencies would be listed against positions in order to find better matches. The CF personnel generation system would be tasked to produce 130% of the total requirement, ensuring all competencies are covered either by Regular Force, Reserve Force or Public Service. In fact, positions could only be designated as requiring a full-time or a part-time qualified person. The 100% would have to be effective, employable people, produced by CF personnel generation. Commanders would receive 100% of the salary envelope required to fill 100% of their positions, and would 'purchase' a minimum of 80% of people from the regular force personnel generation. Commanders would be directed by strategic policy to fill up to 80% of these positions by regular force members only to ensure sufficient regeneration of CF critical capabilities and competencies. The remaining 20% of their positional requirement, Commanders could fill at leisure with funds, 'purchasing' other regular force, reserve force, public service or contractors, within our 'market'. Force structure would no longer be a limiting factor to 'Total Force' integration within our Force. Reserve force entities would be affiliated regular force ones and share resources and knowledge. We would dispose of more relevant operational entities unlike the 'Regiments' we know today. It would become a matter of leadership based on sound human resource plans and management. This approach would further allow the design of force structures along capabilities-based plans.


Strategic Management

Consider the current posture of National Defence Headquarters, known as our Box; our Rubik®. The matter of fact is that the existence of the so-called operational level Commands and Groups serves to multiply the number of staff functions and positions required for self-sustaining these. Take any crucial defence task or activity; for example our personnel policies and management; Environmental Chiefs of Staff each have their own integral directorates complete with directors and staff; so too do the Assistant Deputy-Ministers. And so too do each of the new Commands that were stood-up just recently, albeit smaller. Now imagine you are trying to enforce changes and need all reserve force management policies to be seamless across all these internal entities. At the junction of each of these entities will arise the need for coordination, meetings etc. With each there will also be a need to secure buy-in, and therefore, adapt your policies ever so slightly. In the end, the final result, measured by its real strategic impact, is likely to be seriously diluted. And the road getting there will have been chaotic, resource and energy intensive, to little avail. In order to achieve the promised effect, the only strategic end-state must be that of integration. Even if it must be recognised that integration will not be a panacea or a proverbial silver bullet, simply saving on the high transaction costs related to defence management would be significant.

A single integrated Canadian Force Headquarters (CFHQ) would have for strategic purpose to translate Government policy and money into tangible and intangible CF operational capabilities. Hence, each of the crucial functions of a NATO standard headquarters would be found in CFHQ. With the designation as Chief of Force, each of these functions would be the unique functional point of entry and coordination on matters pertaining to their respective spheres of responsibility. They would not be a strategic joint staff per se, which only adds another so-called staffing level. Chiefs of Force 1 to 9 would be strategically responsible and accountable directly to the Chief of the CF not the Chief of defence staff; their core business would be that of strategic management. For example: Chief of Force 1 – Personnel; Chief of Force 2 – Intelligence & Security; Chief of Force 3 – Operations; Chief of Force 4 – Material & Logistics; Chief of Force 5 – Program & Infrastructure, Chief of Force 6 – Information Management & Systems, Chief of Force 7 – Force Development, Research & Development, Chief of Force 8 – Management & Finances; and Chief of Force 9 – Policy & Liaison. They would conduct their strategic management business in lieu of our current stovepipe posture that only leads to the disintegration of the CF's strategic impact:

Canadian Force Headquarters (CFHQ)


Core business: Strategic Management



The CF3 for example, building on the existing Strategic Joint Staff, would coordinate on behalf of the CCF, all CF operations: naval, land, air, special, continental and expeditionary operations:

Chief of Force 3- Integrated Operations


Core business: Manage Operations



At the operational / regional level, Joint Task Force Headquarters would manage CF operations; naval, land, air, special, continental, expeditionary and even support or humanitarian operations. Mirroring at a smaller scale the key functions of the CFHQ, CF JTF-HQs would have for main purpose to conduct operations, coordinating thereby all aspects of operational formations / units. Thereby, there would be no more need for so-called operational level headquarters, from areas to fleets, brigades and wings, and these could be offset in favour of augmenting our real force ratio:

Joint Task Forces Headquarters (JTFs)

Core business: Conduct Operations



Synergised Impact

Lessons learned from transformation initiatives from other defence, public and private sector organisations reiterate the importance of changing culture to ensure the lasting effects of most transformations. Culture consists of the knowledge, values, beliefs, customs and laws shared by members of an organization. Beyond integrating structure, strategic management and systems, the key importance of integrating culture to ensure transformation buy-in cannot be overstated. Today, the essence is not that of unifying the constituent forces into a single unified entity, but rather to seize the positive impacts of a strategically centralised efficient corporate management coupled with an operationally and tactically decentralised effective military force management. Or in other words, to integrate the constituent forces in one strategically smart Canadian Force and to capitalise on the greater synergy and higher strategic impact of this fully leveraged force. This can only be achieved once the defence posture has been fundamentally realigned to better face the challenges presented by fourth generation warfare and its unrestricted antagonists, and once the political, economical, sociological, technological and operational imperatives are met. This might include going as far as changing Canada's legislative framework around our Force. With an integrated structure, integrated strategic management, integrated systems and culture, synergised impact would be transformation's outcome; the sum of forces being much greater.

Synergy, from the Greek *synergos*, meaning working together, refers to a phenomenon in which two or more discrete influences or agents acting together create an effect greater than the sum of the effects each is able to create independently. The challenge with achieving synergy is that it is unquantifiable and depends on emergent behaviour, whereas whole systems cannot be predicted by the behaviour of their parts taken separately. Simply put, synergy is somewhat of a black box. Most mathematical modelling problems are often classified into black box or white box models, according to how much a priori information is available of the system. A black-box model is a system of which there is no a priori information available. A white-box model is a system where all necessary information is available. In black-box models, scientists try to estimate both the functional form of relations between variables and the numerical parameters in those functions. An often used approach for black-box models are neural networks which usually do not assume almost anything about the incoming data, akin to the human brain which we do not understand. The problem with using large sets of functions to describe a system is that estimating parameters becomes increasingly difficult when the amount of parameters and types of functions increases. That is to say although synergy is ideal, there is no clear way getting there, except via intuition. Hence, as warfare is half an art half a science, much like modern management, the most highly regarded military leaders of all times can be qualified as its artisans; half artists, half scientists. Often times, synergy was achieved out of their positive and holistic influence on a 'network' of integrated strategy, structure, systems and culture that leveraged all organisational capabilities. Integration therefore, is not only a rational way for the future but an intuitive positive feeling, fostered by a higher sense of impact and consequently, by higher chances of overall success.

Systemic operational design, as an alternative to effects-based operations, proposes just such a model where in lieu of so-called scientific calculations of causes, consequences, targets, effects, a more holistic and systematic, even neural or black box approach is taken to leverage synergies. With the effects-based approach, western military forces are attempting to cause effects outside the realm of the physical by trying to bring effects about in the realm of human hearts and minds. If we accept that humans do not understand the human mind, spirit or heart, how can this be true? Synergy is intangible as is knowledge, courage and many other military qualities essential in war and no algorithm has so far come close to replacing these intangibles with artificial intelligence. War is fundamentally a collective human venture. Thus, teaming-up is of strategic importance. Although synergy cannot be explained, as human hearts and minds, the importance of putting positive spins and integrating the organisational capabilities to achieve more impact is crucial.

Articulating Integration

In opposition to the Forces, Force “denotes an integrated capability package able to accomplish assigned Defence tasks normally made up of more than one environmental capability element³⁰”. As such, not only is integration necessary because of the operational imperative to streamline the current coordination-intensive CF posture, to make it more effective, relevant and responsive. CF integration, as transformation end-state, is necessary because of our earthly imposed conditions. In this perspective, even if the CF had all the money and time it could hope for, it would still be insufficient to meet its ideal vision of an integrated, world-class, full-spectrum, Canadian Force. “Strategy is fundamentally a choice. It reflects a preference for a future state or condition³¹”. In this vein, the CDS Annual Report for fiscal year 2003-2004 was rightly titled: “Making choices”. It stated that: “Making choices, to strengthen the CF and prepare for the future is the next step on the path to transformation. I encourage all CF personnel to embrace the changes and the choices required for transformation so we can act with unity and purpose. Together, we will strengthen the CF, making it an even more relevant, credible and effective armed force for the future³²”.

As we still deliberate on implementing jointness at the tactical level within the Canadian Force, and as we debate the need for jointness at both our operational and corporate - strategic levels, discussions have emerged on defence integration between the Department and Canadian Force. Although I advocate strongly for integration in this paper, which will inevitably be realized by the Canadian Forces becoming one Force, likely leveraging the benefits of *e*-technologies, one could further argue that the fundamental need is really for fusing the Canadian Force into one. History however will teach us the challenges faced by the Canadian Forces unification of 1967. Back then, the geo-strategic environment was such there was no real external pressure to do so, and actually fusion the Canadian Force; Canada could still afford many Forces as basic entities. Today however, this geo-strategic environment has significantly changed and there clearly are fundamental strategic imperatives naturally pushing the Canadian Force towards its integration. Namely, the challenges that are and will be facing the Canadian Force within fourth generation warfare, by such unrestricted antagonists that will use every opportunity that exists for their end, poses a real strategic challenge to both the sovereignty and security of Canada and of Canadians. While we still ponder the impact of the three-dimensional block-war and of the three dimensions of diplomacy, development and defence, our antagonists have taken the fight into a new domain. In the absence of Canadian Force integration, unrestricted antagonists will find more opportunity. And beyond this very insidious and pernicious threat, there also exist other strategic imperatives.

“The urgency is all the more acute in light of the operational challenges facing Canada’s military today in a troubling and unstable world. Some Canadians may not admit it, but our country is at War. We face an insidious terrorist enemy not bound by moral restraint or geographical limits. For the first time in almost two hundred years our own territory could become a battleground³³”. In fact, Canada is already a theatre for unrestricted antagonists in this fourth generation warfare. Politically, this makes it all the more urgent the imperative to dispose of a credible and effective Canadian Force, which has more strategic impact as well as leverage than the sum of its forces. Economically, strategic efficiency is crucial in order to best affect finite defence resources as to achieve the optimal operational effectiveness in developing, generating and employing the Force. Sociologically, the Canadian Force must leverage each and every member’s knowledge in order to achieve a more strategic impact, fostering a culture closer to its ethos, thinking as of one Corps. Technologically, a seamless integrated network of systems is the way forward in leveraging the opportunities offered by advances in emerging technologies, but this is more about our thinking. Operationally, adopting an integrated managed readiness system is likely the only way to adapt to our strategic environment which requires integrated force packages from the conception and development, to force generation and employment, in a synchronized and highly synergised way. All converge naturally towards the strategic imperative to integrate Canadian Forces as 1^e-Force.

Conclusion

The Chief of the Defence Staff outlined his six key principles at the outset of CF transformation: Canadian Forces identity (focus and culture), operations primacy, command centrality, authority, mission command, and integrated structure. However, in launching the horses of transformation, all were interpreted in light of different cultures, with primacy of different operations, with their respective commanders pulling for centrality, enforced by authority, with mission command as philosophy and integrated structure as an ideal; in other words, the wild horses were unleashed. The emerging transformation challenge is that of herding our wild horses and harnessing them together, training them as one team and getting them to pull together in one strategic direction. There will always be need for specialised military knowledge related to environments, or types of operations, but beyond transformation, integration recognises strategic knowledge as central. Greater strategic impact will be achieved through structural, systematic and cultural integration. Indeed, fourth generation warfare doesn't require more tactical and/or operational effectiveness, and it's sadly not about military capabilities per se. It's really about our overall strategic impact. Indeed, in order to confront unrestricted antagonists, achieving strategic impact is quintessential. Our Force has not become accustomed to 'strategic thought' while managing military operations; by focusing so much on our trees, new sapling or dead wood, we lost sight of the strategic forest.

"Canada's military has a proud tradition of responding to crises while fulfilling the fundamental government role of ensuring our national sovereignty. The international missions now being undertaken call for a new concept, with different force structures, different equipment and different operational requirements. The new international role means Canada's military and its defence policy need to transform and adapt to a new operational environment. At home, the Government needs a strong Canadian Force to provide emergency response for such disasters as floods, storms, earthquakes or the threat of terrorism. For this reason, Canada's government will implement its 'Canada First' defence plan to strengthen Canada's independent capacity to defend our national sovereignty and security. Budget 2006 will increase the National Defence budget to, namely: Proceed with the transformation of military operations and defence administration³⁴". Consider life as a journey, not a destination and transformation is but a few years of that journey. Hence, Defence strategic managers better have a pretty good idea of where that end ought to be, and short-term management is unlikely to solve our long-term strategic management challenges. Thus, Canadian Force integration is our strategic imperative and CF transformation's end-state. Consider what the RCMP 'a Canadian Force of 23,000' is doing in terms of integration (Anx A). As such, we proposed in this paper that fundamental integration, as defined by the emergence of 1^e-Force, would be a good metric against which to measure the success of our CF transformation. The strategic imperative for integration is a multidimensional convergence of imperatives found in the Canadian political, economical, sociological, technological and operational environments.

The fundamental question is: What is in the best National interest of Canada and of Canadians? Canadians expect nothing less than a credible effective Force with highly efficient management. The former has been the hallmark of the CF while the latter has been its strategic Achilles' heel. Beyond the conduct of operations, achieving greater strategic impact is crucial to transformation, but it underlines our Defence strategic paradox: The equilibrium of efficiency and effectiveness. While Government is more concerned with its credibility, the Department is more interested in efficiency and optimal use of finite resources, while the Force is concerned with its effectiveness. It is crucial that we view 1^e-Force integration as: strategic efficiency → operational effectiveness. Money, time and will are no longer barriers to progress; our last frontier literally is management! We must no longer refer to the Canadian Forces as many but talk of the Canadian Force as One. The most fundamental strategic imperative of all is simply Canada's sovereignty and security!!! In conclusion, the challenge is not so much about the vision. It's now about its implementation. Strategically, this is precisely where the Defence challenge is: Integrating defence in 1^e- Force.


Annex A – Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) - Integration³⁵

Integrated Policing

Integrated policing continues as the defining philosophy for everything we do as part of our Strategic Framework. It means collaborating with our partners at all levels toward common purposes, shared values and priorities. This globalization of public safety and security is characterized by:

- **Shared strategic priorities** – devoting our resources to achieving common goals, with our actions based on the highest standards of transparency and accountability;
- **The free flow of intelligence** – at all levels, and within and between organizations and partners;
- **Interoperable systems** – enabling ‘real-time’ communications across organizations, borders and nations;
- **Seamless service delivery** – eliminating fragmentation and duplication; and,
- **Leveraging economies of scale** – maximizing our individual and collective efforts.

Our Integrated Border Enforcement Teams – or IBETs – are an excellent model of working effectively with our partners, domestically and internationally. With IBETs, we have achieved true integration: free-flowing intelligence; interoperable systems; seamless service delivery; economies of scale; and, shared strategic priorities.



Five key challenges remain to achieving integration. These include:

- Developing an over-arching framework to focus international integration efforts;
- Addressing the lack of interoperability among police organizations;
- Ramping up our human, technological and infrastructure-related resources to match current and future needs;
- Challenging the culture of our law enforcement and intelligence institutions which may hinder information sharing; and,
- Building public confidence and understanding in what we do.

The RCMP has over 23,000 employees, including regular and civilian members and public service employees, located in Headquarters, 4 Regions, 14 Divisions and 750+ Detachments.

Annex B – Key Definitions

Force Certification: The process by which a Force Employment authority evaluates and formally recognizes an integrated force's ability to meet certain predetermined standards (adapted from the Termium definition). Force certification results in confirmation that an integrated force is capable of accomplishing the tasks for which it was generated. This process would see a Force declared operationally ready for its assigned mission, and in the case of a Mission specific task force (MSTF), assumes that some theatre mission specific training (TMST) has been done. Force certification is generally the responsibility of the Force employer or the Task Force Commander.

Force Development: A system of integrated and interdependent processes spanning concept development, research and development, experimentation and doctrine development that identifies necessary changes to existing capability and articulates new capability and structure requirements for the Canadian Force, driven by actual or projected changes in the security environment and/or lessons learned from operations. The system involves prioritizing capability requirements, fully developing competitive capability delivery options as per the PRICIE model (Personnel, Resources, Infrastructure, Concepts and doctrine, Information systems, Equipment) and recommending an optimal mix of capabilities for generation to meet force employment needs. It does not include authority for resource allocation or business planning activities associated with generation of the selected capabilities.

Force Employment: The process of exercising command and control of forces tasked to carry out operations in accordance with defence policy and strategic direction. It includes the strategic, operational or tactical use of forces to perform the missions or functions for which they are organized or designed. In some circumstances force employment and capability generation may occur simultaneously. Force employment / deployment will generally follow force certification.

Force Generation: The process by which military resources are assembled, trained, certified, deployed and recovered to meet a force employment requirement (adaptation from A-GL-397-000/JX-001). Force generation brings forces, or capability components of those forces, to a state of readiness for employment, by assembling, and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. This includes the training and equipping of capability elements, integration of those capabilities into integrated forces, certification of those forces, and provision of their means of sustainment and regeneration to meet all current and potential threats. Force generation culminates with the certification of a force as operationally ready for employment. Account must be taken of the need to cater for concurrent operations and timely recuperation. Where applicable it would also embrace the mobilization, regeneration and reconstitution necessary to meet a major conflict, such as general war, and long-term development of capability to meet changing circumstances (Strategic capabilities plan glossary). Personnel generation activities such as: Recruiting, basic military qualification, individual education and training etc... are subsets of Force Generation.

Force Integration: The process of bringing environmental capability elements together into a single force package, to a state of readiness for employment (adapted from Force generation – Strategic capabilities plan glossary). This process normally precedes Force certification.

Integrated: A greater level of operational integration than “joint” and able to carry out many missions at any one time. Integrated could as well refer to corporate-strategic level integration.



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